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;GAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS 


OF 


WOMEN  IN  IOWA 


AN- HISTORICAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  RIGHTS 
OF  WOMEN  IN  iCWA  FROM  1838  TO  1918 


RUTH  A  GALLAHER 


SUBMITTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  COLKECi   OF  THE 
STATE  UNIVERSITY  OF  IOWA  IN  PARTIAL  F  1ENT 

OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE  DEGKi  F 
DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


IOWA  CITY  IOWA 
1918 


EXCHANGE 


THE  LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL 
STATUS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA 


LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS 

OF 

WOMEN  IN  IOWA 


AN  HISTORICAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  BIGHTS 
OF   WOMEN   IN   IOWA   FROM    1838    TO    1918 


BY 
RUTPT  A.  GALLAHER 


SUBMITTED   TO    THE    FACULTY    OF    THE    GRADUATE    COLLEGE    OF   THE    STATE 

UNIVERSITY    OF    IOWA    IN    PARTIAL    FULFILLMENT    OF    THE 

REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR 

OF    PHILOSOPHY 


PUBLISHED  AT  IOWA  CITY  IOWA  IN   1918 


G- 
V 


EDITOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

IT  is  apparent  that  the  spirit  of  democracy  which 
brooded  over  the  enfranchisement  of  men  without 
regard  to  rank,  religion,  or  property  has  inspired 
the  movement  for  equality  of  legal  and  political 
status  without  regard  to  sex.  The  history  of  the 
legal  and  political  status  of  women  in  Iowa  from 
1838  to  1918  is  typical  of  the  development  of  the 
movement  in  the  United  States. 

BENJ.  P.  SHAMBAUGH 

OFFICE  OF  THE  SUPERINTENDENT  AND  EDITOR 

THE  STATE  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  IOWA 

IOWA  CITY  IOWA 


395061 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

IN  the  preparation  of  this  monograph  the  writer  has 
attempted  to  present  a  general  survey  of  the  status  of 
women  in  Iowa  by  pointing  out  the  distinctions  between 
men  and  women  which  have  been  established  by  law  or 
sanctioned  by  judicial  rulings.  The  status  of  women 
with  reference  to  activities  which  are  not  regulated  either! 
directly  or  indirectly  by  the  government  is  outside  the  )• 
scope  of  this  monograph  and  is  not  discussed  in  these 
pages.  Thus  the  position  of  women  in  religious  and 
other  similar  organizations  has  not  been  considered  since 
this  does  not  concern  their  status  as  citizens. 

Furthermore,  all  laws  of  a  general  nature  applying 
equally  to  men  and  women  have  received  only  incidental 
mention,  although  such  laws  are  often  of  vital  importance 
to  women.  In  this  class  belong  the  laws  concerning 
public  utilities,  protection  of  life  and  property,  public 
health,  and  municipal  administration.  Unless  otherwise 
specified  or  plainly  inapplicable  to  both  sexes,  Iowa 
statute  laws  governing  civil  rights  and  obligations  may 
be  assumed  to  apply  equally  to  men  and  women.  Laws 
concerning  political  matters,  on  the  contrary,  refer  to 
male  citizens  only  unless  women  are  specifically  included. 

vii 


viii  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

In  some  cases  it  has  seemed  advisable  to  include  a 
brief  discussion  of  certain  aspects  of  the  status  of 
women  which  show  little  or  no  legal  discrimination 
against  women.  Thus  the  admission  of  women  to  the 
public  schools,  to  institutions  of  higher  education,  and 
to  the  professions  has  been  discussed,  although  the  Iowa 
laws  show  but  little  difference  between  men  and  women 
in  such  matters.  There  are  two  reasons  for  including 
these  subjects :  first,  because  such  privileges  are  largely 
furnished  at  the  expense  of  the  State;  and  secondly,  be- 
cause the  equality  which  has  prevailed  in  Iowa  is  by  no 
means  general  throughout  the  United  States  and  ought 
not  to  be  taken  for  granted.  Teaching  has  been  included 
for  the  same  reasons,  and  also  because  the  teacher  in 
State  supported  schools  is  in  one  sense  a  public  official. 

In  this  study  of  the  various  aspects  of  the  status  of 
women  in  Iowa  it  has  been  necessary  to  consult  such 
sources  as  the  session  laws  of  Iowa,  the  codes  of  Iowa 
law,  and  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  reports.  These  pages, 
however,  are  in  no  sense  intended  as  a  contribution  to 
law  and  jurisprudence :  the  effort  of  the  writer  has  been 
rather  to  ascertain  the  principles  which  have  governed 
the  status  of  women  in  Iowa  and  to  describe  the  situation 
in  non-technical  language.  And  in  this  connection  it  may 
be  well  to  explain  that  since  this  monograph  is  limited 
for  the  most  part  to  the  discussion  of  the  legal  and  polit- 
ical status  of  women  in  Iowa,  references  to  court  reports, 
House  and  Senate  journals,  and  other  public  documents 
refer  to  Iowa  unless  otherwise  stated. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  ix 

A  history  of  the  status  of  women  in  Iowa  divides 
itself  naturally  into  two  parts:  the  political  position  of 
women,  and  their  status  in  civil  affairs.  Logically,  the 
former  should  be  discussed  first,  since  it  is  theoretically 
the  source  and  guarantee  of  all  other  rights;  but  his- 
torically the  advance  of  women  in  civil  affairs  takes 
precedence.  Consequently,  it  has  seemed  advisable  to 
study  first  the  position  of  women  under  the  Common 
Law  and  the  gradual  evolution  of  her  personal,  educa- 
tional, and  property  rights.  Along  with  these  successive 
advances  has  come  an  almost  negligible  increase  in  the 
actual  participation  of  women  in  public  administration. 
At  the  same  time  women  have  exerted  a  very  powerful 
indirect  influence  in  public  affairs  which  has,  to  some 
extent,  made  further  progress  possible. 

It  has  not  been  the  intention  of  the  writer  to  portray 
the  men  and  women  of  Iowa  as  hostile  classes.  The  line 
of  cleavage  between  the  advocates  and  opponents  of 
measures  concerning  the  status  of  women  has  usually 
separated  progressives  from  conservatives  —  groups  in 
which  both  men  and  women  are  to  be  found.  Further- 
more, there  is  no  evidence  that  injustice  to  women  has 
been  desired  by  the  electorate,  although  the  voters  have 
usually  looked  upon  proposed  changes  with  distrust. 

In  many  respects  Iowa  is  fairly  typical  of  the  north- 
ern States  in  its  treatment  of  women.  Though  less  pro- 
gressive than  the 'western  Commonwealths,  it  has  been 
more  progressive  than  many  of  the  eastern  States;  and 
it  is  far  in  advance  of  the  South,  which  still  adheres  to 
most  of  the  Common  Law  rules  concerning  the  position 
of  women  —  more  especially  married  women. 


x  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

Throughout  the  preparation  of  the  monograph,  the 
writer  has  been  greatly  indebted  to  Dr.  Benj.  F. 
Shambaugh,  under  whose  direction  the  work  was  car- 
ried on,  for  advice  and  encouragement  and  for  the  final 
editing  of  the  manuscript.  Helpful  suggestions  and 
advice  were  also  received  from  Dr.  Frank  E.  Horack, 
Dr.  Dan  E.  Clark,  and  Professor  E.  A.  Wilcox.  Mr. 
V.  Diamonon  assisted  in  the  verification  of  the  manu- 
script. 

RUTH  A.  GALLAHEK 

THE  STATE  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  IOWA 
IOWA  CITY  IOWA 


CONTENTS 

EDITOR'S  INTRODUCTION     ....  v 

AUTHOR'S  PREFACE vii 

Part  I:    Civil  Rights 

I.     INTRODUCTION:  THE  COMMON  LAW   .         .  3 

II.     EARLY  STATUS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA    .        .  14 

III.  PERSONAL  BIGHTS  OF  WOMEN    ...  23 

IV.  WOMEN  IN  EDUCATION      ....  39 
V.     WOMEN  IN  THE  PROFESSIONS      ...  45 

VI.    WOMEN  AND  THE  CRIMINAL  LAW      .        .  53 

VII.     MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE      ....  64 

VIII.     GUARDIANSHIP  OF  CHILDREN      ...  82 

IX.     PROPERTY  EIGHTS  OF  WOMEN    ...  86 

X.     WOMEN  IN  INDUSTRY         ....  144 

XI.     RECAPITULATION  OF  LEGAL  STATUS    .        .  152 

Part  II:   Political  Rights 

XII.     EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES    .  159 

XIII.  EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  — 1838-1865    .  172 

XIV.  EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  — 1865-1890  176 


xii  CONTENTS 

XV.     EQUAL  SUFFKAGE  IN  IOWA  — 1890-1918  .  200 

XVI.     WOMEN  IN  APPOINTIVE  OFFICES  IN  IOWA  .  222 

XVII.     WOMEN  IN  ELECTIVE  OFFICES  IN  IOWA  .  228 

XVIII.     EECAPITULATION  OF  POLITICAL  STATUS  .  238 

NOTES  AND  REFEBENCES      ;        .        .  .  243 

INDEX  279 


PAET  I 
CIVIL  EIGHTS  OP  WOMEN  IN  IOWA 


INTRODUCTION:   THE  COMMON  LAW 

THE  Common  Law  of  England  became  to  a  large  extent 
the  fundamental  law  of  the  English-speaking  American 
colonists ;  and  with  certain  modifications  and  adaptations 
to  American  conditions,  it  has  been  incorporated  into  the 
jurisprudence  of  practically  all  the  States  which  have 
been  organized  since  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution. Little  by  little  much  of  the  Common  Law 
discriminating  between  men  and  women  has  been  super- 
seded by  statute  law,  until  now,  especially  in  Common- 
wealths like  Iowa,  only  in  rare  cases  is  the  Common  Law 
resorted  to  in  judicial  decisions. 

Since  the  Common  Law  has  been  in  force  in  Iowa,  and 
is  still  followed  in  cases  not  covered  by  statute  law,  it  will 
be  worth  while  to  examine  briefly  such  of  its  principles  as 
dealt  with  the  legal  status  of  women.  Indeed,  such  a 
study  will  constitute  an  historical  background  for  the 
discussion  of  the  status  of  women  in  Iowa.  Here  only 
the  provisions  of  the  Common  Law  which  distinguished 
between  men  and  women  in  the  matter  of  legal  rights  and 
privileges  will  be  discussed,  although  women  were  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  affected  by  the  administration  of  the 
general  law. 

The  most  striking  feature  of  the  Common  Law  in 
respect  to  women  was  the  distinction  between  those  who 
were  married  and  those  who  were  single.  An  unmarried 
woman  was,  in  most  respects,  legally  entitled  to  nearly 
all  the  civil  rights  and  privileges  accorded  to  men:  at 


'  • 

4        LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  same  time,  because  of  her  subordinate  position  in  the 
family  and  because  she  lacked  the  physical  force  to  assert 
her  rights  she  did  not  actually  enjoy  many  of  the  advan- 
tages the  law  gave  her.  Among  these  were  the  right  to 
own  property,  the  right  to  make  valid  contracts,  the 
right  to  act  as  administrator,  and  the  right  to  assume 
other  financial  obligations  on  practically  the  same  terms 
as  men.  Political  rights,  except  for  the  Queen,  were  un- 
dreamed of  by  women  in  an  age  when  force  was  the 
undisputed  foundation  of  political  power. 

The  position  of  a  married  woman,  or  feme  covert  as 
she  was  legally  termed,  was  very  different  in  law  from 
that  of  a  single  woman.  A  girl  might  make  a  valid  mar- 
riage contract  at  the  age  of  twelve,  although,  by  an  early 
statute,  a  clergyman  who  performed  the  ceremony  might 
be  fined  if  the  bride  was  under  sixteen  and  did  not  have 
the  consent  of  her  father  or  guardian.  In  case  the  girl 
was  wealthy,  the  husband  could  be  deprived  of  her  prop- 
erty if  the  consent  of  the  father  or  guardian  was  lacking.1 

By  entering  into  a  marriage  contract  a  woman  lost 
her  legal  personality  for  the  period  of  the  marriage,  or 
during  her  coverture  as  the  wife's  condition  was  called. 
Her  husband  became  her  baron  or  lord  and  she  ceased  to 
have  a  separate  existence  before  the  law  except  under 
certain  conditions.  For  this  reason  a  husband  could 
make  no  contract  with  the  wife  nor  could  he  give  her 
property,  since  the  Common  Law  recognized  but  one 
person  —  the  husband.  Thus,  since  a  person  can  not 
make  a  contract  with  himself,  receive  a  gift  from  him- 
self, or  give  anything  to  himself,  all  transactions  of  the 
kind  mentioned  between  the  husband  and  wife  were  in- 
valid.2 


THE  COMMON  LAW  5 

Furthermore,  the  Common  Law  deprived  the  wife  of 
the  control  of  her  real  property  and  she  lost  even  the  title 
to  all  personal  property  in  her  possession,  even  though  it 
had  been  acquired  before  the  marriage,  which  was  de- 
clared to  be  "an  absolute  gift  to  the  husband  of  the 
goods,  chattels  and  personal  estate  of  which  the  wife  was 
actually  or  beneficially  possessed  at  the  time  of  the  mar- 
riage, and  of  all  such  as  shall  come  to  her  during  cov- 
erture/'3 

An  exception  to  this  rule  was  made  in  the  law  con- 
cerning the  rights  of  the  Queen,  since  she  was  under  no 
such  disability  as  to  property  rights  or  the  right  to  make 
contracts.  The  King's  wife  could  sue  and  be  sued  alone, 
might  receive  a  grant  from  her  husband,  and  was  in  gen- 
eral treated  as  a  feme  sole.  This  was  explained  as  an 
attempt  to  relieve  the  King  of  the  care  of  his  wife's 
property  since  he  had  the  care  of  the  state.  Another 
exception  was  also  found  in  London  where  custom  per- 
mitted a  married  woman  to  carry  on  trade  and  made  her 
responsible  for  her  debts.4 

For  the  most  part,  however,  the  husband  was  given 
at  least  control  of  his  wife's  property  and  she  was  en- 
tirely disqualified  from  making  any  arrangements  con- 
cerning it.  In  prescribing  the  terms  of  the  husband's 
rights  to  the  wife's  property,  the  Common  Law  estab- 
lished three  general  classes  with  slight  variations  for 
each.  These  may  be  designated  as  real  estate,  choses  in 
action,  and  personal  property  in  the  immediate  posses- 
sion of  the  owner. 

The  wife's  real  estate  did  not  become  the  husband's 
while  the  wife  lived,  although  there  were  so  few  restric- 
tions on  his  control  over  it  that  it  was  his  in  fact  until 


6        LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

his  death  if  there  were  children  or  until  the  wife 's  death 
if  there  were  none  and  he  could  sell  or  lease  his  interest 
in  the  property  without  the  wife 's  consent.  The  right  of 
the  husband  to  the  wife's  property  after  her  death,  if  he 
survived  her,  was  generally  called  a  title  by  curtesy  and 
began  as  soon  as  a  child  was  born  alive.  Before  this,  in 
feudal  times,  the  husband  and  wife  were  both  to  do 
homage  for  the  wife's  lands;  but  after  the  birth  of  a 
child  the  husband,  as  the  guardian  of  the  heir,  could  do 
homage  for  it  alone.  Some  peculiar  exceptions  to  this 
rule  are  to  be  found  in  the  early  Common  Law  treatises. 
For  example,  a  husband  had  no  title  by  curtesy  in  the 
real  estate  of  his  wife  if  she  were  an  idiot,  for  then  she 
was  under  the  guardianship  of  the  King.  Furthermore, 
the  child  must  be  capable  of  inheriting  the  mother's 
estate,  for,  if  only  a  male  heir  was  entitled  to  it,  the  birth 
of  a  daughter  conveyed  no  right  to  the  husband.5 

A  second  class  of  property  was  that  in  the  immediate 
possession  of  the  wife  at  the  time  of  the  marriage  — 
such  as  clothing,  jewelry,  and  house  furnishings.  These 
became  the  husband's  absolutely  and  could  be  sold,  taken 
for  the  husband's  debts,  or  destroyed  by  him  without  the 
wife's  consent.  The  wife's  clothing  and  jewelry,  desig- 
nated as  her  "  paraphernalia ",  could  not,  however,  be 
willed  away  from  her,  and  she  secured  possession  of  them 
at  the  death  of  the  husband  provided  he  had  not  sold  or 
given  them  away  while  he  was  alive  or  his  creditors  did 
not  take  them  for  his  debts  if  he  became  insolvent.6 

Another  kind  of  property  was  usually  designated  as 
choses  in  action.  This  consisted  of  notes,  bank  stock,  or 
other  chattels  not  in  the  immediate  possession  of  the 
owner.  The  husband  was  entitled  to  the  absolute  owner- 


THE  COMMON  LAW  7 

ship  of  these  by  Common  Law,  if  he  reduced  them  to 
possession  during  the  marriage.  If  he  required  the  aid 
of  the  courts  of  equity  in  securing  possession  of  such 
property,  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  make  a  reasonable 
provision  for  the  wife ;  otherwise  she  had  no  right  to  it  or 
to  the  profits  from  it.  Even  this  exception  was  barred  if 
the  wife  was  found  guilty  of  adultery.  The  wife's  per- 
sonal property  was  subject  to  the  husband's  debts  and 
was  forfeited  by  his  crimes.7 

A  married  woman  could  not  dispose  of  her  personal 
property  either  by  sale  or  will  without  the  consent  of  the 
husband,  although  the  latter  right  might  be  secured  by 
an  antenuptial  agreement.  She  could  not  act  as  an  ad- 
ministrator without  her  husband's  concurrence;  nor 
could  she  make  a  contract,  although  she  could  bind  her 
husband  for  necessaries  —  a  power  which  was  lost  if  the 
wife  left  the  husband  without  cause.  It  is  evident  that 
this  rule  was  not  interpreted  in  favor  of  the  wife,  for  it 
was  once  decided  that  the  wife  was  not  justified  in  leav- 
ing her  husband's  home  even  when  he  introduced  an 
immoral  woman  into  it.8 

A  wife  could  purchase  an  estate,  however,  without  the 
consent  of  her  husband,  provided  he  did  not  definitely 
forbid  it ;  but  after  the  husband 's  death  either  the  widow 
or  —  if  she  were  dead  —  her  heirs  might  avoid  the  con- 
tract unless  it  had  been  reaffirmed  after  she  had  become 
a  widow.  "But  the  conveyance  or  other  contract  of  a 
feme-covert",  declares  Blackstone,  "(except  by  some 
matter  of  record)  is  absolutely  void,  and  not  merely  void- 
able ' '.  In  this  respect  a  wife  was  at  a  greater  disadvan- 
tage than  a  minor,  who  merely  had  an  opportunity  to 
avoid  his  contracts  upon  coming  of  age.  At  the  death  of 


8        LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  wife,  the  husband  had  the  exclusive  right  to  act  as 
administrator  of  her  estate.9 

In  addition  to  the  control  over  the  wife's  property, 
the  husband  was  entitled  to  her  company  and  services. 
He  could  collect  her  wages  just  as  he  could  those  of  a 
minor  child,  and  persuading  or  even  assisting  a  wife  to 
leave  her  husband  was  punishable  by  fine  and  imprison- 
ment. The  woman's  consent  made  no  difference  in  the 
guilt  of  her  abductor  or  protector,  since  she  had  no  legal 
power  to  consent.  Indeed,  in  ancient  times  it  was  un- 
lawful for  a  man  to  take  another  man 's  wife  to  his  home 
even  though  she  needed  care  and  protection.  He  might, 
however,  take  her  to  the  market,  to  the  justice  court,  or 
to  the  spiritual  court  to  sue  for  a  divorce.10 

Moreover,  the  husband  was  entitled  to  collect  the  dam- 
ages for  injuries  to  the  wife  whether  malicious  or  acci- 
dental. In  all  cases  involving  acts  preceding  the  marriage 
the  wife  was  joined  with  the  husband,  and  it  was  also 
necessary  that  she  be  joined  with  him  if  the  suit  was  for 
damages  to  her  person  or  character  when  the  occasion 
arose  after  the  marriage.  The  husband  might  include 
the  wife  in  suits  arising  after  marriage  if  they  were  con- 
cerned with  property  or  contract  rights  but  suits  for 
damages  because  of  medical  expenses  or  loss  of  services 
could  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the  husband  only.  In 
any  case  the  damages  belonged  to  him  and  the  wife  had 
no  claim  upon  them  unless  he  died  before  the  suit  was 
decided  or  the  judgment  paid.  If  the  wife  was  included 
in  the  suit  and  the  husband  died  before  the  decision  was 
rendered,  she  might  continue  the  proceedings,  but  if  not, 
the  suit  was  dropped.  In  case  the  husband  died  after  the 
decision  of  the  case  but  before  the  payment  of  the  sum 


THE  COMMON  LAW  9 

awarded,  it  went  to  the  widow  if  she  was  a  party  to  the 
suit,  but  to  the  husband 's  administrator  if  he  sued  alone. 
If  the  injury  produced  instant  death,  however,  the  hus- 
band could  not  recover  damages  for  his  right  to  her  soci- 
ety ended  at  her  death;  nor  could  the  husband  recover 
for  the  wife's  injuries  if  she  died  before  the  case  was 
decided.  This  claim  was  not  reciprocal  and  the  wife 
could  not  recover  damages  for  any  injuries  to  her  hus- 
band; for  if  he  lived,  he  was  expected  to  prosecute  the 
suit  and  if  he  died  her  interest  ended  at  his  death.11 

On  the  other  hand  the  husband  assumed  certain  re- 
sponsibilities at  the  time  of  the  marriage.  He  was  re- 
quired to  support  his  wife  and  children  in  a  manner 
consistent  with  his  position  in  life;  and  he  assumed  the 
wife's  debts  incurred  before  marriage.  No  such  respon- 
sibility rested  upon  the  wife  since  she  legally  ceased  to 
exist  at  the  time  of  the  marriage  and  her  property  passed 
into  her  husband's  possession.  As  a  result  she  was  held 
responsible  for  nothing  except  obedience  to  her  husband 
and  for  certain  crimes.  The  husband  could  not  escape 
his  obligation  to  provide  for  his  wife  even  by  issuing  a 
public  statement  that  he  would  refuse  to  pay  bills  con- 
tracted by  her;  but  this  advantage  the  wife  lost  if  she  left 
her  husband  without  cause,  and  in  practice  this  rule  com- 
pelled her  to  submit  to  almost  any  form  of  cruelty,  for 
the  courts  seldom  admitted  that  her  plea  was  sufficient 
justification.12 

The  husband  was  likewise  responsible  for  the  torts 
committed  by  the  wife  either  before  or  after  marriage  so 
long  as  both  were  alive ;  but  a  person  injured  by  the  wife 
could  not  recover  from  the  husband  after  the  wife's 
death.  If  the  husband  died  before  judgment  was  ren- 


10      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

dered,  the  wife  again  became  responsible  for  her  acts 
and  could  be  sued  as  if  she  had  not  been  married.13 

Even  criminal  misconduct  on  the  part  of  the  wife  was 
usually  excused  on  the  theory  that  subjection  to  her  hus- 
band made  her  merely  his  agent  and  consequently  if  he 
were  present  when  the  crime  was  committed  and  influ- 
enced her  to  commit  it,  the  woman  was  not  punished  al- 
though the  husband  was  held  liable  if  he  participated  in 
the  act.  The  law  presumed  that  the  wife  was  coerced  and 
did  not  act  voluntarily  unless  it  was  proven  otherwise. 
Some  crimes,  however,  were  not  included  in  this  im- 
munity. For  example,  a  married  woman  who  killed  or 
attempted  to  kill  the  King  was  guilty  of  treason,  even 
though  her  husband  ordered  her  to  commit  the  deed,  for 
her  allegiance  to  the  King  was  superior  to  the  duty  she 
owed  her  husband.  The  husband  was  indeed  the  '  *  baron ' ' 
and  the  wife  his  subordinate,  but  his  right  ceased  when 
he  became  false  to  his  sovereign.  Moreover,  it  was  petit 
treason  for  a  wife  to  kill  her  husband  even  when  they 
were  living  apart  under  a  limited  divorce.  For  crimes 
of  this  degree  women,  if  convicted,  were  sentenced  to  be 
burned  alive.  Murder  and  manslaughter  committed  by  a 
woman  even  in  the  presence  of  the  husband  were  felonies 
and  the  guilty  person  could  be  punished  in  spite  of  the 
theory  that  the  wife  was  not  responsible  for  acts  commit- 
ted in  the  company  of  her  husband.14 

Coincident  with  this  theory  of  the  wife's  lack  of  cul- 
pability, was  the  laissez  faire  principle  of  the  Common 
Law  concerning  domestic  affairs  which,  in  practice,  gave 
to  the  husband  the  right  to  control  and  punish  his  wife 
much  as  he  could  his  children.  He  could  keep  her  at 
home  against  her  will,  refuse  to  permit  even  her  relatives 


THE  COMMON  LAW  11 

to  visit  her,  and  it  was  sometimes  asserted  that  he  could 
legally  chastise  her  providing  he  did  not  use  a  stick 
larger  around  than  his  thumb.15 

Neither  husband  nor  wife  could,  under  Common  Law 
rules,  be  a  witness  for  or  against  the  other;  nor  could 
they  sue  each  other  except  for  divorce.  A  man,  however, 
could  bring  suit  against  a  woman  for  breach  of  promise 
just  as  she  could  against  him  if  he  failed  to  fulfil  his 
contract.16 

Although  a  woman  could  not  make  a  legal  marriage 
contract  until  she  reached  the  age  of  twelve,  a  statute  of 
Elizabeth  fixed  the  age  of  consent  at  ten.  In  this  connec- 
tion it  will  be  of  interest  to  recall  that  the  consent  of  a 
married  woman,  no  matter  what  her  age,  was  of  no  con- 
sequence so  far  as  the  punishment  of  her  seducer  was 
concerned,  while  that  of  a  ten  year  old  girl  barred  prose- 
cution. Rape  was  a  felony  without  benefit  of  clergy. 
The  forcible  abduction  and  marriage  or  violation  of  an 
heiress,  whether  maid,  widow,  or  wife,  was  also  a  felony 

—  but  only  in  case  the  woman  had  money  and  in  this  case 
the  wife  was  permitted  to  testify  against  her  husband.17 

A  further  right  —  and  one  of  the  dearest  to  a  woman 

—  was  denied  to  a  wife  by  the  Common  Law.    She  had 
no  right  to  the  custody  of  her  own  children,  for  the  fa- 
ther was  the  sole  guardian  during  his  life  and  could 
appoint  a  guardian  by  will  to  the  exclusion  of  the  moth- 
er's claim.     The  parental  authority,  except  in  unusual 
cases,  rested  entirely  in  the  father  even  when  a  divorce 
had  been  granted  to  the  wife  —  it  being  said  that  "a 
mother,  as  such,  is  entitled  to  no  power,  but  only  to  rev- 
erence and  respect".18 

At  the  death  of  the  husband,  the  wife,  if  she  survived 


12      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

him,  received  one-third  of  his  real  estate  for  life.  This 
might  include  property  purchased  with  money  received 
from  the  wife.  She  was  also  entitled  to  remain  forty 
days  in  her  husband's  house.  This  dower  right,  as  it  was 
called,  might  be  alienated  in  three  ways :  if  she  accepted  a 
bequest  by  will  or  a  payment  in  lieu  of  dower ;  in  case  of 
divorce ;  or  by  an  antenuptial  agreement.  She  could  not, 
however,  contract  concerning  dower  after  marriage.19 

Divorces  during  this  early  period  in  England  could 
be  granted  only  by  act  of  Parliament  or  by  the  Ecclesi- 
astical Courts.  The  divorce  by  Parliament  was  said  to 
be  a  vinculo  matrimonii  and  was  an  absolute  divorce. 
Divorces  by  the  courts  were  of  two  kinds.  The  first  was 
really  an  annulment  of  the  marriage  since  it  could  be 
granted  only  for  causes  which  were  impediments  to  a 
legal  marriage,  such  as  consanguinity,  and  in  such  cases 
the  children  were  considered  illegitimate.  The  second, 
called  a  divorce  a  mensa  et  thoro,  was  a  partial  divorce 
and  could  be  granted  chiefly  for  adultery.  The  wife,  if 
she  obtained  the  divorce,  might  be  allowed  alimony,  if 
she  herself  had  not  committed  adultery.20  Since  the  hus- 
band always  had  the  right  to  the  children  and  absolute 
control  over  the  property  of  both,  the  wife  had  not  an 
equal  chance  in  divorce  proceedings,  although  the  law 
permitted  her  to  sue  on  theoretically  equal  terms. 

Such,  in  brief,  were  the  principles  of  the  Common 
Law  which  most  affected  women  as  distinguished  from 
men.  Unjust  as  many  of  them  appear  it  is  probable  that 
the  idea  of  protesting  against  them  seldom  occurred  to 
the  women  of  that  day.  Many  of  them  lived  happy  and 
contented  lives,  raised  large  families,  and  accepted  their 
subordination  as  both  natural  and  just.  Marriage  and 


THE  COMMON  LAW  13 

the  monastic  life  offered  the  only  careers  open  to  women 
and  as  a  result  girls  married  early,  passing  directly  from 
the  father's  jurisdiction  to  that  of  the  husband. 

In  spite  of  the  common  belief  that  women  were  in- 
capable of  acting  independently  it  appears  that  single 
women  might  act  for  themselves  and  married  women 
occasionally  took  charge  of  their  husbands'  affairs  with 
courage  and  ability  during  their  absence.  This  they 
were  justified  in  doing  by  the  Common  Law  principle 
that  a  wife  in  such  event  was  the  agent  of  the  husband. 

A  number  of  causes  probably  contributed  to  the  the- 
ory of  the  unity  of  husband  and  wife  in  the  person  of  the 
husband.  Wife  purchase  had  been  in  vogue  in  early 
times  and  this  combined  with  the  attitude  of  the  early 
church  toward  women  tended  to  subordinate  the  wife. 
Furthermore,  women  had  been  at  a  disadvantage  in  a 
society  where  force,  too  often,  took  precedence  over  the 
court  in  deciding  disputes. 

It  must  also  be  conceded  that  the  men  of  this  period 
were  not  conscious  that  the  laws  were  unjust  to  women, 
for  it  was  believed  that  the  disabilities  of  married  women 
were  a  protection  and  benefit  rather  than  a  hardship. 
Indeed,  Blackstone's  comment  on  the  status  of  women 
was  concluded  with  the  following  words:  "so  great  a 
favourite  is  the  female  sex  of  the  laws  of  England.  "21 

This  Common  Law  which  denied  a  married  woman 
practically  all  rights  in  property  and  even  the  legal  right 
to  her  children  became  the  foundation  for  colonial  juris- 
prudence, and  with  its  American  adaptations  was  later 
introduced  into  Iowa.  The  story  of  its  promulgation  in 
this  State  and  its  gradual  elimination  by  the  substitution 
of  statute  law  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapters. 


II 

EAELY  STATUS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA 

THE  territory  now  included  in  the  State  of  Iowa  came 
into  the  possession  of  the  United  States  as  a  part  of  the 
Louisiana  Purchase.  Before  its  transfer  to  this  country, 
Louisiana  had  been  under  the  jurisdiction  of  both  France 
and  Spain,  and  the  Civil  Law  was  in  force  in  the  white 
settlements.  Since  white  men,  however,  were  rare  and 
white  women  almost  unknown  in  the  northern  part  of  the 
province,  the  political  and  legal  status  of  women  under 
the  Civil  Law  does  not  materially  concern  the  history  of 
their  rights  in  the  Iowa  country. 

On  the  26th  of  March,  1804,  Congress  provided  for  the 
government  of  the  new  purchase  by  dividing  it  into  two 
parts :  the  Territory  of  Orleans,  south  of  the  thirty-third 
degree  of  north  latitude,  and  the  District  of  Louisiana, 
north  of  that  line.  The  Governor  and  Judges  of  the  Ter- 
ritory of  Indiana  were  given  jurisdiction  over  the  district 
of  Louisiana;  but  since  the  Iowa  country  remained  un- 
inhabited by  white  people  for  another  quarter  of  a  cen- 
tury, no  considerable  amount  of  legislation  was  needed  or 
provided.  The  act  creating  the  two  political  subdivisions 
of  Louisiana  provided  that  the  "inhabitants  of  each  dis- 
trict, between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five,  shall  be 
formed  into  a  militia  ",22  It  was  not  the  intention  of 
Congress,  however,  to  include  women  in  the  militia:  in- 
deed, as  a  rule  early  laws  disregarded  women  in  matters 
concerning  the  administration  of  government,  and  the 

14 


EARLY  STATUS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA  15 

words  ""person",  "inhabitants",  and  "people"  are  used 
without  qualifying  adjectives  when  only  men  are  in- 
tended. 

A  year  after  this  first  act  Congress  organized  the  Ter- 
ritory of  Louisiana  in  place  of  the  District  of  Louisiana, 
and  on  June  4,  1812,  the  Territory  of  Louisiana  was  re- 
organized as  the  Territory  of  Missouri.  The  act  cre- 
ating this  new  Territory  provided  for  one  representative 
in  the  Territorial  legislature  for  every  five  hundred 
' '  free  white  male  inhabitants ' ',  and  t '  all  free  white  male 
citizens  of  the  United  States"  who  possessed  certain 
other  qualifications  could  vote,  although  the  members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  were  to  be  elected  by  the 
"people  of  the  said  territory".23  The  use  of  the  qualify- 
ing adjectives  "free  white  male"  suggests,  however,  not 
that  white  women  were  expected  to  claim  the  right  to 
vote,  but  that  slaves  or  free  blacks  were  to  be  denied  the 
franchise.  The  same  qualifications  were  prescribed  for 
office-holding  and  for  jury  service  —  probably  for  the 
same  reason. 

This  act  also  provided  that  the  people  of  the  Terri- 
tory of  Missouri  should  be  entitled  to  judicial  proceedings 
according  to  "the  common  law  and  the  laws  and  usages 
in  force  in  the  said  territory" —  a  provision  that  was  re- 
stated more  specifically  in  an  act  passed  by  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  Territory  of  Missouri  on  January  19, 
1816,  which  read,  in  part,  as  follows : 

The  common  law  of  England,  which  is  of  a  general  nature, 
and  all  statutes  made  by  the  British  parliament  in  aid  of  or  to 
supply  the  defects  of  the  said  common  law,  made  prior  to  the 
fourth  year  of  James  the  first,  and  of  a  general  nature  .  .  *  . 
which  said  common  law  and  statutes  are  not  contrary  to  the  laws 


16      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

of  this  territory,  and  not  repugnant  to,  nor  inconsistent  with  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  shall  be  the  rule  of 
decisions  in  this  territory,  until  altered  or  repealed  by  the  legis- 
lature.24 

Laws  concerning  domestic  relations  and  property 
rights  in  Iowa  were  thus  based  on  the  Common  Law,  since 
the  Iowa  country  was  then  a  part  of  the  Territory  of 
Missouri,  but  the  judges  in  this  State  have  a  more  de- 
cisive authority  for  their  decisions  than  this  act,  as  a 
study  of  later  Iowa  history  will  show. 

When  Missouri  was  admitted  as  a  State  in  1821  the 
Iowa  country  was  not  included  in  any  political  subdivi- 
sion: it  remained  in  a  state  of  political  orphanage  until 
1834  when  it  was  made  a  part  of  the  newly  organized  Ter- 
ritory of  Michigan.  The  Ordinance  of  1787  had  been 
extended  over  this  Territory  and  thus  Iowa  fell  heir  to 
the  provisions  of  that  famous  organic  act.  The  Ordi- 
nance of  1787  guaranteed  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  North- 
west Territory  all  judicial  proceedings  ' '  according  to  the 
course  of  the  common  law",  and  consequently  the  set- 
tlers who  had  crossed  the  Mississippi  Eiver  were  likewise 
placed  under  the  Common  Law.25 

Although  the  extension  of  the  Common  Law  over  the 
Iowa  country  was  considered  an  advantage  by  the  set- 
tlers, who  were  chiefly  of  Anglo-Saxon  origin,  its  effect 
on  the  position  of  women  —  especially  married  women  — 
was  by  no  means  entirely  beneficial.  Mr.  Emlin  McClain 
makes  the  following  comment  on  the  relative  status  of 
women  under  the  Civil  Law  and  the  Common  Law : 

As  an  illustration  of  the  higher  civilization  embodied  in  the 
Civil  Law  as  compared  with  the  Common  Law,  there  would  be 
general  unanimity,  I  think,  in  referring  to  the  condition  of  mar- 


EAKLY  STATUS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA  17 

ried  women  under  the  two  systems.  I  say  emphatically,  married 
women,  for  though  it  is  often  assumed  that  by  reason  of  her  sex, 
woman  as  such  is  by  the  Common  Law  degraded  and  wronged, 
yet  the  fact  is  that  the  Common  Law  has  always  recognized  the 
perfect  equality  in  property  rights,  in  power  to  make  contracts, 
in  the  vindication  of  her  liberties,  and  the  protection  of  her  prop- 
erty between  the  unmarried  woman  and  the  man.  The  unmar- 
ried woman,  under  the  institutions  of  England,  which  are  still 
largely  prevalent  in  the  United  States,  is  not  entitled  to  the  elec- 
tive franchise,  nor  to  hold  public  office,  but  those  are  mere  polit- 
ical privileges  having  no  relations  to  her  civil  rights.  It  was  only 
as  an  incident  of  marriage  that  by  the  Common  Law,  the  woman 
lost  her  power  to  own  or  control  property,  to  make  contracts,  or 
to  bring  suits  in  the  courts.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
with  these  disadvantages,  she  had  a  total  exemption  from  liabil- 
ity under  her  contracts,  and  was  in  many  ways  granted  immunity 
from  the  burdens  of  legal  relations.  As  contrasted,  however, 
with  this  inequality  in  the  condition  of  the  married  woman  under 
the  Common  Law  it  is  usual  to  refer  to  the  doctrines  of  the  Civil 
Law  as  illustrating  a  higher  appreciation  of  her  intelligence  and 
legal  capabilities.  By  that  system  in  its  present  form,  she  may 
own  property  independently  of  her  husband,  she  may  make  con- 
tracts, and  indeed,  she  is  in  most  respects  in  the  same  legal  posi- 
tion as  a  woman  unmarried.  But  this  situation  is  not  due  to  any 
inherent  principles  of  the  Civil  Law,  indicating  a  higher  rever- 
ence and  respect  for  the  married  woman.  By  the  earlier  Civil 
Law,  she  became  absolutely  the  property  of  her  husband,  and 
everything  she  had  became  his  in  his  complete  individual  right. 
She  passed  under  her  husband 's  hand  by  marriage,  as  completely 
as  a  chattel  passed  under  his  hand,  when  he  made  a  purchase  of 
it  and  paid  the  price.  Indeed,  the  original  theory  of  the  Civil 
Law  with  reference  to  the  entire  domestic  relations  was  that  the 
head  of  the  family  had  over  all  its  members,  including  his  wife, 
his  sons,  whether  of  age  or  not,  and  their  families,  the  most 


18      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

absolute  and  despotic  power,  a  power  extending  to  the  control  of 
the  entire  family  property,  and  the  personal  supervision  of  every 
member.26 

The  Ordinance  of  1787  also  made  provision  for  the 
descent  of  property  of  intestates,  i  '  saving  in  all  cases,  to 
the  widow  of  the  intestate,  her  third  part  of  the  real 
estate  for  life,  and  one-third  part  of  the  personal  estate  ". 
Estates  might  "be  devised,  or  bequeathed  by  wills  in 
writing,  signed  and  sealed  by  him  or  her,  in  whom  the 
estate  may  be,  (being  of  full  age)."27  The  right  of 
curtesy,  however,  is  not  mentioned. 

In  this  connection  it  would  not  be  practicable  to 
undertake  a  detailed  study  of  the  laws  of  Michigan  which 
affected  the  status  of  women  either  directly  or  indirectly. 
There  was  no  feminist  movement  in  those  pioneer  days 
and  there  was  very  little  discussion  of  either  the  legal  or 
political  status  of  women.  A  few  statutes,  however,  may 
be  cited  as  of  interest.  Girls  between  the  ages  of  four- 
teen and  eighteen  and  boys  between  the  ages  of  eighteen 
and  twenty-one  could  contract  legal  marriages  if  the  con- 
sent of  the  " parent "  or  guardian  was  secured;  but  the 
marriage  of  a  girl  under  fourteen  or  a  boy  under  eighteen 
was  prohibited  —  which  was  a  great  improvement  over 
the  ages  of  twelve  and  fourteen  fixed  by  the  Common 
Law.28  Divorces  were  to  be  granted  by  the  supreme  or 
circuit  courts  for  impotency,  adultery,  extreme  cruelty, 
or  wilful  desertion  for  three  years.  In  case  of  adultery 
by  the  wife,  the  husband  was  to  have  her  personal  estate 
forever  and  her  real  estate  during  his  life  if  there  were 
children  and  during  her  life  if  there  were  no  children. 
The  court  might  allow  her  subsistence  out  of  her  prop- 
erty if  it  desired  to  do  so.  In  case  the  husband  were 


EARLY  STATUS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA  19 

guilty  of  adultery,  the  wife  was  allowed  her  own  prop- 
erty and  such  alimony  as  the  court  might  allow,  but  not 
exceeding  one-half  of  the  husband's  income  during  the 
life  of  the  wife.  If  there  were  children,  the  court  might 
alter  these  rules.29 

It  appears  that  one  of  the  earliest  subjects  of  legisla- 
tion among  these  pioneer  law-makers  was  the  question  of 
providing  for  the  support  of  illegitimate  children  — 
chiefly  because  they  frequently  became  a  burden  on  the 
community.  Accordingly,  in  1827  an  act  was  passed  by 
the  Michigan  legislature  to  enable  the  mother  of  such 
child  to  compel  the  father  to  contribute  to  its  support. 
The  woman  might  not  testify  in  a  case  of  this  kind,  how- 
ever, if  disqualified  in  other  cases.  About  a  year  later 
this  law  was  extended  to  Indian  mothers  in  certain  coun- 
ties. If  the  mother  of  an  illegitimate  child  should  by 
neglect  or  severity  cause  the  death  of  such  child,  she  was 
to  be  punished  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  three  hundred 
dollars,  or  imprisonment  at  hard  labor  not  more  than 
two  years,  or  by  both  fine  and  imprisonment.  The  age  of 
consent  was  ten  years ;  and  the  punishment  for  rape  com- 
mitted by  one  over  fourteen  years  was  a  fine  not  exceed- 
ing $1000,  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  twenty  years, 
or  both  fine  and  imprisonment.30 

In  respect  to  property,  unmarried  women  were  ap- 
parently upon  the  same  basis  as  men  —  at  least  no  men- 
tion is  made  of  any  distinction.  A  married  woman's 
property,  however,  passed  largely  under  the  control  of 
her  husband,  although  she  retained  the  title.  Further- 
more the  law  provided  that  "when  a  man  and  his  wife 
shall  be  seized  of  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments,  in 
her  right  and  fee,  and  issue  shall  be  born  alive  of  her 


20      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

body  that  may  inherit,  or  might  have  inherited  the  same, 
and  such  wife  shall  die,  the  husband  shall  have  and  hold 
such  estate  during  his  natural  life,  as  tenant  by  the  cour- 
tesy."31 If  a  widow,  acting  as  one  of  the  executors  of 
her  husband's  estate,  should  remarry,  her 'husband  was 
given  no  share  in  the  responsibility,  but  her  marriage 
automatically  extinguished  her  right  to  act  and  the  other 
executors  might  act  without  her  as  if  she  had  died.  If  a 
single  woman  began  a  suit  and  married  before  its  com- 
pletion, her  husband  upon  proof  of  the  marriage  might 
prosecute  or  defend  the  suit  as  if  it  were  his  own.32 

A  wife,  however,  had  a  certain  claim  on  the  real  prop- 
erty of  the  husband,  although  this  claim  was  inchoate 
during  his  life.  If  he  sold  the  property  she  still  retained 
her  dower  right  in  it  unless  she  joined  with  him  in  the 
transfer  and  declared,  when  examined  alone  by  the  officer 
before  whom  the  transaction  was  made,  that  her  act  was 
not  due  to  her  husband's  will  or  compulsion.  If  she  did 
not  give  her  consent  to  the  sale  in  accordance  with  this 
provision,  upon  her  husband's  death,  her  claim  to  dower 
in  the  property  became  a  legal  right  and  could  be  en- 
forced against  it,  no  matter  who  owned  it  at  the  time. 
The  widow  received  one-third  of  the  real  estate  for  life 
and  one-third  of  the  personal  property  of  the  husband 
"forever",  if  there  were  children  and  one-half  if  there 
were  none.33 

In  case  it  was  impracticable  to  divide  the  shares  of 
the  children,  one  of  them  might  take  the  whole  amount 
and  pay  the  others  their  share,  but  in  this  respect  prefer- 
ence was  to  be  given  to  sons,  especially  the  eldest  son. 
If  a  child  died  before  it  reached  the  age  of  twenty-one, 
the  other  children  inherited  its  share,  and  if  over  twenty- 


EARLY  STATUS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA  21 

one  and  unmarried  at  the  time  of  death  the  mother  and 
other  children  inherited  its  share  at  the  death  of  the 
father.  If  a  man  left  little  or  no  surplus  above  his  debts 
his  wife  was  given  the  right  to  her  apparel  and  such 
other  allowance  as  the  court  might  provide.34 

On  April  20,  1836,  Congress  made  the  Iowa  country  a 
part  of  the  newly  organized  Territory  of  Wisconsin. 
The  organic  act  repeated  the  provision  that  only  free 
white  male  citizens  could  vote :  indeed,  no  change  in  the 
political  status  of  women  can  be  discerned  in  this  act.35 

Although  there  was  not  much  legislation  concerning 
the  position  of  women  during  the  two  years  that  Iowa 
was  a  part  of  Wisconsin,  some  of  the  acts  of  the  legisla- 
ture are  interesting.  Thus,  it  appears  that  divorces  were 
granted  by  the  legislature  and  that  the  early  lawmakers 
were  not  unfair  to  women  petitioners,  or  else  wives  had 
more  cause  for  desiring  divorces  than  husbands,  for  the 
majority  of  the  acts  granting  divorces  were  for  the  bene- 
fit of  women  petitioners.  For  example,  on  January  15, 
1838,  Martha  Newton  was  granted  a  divorce  from  John 
0.  Newton,  the  status  of  "femme  sole"  and  entire  control 
of  their  child;  and  on  the  same  day,  Lucinda  Jones  was 
divorced  from  Abraham  Jones,  both  of  Burlington,  Iowa. 
All  property  in  the  possession  of  the  wife  was  to  belong 
to  her  and  she  was  given  the  custody  of  the  children.36 
Indeed,  in  many  respects  women  fared  better  in  the  mat- 
ter of  divorces  at  the  hands  of  the  legislators  than  they 
did  in  the  courts,  for  the  legislature  paid  little  attention 
to  the  Common  Law,  while  the  judges  relied  very  largely 
upon  it  in  determining  cases  involving  domestic  affairs. 

Married  women  belonged  to  their  husband's  families 
rather  than  their  own  so  far  as  legal  responsibilities  were 


22      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

concerned,  and  in  the  law  fixing  the  responsibility  of  re- 
latives for  poor  persons  the  provision  is  added  that 
"married  females,  whilst  their  husbands  live  shall  not 
be  liable  to  a  suit."37 

Like  all  the  northwestern  or  north  central  States,  the 
Territory  of  Wisconsin  made  no  discrimination  against 
girls  and  women  in  the  matter  of  education.  A  law 
passed  on  December  8, 1836,  provided  that  the  Wisconsin 
University  was  to  be  founded  at  Belmont,  Iowa  County, 
for  the  purpose  of  "educating  youth"  and  the  Dubuque 
Seminary,  Philandrian  College  at  Denmark,  and  the 
seminaries  at  Mineral  Point,  Depere,  Fort  Madison,  West 
Point,  Cassville,  Mount  Pleasant,  Farmington,  Augusta, 
and  in  Des  Moines  County,  were  planned  for  both  sexes. 
The  Davenport  Manual  Labor  College,  however,  was  to 
promote  the  i '  general  interests  of  education,  and  to  qual- 
ify young  men  to  engage  in  the  several  employments 
and  professions  of  society".38 

The  permanent  effect  of  these  laws  of  Michigan  and 
Wisconsin  in  the  newly  created  Territory  of  Iowa  is, 
however,  a  matter  of  dispute.  An  Iowa  law  passed  July 
30,  1840,  repealed  the  laws  of  Michigan  and  Wisconsin 
and  declared  that  the  statutes  of  Great  Britain  should 
not  be  in  force  in  the  Territory  of  Iowa.  This  was  later 
interpreted  to  mean  only  the  laws  passed  after  1707.39 


Ill 

PERSONAL  EIGHTS  OF  WOMEN 

ANY  person  living  in  an  organized  society  is  largely 
dependent  for  his  happiness  and  welfare  upon  the  laws 
governing  his  right  to  property,  regulating  his  associa- 
tion with  other  persons,  and  fixing  his  relation  to  the 
government  under  which  he  lives.  Or,  in  other  words, 
a  person  may  have  personal,  property,  and  political 
rights  with  corresponding  obligations.  The  first  two 
groups  are  frequently  referred  to  as  civil  rights  as  dis- 
tinguished from  political  rights  and,  indeed,  in  many 
cases  are  so  closely  associated  as  to  be  indistinguishable. 

Theoretically  political  rights  are  fundamental  as  a 
means  of  securing  the  civil  rights  of  individuals,  but  in 
practice  a  participation  in  government  has  generally  fol- 
lowed the  acquisition  of  the  rights  of  property  and  those 
of  personal  liberty.  Thus  the  women  of  Iowa  have  passed 
from  the  restrictions  of  the  Common  Law  to  a  position  of 
virtual  equality  in  civil  affairs,  and  now,  with  a  hope  of 
almost  certain  success,  they  claim  the  right  to  participate 
in  the  management  of  the  government  under  which  they 
live. 

The  laws  most  directly  affecting  the  welfare  and  hap- 
piness of  women  are  those  which  concern  their  personal 
freedom  and  protection  and  those  governing  their  rela- 
tions with  other  persons.  Since  single  women,  even  under 
the  Common  Law,  were  accorded  practically  all  the  civil 
rights  which  were  recognized  as  belonging  to  men,  the 

23 


24      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

discussion  of  the  acquisition  of  these  rights  by  the  women 
of  Iowa  relates  largely  to  married  women.  The  different 
aspects  in  which  these  personal  rights  present  themselves 
will  be  considered  separately  for  the  sake  of  clearness, 
although,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  such  rights  as  guardian- 
ship of  children  and  divorce  are  closely  connected. 

Among  the  rights  classed  as  personal  as  distinguish- 
ed from  property  and  political  rights,  are  those  of  per- 
sonal protection,  legal  settlement,  testimony,  recovery 
for  personal  injuries,  and  the  guardianship  of  children. 

EIGHT  OF  RESIDENCE  OR  SETTLEMENT 

One  of  the  earliest  rights  secured  by  law  was  that  of 
a  legal  settlement  or  recognized  residence  in  a  certain 
community.  This  was  made  necessary  by  the  system  of 
poor  relief  administered  through  local  governments  and 
was  regulated  by  law  to  prevent  disputes  between  differ- 
ent localities  as  to  which  should  supply  relief  to  a  depend- 
ent who  moved  from  one  locality  to  another. 

The  early  lawmakers  and  judges  of  Iowa  recognized 
the  need  of  such  legislation  both  for  purposes  of  poor  re- 
lief and,  in  the  case  of  men,  for  voting.  Any  person  who 
lived  for  a  certain  period  of  time  in  any  one  place  ac- 
quired a  settlement  in  that  place,  and  if  he  became  desti- 
tute was  entitled  to  poor  relief.  If  a  person  became 
destitute  in  a  community  in  which  he  did  not  have  a 
settlement,  he  was  promptly  returned  to  his  place  of 
settlement.  The  frequent  provisions  in  the  early  Iowa 
laws  concerning  this  matter  are  not  important:  it  will 
only  be  necessary  to  indicate  the  provisions  which  applied 
unequally  to  men  and  women. 

A  single  woman  acquired  a  settlement  on  the  same 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  25 

terms  as  a  man;  but,  in  conformity  to  the  Common  Law 
idea,  a  married  woman's  settlement  followed  that  of  her 
husband.  If  he  had  none,  the  wife  retained  that  which 
she  had  at  the  time  of  her  marriage.  A  wife  abandoned 
by  her  husband  could  acquire  a  settlement  of  her  own  if 
she  had  received  authority  from  the  court  to  transact 
business  independently.  Legitimate  minor  children  had 
the  settlement  of  the  father;  illegitimate  children  that 
of  the  mother.40 

This  rule  has  remained  in  force  with  only  minor 
changes.  The  Code  of  1897  permits  a  married  woman 
whose  husband  has  abandoned  her  to  acquire  a  settle- 
ment as  if  unmarried  without  the  formality  of  a  court 
decision,  but  in  other  respects  the  requirement  as  to  a 
wife's  settlement  remains  practically  as  at  Common 
Law.41 

In  1908  the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  the  legal 
settlement  of  a  married  woman  follows  the  husband's  only 
when  the  family  relation  exists  at  the  time  he  acquires 
the  new  settlement,  and  a  wife  abandoned  by  her  husband, 
retains  the  settlement  she  had.  Again  in  1915  the  same 
court  ruled  that  if  a  wife  had  been  committed  to  a  hospi- 
tal for  the  insane  and  the  husband  moved  to  another 
place,  she  retained  her  settlement  in  the  county  from 
which  she  had  been  sent  so  long  as  public  restraint  con- 
tinued.42 

Closely  allied  with  this  ancient  right  of  settlement, 
which  had  to  do  largely  with  poor  relief,  is  the  right  to 
acquire  a  legal  residence.  This  right  has  become  more 
important  than  the  right  of  settlement  since  it  is  a  re- 
quirement in  voting  and  in  certain  judical  actions.  Here 
also,  an  unmarried  woman  or  a  widow  is  on  the  same 


26      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

footing  as  a  man — except  in  the  matter  of  voting — but  a 
married  woman  has  the  same  legal  residence  as  her  hus- 
band unless  she  has  left  him  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
a  divorce.  Even  in  this  event,  the  Supreme  Court  de- 
cided in  1899,  the  residence  of  the  husband  would  be  con- 
sidered that  of  the  wife  for  the  purpose  of  serving  her 
with  notice  of  an  action  when  it  appeared  that  she  left 
him  without  cause.43 

IN  THE  MATTEE  OF  NAME 

In  Iowa,  as  in  other  Anglo-Saxon  commonwealths, 
legislation  concerning  the  legal  names  of  individuals  is 
largely  based  upon  old  customs.  The  married  woman 
in  this  State  has  always,  as  a  matter  of  course,  taken  the 
surname  of  her  husband,  nor  can  she  change  it  after  mar- 
riage as  a  man  or  an  unmarried  woman  may,  by  applica- 
tion to  a  district  court.44  Indeed,  it  appears  that  the  pro- 
vision in  Iowa  concerning  a  woman's  name  is  similar  to 
that  of  the  United  States  concerning  her  citizenship:  if 
unmarried,  there  is  no  distinction  between  her  and  a  man ; 
if  married  she  takes  her  name  as  well  as  her  citizenship 
from  her  husband  and  he  may  change  either  without  her 
consent.  There  is,  however,  practically  no  opposition  to 
this  rule  concerning  a  married  woman's  name,45  although 
in  States  where  women  vote,  the  citizenship  rule  is  oc- 
casionally a  hardship  to  American  women  who  have  mar- 
ried aliens. 

IN  THE  MATTEE   OF   TESTIMONY 

Although  the  right  to  testify  before  a  court  is  not  as 
a  rule  personally  desired,  it  is  an  important  and  coveted 
civil  right  since  it  is  indispensable  in  the  protection  of 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  27 

other  rights.  Iowa  laws  have  not  discriminated  against 
women  in  this  respect,  although  the  provision  that  neither 
husband  nor  wife  could  be  a  witness  against  the  other 
"except  in  a  criminal  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed 
by  the  one  against  the  other "  is  probably  more  to  the 
advantage  of  the  husband  than  to  that  of  the  wife.  The 
Code  of  1851,  however,  provided  that  husband  and  wife 
might  be  witnesses  for  each  other — something  not  per- 
mitted by  the  Common  Law.46 

This  has  been  the  general  rule  of  Iowa  courts  since 
1851.  Indeed,  the  Supreme  Court  once  reversed  a  de- 
cision of  an  inferior  court  because  the  judge,  in  giving 
instructions  to  the  jury,  had  declared  that  the  testimony 
of  the  defendant's  wife  in  his  behalf  "should  be  received 
with  great  caution".47 

The  Revision  of  1860  contained  the  rather  ambiguous 
provision  that  the  husband  or  wife  "shall  in  no  case  be 
a  witness  for  or  against  the  other,  except  in  a  criminal 
proceeding  for  a  crime  committed  by  one  against  the  oth- 
er, or  in  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  one  against  the  other, 
but  they  may  in  all  criminal  prosecutions  be  witnesses 
for  each  other."  All  prohibitions  as  to  testimony,  how- 
ever, were  not  to  be  applicable  if  the  party  in  whose 
favor  they  operated  waived  the  rights  conferred.48 

Apparently  the  code  commissioners  intended  to  pro- 
hibit a  husband  or  wife  from  testifying  or  being  com- 
pelled to  testify  against  each  other,  but  the  section  was 
so  vague  that  it  required  judical  interpretation  and  the 
courts  disagreed  as  to  what  the  law  really  meant.  In  the 
case  of  Karney  v.  Paisley  it  was  held  that  a  wife  could 
not  testify  even  for  her  husband;  while  later  decisions 
declared  that  a  husband  or  wife  might  testify  for  the 


28      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

other  if  the  prohibition  was  waived  by  the  one  involved 
in  the  case.4"9 

This  inconsistency  was  not,  however,  corrected  in  the 
Code  of  1873  for  the  section  appears  in  almost  the  same 
words;  but  in  1874  the  General  Assembly  so  amended 
the  Code  as  to  make  it  clear  that  a  husband  or  wife  might 
testify  for  each  other  in  any  case,  but  could  not  appear  as 
a  witness  against  the  other  except  in  a  suit  brought  by  one 
against  the  other.50 

The  Code  of  1897  made  this  exception  more  definite. 
A  husband  or  wife  might  testify .  against  the  other  only 
in  a  trial  for  a  crime  committed  by  one  against  the  other, 
in  a  civil  suit  brought  by  one  against  the  other  or  by  one 
against  a  third  party  for  alienating  the  affections  of  the 
other.  This  provision  was  amended  in  1898  to  include 
' '  any  civil  action  brought  by  a  judgment  creditor  against 
either  the  husband  or  the  wife,  to  set  aside  a  conveyance 
of  property  from  one  to  the  other  on  the  ground  of  want 
of  consideration  or  fraud  ".51 

No  important  changes  in  the  law  have  been  made  since 
that  time,  but  the  question  arises  frequently  in  judicial 
decisions.52  From  one  of  these  it  appears  that  the  rule 
barring  a  husband  or  wife  from  testifying  against  the 
other  applies  to  crimes  committed  before  marriage  as 
well  as  afterwards.53  Another  case  presented  an  un- 
usual situation.  A  man  was  accused  of  forging  his  wife 's 
name  to  an  obligation  for  the  payment  of  money  and  an 
attempt  was  made  to  compel  the  wife  to  testify  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  a  crime  involving  her.  The  court, 
however,  decided  that  the  crime  was  against  the  person 
who  had  been  induced  to  accept  the  fraudulent  paper  and 
not  against  the  wife.  Consequently  she  could  not  be  pun- 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  29 

ished   for   contempt   of  court   because   she   refused  to 
testify.54 

EIGHT  TO  EECOVEE  FOE  PEESONAL  INJUEIES 

The  right  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  by  an  ap- 
peal to  civil  law  has  two  phases :  recovery  for  an  injury 
to  the  person  bringing  the  action,  and  damages  sued  for 
on  account  of  injuries  to  another  whereby  the  plaintiff 
claims  to  have  been  deprived  of  services  or  subjected  to 
expense  or  trouble.  The  right  of  recovery  for  damages 
in  certain  cases  was  provided  by  the  Common  Law  and 
unmarried  women  were  entitled  to  the  same  privileges  as 
men.  Married  women,  on  the  contrary,  were  deprived  of 
practically  all  opportunities  to  recover  for  injuries  of 
any  kind;  the  husband  was  entitled  to  all  money  recov- 
ered for  injuries  to  himself,  his  wife,  or  their  minor 
children,  but  in  the  case  of  the  children  he  acted  merely 
as  the  guardian  and  the  money  did  not  legally  belong  to 
him.  If  he  were  dead  the  wife  regained  her  right  to  sue, 
but  she  could  not  recover  damages  for  his  death  resulting 
from  the  negligence  of  another.  Furthermore,  the  hus- 
band was  entitled  to  his  wife's  society  and  services  and 
might  be  given  damages  if  a  third  person  had  a  part  in 
depriving  him  of  them. 

These  Common  Law  principles  were  in  force  in  Iowa 
until  about  1860,  when  modifications  began  to  appear,  and 
the  decisions  of  the  courts  in  early  years  were  based 
upon  them.  For  example,  in  1849  the  Iowa  Supreme 
Court  ruled  that  a  father  could  not  recover  damages  on 
account  of  the  marriage  of  a  daughter  between  twelve 
and  fourteen  years  of  age,  because  the  Common  Law  rec- 
ognized the  marriage  as  valid,  and  the  right  of  the  hus- 


30      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

band  to  the  wife's  services  was  superior  to  the  father's 
claim  on  his  minor  child.  "The  wife",  said  the  court, 
"cannot  be  held  to  *  serve  two  masters'  therefore  the 
right  of  the  husband  must  prevail."55 

In  1856  a  wife  deserted  by  her  husband  was  permitted 
to  bring  an  action  for  slander  without  her  husband's 
joining  her,  since  it  was  held  that  equity  demanded  that 
the  wife  who  had  been  compelled  to  support  herself 
should  have  the  privilege  of  protecting  her  property  and 
reputation  without  the  formality  of  a  decree  from  the 
District  Court  as  the  law  required.  If  the  two  were  liv- 
ing together,  however,  the  husband  was  required  to  bring 
the  action.  One  decision  contains  the  following  comment  : 

We  suppose  that  at  common  law,  the  rule  is  well  settled,  that 
for  an  injury  to  the  person  of  the  wife  during  coverture,  by  bat- 
tery, or  to  her  character,  by  slander,  or  for  any  such  injury,  the 
wife  must  join  with  the  husband  in  the  suit.  When,  however, 
the  injury  is  such  that  the  husband  received  a  separate  loss  or 
damage,  as  if  in  consequence  of  the  battery,  he  has  been  deprived 
of  her  society,  or  been  put  to  expense,  he  may  bring  a  separate 
action  in  his  own  name.56 

The  Revision  of  1860,  like  the  Code  of  1851,  contained 
few  modifications  of  the  Common  Law  rules  governing 
recovery  of  damages  where  married  women  were  con- 
cerned. An  "unmarried  female"  might  prosecute  for 
her  own  seduction  and  recover  damages,  but  another  wit- 
ness was  required.  The  father  of  a  minor  daughter,  or, 
if  he  were  dead  or  disqualified,  the  mother  might  also 
prosecute  for  the  seduction.  Ten  years  later,  the  hus- 
band's share  in  actions  brought  against  or  by  the  wife 
was  slightly  modified,  by  the  provision  that  the  wife 
might  sue  or  be  sued  alone  except  where  both  were,  in 
their  own  right,  parties  to  the  suit.57 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  31 

The  interpretations  of  these  provisions  in  judicial  de- 
cisions are  interesting  because  they  illustrate  the  tend- 
ency to  emancipate  women  and  to  construe  laws  more  to 
their  advantage.  In  1864  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  de- 
cided that  the  husband  must  be  joined  with  the  wife  in  an 
action  for  slander  of  the  wife;  but  in  1871  the  same 
tribunal  ruled  that  a  married  woman  had  the  same  right 
to  bring  an  action  for  an  injury  to  her  person  or  reputa- 
tion that  she  had  to  bring  an  action  to  defend  her  prop- 
erty, and  that  the  husband  had  no  right  to  participate 
except  to  sue  for  damages  resulting  from  his  own  de- 
privation or  expense  resulting  from  the  injury  to  the 
wife.  Moreover,  the  husband  need  not  join  the  wife  in  an 
action  for  libel.58 

The  Code  of  1873  reflects  these  changes  in  reference  to 
the  civil  rights  of  married  women.  The  husband  was 
freed  from  his  former  responsibility  for  torts  committed 
by  the  wife;  and  he  was  likewise  denied  the  right  to  re- 
cover for  those  committed  against  the  wife  except  in  so 
far  as  he  was  himself  injured  by  loss  of  the  wife's  ser- 
vices or  by  expenses  incurred  on  account  of  her  injury, 
for  he  was  still  responsible  for  medical  attendance  and 
support  for  his  wife,  whether  she  was  able  to  work  or 
not.59 

The  Iowa  Supreme  Court  in  applying  these  provi- 
sions worked  out  a  fairly  consistent  rule.  It  was  agreed 
that  the  wife  might  recover  damages  for  pain  resulting 
from  an  injury;  but  the  husband  alone  could  recover  for 
loss  of  time  and  medical  attendance  unless  the  wife  was 
engaged  in  a  business  of  her  own  or  was  working  for 
wages,  but  even  in  this  event  the  husband  must  sue  for 
the  expenses  of  medical  attendance.60 


32      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OP  WOMEN 

Some  individual  decisions  are  worth  citing  briefly  as 
illustrations  of  the  various  phases  of  this  question.  Ac- 
cording to  a  decision  in  1875  neither  husband  nor  wife 
could  maintain  an  action  against  the  other  for  a  tort 
committed  during  coverture.  In  another  case  it  was  de- 
cided that  a  man  might  recover  damages  from  a  physi- 
cian for  mal-treatment  of  his  wife  which  subjected  him 
to  additional  expense;  but  if  she  died  as  a  result  of  this 
treatment,  action  could  be  brought  only  by  her  adminis- 
trator. Furthermore,  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  it 
was  an  error  for  a  lower  court  to  instruct  the  jury  that 
the  damages  would  be  the  same  for  a  married  as  for  an 
unmarried  woman  —  the  damages  were  not  the  same, 
since  everything  an  unmarried  woman  made  was  her 
own,  while  a  wife  devoted  at  least  part  of  her  time  to  her 
husband  and  his  estate.61 

Another  decision,  handed  down  by  Judge  Shiras  at 
Council  Bluffs  in  1894,  denied  a  woman  damages  for  suf- 
fering resulting  from  being  struck  by  a  switch  engine  on 
the  ground  of  contributory  negligence,  but  her  husband 
received  $3000  for  loss  of  her  services.62  In  another  case 
the  Supreme  Court  reversed  the  decision  of  a  lower 
court  giving  a  married  woman  damages  for  disability 
resulting  from  an  accident  caused  by  a  defective  street, 
declaring  that  the  husband  only  was  entitled  to  sue  for 
such  damages  while  the  wife  was  keeping  house  for  him. 
Some  quotations  from  this  decision  express  the  prin- 
ciples which  governed  the  judges.  "We  know  of  no  leg- 
islation ",  an  earlier  decision  read,  "which  changes  the 
relations  of  husband  and  wife  so  as  to  give  the  headship 
of  the  family  in  any  case  to  the  wife.  He  [the  husband] 
is  still  bound  for  her  support,  and  entitled  to  her  earn- 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  33 

ings,  when  she  is  not  engaged  in  business  on  her  own 
account. "  "  Whatever  time  she  [the  wife]  lost  or  would 
lose  would  have  been  devoted  to  his  employment,  and  the 
loss  was  her  husband's  for  which  she  had  no  right  to 
recover.  If  we  admit  her  right  to  recover,  defendant 
would  be  twice  liable,  for  assuredly,  under  the  rules  of 
law,  the  husband  may  recover  for  such  losses  as  were 
sustained  by  her. ' '  i '  She  can  not  recover  for  loss  of  time 
occasioned  by  an  injury,  if  her  occupation  is  that  of  a 
mere  housewife  in  the  family  of  her  husband.  "°3 

In  1899  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  decided  that  a  mar- 
ried woman  who  owned  a  sewing  machine  and  earned 
from  five  to  ten  dollars  a  month  sewing  might  collect 
damages  for  loss  of  earning  capacity  if  injured  by  the 
fault  of  another.  In  another  case  the  same  court  de- 
clared that  a  married  woman 's  equal  liability  for  medical 
services,  rendered  her  did  not  give  her  a  right  to  recover 
for  such  expenses  in  an  action  for  assault  and  battery.64 

Down  to  1911,  indeed,  court  decisions  in  Iowa  con- 
sistently ruled  that  a  wife  might  collect  damages  for  pain 
and  suffering,  but  her  husband  only  could  collect  for  loss 
of  time,  unless  she  were  engaged  in  a  separate  business, 
and  in  any  case  for  the  expenses  resulting  from  such  in- 
juries. At  that  time  the  General  Assembly  made  a  rad- 
ical change  in  the  law  by  adopting  the  provision  that  a 
woman,  if  injured  by  the  negligence  or  wrongful  act  of  a 
person  or  corporation,  might  "recover  for  loss  of  time, 
medical  attendance  and  other  expenses  incurred  as  a 
result  thereof  in  addition  to  any  elements  of  damages  re- 
coverable by  common  law;  and  if  such  injury  result  in 
causing  death,  her  administrator  may  sue  and  recover 
for  her  estate  the  value  of  her  services  as  a  wife  or 

3 


34      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

mother  or  both  ....  but  in  no  event  shall  the 
amount  recovered  exceed  the  sum  of  six  thousand  dol- 
lars ",65  Four  years  later  the  maximum  punitive  dam- 
ages to  be  recovered  by  the  administrator  of  a  woman's 
estate,  in  case  of  her  death,  was  raised  to  $15,000  —  a 
sum  that  could  be  awarded  even  for  "services  as  a  wife 
or  mother  ",66 

Thus,  by  1915  a  woman  in  Iowa,  even  though  she  were 
married  and  engaged  in  housekeeping,  came  to  be  recog- 
nized as  an  individual  with  a  right  to  secure  compensa- 
tion in  her  own  right  for  pain  and  for  loss  of  time.  The 
old  rule  that  everything  the  wife  earned  belonged  to  her 
husband  has  been  displaced  at  least  partially  by  new 
statute  law. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  laws  of  Iowa  from 
very  early  times  singled  out  one  injury  for  which  an  un- 
married women  might  collect  damages,  namely,  seduc- 
tion. The  civil  action  to  recover  damages  for  this  injury 
was  entirely  separate  from  the  criminal  prosecution 
which  required  that  the  woman  be  of  previously  chaste 
character  —  while  in  the  civil  action  there  was  no  such 
requirement.  The  Code  of  1851  provided  that  an  un- 
married woman  might  prosecute  such  an  action  in  her 
own  right ;  or  the  father,  mother,  or  guardian  of  a  minor 
daughter  or  ward  might  bring  such  a  suit,  but  any  dam- 
ages awarded  the  guardian  were  to  be  used  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  girl.  Similar  provisions  have  been  repeated  in 
the  later  codes,  the  only  change  being  the  omission  of  the 
guardian's  right  after  1873.67 

The  amount  of  damages  awarded  has  varied  with  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case  and  the  financial 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  35 

standing  of  the  seducer.  In  one  case,  for  example,  a 
woman  was  awarded  $5000  and  in  another  $16,000  for 
breach  of  promise  including  seduction.68 

EIGHT  TO  EECOVEEY  FOE  INDIEECT  INJUEIES 

It  is  evident  that  under  the  Common  Law  the  legal 
status  of  a  wife  and  minor  children  was  one  of  depend- 
ence upon  the  husband  and  father.  The  husband  was 
entitled  to  the  services  or  wages  of  the  wife  and  children 
and  could  collect  damages  if  wrongfully  deprived  of  them 
by  another.  He  was,  on  the  other  hand,  held  responsible 
for  their  maintenance  and  medical  attendance ;  and  if  the 
cost  of  this  was  increased  by  the  fault  of  another  he 
might  also  sue  for  such  an  amount  as  would  reimburse 
him  for  his  outlay. 

If,  however,  the  man  were  injured  the  wife  and  chil- 
dren had  no  recourse  in  their  own  hands.  If  the  husband 
survived,  it  was  his  privilege  to  sue  for  damages,  and 
any  which  he  might  secure  belonged  to  him.  The  wife 
and  children  could  not  secure  any  compensation  for  loss 
of  support  aside  from  that  awarded  to  the  husband.  In 
case  of  an  injury  to  a  child  the  right  of  action  for  in- 
juries was  part  of  the  right  of  guardianship  and  could  be 
exercised  by  the  mother  only  in  rare  cases. 

In  Iowa  the  right  of  a  woman  to  sue  for  injuries  to 
others  has  been  closely  associated  with  the  administra- 
tion of  estates,  the  guardianship  of  children,  and  the 
property  rights  of  husband  and  wife.  Thus  the  question 
of  recovery  for  indirect  injuries  by  women  requires  little 
discussion  apart  from  the  history  of  their  rights  in  these 
other  fields.  A  woman  has  been  given  the  right  to  bring 
an  action  for  the  death  of  the  person  of  whose  estate  she 


36      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

is  administrator,  for  the  death  or  injury  of  any  minor 
child  for  whom  she  is  the  legal  guardian,  and,  in  certain 
special  cases,  for  loss  of  support  due  to  some  injury  to 
her  husband.69 

It  is  this  third  phase  of  the  question  which  alone  re- 
quires elaboration  in  this  connection,  since  the  first  two 
are  covered  by  the  more  general  accounts.  For  the  sake 
of  clearness  it  may  be  said  that  a  wife  can  not,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  sue  for  damages  on  account  of 
injuries  to  her  husband  —  no  matter  how  much  she  may 
suffer  on  account  of  them.  An  exception  to  this  rule,  and 
one  which  has  acquired  some  importance  in  Iowa,  con- 
cerns the  recovery  of  damages  by  the  wife  from  one  who 
sells  intoxicating  liquor  to  the  husband.  This  is  entirely 
a  matter  of  statute  law  and  court  decisions,  since  there  is 
no  foundation  for  such  suits  in  the  Common  Law. 

The  Code  of  1873  provided  that  a  wife  might  sue  for 
injury  to  her  support  produced  by  the  illegal  sale  of 
liquor  to  her  husband;  and  this  provision  with  modifica- 
tions and  additions  has  been  repeated  in  succeeding 
codes.  The  damages  awarded  might  include  exemplary 
damages  as  well  as  actual  damages,  it  being  declared  in 
cases  of  this  kind  that  "a  married  woman  shall  have  the 
same  right  to  bring  suits,  prosecute,  and  control  the  same 
and  the  amount  recovered  as  if  a  single  woman  ".70 

Court  decisions  on  this  subject  have  been  numerous 
and  important,  though  not  always  consistent.  The  courts 
have  decided,  for  example,  that  this  section  applies  only 
to  the  sale  of  liquor  when  such  act  is  illegal ;  but  that  the 
sale  of  beer,  when  this  was  not  prohibited,  could  not  be 
made  the  basis  for  awarding  damages  for  loss  of  support 
to  the  wife.  On  the  other  hand,  even  the  giving  of  liquor 


PERSONAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  37 

to  an  intoxicated  person  might  subject  the  giver  to  lia- 
bility, according  to  one  judicial  interpretation.71 

Other  decisions  have  established  the  rule  that  a  wife 
may  collect  damages  for  loss  of  support  either  because 
of  the  death  or  loss  of  earning  capacity  of  the  husband 
due  to  the  illegal  sale  of  liquor  to  him  and  for  injuries  to 
her  person  or  property  resulting  from  the  same  cause. 
Moreover,  exemplary  damages  may  also  be  fixed  by  the 
jury,  if  a  basis  for  actual  damages  is  found.  The  fact 
that  the  husband  was  habitually  intoxicated  before  the 
defendant  sold  him  liquor  does  not,  the  court  decided, 
prevent  the  wife 's  recovery  of  damages,  if  the  fact  of  the 
sale  and  its  illegality  are  proven.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Supreme  Court  has  ruled  that  a  wife  may  not  recover  for 
threatening  language,  loss  of  social  position,  or  similar 
hardships,  not  immediately  affecting  her  person  or  prop- 
erty.72 

One  of  the  cases  involving  the  liability  of  the  one  sell- 
ing intoxicating  liquor  included  a  claim  for  the  value  of 
a  horse  belonging  to  the  wife  which  had  been  sold  by  the 
husband  while  intoxicated.  The  court  decided  that  the 
wife  could  recover  the  value  of  the  animal  from  the  seller 
of  the  intoxicating  liquor.73 

Several  years  later  a  decision  awarded  a  wife  exem- 
plary damages  because  her  children  were  compelled  to 
leave  home,  as  well  as  actual  damages  for  loss  of  sup- 
port ;  but  this,  the  court  explained,  would  be  true  only  in 
case  the  defendant  were  aware  of  the  situation.74 

Court  decisions  have  generally  agreed  that  in  an 
action  brought  by  a  wife  for  the  recovery  of  damages  due 
to  the  illegal  sale  of  liquor  to  the  husband  it  is  sufficient 
to  prove  that  the  liquor  sold  by  the  defendant  contrib- 


38      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

uted  to  the  intoxication  of  the  husband  even  if  it  were 
not  the  sole  cause  of  it,  but  if  the  wife  contributed  by 
giving  the  husband  liquor  she  could  not  recover.  Even 
in  this  event,  however,  the  wife's  motives  are  to  be  con- 
sidered; and  giving  the  husband  liquor  in  order  to  keep 
him  away  from  places  where  it  was  sold  was,  on  one  occa- 
sion, declared  to  be  no  bar  to  recovery.75 

It  appears  that  the  laws  making  the  seller  of  intoxi- 
cating liquor  liable  for  damages  to  the  wife  of  the  man 
to  whom  it  is  illegally  sold  are  largely  intended  to  supple- 
ment the  punishments  fixed  for  the  illegal  sale  of  liquor. 
As  the  sentiment  against  the  sale  of  intoxicating  bever- 
ages has  become  stronger  and  interest  in  the  welfare  of 
dependent  wives  and  children  has  increased,  the  deci- 
sions in  cases  of  this  kind  have  become  increasingly 
favorable  to  the  wife. 

A  case  involving  still  another  phase  of  recovery  for 
indirect  injuries  came  before  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court 
in  1894.  This  case  was  a  suit  brought  by  a  wife  on  ac- 
count of  the  alienation  of  her  husband 's  affections.  Such 
cases  on  the  part  of  husbands  were,  of  course,  not  un- 
usual and  were  governed  by  the  Common  Law.  It  was 
generally  believed,  however,  that  such  action  could  not 
be  brought  by  the  wife  for  she  possessed  no  separate  per- 
sonality and  could  suffer  no  individual  injury.  The  Iowa 
decision,  however,  was  rendered  in  the  wife's  favor,  since, 
the  court  declared,  the  "tendency  of  legislation  in  this 
country  is  toward  making  husband  and  wife  equal  in  law, 
giving  to  each  the  rights  possessed  by  the  other,  and  the 
legislation  of  this  state  is  designed  to  accomplish  that 
end,  in  most  respects."76 


IV 

WOMEN  IN  EDUCATION 

PEKHAPS  the  most  important  factor  in  the  development 
of  any  person  or  group  of  persons  is  education.  This  is  a 
subject  that  has  many  different  aspects;  but  in  this  con- 
nection the  opportunity  to  follow  out  any  line  of  instruc- 
tion or  training  desired  is  the  most  important  of  these 
privileges  and  is  the  most  essential  to  the  enjoyment  of 
personal  and  political  freedom.  In  this  sense  education 
means  more  than  a  chance  to  attend  schools  and  colleges : 
it  includes  the  right  to  take  up  any  desired  profession,  to 
speak,  and  to  write  without  incurring  either  a  civil  pen- 
alty or  social  ostracism.  Of  all  educational  agencies  in 
America  the  most  fundamental  has  been  the  public 
school. 

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  SCHOOL  ATTENDANCE 

Co-education  has  been  so  much  in  evidence  in  Iowa 
that  the  general  prejudice  against  it  in  former  times  is 
difficult  for  us  to  understand.  To  the  Iowa  pioneers  it 
was  the  natural  and  only  possible  plan  for  the  primitive 
schools.  Their  boys  and  girls  worked  and  played  to- 
gether on  the  prairies;  and  so  when  the  public  schools 
were  first  organized  the  Legislative  Assembly  declared 
that  they  should  be  "open  and  free  for  every  class  of 
white  citizens  between  the  ages  of  four  and  twenty-one 
years ".  Horace  Mann  visited  Davenport  in  1858  and 
recommended  co-education  in  secondary  schools,  and 

39 


40      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

there  is  little  evidence  that  any  other  plan  for  the  com- 
mon schools  was  ever  considered.77 

The  system,  however,  was  not  so  universally  approved 
for  the  secondary  schools;  and  female  seminaries  were 
established  here  and  there  over  the  State  to  provide  edu- 
cation suitably  diluted  for  the  daughters  of  the  pioneers. 
But  there  were  other  secondary  schools  which  began  as 
co-educational  institutions,  giving  young  women  the 
same  opportunities  as  those  offered  young  men.  These 
early  schools  were  semi-public  in  character  since  they 
were  incorporated  by  law,  although  supported  by  tuition 
or  private  subscriptions.  When  the  public  high  school 
was  established  co-education  was  the  natural  rule:  the 
right  of  girls  to  attend  such  schools  has  never  been  ques- 
tioned.78 The  advisability  of  separate  departments  or 
separate  classes  for  high  school  boys  and  girls  has  been 
frequently  discussed  in  educational  circles,  but  without 
any  idea  of  discriminating  between  the  sexes. 

When  the  State  University  was  organized  there  was  a 
decided  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  advisability  of  the 
admission  of  women.  The  act  incorporating  the  institu- 
tion made  no  mention  of  co-education,  and  it  is  possible 
that  the  legislators  did  not  even  anticipate  that  women 
would  attempt  to  enter.  All  the  precedents  of  European 
and  eastern  universities  opposed  the  idea.  Nor  was 
there  any  such  association  between  the  University  and 
the  secondary  schools  as  there  was  between  these  and  the 
common  schools. 

That  some  young  women  did  not  accept  such  prece- 
dents is  evidenced  by  the  first  report  of  students  which 
lists  forty-one  young  women  out  of  an  attendance  of  one 
hundred  and  twenty-four.  This  was  not  entirely  pleas- 


WOMEN  IN  EDUCATION  41 

ing  to  the  Board  of  Trustees,  who  in  1858  voted  to  ex- 
clude women  from  general  university  work  after  that 
year  since  it  was  "neither  consistent  with  the  design  of  a 
university  nor  expedient  to  admit  women  to  regular  in- 
struction. "  Co-education,  however,  was  too  strongly 
entrenched  in  the  State  supported  schools  of  Iowa  to  be 
successfully  prohibited  at  the  State  University;  and  so 
this  ruling  of  the  Board  was  first  modified  to  permit 
women  to  attend  lectures,  then  to  attend  the  normal  de- 
partment, and  before  the  close  of  the  same  year  the 
original  action  of  the  Board  was  entirely  rescinded.79 

Thus  ended  the  only  serious  attempt  to  exclude  wom- 
en from  the  State  University  in  which  they  have  been 
enrolled  in  large  numbers.  In  1864  the  General  Assem- 
bly definitely  stated  that  the  object  of  the  University 
should  "be  to  provide  the  best  and  most  efficient  means 
of  imparting  to  the  youth  of  the  State  of  both  sexes  upon 
equal  terms  a  liberal  education  and  a  thorough  knowl- 
edge of  the  different  branches  of  literature,  the  arts  and 
sciences '  '.80 

There  appears  to  have  been  some  thought  of  exclud- 
ing women  from  the  State  Agricultural  College  also,  for 
a  petition  that  they  be  admitted  was  presented  to  the 
legislature  in  1868 ;  but  here  too  equality  of  opportunity 
prevailed.  Indeed,  the  first  enrollment  at  the  college 
shows  thirty-seven  young  women  in  attendance.81 

That  the  women  of  Iowa  have  not  failed  to  prove 
their  equality  in  intelligence  is  suggested  by  the  report 
that  five  of  the  nine  persons  granted  life  certificates  by 
the  Board  of  Examiners  from  1862  to  1873  were  women. 
In  1910  the  percent  of  illiteracy  in  Iowa  was  1.7  for  both 
males  and  females  over  ten  years  of  age  —  the  lowest  in 


42      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  United  States,  for  the  entire  population  and  for  men. 
Two  States,  however,  Idaho  and  Oregon,  showed  a  lower 
rate  of  illiteracy  for  women.82 

IN   THE   MATTEE   OF   TEACHING 

Closely  associated  with  the  privilege  of  school  at- 
tendance has  been  the  opportunity  of  teaching.  In  Iowa 
the  employment  of  women  as  teachers  in  the  public 
schools  was  never  restricted  by  law,  but  rather  by  custom 
and  by  economic  conditions.  In  1848  only  twenty-three 
women  were  listed  among  the  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
four  teachers  in  the  Territory,  or  about  one  to  five ;  but 
the  number  of  women  engaged  in  teaching  increased 
especially  during  the  Civil  War  when  the  men  were 
called  to  the  camps  and  battlefields,  and  in  1862  for  the 
first  time  the  women  outnumbered  the  men  employed  in 
educational  work.83  This  condition  has  prevailed  ever 
since  for  the  reason  that  economic  conditions  have  gen- 
erally given  men  more  profitable  occupations  and  public 
opinion  has  considered  teaching  the  employment  best 
suited  to  respectable  young  women.  In  1910  the  number 
of  men  teachers  in  Iowa  was  2671,  while  the  number  of 
women  teachers  was  22,068  —  almost  ten  to  one.84 

The  pay  of  women  teachers,  however,  has  remained 
inferior  to  that  of  the  men  in  the  same  lines  of  work. 
According  to  a  report  made  for  1854  the  average  wage 
paid  men  teachers  was  less  than  twenty  dollars  a  month, 
while  that  of  women  teachers  was  less  than  ten  dollars. 
It  is  evident  that  this  proportion  varied  at  different  pe- 
riods and  in  different  places.  For  example,  Iowa  City 
was  reported  as  paying  the  men  teachers  in  its  schools 
in  1864  an  average  of  $50  a  month,  while  the  women  re- 


WOMEN  IN  EDUCATION  43 

ceived  only  $30,  although  the  men  teachers '  wages  in  the 
decade  between  1863  and  1873  for  the  State  as  a  whole 
increased  from  twenty-two  to  thirty-six  dollars  per 
month  and  women's  wages  rose  from  sixteen  to  twenty- 
eight.85 

This  difference  in  pay  was  sometimes  regulated  by 
the  county  authorities.  Thus  in  Muscatine  County  the 
compensation  was  fixed  according  to  certificate  and  sex 
—  women  receiving  from  twenty-five  to  thirty-five  dol- 
lars per  month,  and  men  from  thirty  to  forty.  A  reso- 
lution offered  in  the  House  of  Representatives  in  1868 
declared  that  '  '  it  is  the  sense  of  this  House  that  the  cus- 
tom practiced  in  some  parts  of  this  State  of  paying  to 
male  teachers  in  our  public  schools  higher  prices  than 
are  allowed  female  teachers  for  the  same  amount  of  la- 
bor, is  a  relic  of  barbarism,  and  should  be  discoun- 
tenanced by  all  good  citizens.  "86 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  salaries  paid  women  in  educa- 
tional work  have  remained  lower  than  those  of  the  men 
partly  because  of  the  limited  field  of  employment  for 
women  outside  the  school  room  and  partly  because  wom- 
en have  not,  as  a  rule,  desired  or  prepared  for  positions 
requiring  executive  as  well  as  intellectual  ability  —  posi- 
tions which  usually  carry  the  higher  salaries. 

Some  women,  however,  have  served  in  such  positions 
and  the  number  is  increasing.  Mrs.  Lou  M.  Wilson 
served  as  superintendent  of  the  West  Des  Moines  schools 
from  1884  to  1888;  and  in  1888  Miss  E.  M.  Todd  was 
elected  superintendent  of  the  Cedar  Falls  schools  at  a 
salary  of  $1250.87  Nor  have  women  been  unrepresented 
in  the  honorary  positions  to  which  no  remuneration  is 
attached.  Miss  Phoebe  W.  Sudlow  was  chosen  President 


44      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

of  the  State  Teachers'  Association  in  1876  and  twelve 
years  later  that  position  was  held  by  Miss  Lottie  E. 
Granger.  Three  other  women  have  served  in  this  capac- 
ity down  to  1917 :  Miss  Abbie  S.  Abbott  of  Cedar  Eapids 
in  1908,  Miss  Alice  Dilley  of  Osceola  in  1912,  and  Mrs. 
Eva  Fleming  of  Ottumwa  in  1917.88 

In  college  work,  women  probably  occupy  a  more  fa- 
vorable place  in  Iowa  than  they  do  in  eastern  and  south- 
ern localities.  It  is  said  that  the  first  woman  in  America 
to  be  elected  to  a  full  professorship  in  a  college  was  Miss 
Harriette  J.  Cook  of  Cornell  College.89 


V 

WOMEN  IN  THE  PROFESSIONS 

ALTHOUGH  women  were  very  early  included  among  the 
teachers  of  Iowa  and  girls  were  equally  entitled  to  the 
education  provided  by  the  Commonwealth,  it  was  not 
until  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  that  women  appear 
in  the  more  specialized  professions.  While  newspaper 
work,  law,  medicine,  nursing,  pharmacy,  the  ministry, 
and  similar  occupations  offer  work  suitable  for  trained 
women  the  number  in  such  professions  is  relatively 
small.  Two  considerations  deter  women  from  preparing 
themselves  for  highly  specialized  professions :  the  length 
and  difficulty  of  the  training  required,  and  the  difficulty 
of  coordinating  such  work  with  homemaking  and  the  care 
of  children.  In  other  words,  women  show  a  tendency  to 
avoid  highly  specialized  training  which  has  little  to  do 
with  the  work  of  the  normal  woman  after  marriage. 

The  history  of  the  struggle  of  women  for  admission 
to  professional  schools  lies,  for  the  most  part,  outside 
the  annals  of  Iowa  history;  but  the  adjustments  which 
have  occurred  in  this  Commonwealth  may  profitably  be 
studied  as  illustrations  of  the  tendency  of  women  to  se- 
cure freedom  of  choice  and  then  to  select  congenial  occu- 
pations. For  the  most  part,  such  restrictions  as  have 
existed  in  Iowa  as  to  the  admission  of  women  into  the 
professions  have  been  due  to  popular  opinion  rather  than 
to  legal  restraints.  Indeed,  it  would  seldom  have  oc- 
curred to  early  lawmakers  to  forbid  what  was  practically 
unheard  of. 

45 


46      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

In  discussing  this  subject  it  is  clear  that  only  such 
professions  as  are  regulated  by  law  or  aided  by  the 
State  need  to  be  considered.  For  example,  it  is  not  re- 
garded as  a  part  of  the  State's  duties  to  provide  special 
training  for  persons  engaged  in  religious  work,  nor  does 
the  law  in  any  way  establish  qualifications  for  such  occu- 
pations. On  the  other  hand,  the  practice  of  medicine  and 
law  are  under  State  supervision  and  may  be  studied  as 
illustrations  of  professions  having  a  legal  status. 

THE  PEACTICE  OF  MEDICINE 

Women  have  always  been  especially  interested  in  the 
care  of  the  sick,  and  pioneer  women  had  some  knowledge 
of  common  herbs  and  their  use.  Many  served  as  mid- 
wives  where  regular  physicians  were  too  distant  or  too 
expensive  for  the  settlers.  Indeed,  some  of  these  home 
doctors  were  frequently  as  competent  as  many  of  the  so- 
called  physicians  who  often  had  little  or  no  professional 
training.  The  suggestion  that  women  should  study  medi- 
cine, however,  was  at  first  generally  opposed. 

There  were,  of  course,  many  reasons  for  this  opposi- 
tion. Women  were  considered  as  intellectually  inferior 
to  men,  and  the  life  of  a  physician  on  the  frontier  was 
unusually  full  of  hardships.  Medical  training  was,  as  a 
rule,  secured  largely  through  a  system  of  apprenticeship 
by  which  the  physician  secured  a  driver  and  office  assist- 
ant, and  the  apprentice  was  given  an  opportunity  to  read 
and  observe.  This  training  was  sometimes  supplemented 
by  a  course  of  lectures  at  some  medical  school  for  a  few 
weeks,  but  many  physicians  carried  on  a  regular  practice 
without  this  schooling.  Such  preparation  was,  not  with- 
out reason,  considered  unfit  for  young  women. 


WOMEN  IN  THE  PROFESSIONS  47 

The  law,  however,  made  no  distinction  between  men 
and  women ;  nor  did  it  for  many  years  make  any  attempt 
to  restrict  practice  by  the  incompetent.  The  Code  of 
1851  provided  that  the  College  of  Physicians  and  Sur- 
geons at  Keokuk,  which  was  named  as  the  medical  de- 
partment of  the  future  State  University,  should  have 
power  "to  grant  diplomas  .  \  -.  .  to  such  persons 
as  they  deem  qualified";  and  all  persons  with  such 
degrees  might  practice  in  the  State,  but  there  was  no  dis- 
qualification of  those  who  were  not  graduates.90 

It  is  probable  that  the  word  "persons"  used  at  this 
time  is  no  proof  that  women  were  included,  for  it  was 
frequently  used  in  early  laws  when  men  only  were  meant. 
The  State,  however,  never  assumed  control  of  the  Keo- 
kuk medical  school  and  paid  no  attention  to  its  adminis- 
tration. It  is  doubtful  whether  women  were  admitted  to 
the  Iowa  institution.  The  few  who  entered  the  profes- 
sion went  east  for  their  training.  When  the  medical  de- 
partment of  the  State  University  was  organized  in  1870 
it  was  clearly  the  purpose  of  the  institution  to  admit 
women,  since  it  was  requested  that  the  candidate  for 
graduation  should  notify  the  Dean  of  "his  or  her"  in- 
tention.91 

Moreover,  it  is  evident  that  there  was  a  demand  for 
such  professional  education  on  the  part  of  women,  since 
the  first  list  of  students  in  the  medical  department  con- 
tains the  names  of  eight  women,  five  of  whom  were  mar- 
ried. It  is  recorded  that  the  admission  of  women  to 
anatomy  classes  along  with  male  students  aroused  much 
discussion  and  this,  together  with  an  experiment  known 
as  "a  gastric  juice  dog"  and  a  case  of  body  stealing, 
gave  the  school  a  good  deal  of  advertising  which  was  not 


48      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

altogether  favorable.  Two  women  were  graduated  from 
the  medical  school  of  the  University  in  1872  —  Anna  A. 
Shepard  and  Isabel  G.  Whitfield.92  By  this  time  a  wom- 
an's right  in  the  profession  was  recognized  by  a  part  of 
the  people  of  Iowa  although  prejudice  remained.  In 
1873,  the  first  woman  physician  was  appointed  to  a  posi- 
tion in  a  State  institution  when  Miss  M.  Abbie  Cleaves 
was  made  an  assistant  physician  at  the  Mount  Pleasant 
hospital.93 

According  to  a  list  of  physicians  and  surgeons  in  Iowa 
in  1878-1879  there  were  at  least  nineteen  women  prac- 
ticing in  the  State,  nearly  all  of  whom  were  graduates  of 
some  medical  course.  Of  this  number  about  half  were 
homeopaths  and  half  regulars  —  only  one  of  the  gradu- 
ates having  completed  the  course  earlier  than  1870.94 

The  first  act  of  the  General  Assembly  providing  fully 
for  the  regulation  of  the  practice  of  medicine  was  passed 
in  1886.  This  law  made  no  distinction  between  men  and 
women  candidates :  indeed,  it  specifically  included  women 
by  the  use  of  the  double  pronoun  ' i  his  or  her ' '.  Equality 
of  men  and  women  in  the  closely  allied  profession  of 
pharmacy  had  been  definitely  recognized  six  years  be- 
fore in  the  law  providing  for  the  registration  of  pharma- 
cists.95 

The  number  of  women  physicians  in  Iowa  has  in- 
creased steadily,  although,  as  might  be  expected  in  a 
highly  specialized  and  exacting  profession,  the  number 
is  still  small.  The  United  States  census  reported  eight 
women  physicians  in  Iowa  in  1870,  seventy-three  in  1880, 
one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  in  1890,  two  hundred  and 
sixty  in  1900,  and  three  hundred  and  twenty-five  in  1910. 
This  number,  though  small,  is  exceeded  by  that  in  only 


WOMEN  IN  THE  PROFESSIONS  49 

seven  other  States.96  The  statistics  include  many  wom- 
en practitioners  in  the  newer  and  semi-professional 
schools  such  as  osteopaths  and  chiropractors.  Many 
others,  however,  are  graduates  of  high  grade  medical 
schools  and  have  large  and  profitable  practices. 

NURSING 

Closely  associated  with  the  medical  profession  is 
nursing  which  is  preeminently  a  woman's  profession. 
The  first  legal  restriction  on  this  occupation  was  made  in 
1907  when  provision  was  made  for  the  certification  of 
graduate  nurses.  No  distinction  was  made  between  men 
and  women  —  the  act  applying  to  all  alike.  The  number 
of  men  in  this  work  is,  however,  negligible.  The  number 
of  women  listed  as  trained  nurses  has  increased  from 
160  in  1900,  when  nurses  were  classed  with  women  in 
domestic  or  personal  service,  to  1710  in  1910,  when 
trained  nursing  was  listed  as  a  profession.97 

THE  PRACTICE  OF  DENTISTRY 

In  the  profession  of  dentistry  it  does  not  appear  that 
any  legal  sex  qualification  or  restriction  has  ever  been 
made  in  this  State.  Miss  Lucy  B.  Hobbs  (Mrs.  Taylor) 
began  the  practice  of  dentistry  here  in  1863,  and  later 
through  the  influence  of  her  male  associates  was  admit- 
ted to  a  dental  college  in  Ohio  from  which  she  had  for- 
merly been  excluded.  Although  the  number  of  women 
dentists  in  Iowa  has  always  been  comparatively  small, 
this  is  due  to  preference,  since  women  are  admitted  both 
to  schools  of  dentistry  and  to  practice  on  the  same  terms 
as  men.98 

Women  have  usually  been  satisfied  with  equality  in 


50      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  professions,  but  the  law  of  1917  concerning  "dental 
hygienists"  apparently  gives  them  a  monopoly  of  this 
particular  work,  since  it  provides  that  i '  any  woman  over 
eighteen  years  of  age  and  of  good  moral  character "  and 
a  graduate  of  a  training  school  may  be  given  a  license  as 
a  dental  hygienist  upon  passing  the  required  examina- 
tion." 

THE  PRACTICE  OF  LAW 

Among  the  highly  specialized  professions  one  of  the 
oldest  and  most  influential  is  the  study  of  the  law  and  its 
application.  It  has  been  one  of  the  latest  to  be  opened 
to  women  and  apparently  one  of  the  least  attractive  to 
them.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  women  of  pioneer  Iowa 
ever  desired  the  right  to  appear  before  a  court  as  attor- 
neys, but  the  subject  was  being  agitated  in  the  East.  Ap- 
parently the  makers  of  the  Code  of  1851  did  not  favor 
admitting  women  to  the  bar,  for  they  definitely  provided 
that  only  a  "white  male  citizen "  with  certain  other  quali- 
fications might  practice  law  in  the  State  courts.  It  was 
not  until  1870  that  this  disability  was  removed  by  striking 
out  the  words  "white  male" — negroes  and  women  being 
admitted  on  equal  terms  with  white  men.100 

Accounts  of  the  early  practice  of  law  by  Iowa  women 
are  somewhat  conflicting.  Mrs.  Arabella  Mansfield  of 
Mount  Pleasant  is  said  to  have  been  admitted  to  the  bar 
in  1869  —  a  year  before  the  General  Assembly  passed  the 
law  removing  the  disability  of  women  with  respect  to  this 
profession.  Under  the  law  of  1870  several  women  were 
successful  in  passing  the  examinations.  Among  them 
were  Mrs.  Judith  Ellen  Foster,  Mrs.  Annie  C.  Savery, 
and  Mrs.  Emma  H.  Haddock.  Judge  Austin  Adams  was 


WOMEN  IN  THE  PROFESSIONS  51 

the  first  chief  justice  to  admit  women  to  practice  in  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Iowa.101 

The  first  woman  regularly  enrolled  in  the  law  school 
of  the  State  University  of  Iowa  was  Mary  B.  Hickey  of 
Newton,  Iowa,  who  graduated  in  1873.  Since  then,  be- 
tween twenty-five  and  thirty  women  have  completed  the 
law  course  at  the  University — seven  of  whom  belonged 
in  the  classes  of  1899  and  1900.  A  few  of  these  women 
have  remained  in  the  State  as  active  lawyers,  but  usually 
in  association  with  their  husbands.  Others  have  located 
outside  the  State,  and  only  a  few  are  carrying  on  an  ac- 
tive law  business  independently.102  The  practice  of  law 
has  not,  however,  been  popular  among  the  women  of 
Iowa. 

The  census  reports  show  that  the  number  of  women 
lawyers  in  Iowa  increased  from  none  in  1870,  to  five  in 
1880,  twenty-one  in  1890,  and  fifty-three  in  1900;  but  only 
ten  are  reported  in  1910.103  This  decrease  is  probably 
due  partly  to  a  more  strict  interpretation  of  the  term 
and  also  to  a  realization  on  the  part  of  women  that  law 
is  not  at  present  as  suitable  for  women  as  other  employ- 
ments, since  it  requires  a  long  period  of  training  and  is 
not  closely  associated  with  the  field  of  activity  usually 
claimed  by  women.  A  greater  interest  in  legal  work  for 
dependent  classes,  however,  may  overcome  this  condition 
to  some  degree. 

GENERAL  SUMMAEY 

This  brief  survey  suggests  that  law  is  the  only  pro-.' 
fession  from  which  women  were  ever  barred  by  law  in\ 
Iowa,  and  this  may  have  been  due  to  the  close  relation 
between  the  courts  and  political  affairs.    In  such  profes- 


52      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

sions  as  medicine,  nursing,  dentistry,  and  pharmacy  the 
personal  preference  of  women  and  public  opinion  have 
regulated  the  number  of  women  thus  engaged,  while 
other  professions  have  established  the  status  of  women 
by  private  agreement. 

The  following  table  showing  the  number  of  women  in 
certain  occupations  at  different  periods  in  the  history 
of  Iowa  may  be  of  interest  in  this  connection : 


CLERGY- 

PHYSI- 

YEAR 

MEN 

DENTISTS 

LAWYERS 

CIANS 

TEACHERS 

OFFICIALS  104 

1870 

3 

0 

0 

8 

4,472 

0 

1880 

10 

1 

5 

73 

10,157 

184 

1890 

34 

13 

21 

128 

16,502 

243 

1900 

117 

52 

53 

260 

19,589 

391 

1910 

31 

43 

10 

325 

22,088 

307 

VI 

WOMEN  AND  THE  CEIMINAL  LAW 

THE  exercise  of  the  police  power  is  one  of  the  funda- 
mental activities  of  government:  the  protection  of  life 
and  property  is  indispensable  for  the  order  and  pros- 
perity of  any  community.  The  status  of  women  under 
the  criminal  law  of  Iowa  requires  but  brief  consideration, 
since  only  in  minor  details  has  there  been  any  distinction 
between  men  and  women  either  as  to  protection  from 
injury  or  treatment  when  accused  or  convicted  of  a 
crime.  The  great  mass  of  criminal  law  applies  equally 
to  both  sexes  and  so  does  not  come  within  the  scope  of 
this  study  which  deals  chiefly  with  distinctions  between 
men  and  women.  The  great  majority  of  people  almost 
everywhere  are  interested  in  criminal  affairs  principally 
from  the  standpoint  of  protection.  Impartial  jury  trials 
for  those  accused  of  crimes  were,  it  is  true,  highly  prized 
by  our  Anglo-Saxon  ancestors,  but  measures  for  the  safe- 
guarding and  reformation  of  criminals  or  those  accused 
of  crime  have  attracted  attention  only  recently  and 
rather  from  motives  of  public  welfare  than  from  per- 
sonal interest. 

THE  PROTECTION  OF  WOMEN 

The  Common  Law  apparently  made  little  distinction 
between  men  and  women  so  far  as  personal  protection 
was  concerned,  except  in  cases  involving  a  husband  and 
wife  and  in  the  class  of  crimes  which  are  based  upon 
differences  in  sex.  It  is  true  that  married  women  were 

53 


54      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

entitled  to  very  little  protection  against  mistreatment  by 
their  husbands,  unless  such  treatment  resulted  in  death, 
since  the  law  did  not  interfere  in  what  were  considered 
minor  domestic  difficulties.  The  murder  of  a  wife  was 
frankly  considered  a  less  important  crime  than  the  kill- 
ing of  the  husband  by  the  wife,  which  was  looked  upon  as 
a  kind  of  treason.  A  wife  was  also  expected  to  depend 
upon  her  husband  for  protection  against  many  of  the 
crimes  which  might  be  committed  against  her  person  or 
property  by  a  third  party. 

The  attitude  of  the  Common  Law  towards  the  sex 
crimes,  such  as  rape,  seduction,  and  prostitution,  has 
been  discussed  in  an  earlier  section.  It  is,  therefore, 
only  necessary  in  this  connection  to  note  that  the  laws 
were  generally  more  favorable  to  men  than  to  women  — 
at  least  as  applied  in  the  courts.  Furthermore,  these 
acts  appear  to  have  been  considered  largely  as  injuries 
against  the  husband  or  father  who  was  entitled  to  the 
woman 's  services  rather  than  against  the  woman  herself, 
since  the  spiritual  courts  rather  than  the  civil  courts  were 
responsible  for  the  punishment  of  immorality. 

The  Common  Law  was  at  first  the  basis  for  the  pun- 
ishment of  crimes  in  Iowa,  but  step  by  step  it  was  super- 
seded by  statute  laws  more  favorable  to  women.  In 
studying  the  development  of  these  laws  only  such  crimes 
as  rape,  seduction,  and  desertion  require  consideration 
since  women  have  been  entitled  to  equal  protection  in  the 
case  of  general  crimes. 

Rape  was  among  the  earliest  crimes  for  which  punish- 
ment was  provided  by  the  legislature  of  Iowa.  The  pen- 
alty for  this  crime  depended  upon  the  age  and  character 
of  the  woman,  and  hence  even  under  the  Common  Law 


WOMEN  AND  THE  CRIMINAL  LAW  55 

there  had  developed  a  minimum  age  below  which  the  girl 
was  considered  incapable  of  agreeing  to  her  own  dis- 
honor. The  Iowa  law  of  1838  accepted  the  Common  Law 
standard  and  fixed  ten  years  as  the  age  of  consent.  If 
the  girl  was  over  that  age,  proof  of  her  consent  or  non- 
resistance  prevented  prosecution.  The  punishment  in 
case  of  conviction  was  from  twenty  years  to  life  impris- 
onment if  the  victim  was  less  than  ten  years  of  age,  and 
if  she  was  ten  years  of  age  or  more  the  man,  if  found 
guilty,  might  be  imprisoned  for  not  more  than  ten  years 
and  fined  up  to  $500.105 

This  minimum  age  of  consent  remained  in  force  in 
Iowa  until  1886,  when  it  was  raised  to  thirteen;  and  in 
1896  fifteen  was  established  by  law  as  the  age  at  which  a 
girl  became  responsible  for  her  honor,  although  she  was 
required  to  be  eighteen  before  property  was  entrusted  to 
her  care.  Since  1896  no  change  in  this  particular  has 
been  made  although  a  definite  movement  to  fix  it  at 
eighteen  is  evident  from  the  petitions  presented  to  the 
various  General  Assemblies  —  as  many  as  thirty-three 
petitions  having  been  presented  to  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives alone  in  1915.  Occasional  bills  to  raise  the 
age  of  consent  have  also  been  introduced,  but  none  have 
been  favorably  acted  upon,  the  chief  argument  against 
the  change  being  the  possible  injustice  to  young  men.108 

Another  difficulty  in  securing  the  conviction  of  de- 
fendants accused  of  rape  has  been  the  requirement  that 
the  testimony  of  some  witness  other  than  the  injured 
person  must  be  presented  to  secure  conviction.  This  re- 
striction, although  intended  to  prevent  injustice  to  a  man 
accused  falsely,  has  made  difficult  the  conviction  of  the 
guilty.107 


56      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Closely  associated  with  this  universally  condemned 
crime  is  that  specified  as  enticing  a  virtuous  woman  to  a 
house  of  ill-fame.  The  Code  of  1851  provided  a  penalty 
of  from  three  to  ten  years  imprisonment  in  the  peniten- 
tiary for  this  crime,  and  one  year  in  jail  or  a  $500  fine 
for  keeping  such  a  resort.  A  second  conviction  increased 
the  penalty  for  the  latter  offense  to  three  years  in  the 
penitentiary.  Coercing  a  woman  into  marriage  was 
made  punishable  by  a  $1000  fine  and  a  penitentiary  sen- 
tence up  to  ten  years.  The  use  of  stupefying  drugs  for 
immoral  purposes  was  to  be  considered  as  rape.  A  spe- 
cial provision  was  made  in  case  the  woman  enticed  away 
for  immoral  purposes  was  under  fifteen.  Upon  convic- 
tion, the  one  responsible  for  such  an  act  might  be  sen- 
tenced to  three  years  in  the  penitentiary  or  a  $1000  fine 
and  one  year's  imprisonment  in  the  county  jail.  For 
enticing  away  a  girl  under  twelve  years  of  age,  the  pen- 
alty might  be  ten  years  in  the  penitentiary,  a  $1000  fine, 
or  both  fine  and  imprisonment.108 

The  statute  penalizing  the  enticing  of  a  virtuous  wom- 
an or  girl  into  resorts  of  prostitution  has  also  been  re- 
tained in  later  enactments,  and  in  1884  the  law  was  so 
amended  as  to  include  women  who  had  formerly  been  in 
such  resorts  but  had  partially  reformed.109 

Seduction,  which  involves  the  use  of  promises  or  de- 
ceit instead  of  force  or  drugs,  was  punishable  by  a  period 
of  five  years  in  the  penitentiary  or  a  $1000  fine  and  one 
year  in  jail,  but  the  subsequent  marriage  of  the  parties 
was  a  bar  to  prosecution.  As  in  the  case  of  rape,  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  other  than  the  complainant  was 
necessary  to  convict.110 

One  question  not  definitely  answered  by  the  Code  of 


WOMEN  AND  THE  CRIMINAL  LAW  57 

1851  was  the  responsibility  of  a  feeble-minded  girl  —  a 
common  victim  of  unscrupulous  men.  This  left  the  ques- 
tion for  the  courts  to  decide,  depending  largely  upon  the 
reason  or  sympathy  of  the  jury.  In  one  case  the  court 
ruled  that  lack  of  consent  was  to  be  presumed,  although 
in  the  case  of  normal  women  the  reverse  was  usually 
true.111 

In  a  trial  for  seduction  a  number  of  elements  must  be 
considered :  the  fact  of  the  crime  must  be  proven  and  the 
woman  must  have  been  of  previously  chaste  character. 
Iowa  courts  have  generally  assumed  a  woman  to  be 
chaste  until  she  has  been  proven  otherwise,  thus  throw- 
ing the  burden  of  proof  in  this  respect  upon  the  defend- 
ant. Seduction  accomplished  by  means  of  a  promise 
which  indicated  that  the  woman  was  not  deceived  could 
not  be  punished  as  a  crime  according  to  a  ruling  of  the 
Iowa  Supreme  Court  in  1898.112 

The  Code  of  1897  provided  a  penalty  for  desertion  by 
the  husband,  without  good  cause,  in  case  the  marriage 
had  been  the  means  of  escaping  prosecution  for  seduc- 
tion, although  desertion  was  not  at  this  time  made  a 
crime  in  other  cases.113  Ten  years  later,  however,  the 
General  Assembly  responded  to  the  popular  demand  that 
men  who  abandoned  their  wives  and  children  should  be 
punished  in  other  cases  as  well  as  the  one  fixed  in  1897. 
A  wife,  of  course,  might  obtain  a  divorce  for  desertion, 
but  that  did  not  help  support  the  family.  The  law  passed 
in  1907  provides  a  penalty  of  one  year's  imprisonment 
in  the  penitentiary  or  six  months  in  jail  for  any  man  who 
deserts  his  destitute  wife  or  children  under  sixteen  years 
of  age  and  for  any  woman  who  deserts  her  children 
under  that  age  if  they  are  left  destitute.  In  cases  of  this 


58      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

kind  the  husband  or  wife  are  competent  witnesses  for  the 
State,  although  they  can  not  be  compelled  to  testify.114 

WOMEN  OFFENDERS 

As  noted  above,  the  Common  Law  did  not,  as  a  rule, 
hold  a  woman  responsible  for  a  crime  or  tort  committed 
in  the  presence  of  her  husband  and  under  his  direction, 
the  assumption  being  that  it  was  the  wife's  duty  to  obey 
without  question  the  command  of  her  husband.  This 
rule,  in  a  modified  form,  has  largely  prevailed  in  Iowa. 
Indeed,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  has  applied  this  prin- 
ciple of  the  wife's  exemption  to  a  case  of  manslaughter, 
although  this  crime  was  one  of  the  exceptions  under  the 
Common  Law,  and  other  American  courts  have  generally 
held  the  wife  responsible  in  such  cases. 

The  Code  of  1851  contained  the  provision  that  a  mar- 
ried woman  might  be  found  guilty  of  arson  even  though 
the  property  destroyed  belonged  wholly  or  in  part  to  her 
husband  and  this  provision  has  been  retained  in  subse- 
quent codes.  The  presumption  of  the  wife's  innocence, 
in  so  far  as  it  applied  to  a  husband  and  wife  jointly  in- 
dicted for  keeping  a  disorderly  house,  was  also  denied  by 
the  Supreme  Court  in  1911.115 

In  other  respects  criminal  law  makes  little  distinction 
between  men  and  women  defendants.  It  sometimes 
seems  that  a  woman  charged  with  a  crime  has  an  advan- 
tage when  tried  before  a  jury  of  men ;  but  if  this  is  true 
it  is  entirely  a  matter  of  sentiment  and  not  of  law. 

In  the  matter  of  caring  for  prisoners  —  especially 
those  not  yet  tried  and  those  found  guilty  of  slight  of- 
fences—  the  people  of  Iowa  have  been,  on  the  whole, 
slow  to  realize  their  responsibility.  The  early  lawmakers 


WOMEN  AND  THE  CRIMINAL  LAW  59 

paid  little  heed  either  to  the  possibility  of  reforming 
men  or  women  convicted  of  crime  or  to  the  evil  effects  of 
collecting  old  and  young  offenders,  the  guilty  and  the 
innocent  in  the  jails  to  await  trial.  The  only  provision 
concerning  the  treatment  of  women  prisoners  found  in 
the  Old  Blue  Book  was  the  law  that  men  and  women  must 
not  be  confined  in  the  same  apartments.116 

This  remained  almost  the  sole  restriction  on  the  man- 
agement of  jails  in  this  particular  until  1894,  when  cities 
having  a  population  of  25,000  or  over  were  required  to 
provide  separate  apartments  at  certain  police  stations 
for  women  and  children  who  were  under  arrest  or  de- 
tained for  any  reason.  A  police  matron  was  also  to  be 
employed  and  was  to  receive  a  stipend  not  less  than  the 
minimum  paid  patrolmen.  Four  years  later,  the  min- 
imum population  was  raised  to  35,000  and  only  one  ma- 
tron in  each  city  was  required  instead  of  several.  Small- 
er cities  might  adopt  the  plan  if  they  desired,  but  it  was 
not  obligatory.117 

The  care  and  treatment  of  prisoners,  especially  wom- 
en, after  conviction  first  began  to  attract  public  attention 
about  1870.  Indeed,  women  convicts  have  always  been 
comparatively  few  in  numbers  in  Iowa  and  in  the  early 
days  were  almost  unknown.  Moreover,  the  public  con- 
science had  not  been  awakened  to  the  possibility  of  pre- 
vention and  reform. 

In  1882  a  committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
appointed  to  consider  a  petition  presented  by  the  Wom- 
an's Christian  Temperance  Union,  reported  in  part  as 
follows : 

Your  committee  confidently  believe  that  at  an  early  day  the 
legislature  of  the  State  of  Iowa  will  take  proper  steps  and  enact 


60      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

a  law  establishing  an  institution  or  prison  of  the  kind  referred  to 
.  wherein  fallen  women  convicted  of  crime  may  be  con- 
fined, looking  to  the  reclaiming  of  the  virtue  of  the  fallen  and 
lost  women,  and  in  connection  with  said  institution  a  reforma- 
tory school  may  be  established  for  the  reformation  of  the  young 
and  tender  lost  females.118 

The  legislation  suggested  was  not  provided,  however, 
and  petitions  continued  to  pour  into  both  houses  from 
individuals  and  societies  interested  in  this  reform.119  In 
1890  the  General  Assembly  appropriated  $30,000  for  a 
building  for  women  convicts  at  Anamosa,  and  the  Code 
of  1897  authorized  the  warden  of  the  penitentiary  at  that 
place  to  appoint  a  matron  to  take  charge  of  the  women 
imprisoned  there.  Three  years  later  the  Iowa  Industrial 
Reformatory  for  Females  was  established  in  connection 
with  the  Anamosa  penitentiary:  it  was  organized  as  a 
separate  institution  under  the  Board  of  Control.  An- 
other law,  adopted  in  1907,  provided  that  any  female 
heretofore  or  hereafter  "convicted  of  a  felony  and  sen- 
tenced to  the  penitentiary "  should  be  sent  to  Anamosa. 
Furthermore,  girls  under  eighteen  might  be  sent  there 
instead  of  to  Mitchellville  at  the  discretion  of  the  court, 
and  girls  over  fourteen  might  be  transferred  from  Mitch- 
ellville to  the  reformatory  if  unruly  and  incorrigible. 
Besides  making  these  provisions  for  women  convicted  of 
crime  the  General  Assembly  also,  in  1904,  enacted  a  law 
that  females  who  were  dipsomaniacs,  inebriates,  or  ad- 
dicted to  the  excessive  use  of  drugs  might  be  sent  to 
a  State  hospital  for  the  insane.120 

Finally,  in  response  to  a  determined  if  not  a  general 
demand  the  legislature,  in  1913,  made  an  appropriation 
for  the  purchase  of  a  new  site  for  the  Industrial  Re- 


WOMEN  AND  THE  CRIMINAL  LAW  61 

formatory  for  Females  to  take  the  place  of  the  Anamosa 
annex.  Two  years  later  a  general  outline  for  the  admin- 
istration of  the  new  institution  was  drawn  up  and 
adopted.  This  scheme  provided  for  a  woman  superin- 
tendent with  a  salary  of  $2000  a  year  and  board  and 
dwelling  for  herself  and  her  minor  children.  The  super- 
intendent was  empowered  to  appoint  subordinates.  All 
the  women  convicts  at  Anamosa  and  all  women  over  six- 
teen years  of  age  who  might  afterwards  be  convicted 
were  to  be  imprisoned  at  the  new  reformatory  when  it 
was  ready  for  occupancy.  In  addition  to  the  older  of- 
fenders, all  girls  between  twelve  and  sixteen  years  of  age 
who  might  be  convicted  of  an  offense  punishable  by  life 
imprisonment  might  be  sent  to  the  new  institution  or  to 
the  industrial  school  as  the  court  might  decide.  The  law 
also  required  that  any  woman  prisoner  when  being  trans- 
ferred from  one  place  to  another  must  be  accompanied  by 
a  woman  attendant  designated  by  the  warrant.121 

When  the  General  Assembly  met  in  1917  agitation  was 
begun  to  repeal  the  act  of  the  earlier  legislature  and  sell 
the  land  which  had  already  been  purchased  at  Eockwell 
City  for  the  new  reformatory  for  women.  The  movement 
failed,  however,  and  the  only  statute  concerning  this  in- 
stitution which  was  adopted  was  one  changing  the  name 
from  the  "Iowa  Industrial  Reformatory  for  Females" 
to  "The  Women's  Reformatory".122 

Closely  associated  with  the  treatment  of  adult  women 
offenders  after  conviction  and  even  more  important  per- 
haps was  the  attitude  of  the  State  government  towards 
delinquent  girls.  When  the  Iowa  Reform  School  was 
established  in  1868  it  was  intended  for  both  boys  and 
girls ;  but  the  limited  support  made  it  impossible  to  pro- 


62      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

vide  suitable  quarters  for  the  girls  during  the  time  when 
the  school  was  located  in  Lee  County.  Four  girls,  how- 
ever, were  cared  for  in  the  family  of  the  superintendent, 
and  thus  the  law  was  to  some  extent  carried  out.123 

In  1872  the  boys  were  moved  to  Eldora  and  the  farm 
in  Lee  County  was  made  available  for  delinquent  girls  by 
an  appropriation  of  $5000.  The  superintendent  was 
under  the  direction  of  the  superintendent  of  the  school  at 
Eldora  and  reports  were  made  as  if  the  two  schools  were 
united.  Eleven  girls  were  present  in  1873,  and  by  1875 
this  number  had  increased  to  thirty.  After  much  discus- 
sion as  to  the  advisability  of  consolidating  the  two 
schools  at  Eldora,  the  plan  was  rejected,  and  when  the 
lease  on  the  Lee  County  farm  ran  out  in  1878  the  girls 
were  removed  to  temporary  quarters  at  Mount  Pleasant. 
The  maximum  age  limit  was  reduced  to  sixteen  in  1876 
and  the  minimum  age  was  fixed  at  seven,  but  in  spite  of 
this  fact  there  were  fifty-three  girls  in  this  department  in 
1877.  Two  years  later  steps  were  taken  to  secure  a  site 
near  Mitchellville  and  forty  acres  were  purchased,  to- 
gether with  the  building  of  a  seminary,  as  a  site  for  the 
present  Industrial  School  for  Girls.124 

The  Code  of  1897  fixed  the  per  capita  allowance  for 
the  boys  in  the  industrial  school  at  ten  dollars  a  month 
and  that  for  the  girls  at  eleven  dollars.  The  Twenty- 
eighth  General  Assembly  increased  the  allowance  for 
girls  to  twelve  dollars  per  month  and  fixed  the  minimum 
age  at  nine  instead  of  seven  years.  In  1913,  the  two 
branches  of  the  school  were  declared  to  be  separate  insti- 
tutions under  the  management  of  the  Board  of  Control. 
The  provisions  concerning  the  schools,  however,  remain 
almost  identical.  Boys  and  girls  may  be  committed  to 


WOMEN  AND  THE  CRIMINAL  LAW  63 

these  schools  between  the  ages  of  ten  and  eighteen,  but 
no  sentence  can  extend  beyond  the  age  of  twenty-one. 
Certain  classes  of  girls,  however,  are  sent  to  the  reforma- 
tory instead  of  to  the  Industrial  School,  and  other  girls, 
at  the  discretion  of  the  court,  may  be  sent  to  reputable 
institutions  maintained  in  the  State  for  such  girls.  In 
this  case  an  allowance  is  to  be  paid  to  the  institution  by 
the  county  from  which  the  girl  is  sent.  A  per  capita 
allowance  of  thirteen  dollars  for  each  boy  and  sixteen 
dollars  a  month  for  each  girl  is  provided  by  the  State 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  schools.125 

The  application  of  general  terms  to  specific  cases  is 
always  an  important  point  in  legislation  and  judicial 
action.  The  word  "  person "  which,  for  example,  is  used 
generally  in  the  Constitution  and  laws  has  been  inter- 
preted as  referring  only  to  a  man  in  so  far  as  political 
affairs  are  concerned,  but  as  referring  to  either  men  or 
women  in  criminal  matters.  Indeed,  as  late  as  1915  it 
was  urged  that  the  words  "any  person "  in  the  statute 
providing  for  the  punishment  of  "prostitution  or  lewd- 
ness"  applied  only  to  women;  but  in  this  case  the  Su- 
preme Court  ruled  that  it  might  also  apply  to  men.  A 
woman  would  be  guilty  of  prostitution,  a  man  of  lewd- 
ness.126 

According  to  the  definition  of  a  "  tramp ' '  made  by  the 
General  Assembly  in  1890  a  woman  can  not  be  legally 
considered  as  such,  since  a  tramp  was  declared  to  be  any 
"male  person  sixteen  years  of  age  or  over  who  is  phys- 
ically able  to  perform  manual  labor "  and  yet  refuses  to 
do  so  and  is  not  able  to  provide  for  himself  honestly  in 
other  ways.127 


VII 
MAEEIAGE  AND  DIVOECE 

THEKE  has  been  a  large  amount  of  legislation  enacted  in 
Iowa  concerning  the  rights  of  married  persons,  but  com- 
paratively little  relating  to  the  marriage  contract  or  its 
dissolution.  Marriage  in  Iowa  is  considered  a  civil  con- 
tract between  a  man  and  woman  who  have  the  proper 
qualifications  to  enter  into  such  a  contract:  it  is  also  a 
status  in  which  the  community  is  interested  as  a  party. 
Consequently,  the  State  exercises  control  over  the  forma- 
tion of  the  contract  and  restricts  or  regulates  its  abroga- 
tion or  dissolution. 

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  MARRIAGE 

When  Iowa  became  a  Territory  in  1838  its  law  con- 
cerning marriage  was  derived  from  the  Common  Law  and 
from  the  legislation  of  the  Old  Northwest.  Thus  a  valid 
marriage  contract  might  be  made  by  a  woman  at  twelve 
years  of  age  and  by  a  man  at  fourteen.128  A  year  later 
the  Legislative  Assembly  raised  the  minimum  age  to 
eighteen  for  men  and  fourteen  for  women,  although  a 
boy  between  fourteen  and  eighteen  and  a  girl  between 
twelve  and  fourteen  years  of  age  might  make  a  valid 
marriage  contract  if  the  father's  consent  was  obtained 
—  or,  in  the  case  of  his  death  or  disability,  the  mother's 
approval  was  sufficient.  In  all  other  respects  the  law 
made  no  distinction  between  the  qualifications  required 
of  men  and  women.129 

64 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  65 

When  the  Code  of  1851  was  adopted  the  minimum  age 
was  fixed  at  sixteen  for  males  and  fourteen  for  females. 
Persons  under  these  minimum  ages  could  not  make  a 
valid  marriage  contract,  while  the  consent  of  the  ' '  parent 
or  guardian "  was  necessary  if  either  party  was  a  mi- 
nor.130 The  age  qualifications  have  not  been  changed 
since  1851 ;  but  since  1897  the  law  provides  that  if  either 
party  is  a  minor  the  consent  of  the  " parents"  is  neces- 
sary, or  that  of  the  survivor  if  one  is  dead  or  disqualified. 
The  Iowa  laws  have  fixed  twenty-one  as  the  age  of  ma- 
jority for  men  and  eighteen  for  girls,  but  all  minors  at- 
tain their  majority  at  marriage.131 

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  IHVORCE 

Divorce  in  many  of  the  ancient  countries  was  granted 
only  to  the  husband  and  was  probably  associated  with 
the  theory  that  a  wife  was  a  form  of  property.  The 
owner  might  dispose  of  his  chattel;  but,  of  course,  a 
chattel  was  not  competent  to  dispose  of  its  owner.  Under 
the  Common  Law  the  wife  was,  theoretically  at  least,  en- 
titled to  secure  a  divorce  for  certain  causes,  but  in  prac- 
tice she  was  at  a  disadvantage  in  beginning  a  suit  for 
divorce,  since  the  husband  was  given  control  of  all  the 
property,  the  children,  and  even  the  wife 's  person. 

Causes  for  Divorces  in  Iowa. —  Under  the  laws  of 
Iowa  the  causes  for  which  divorces  may  be  granted  have 
been,  as  nearly  as  possible,  the  same  for  men  and  wom- 
en132—  although  the  interpretation  of  the  laws  has  va- 
ried according  to  the  sentiment  of  the  judges  and,  until 
1846,  of  the  legislators.  It  will,  therefore,  be  of  interest 
to  point  out  only  the  distinctions  between  husbands  and 
wives  in  divorce  legislation  and  court  decisions. 


66      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

As  a  general  rule  public  sentiment  in  the  early  days 
opposed  the  resort  of  the  wife  to  a  divorce  court.  Mar- 
ried women  were  expected  to  yield  their  preferences  and 
even  their  rights  rather  than  oppose  the  wishes  of  their 
husbands.  A  newspaper  paragraph  on  the  subject  in 
1843  contains  the  following  advice  to  wives : ' '  Study  your 
husband's  temper  and  character;  and  be  it  your  pride 
and  pleasure  to  conform  to  his  wishes.  Check  at  once  the 
first  advances  to  contradiction,  even  of  the  most  trivial 
nature. "  "How  indecorous  and  offensive  it  is",  con- 
tinued the  same  authority,  "to  see  a  woman  exercising 
authority  over  her  husband  and  saying,  'I  will  have  it 
so/  'It  shall  be  done  as  I  like'  ",133 

Wives  apparently  did  not  always  follow  this  advice, 
or  if  they  did  it  was  not  sufficient  to  prevent  dissensions, 
for  divorces  were  not  unusual  even  in  early  Iowa  history. 
Among  the  causes  usually  established  by  law  were:  im- 
potency,  bigamy,  adultery,  desertion,  conviction  of  a 
felony  after  marriage,  drunkenness  if  acquired  after 
marriage,  inhuman  treatment,  and  incompatibility.  As 
has  already  been  stated  these  causes,  while  in  force,  ap- 
plied equally  to  men  and  women,  so  that  there  is  no  need 
to  discuss  each  one  separately.134 

Although  a  husband  has  always  been  legally  required 
to  support  his  wife,  failure  to  support  her  is  not  of  itself 
a  cause  for  divorce  in  Iowa  although  it  may  be  included 
in  desertion  or  inhuman  treatment. 

One  of  the  few  provisions  relative  to  divorce  in  which 
the  wife's  offense  only  is  mentioned  as  a  cause  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Code  of  1873  and  also  in  later  codes.  This 
section  gives  the  husband  the  right  to  secure  a  divorce 
from  the  wife  if,  at  the  time  of  their  marriage,  she  was 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  67 

pregnant  by  another,  unless  he  had  an  illegitimate  child 
living  at  the  time  unknown  to  the  wife.  The  existence  of 
such  child  did  not,  however,  entitle  the  wife  to  a  divorce 
—  it  merely  acted  as  a  bar  to  the  granting  of  a  divorce  to 
the  husband  on  account  of  the  wife 's  misconduct.135 

Cruel  or  inhuman  treatment  has  ordinarily  been  one 
of  the  causes  for  divorce  by  either  husband  or  wife  in 
Iowa ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  charge  has  been  more 
frequently  preferred  by  women  than  by  men.  For  this 
reason  the  definition  of  "  cruel  or  inhuman  treatment " 
requires  a  brief  discussion  in  a  paper  dealing  with  the 
differences  between  the  legal  and  political  status  of  men 
and  women  in  Iowa. 

It  is  evident  that  the  opinions  of  the  courts  might 
vary  greatly  as  to  what  would  constitute  "  cruel  or  in- 
human treatment ".  In  1871  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court 
decided  that  a  wife  was  not  entitled  to  a  divorce  on  this 
ground  unless  it  threatened  physical  danger.  "Mere 
turbulence  of  temper,  petulance  of  manner,  infirmity  of 
body  or  mind",  declared  the  judges,  "are  not  numbered 
among  these  grave  and  weighty  causes.  .  .  .  And  it 
is  not  every  slight  touching  of  the  wife  by  the  husband, 
even  in  anger,  which  will  justify  a  divorce."  This  de- 
cision appears  to  be  a  lineal  descendant  of  the  old 
opinion  that  a  husband  might  chastise  his  wife  if  he  did 
not  use  a  stick  larger  around  than  his  thumb.136 

Later  decisions,  however,  have  given  a  broader  mean- 
ing to  the  words.  In  1889  it  was  decided  by  the  same 
court  that  "cruel  or  inhuman  treatment"  need  not  be 
physical,  and  a  wife  who  left  her  husband  for  cause  could 
not  be  held  to  have  deserted  him.137  Moreover,  repeated 
assertions  by  the  husband  that  the  wife  was  unchaste, 


68      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

made  in  the  presence  of  the  family  or  others,  was  in  one 
case  held  to  be  sufficient  cause  for  divorce,  since  such  a 
charge  would  naturally  produce  a  mental  state  detri- 
mental to  health.  On  the  other  hand,  a  similar  charge 
made  by  the  wife  against  the  husband  was  not  generally 
considered  sufficient  to  injure  his  health.  The  wife  could 
not  secure  redress  in  this  case,  however,  if  she  by  her 
wrongful  acts  provoked  the  cruel  treatment.138 

Alimony. —  The  chief  problems  associated  with  di- 
vorce cases,  aside  from  the  question  of  the  divorce  itself, 
are  the  adjustment  of  financial  claims  and  the  disposal  of 
the  minor  children.  The  financial  settlement  was  in  the 
beginning  an  outgrowth  of  the  Common  Law  principle 
that  the  wife's  property  came  under  the  husband's  con- 
trol at  marriage,  while  he  was  required  to  supply  her 
with  necessities  in  keeping  with  his  station  in  life,  so  long 
as  she  remained  at  home.  The  influence  of  this  rule  is 
observable  in  the  first  law  regulating  divorces  passed  by 
the  Territorial  legislature. 

One  of  the  causes  for  which  a  divorce  might  be  grant- 
ed at  that  time  was  adultery,  and  if  the  wife  was  the 
guilty  party  the  husband  received  all  her  personal  prop- 
erty as  his  own  and  was  to  be  given  the  use  of  her  real 
estate  during  his  life,  if  there  were  children,  or  during 
her  life  if  there  were  none.  If  the  husband,  on  the  con- 
trary, was  the  offender,  and  there  were  no  children  the 
wife  was  permitted  to  keep  her  own  property  and  to  re- 
ceive such  alimony  as  the  court  might  assign  her  during 
her  life,  but  this  could  not  exceed  one-half  of  the  hus- 
band's income.  This  provision  was  to  be  modified  at  the 
discretion  of  the  court  if  there  were  children.139 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  69 

A  law  of  1840,  however,  repealed  this  provision,  de- 
claring merely  that  the  guilty  party,  in  case  of  divorce, 
forfeited  all  the  rights  acquired  by  marriage.  Property 
acquired  by  the  husband  at  the  time  of  the  marriage  was 
to  be  settled  upon  the  wife  and  children,  if  the  wife  se- 
cured the  divorce.  Alimony  could  be  granted  only  to  the 
wife,  and  on  the  condition  that  she  was  the  innocent 
party.  This  was  usually  a  money  payment  made  by  the 
month  or  year  and  was  assigned  to  the  wife  in  recogni- 
tion of  her  right  to  support  by  her  husband.  If  the 
man's  income  increased,  the  alimony  might  also  be  in- 
creased by  an  appeal  to  the  court  which  had  granted  the 
divorce.140 

The  Code  of  1851  made  no  attempt  to  provide  the  de- 
tails of  property  settlement  in  case  of  divorce,  but  it  was 
provided  that  "when  a  divorce  is  decreed  the  court  may 
make  such  order  in  relation  to  the  children  and  property 
of  the  parties  and  the  maintenance  of  the  wife  as  shall  be 
right  and  proper.  "141 

Four  years  later  a  case  arose  which  required  the 
interpretation  of  the  word  "alimony".  A  wife  who  had 
been  granted  a  divorce  had  been  given  eighty  acres  of 
the  three  hundred  and  forty-five  acres  held  in  the  hus- 
band's name,  but  partly  paid  for  with  money  belonging 
to  the  wife.  The  husband  did  not  contest  the  divorce 
decree:  he  merely  denied  the  authority  of  the  court  to 
grant  land  to  the  wife,  on  the  ground  that  "alimony" 
meant  a  money  payment  and  not  a  division  of  real  estate. 
The  Supreme  Court,  however,  upheld  the  district  court, 
basing  its  decision  upon  the  words  of  the  Code  and  also 
upon  equity.  "While  technically,  perhaps,"  reads  the 
decision,  "it  [the  land]  is  recognized  as  the  husband's, 


70      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

yet  rightly  and  properly,  it  is  also  the  wife's  .  .  .  . 
It  is  not  his  nor  hers,  but  theirs."142 

This  recognition  of  the  wife's  claim  to  a  share  in  the 
common  property  instead  of  to  maintenance  only  sug- 
gests that  *  '  alimony ' '  meant  the  share  of  property  grant- 
ed to  one  of  the  parties  to  a  divorce  as  a  recompense  for 
the  dower  right  which,  of  course,  ended  whenever  the 
marriage  was  dissolved.  Accordingly  it  appears  that  ali- 
mony might  legally  have  been  granted  to  a  husband  out 
of  the  separate  estate  of  the  wife  in  case  he  secured  the 
divorce. 

Since  the  wife  was  entitled  to  support,  however,  and 
the  husband  was  not,  alimony  was  most  frequently 
granted  to  the  wife  and  was  considered  almost  as  much 
her  prerogative  as  it  had  been  before  1851.  Indeed,  so 
complete  was  the  husband's  control  over  the  wife's  prop- 
erty at  this  time  that  few  wives  maintained  a  separate 
title  to  their  property  and  thus  the  husband  received  it 
without  the  formality  of  a  court  decree. 

Indeed,  the  wife  was  sometimes  granted  alimony  even 
when  she  was  the  guilty  party,  for  in  1871  the  Supreme 
Court  reversed  a  decision  of  a  lower  court  which  gave  a 
wife  alimony  although  she  had  been  guilty  of  adultery. 
The  higher  court,  however,  decided  that  she  was  not  en- 
titled to  alimony  under  the  circumstances  if  the  husband 
had  received  no  property  from  her  or  she  had  not  con- 
tributed to  the  common  fund.143  This  decision,  which 
indirectly  recognized  the  right  of  even  a  faithless  wife 
to  a  share  in  her  own  property,  was  much  more  lenient 
than  the  law  of  1838  which  had  deprived  the  wife  of  all 
right  to  her  own  property  as  well  as  to  support  from  the 
husband. 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  71 

As  has  already  been  stated,  alimony  in  the  original 
meaning  of  the  term  is  usually  granted  only  to  the  wife, 
since  she  is  entitled  to  support  from  the  husband  if  she 
is  the  innocent  party,  while  she  owes  no  such  obligation 
to  him.  The  term  "alimony",  however,  has  frequently 
been  used  to  denote  compensation  paid  by  one  of  the 
divorced  persons  —  usually  to  the  injured  party  as  a 
substitute  for  the  property  right  acquired  by  marriage 
and  lost  by  the  divorce.  In  this  sense  alimony  is  some- 
times awarded  to  the  husband. 

The  Code  of  1873  provided  that  in  case  of  divorce 
' t  the  court  may  order  either  party  to  pay  the  clerk  a  sum 
of  money  for  the  separate  support  and  maintenance  of 
the  adverse  party  and  the  children,  and  to  enable  such 
party  to  prosecute  or  defend  the  action.  "144  Indeed,  in 
1882,  a  husband  was  awarded  $300  alimony  by  the  dis- 
trict court,  although  he  was  at  fault  and  had  already 
taken  some  $400  worth  of  the  wife's  property.  The  Su- 
preme Court  permitted  the  sum  of  twenty-five  dollars 
allowed  as  an  attorney's  fee  to  stand,  but  denied  the  rest 
as  unjust.145  Likewise,  the  court  set  aside  a  decree  of 
alimony  granted  to  the  husband  in  an  ex  parte  suit,  on  the 
ground  that  the  real  estate  involved  had  been  purchased 
with  his  money,  when  it  was  proven  that  this  claim  was 
false.146 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  has  de- 
cided that  a  husband's  surety  could  not  escape  an  obli- 
gation for  temporary  alimony  on  the  ground  that  the 
wife  had  appropriated  goods  from  the  husband's  house, 
since  the  wife  is  presumed  to  have  a  right  to  use  the 
household  goods;  nor  can  a  debt  for  alimony  be  evaded 
by  a  fraudulent  conveyance  of  property.147 


72      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Court  decisions  in  divorce  cases  have  on  the  whole 
become  gradually  more  favorable  to  women.  In  1896  a 
wife  was  awarded  $750  a  year  out  of  the  husband 's  sal- 
ary of  $1500,  but  she  had  two  small  children  to  support 
out  of  her  allowance.  Again  in  1911  an  award  to  the  wife 
of  $2500  out  of  $5000  worth  of  property  was  likewise 
confirmed.148 

In  case  the  wife  accepted  service  of  a  notice  of  a  di- 
vorce action  and  failed  to  appear,  the  courts  decided  that 
she  could  not  afterwards  secure  alimony;  but  a  volun- 
tary separation  in  which  she  agreed  to  release  her  claim 
upon  her  husband's  property  has  been  held  to  be  no  bar 
to  alimony,  since  such  agreements  are  invalid.149 

In  addition  to  alimony  the  husband  or  wife  may  put 
in  a  claim  for  attorney's  fees.  This  is  usually  allowed  to 
the  wife  when  the  husband  is  the  offending  party,  but 
may  also  be  awarded  the  husband.  The  reason  for  al- 
lowing the  wife  attorney's  fees  is  very  evident  when  it  is 
considered  that  the  property  acquired  by  the  joint  labor 
of  both  husband  and  wife  is  frequently  under  the  sole 
control  of  the  former.  The  justice  of  allowing  such  ex- 
penses to  the  husband  out  of  the  wife's  property  is  less 
evident. 

The  court  rulings  have  usually  allowed  attorney's 
fees  to  the  wife  in  case  the  husband  appeals  after  a  di- 
vorce has  been  granted  her  when  she  has  established  her 
right  to  it.  The  husband  may  also  be  charged  with  at- 
torney's fees  if  he  accuses  the  wife  of  acts  which,  if  true, 
would  reflect  upon  her  reputation  —  unless  he  can  prove 
that  the  charges  are  true.  But  if  the  wife  begins  an  un- 
necessary suit  or  dismisses  a  well-founded  one,  it  has 
been  decided  that  her  lawyer  can  not  collect  his  fee  from 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  73 

the  husband,  even  though  the  action  was  dismissed  with- 
out the  attorney's  consent.150  Decisions  on  this  point  are 
not  uniform,  however,  since  the  decision  rests  upon  the 
opinion  of  the  court  in  each  case. 

It  has  also  been  decided  that  alimony  may  be  granted 
to  a  wife  without  a  divorce  in  case  she  leaves  her  hus- 
band for  conduct  justifying  a  divorce,  and  the  husband 
may  be  compelled  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  action.151  Such 
a  decision  is,  however,  based  upon  equity  and  public  pol- 
icy and  not  upon  statutory  law. 

Disposition  of  Children. —  Many  divorce  cases  also 
involve  the  disposition  of  children;  and  here  there  is 
great  difficulty  in  formulating  any  general  rule.  Early 
judges  were  strongly  impressed  by  the  father's  para- 
mount right  to  the  children  as  found  in  the  Common  Law, 
and  the  mother  was  frequently  denied  the  guardianship 
of  her  children  even  when  she  was  the  innocent  party. 
The  divorces  granted  by  the  legislature  between  1838 
and  1846  were,  on  the  contrary,  much  more  favorable  to 
the  mothers,  and  the  husband  was  sometimes  denied  the 
right  of  control  either  of  the  children  or  of  the  wife's 
property.  Wives  were  frequently  given  permission  to 
resume  their  maiden  names,  and  in  at  least  one  case  the 
child  was  also  to  bear  the  mother's  maiden  name.152 

The  disposition  of  minor  children  is  one  of  the  most 
important  of  the  judge's  duties  in  divorce  cases  where 
there  are  such  children,  but  data  as  to  the  number  grant- 
ed to  the  husbands  and  to  the  wives  are  not  available 
except  in  scattered  court  records.  In  case  the  wife 
brings  the  suit  and  secures  the  divorce  she  has  usually 
been  awarded  the  custody  of  the  minor  children,  espe- 


74      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

cially  since  the  time  of  the  Civil  War.  Possibly  it  is  be- 
cause of  this  that  the  divorce  cases  begun  by  wives  show 
a  larger  proportion  reporting  children  than  do  those 
brought  by  husbands.  Out  of  the  26,384  divorces  secured 
by  women  in  Iowa  between  1887  and  1906,  it  appears  that 
14,325  involved  children;  while  only  2640  of  the  8490 
divorces  granted  to  husbands  reported  children.  The 
number  of  children  involved  in  the  former  group  was 
27,339,  and  in  the  latter  4643.  Since  the  children  are 
generally  given  to  the  mother  if  she  secures  the  divorce 
and  sometimes  even  when  she  is  the  defendant  in  the 
suit,  it  is  probable  that  the  wives  secured  the  custody  of 
a  large  per  cent  of  the  children  disposed  of  by  the  courts. 
From  1887  to  1906  the  statistics  of  divorce  for  Iowa 
were  as  follows:153 


CASKS  REPORTING 
CHILDREN 

CASES  REPORTING 
No  CHILDREN 

CASES  NOT 
REPORTING  AS 
TO  CHILDREN 

CASKS  REPORTING 
NUMBER  or 
CHILDREN 

NUMBER  OF 
CHILDREN 
REPORTED 

Total 

Husband 

2,640 

4,173 

1,677 

2,430 

4,643 

Number 

Wife 

14,325 

8,417 

3,642 

13,746 

27,339 

For 

Husband 

882 

1,151 

Adultery 

Wife 

1,045 

750 

For 

Husband 

435 

526 

Cruelty 

Wife 

5,720 

3,260 

For 

Husband 

1,156 

2,198 

Desertion 

Wife 

4,566 

2,810 

For 

Husband 

37 

47 

Drunkenness 

Wife 

1,613 

816 

For  Combinations 

Husband 

98 

135 

of  Causes 

Wife 

1,030 

513 

For  All 

Husband 

32 

116 

Other  Causes 

Wife 

351 

268 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  75 

Number  of  Divorces. —  A  comparison  of  the  divorce 
statistics  of  the  various  countries  and  States  proves  that 
the  number  of  divorces  is  not  of  itself  an  indication  of 
the  status  of  women  or  the  happiness  of  married  people. 
Japan,  for  example,  had  a  ratio  of  about  one  divorce  to 
three  marriages  during  the  period  between  1887  and 
1896,  while  France  had  only  about  one  to  forty;  and  yet 
the  position  of  women  was  probably  better  in  France 
than  in  Japan.154  On  the  other  hand,  it  can  not  be  as- 
sumed that  women  are  more  unjustly  treated  in  Nevada 
where  divorce  is  frequent  than  in  South  Carolina  where 
it  is  almost  unknown. 

Many  factors  combine  to  determine  the  divorce  rate 
of  a  country  or  State.  Religion,  social  conditions,  cus- 
tom, and  economic  conditions  are  among  the  more  im- 
portant influences  determining  the  attitude  of  people 
toward  divorce  and  the  status  of  divorced  persons.  The 
development  of  an  independent  personality  by  the  wom- 
en of  a  country  may  also  increase  the  divorce  rate  until 
social  readjustment  is  secured. 

None  of  the  influences  mentioned  have  predominated 
in  Iowa,  although  the  divorce  rate  has  been  affected  by 
all  of  them.  The  pioneers  were  intensely  individualistic, 
cared  little  about  the  religious  side  of  marriage,  and  nat- 
urally considered  that  a  civil  contract  made  under  the 
authority  of  the  State  could  likewise  be  dissolved  by  a 
decree  of  the  courts  or  by  an  act  of  the  legislature.  There 
was  no  mysterious  sanctity  about  a  marriage  ceremony 
performed  by  a  frontier  justice  of  the  peace.  Divorce 
was  restrained  only  by  morality,  reason,  and  the  re- 
spect for  the  marriage  institution  which  prevailed  among 
the  Iowa  pioneers. 


76      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Sufficient  proof  that  the  alleged  grievances  were  true 
was  not  always  required.  Indeed,  in  the  legislative  di- 
vorces no  attempt  was  made  to  hear  both  sides  of  the 
case.  It  was  apparently  the  belief  of  the  legislators  that 
no  one  would  ask  for  a  divorce  without  good  reason  or  at 
least  that  the  contract  might  as  well  be  dissolved  if  one 
or  both  of  the  parties  to  it  were  dissatisfied.  The  Iowa 
legislature  did  not  even  consider  each  case  separately, 
but  included  several  divorces  in  a  single  bill.  An  exam- 
ple is  found  in  a  law  passed  over  the  Governor's  veto  in 
1842,  by  which  no  less  than  eighteen  couples  were 
divorced.155 

The  courts  also  had  jurisdiction  over  divorce  cases, 
but  many  persons  apparently  preferred  the  less  expen- 
sive and  easier  method  of  direct  legislation.  Since  1846, 
however,  all  divorce  cases  have  been  tried  by  the  district 
courts,  the  General  Assembly  being  denied  the  power  to 
grant  divorces. 

The  proportion  of  divorces  granted  to  husbands  and 
wives  is  of  great  interest  in  the  study  of  the  legal  posi- 
tion of  women  and  should  be  considered  in  connection 
with  the  total  number.  This  proportion  will  be  affected 
by  two  things :  the  provocation  given,  and  the  ability  of 
the  one  injured  to  secure  redress  by  an  appeal  to  the  law. 
In  other  words,  the  relative  number  of  divorces  granted 
to  husbands  and  wives  will  vary  with  the  equality  or  in- 
equality of  men  and  women  before  the  law  and  also  with 
the  treatment  accorded  one  by  the  other.  If  a  wife  whose 
husband  is  unfaithful  to  her  knows  that  she  will  lose  the 
companionship  of  her  children  if  she  secures  a  divorce, 
she  will  often  prefer  to  remain  at  home.  Again,  the  law 
may  protect  the  wife,  but  if  she  is  afraid  to  act  or  is 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  77 

ignorant  of  the  laws  in  her  favor,  she  must  endure  ill 
treatment,  since  interference  by  third  parties  is  worse 
than  useless. 

It  has  been  said  above  that  the  total  number  of  di- 
vorces indicates  very  imperfectly  the  happiness  or  un- 
happiness  of  married  couples.  It  is  also  true  that  the 
States  in  which  the  wives  obtain  half  or  more  than  half 
of  the  divorces  are  not  necessarily  the  ones  in  which  hus- 
bands are  most  cruel  or  unfaithful  to  their  wives.  As 
one  writer  has  said,  "Divorces  to  wives  measure  their 
resistance,  not  their  burdens."156  In  this  respect  the 
legislative  divorces  were  far  ahead  of  the  time  in  which 
they  were  granted,  for  thirty-four  of  the  fifty-two  di- 
vorces granted  by  the  legislature  during  the  period  be- 
tween 1838  and  1846  were  in  behalf  of  wives.157 

Unfortunately,  statistics  concerning  the  divorces 
granted  by  the  courts  are  not  available  for  the  State  as  a 
whole  until  1867,  and  it  was  not  until  1887  that  the  num- 
ber granted  to  husbands  and  wives  was  separately  re- 
ported. Even  since  then,  information  concerning  the 
disposition  of  the  children  and  the  division  of  property 
is  incomplete.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  the  judges 
were  much  more  conservative  than  the  legislators,  for 
they  were  more  influenced  by  the  Common  Law. 

Statistics  concerning  the  divorces  granted  in  the 
United  States  between  1867  and  1906  have  been  compiled 
by  the  government.  From  this  report  some  idea  of  the 
number  of  divorces  granted  in  Iowa  during  this  period 
and  the  relative  number  granted  to  husbands  and  wives 
may  be  gained.  For  each  of  the  five-year  periods  the 
numbers  are  as  follows : 


78      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 


HUSBAND 

WIFE 

1867-1871 

1,058 

1,780 

1872-1876 

1,145 

2,364 

1877-1881 

1,436 

3,178 

1882-1886 

1,588 

4,015 

5,227  11,337  16,564 

1887-1891                1,649  4,454  6,103 

1892-1896                1,933  5,767  7,700 

1897-1901                2,347  7,466  9,813 

1902-1906                2,561  8,697  11,258 


8,490  26,384  34,874! » 

From  this  table  it  appears  that  during  the  twenty 
years  from  1867  to  1886  a  total  of  11,337  divorces  were 
granted  to  wives  in  Iowa  as  compared  with  5227  granted 
to  husbands;  while  during  the  next  twenty  years  the 
wives  received  26,384  divorces  and  husbands  8490.  Wom- 
en in  Iowa  therefore  received  68.4  per  cent  of  the  divorces 
granted  during  the  first  twenty-year  period  and  75.7  of 
those  granted  between  1886  and  1906.  In  both  cases  this 
is  a  larger  proportion  than  that  for  the  United  States  as 
a  whole  —  which  was  65.8  per  cent  for  the  first  period 
and  66.6  per  cent  during  the  second  twenty  years.  As 
has  been  pointed  out  elsewhere,  however,  this  does  not 
mean  that  domestic  difficulties  are  more  common  in  Iowa 
than  in  other  localities.159 

The  number  of  divorces  granted  for  each  cause  and 
the  division  of  this  number  between  the  husband  and 
wife  also  presents  some  interesting  variations,  as  the 
following  statistics  for  Iowa  will  show:160 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE 


79 


ADULTERY 

CEUELTY 

DESERTION 

DRUNKEN- 
NESS 

H   |   W 

H   |   W 

H   |   W 

H 

W 

1867- 
1886 

53.5% 
1,360 

46.5% 
1,184 

12.3 

370 

87.7 
2,647 

38 

2,814 

62 

4,592 

4.7 
62 

95.3 
1,260 

1887- 
1906 

53% 
2,374 

47%  |  10.2 
2,103  |  1,162 

89.8 
10,254 

33.4 

4,285 

66.6 

8,542 

4 
112 

96 
2,719 

This  table  presents  two  noteworthy  features:  the 
large  per  cent  of  divorces  granted  to  husbands  on  the 
ground  of  adultery,  and  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
divorces  granted  to  both  husbands  and  wives  because  of 
cruel  treatment;  for  it  will  be  noted  that  although  for 
other  causes,  the  number  of  divorces  was  about  twice  as 
large  in  the  second  period  as  in  the  first,  in  the  case  of 
cruelty  the  numbers  are  approximately  five  times  as 
large  in  the  second  twenty  years. 

The  larger  number  of  divorces  secured  by  husbands 
because  of  adultery  is  probably  to  be  explained  on  other 
grounds  than  the  greater  immorality  of  women.  Men 
are  much  less  inclined  to  condone  their  wives'  lapses  in 
morality  than  wives  are  those  of  husbands,  and  since 
they  are  usually  in  possession  of  the  family  property  and 
more  able  to  support  themselves  than  married  women 
are  there  is  no  economic  pressure  to  influence  them  to 
forgive.  Besides,  men  are  less  likely  to  be  detected  in 
their  unfaithfulness  since  they  are  more  frequently  away 
from  home  and  among  strangers.  Possibly,  too,  men  are 
inclined  to  emphasize  this  cause,  since  it  is  the  one  which 
would  arouse  the  greatest  sympathy  for  the  husband; 
while  women  may  prefer  to  base  their  claims  on  cruelty 
and  thus  avoid  the  details  connected  with  a  trial  for 
adultery. 

The  increase  in  the  number  of  divorces  granted  to 


80      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

both  husbands  and  wives  on  the  ground  of  cruelty  is  due, 
probably,  to  the  more  lenient  judicial  definition  of  cruelty 
since  1886.  As  has  already  been  shown,  cruelty,  at  first 
defined  only  in  terms  of  physical  danger,  was  later  en- 
larged to  include  mental  suffering. 

This  question  may  also  be  studied  by  a  comparison 
of  the  same  statistics  from  a  different  angle.  The  pro- 
portion of  divorces  granted  for  each  cause  to  the  entire 
number  granted  to  the  husband  and  to  the  wife  for  these 
two  twenty-year  periods  is  as  follows:161 


ADULTERY 

CRUELTY 

DESERTION 

DRUNKEN- 
NESS 

OF  THESE  |  CAUSES 

|H|     W          H    I    W  |    H    |    W   |   H  |    W  |   H  |   W  |   H  j  W 


1867-1886     1 26%  1 10.4%  |     7.1(23.3    53.8  |  40.5  |  1.2  |  11.1  j  3.3  |  6.5  |  8.6  j  8 


1887-1906     |28%|  8%    |   13.7  |38.9  |  50.5  |  32.4  |  1.3    10.3    3.4  |  6.7  |  3.1    3.7 


It  would  seem  that  certain  conclusions  might  be 
drawn  from  these  various  groups  of  statistics,  though 
several  conditions  probably  exist  in  most  cases.  For  ex- 
ample, it  will  be  seen  that  the  number  of  wives  obtaining 
divorces  is  about  five  times  the  number  of  husbands  in 
the  cases  where  there  are  children  and  only  twice  as 
many  in  the  cases  where  no  children  are  reported.  Sev- 
eral influences  probably  contribute  to  this  result.  The 
women  who  have  children  are  not  so  likely  to  desert  their 
homes  nor  to  commit  many  of  the  acts  which  justify  di- 
vorce. This  is  to  be  seen  in  the  divorces  granted  for 
adultery  where  the  wives  obtain  the  larger  per  cent  when 
there  are  children,  while  the  husbands  receive  the  ma- 
jority when  there  are  no  children. 

Furthermore,  the  statistics  concerning  cruelty  and 
desertion  appear  to  indicate  that  wives  frequently  secure 
divorces  in  such  cases  for  the  sake  of  the  children,  since 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  81 

the  proportion  granted  to  women  with  children  is  much 
larger  than  that  to  those  without.  Possibly  the  fathers 
of  families  find  greater  reason  for  escaping  their  respon- 
sibilities as  expenses  increase. 

There  can  be  little  question  but  that  women  in  Iowa 
have  received  fair  treatment  in  divorce  cases,  at  least 
since  about  1870.  Both  laws  and  court  decisions  are  as 
favorable  to  them  as  to  men,  while  public  opinion  has 
reversed  the  Common  Law  right  of  the  father  to  the 
children  and  invests  the  mother  with  an  equal  if  not  a 
superior  right,  although  the  welfare  of  the  children  con- 
cerned rather  than  the  right  of  either  parent  concerned 
is  supposed  to  be  the  decisive  factor  in  disposing  of 
minor  children  involved  in  divorce  cases. 


VIII 
GUARDIANSHIP  OF  CHILDREN 

THERE  is,  perhaps,  no  right  so  essential  to  a  woman 's 
happiness  as  the  control  of  her  own  children  —  at  least 
on  equal  terms  with  the  father.  And  yet  there  was  no 
right  more  flagrantly  disregarded  by  the  Common  Law, 
which  failed  to  recognize  the  mother's  claim  upon  her 
children  except  in  very  rare  cases.  This  law,  as  has  been 
seen,  w^as  still  in  force  when  Iowa  became  a  Territory 
and  it  was  considered  a  matter  of  course  that  the  father 
should  be  the  sole  guardian  of  the  children  while  he  was 
alive.  His  consent  only  was  required  to  apprentice  a 
child,  while  the  mother 's  was  accepted  only  in  case  of  his 
death  or  disability. 

LEGITIMATE  CHILDREN 

In  case  the  father  died  leaving  minor  children  pos- 
sessed or  entitled  to  real  or  personal  property  those  over 
fourteen  years  of  age  might  choose  a  guardian,  while  the 
court  appointed  one  for  those  under  fourteen ;  and  it  was 
only  when  the  mother  was  thus  chosen  or  appointed  that 
she  became  the  legal  guardian  even  after  the  father's 
death.  Moreover,  it  appears  that  he  could  appoint  an- 
other as  guardian  for  his  children's  property  by  will  and 
thus  deprive  the  mother  of  this  authority.162  It  is  evi- 
dent, however,  that  in  cases  involving  the  custody  of  the 
children  and  not  of  property,  the  mother  was  considered 
the  natural  guardian  without  formal  action  of  the  court. 

82 


GUARDIANSHIP  OF  CHILDREN  83 

The  Code  of  1851  contained  the  following  provision 
concerning  the  guardianship  of  children :  * i  The  father  is 
the  natural  guardian  of  the  persons  of  his  minor  chil- 
dren. If  he  dies  or  is  incapable  of  acting  the  mother  be- 
comes the  guardian. ' '  By  another  provision  the  natural 
and  actual  guardian  of  any  minor  child  was  given  the 
right  to  appoint  another  guardian  for  such  child  by  will, 
but  it  is  not  clear  that  this  gave  the  father  authority  to 
will  a  child  away  from  the  mother  as  he  could  under  the 
Common  Law.  The  mother  was  to  be  the  guardian  of  a 
child's  property  in  case  of  the  father's  death  or  disabil- 
ity, if  the  court  deemed  her  a  suitable  person.163 

The  supreme  authority  of  the  father  while  alive  was 
not,  however,  limited  either  by  legislation  or  judicial  de- 
cisions. This  is  illustrated  by  a  case  decided  soon  after 
the  adoption  of  the  Code  of  1851.  A  wife  had  obtained  a 
divorce  from  her  husband  and  been  given  the  custody  of 
a  daughter  three  years  old,  although  the  two  sons  were 
given  to  the  husband.  Later  the  father  claimed  the  girl 
also,  and  the  Supreme  Court  decided  in  his  favor,  since 
his  interest  was  considered  paramount.  In  the  decision 
is  found  the  following  comment: 

We  are  aware  that  in  this,  our  day,  the  spirit  of  progress  is 
abroad  in  the  land,  but  whilst  we  would  not  obstruct  its  onward 
career  to  triumph  over  error  and  oppression,  we  think  that  it  is 
well  to  observe  and  maintain  those  great  and  cardinal  principles 
upon  which  the  integrity  of  the  social  compact  must  ever  depend. 
The  just  appreciation  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  marriage 
contract,  and  its  incidents,  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  civil 
and  Christian  society.164 

In  other  words,  the  wife  must  choose  between  a  di- 
vorce and  the  companionship  of  her  children.  The 


84      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

" rights",  apparently,  were  to  be  guarded  for  the  hus- 
bands; while  the  "  duties "  were  to  be  impressed  upon 
the  wives. 

If  the  father  were  dead,  however,  the  legislators  and 
judges  generally  recognized  the  mother's  right  to  the 
control  of  the  minor  children  and  to  their  wages  if  she 
wished  to  collect  them.165  This  right  included  also  the 
responsibility  of  providing  for  the  support  of  minor 
children  —  the  father  being  responsible  if  he  were  alive, 
and  the  mother  in  case  he  were  dead. 

Public  sentiment,  however,  changed  radically  during 
the  decade  of  the  Civil  War.  In  1867  the  Iowa  Supreme 
Court  declared  that  the  tendency  was  to  give  the  children 
to  the  mother  in  case  of  divorce,  and  in  1873  the  equal 
right  of  the  mother  was  guaranteed  by  the  Code,  in 
which  it  was  stated  that  "the  parents  are  the  natural 
guardians  of  their  minor  children,  and  are  equally  en- 
titled to  the  care  and  custody  of  them. "  In  case  one  died, 
the  other  became  the  sole  guardian,  and  the  father, 
mother,  or  a  third  party  might  be  appointed  the  guardian 
of  the  property  of  a  minor  child  in  case  such  property 
did  not  come  from  the  parents.166 

The  Supreme  Court  has  passed  upon  a  number  of 
cases  which  involved  the  rights  of  husband  and  wife  to 
their  children.  As  a  rule  the  mother  is  considered  the 
proper  guardian  for  young  children  in  case  of  a  separa- 
tion; and  the  fact  that  the  father  afterwards  becomes 
wealthy  and  offers  to  take  the  children  would  not  prevent 
an  increase  in  alimony  which  would  help  the  children 
although  they  remained  with  the  mother.167 

The  final  step  in  the  matter  of  safe-guarding  the 
mother's  right  to  her  children  was  the  passage  of  the 


GUARDIANSHIP  OF  CHILDREN  85 

widow's  or  mother's  pension  act  in  1913.  This  was  an 
attempt  to  secure  for  every  mother,  even  though  she  were 
destitute,  an  opportunity  to  keep  her  children  with  her 
by  paying  her  a  weekly  stipend  for  each  child  under  four- 
teen. The  success  of  this  law  is  not  yet  assured,  but  of 
its  importance  there  can  be  no  doubt.168 

ILLEGITIMATE  CHILDREN 

In  the  matter  of  the  guardianship  of  illegitimate 
children  the  mother  has  been  somewhat  the  preferred 
parent.  Under  the  early  Iowa  laws  the  father  could  be 
compelled  to  support  such  a  child.  The  illegitimate  child 
inherited  from  the  mother  and  from  the  father  also  if 
publicly  acknowledged,  while  the  mother  became  the  fa- 
vored one  in  the  matter  of  inheriting  from  an  illegitimate 
child.  Very  few  changes  have  been  made  in  these  pro- 
visions since  1851. 169 


IX 
PEOPERTY  EIGHTS  OF  WOMEN 

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  OWNEESHIP 

THE  right  to  own  and  manage  property  is  one  of  the 
fundamental  rights  of  mankind,  but  only  in  recent  years 
has  this  right  come  to  be  recognized  as  belonging  equally 
to  women.  When  the  Territory  of  Iowa  was  organized 
in  1838  it  was  apparently  taken  for  granted  that  unmar- 
ried women  could  own  and  control  property  on  the  same 
basis  as  men  —  the  number  who  did  so,  however,  must 
have  been  very  small.  Married  women,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  not  so  fortunate;  the  judges  and  lawmakers 
were  slow  to  recognize  their  right  to  control  their  own 
property  whether  personal  or  real.  They  were  bound  by 
the  old  Common  Law,  and  when  on  February  1,  1844, 
there  was  introduced  into  the  Legislative  Assembly  a 
bill  which  promised  to  married  women  the  right  to  all 
property  acquired  by  them  either  before  or  after  mar- 
riage, the  measure  failed  by  a  vote  of  eleven  to  twelve.170 

TWTO  years  later,  however,  the  legislature  enacted  a 
law  which  gave  to  a  married  woman  the  right  to  hold 
property,  provided  it  did  not  come  from  her  husband. 
Such  property  was  not  liable  for  the  husband 's  debts, 
although  the  control  of  it  was  vested  in  him  and  all  suits 
concerning  it  must  be  prosecuted  jointly  and  all  deeds 
signed  jointly.171 

Iowa  was  admitted  into  the  Union  on  December  28, 
1846,  but  neither  the  rejected  Constitution  of  1844  nor 

86 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  87 

the  Constitution  adopted  in  1846  made  any  mention  of 
the  property  rights  of  women.  It  was  not  until  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Code  of  1851  that  any  noteworthy  progress 
was  made.  Indeed,  it  is  the  general  rule  that  most  of 
the  statute  law  conferring  rights  and  privileges  upon 
women  is  to  be  found  in  the  codes.  According  to  the 
Code  of  1851  a  married  woman's  property  did  not  vest 
in  the  husband,  nor  did  he  necessarily  control  it.  If  the 
wife  permitted  her  husband  to  take  charge  of  her  prop- 
erty, she  was  required  to  file  a  record  of  ownership  if 
she  wished  to  hold  it  free  from  the  husband's  debts  to 
third  parties  and  to  collect  it  from  his  estate  when  he 
died.172  Furthermore,  it  was  decreed  by  the  Iowa  Su- 
preme Court  in  1855  that  in  case  a  wife's  property  were 
sold  during  coverture  and  the  notes  and  mortgages  given 
in  payment  for  it  made  payable  to  the  husband  alone,  at 
his  death  the  wife,  who  was  made  executrix,  must  treat 
these  notes  and  mortgages  as  a  part  of  the  estate  and  not 
as  belonging  to  her.173  The  taxable  property  of  married 
women  was  by  the  Code  of  1851  required  to  be  listed  by 
the  husband,  or,  if  he  refused,  by  the  wife.  The  Code 
also  provided  that  "married  women  may  receive  grants 
or  gifts  of  property  from  their  husbands  without  the 
intervention  of  trustees".174 

The  Code  of  1851,  however,  did  not  dislodge  the  old 
Common  Law  idea  from  the  minds  of  some  people.  In  a 
case  before  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  in  1860  it  was 
argued  that  a  wife  could  not  buy  property,  for  all  her 
money  and  property  belonged  to  her  husband.  The 
court  ruled  that  a  married  woman  might  acquire  real  and 
personal  property  and  hold  it  in  her  own  right  —  a  de- 
cision to  be  expected  under  the  Code  of  1851.  The  same 


88      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

question  came  up  again  in  1862,  this  time  involving  choses 
in  action  and  notes  payable  to  the  wife  but  delivered  to 
the  husband  as  her  agent.  Again  the  court  held  that 
since  it  was  self-evident  that  they  belonged  to  the  wife 
the  husband  and  his  creditors  had  no  claim  upon  them.175 

The  Revision  of  1860  also  made  several  provisions 
concerning  the  property  rights  of  married  women  — 
most  of  which  were  either  repetitions  of  those  in  the 
earlier  Code  or  elaborations  of  them.  It  restated  the 
rule  that  a  wife's  personal  property  did  not  vest  in  her 
husband,  but  she  was  required  to  file  a  notice  of  her 
ownership  if  she  wished  it  to  be  free  from  his  debts. 
Bank  stock  and  other  similar  personal  property,  however, 
need  not  be  listed  unless  given  to  the  wife  by  the  hus- 
band.176 

The  courts  frequently  attempted  to  distinguish  be- 
tween property  acquired  by  the  wife  as  a  gift  from  the 
husband  and  that  received  from  other  sources.  For  ex- 
ample, in  1864  the  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa  decided  that  a 
wife  could  not  hold  property  purchased  with  her  hus- 
band's money,  or  money  recognized  as  his,  even  though 
the  title  was  in  her  name.  "As  a  rule",  declared  the 
judge  who  wrote  the  decision,  "the  services  of  the  wife 
and  the  products  of  her  labor  belong  as  much  to  the  hus- 
band, under  our  statute,  as  at  common  law."  Since 
neither  the  Code  of  1851  nor  the  Revision  of  1860  spe- 
cifically stated  that  a  wife's  wages  could  not  be  taken  by 
the  husband  or  his  creditors,  the  courts  at  this  time  gen- 
erally assumed  that  they  belonged  to  the  husband  al- 
though it  does  not  appear  that  he  could  collect  them 
directly.177 

The  very  next  year,  however,  the  same  court  ruled 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  89 

that  if  a  husband  purchased  land  with  his  money,  putting 
the  title  in  his  wife's  name,  the  presumption  was  that  he 
intended  it  as  a  provision  for  her  and  not  in  trust  for 
himself;  and  the  same  rule  held,  it  was  declared,  in  case 
the  wife  bought  the  land  using  the  husband's  money.178 
The  status  of  the  wife 's  property  in  this  case  was  decided 
as  between  husband  and  wife  and  not  with  reference  to 
third  parties;  the  same  was  true  in  two  other  cases  de- 
cided about  the  same  time.  In  one  case  the  court  ruled 
that  money  belonging  to  the  wife  at  marriage  did  not  vest 
in  the  husband  —  the  notice  required  being  merely  for 
the  protection  of  third  persons.  Even  when  such  a  notice 
had  not  been  filed,  the  wife  might  maintain  an  action  of 
replevin  against  her  husband  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
possession  of  any  property  belonging  to  her,  if  she  left 
him  for  cause  or  he  drove  her  from  home.  The  wife, 
however,  might  give  her  money  to  her  husband  and  thus 
bar  herself  from  any  claim  to  it,  but  a  promissory  note 
executed  by  the  husband  to  the  wife  for  money  furnished 
TDy  her  was  proof  that  she  had  not  so  given  away  her 
money  and  was  binding  on  him  or  his  estate.179 

A  little  later  a  question  arose  as  to  the  validity  of  a 
mortgage  given  by  the  husband  to  the  wife  for  a  bona 
fide  debt  and  duly  recorded.  The  court  decided  in  this 
case  that  the  wife's  claim  under  the  mortgage  was  supe- 
rior to  that  of  a  subsequent  purchaser  of  the  mortgaged 
property.  The  judge  who  wrote  the  decision  said  in 
part : 

The  ownership  of  the  wife  and  the  possession  of  the  husband 
being  inconsistent,  the  statute  provides  that  the  ownership  shall, 
as  to  third  persons  without  notice  of  the  real  ownership,  be  pre- 
-.sumed  to  be  in  the  party  having  the  possession.  But  in  this  case 


90      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  wife's  interest  as  mortgagee  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  hus- 
band's possession  when  she  records  her  mortgage  and  thereby 
gives  notice  to  the  world  of  such  interest.180 

A  case  which  presented  a  number  of  unusual  features 
was  decided  in  1861.  The  essential  facts  were  as  follows : 
a  woman  with  an  illegitimate  child  married,  but  had  no 
children  by  this  marriage.  She  purchased  property  with 
her  own  money  and  later  sold  it  without  her  husband's 
joining  in  the  deed,  taking  a  mortgage  in  her  own  name. 
This  the  husband  collected,  and  the  land  was  sold.  The 
court  decided  that  the  husband  had  no  right  to  the  land 
nor  to  the  mortgage,  but  that  the  wife's  deed  given  in 
the  first  place  was  not  valid  without  the  husband's  signa- 
ture. This  decision  did  not,  however,  invalidate  the  son's 
claim  as  the  heir  of  his  mother.181 

By  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  the  right  of  even  a  mar- 
ried woman  to  her  own  property  was  generally  conceded 
in  Iowa,  the  emancipation  of  the  negro  to  some  extent 
emphasizing  the  injustice  of  refusing  to  white  women 
rights  which  former  negro  slaves  possessed.  The  chief 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  complete  independence  of  the 
wife  in  respect  to  her  own  property  was  the  necessity 
for  protecting  third  parties  who  supposed  the  property 
in  the  possession  of  the  husband  to  be  his  own.  Because 
of  this  difficulty,  proof  of  the  wife's  ownership  was  fre- 
quently required  and  this  proof  had  to  be  more  definite 
in  cases  involving  innocent  purchasers  than  in  many 
other  cases  where  such  persons  were  not  concerned.182 

It  appears  that  the  amount  of  property  owned  by 
women  began  to  attract  attention  about  this  time,  for  an 
Iowa  newspaper  in  1871  after  printing  the  statement 
that  unmarried  women  of  the  United  States  were  said  to 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  91 

own  about  $400,000,000  of  property  added  the  comment, 
"Here  is  a  large  lump  of  taxation  without  representa- 
tion. »183 

The  Code  of  1873  tended  to  equalize  still  more  the 
property  rights  of  husband  and  wife,  although  no  im- 
portant changes  were  made.  A  wife  might  own  property 
by  descent,  gift,  or  purchase,  and  might  manage  it  under 
the  same  limitations  imposed  upon  the  husband.  It  must 
be  remembered,  however,  that  the  property  accumulated 
by  them  jointly  was  usually  in  the  husband 's  name. 
Property  belonging  to  one  and  held  by  the  other  might 
be  recovered  by  law.  The  Code  of  1873,  likewise  firmly 
established  the  right  of  married  women  to  their  own 
wages  and  to  maintain  action  for  them  in  the  section 
which  provided  that  a  "wife  may  receive  the  wages  of 
her  personal  labor  and  maintain  an  action  therefor  in 
her  own  name,  and  hold  the  same  in  her  own  right;  and 
she  may  prosecute  and  defend  all  actions  at  law  or  in 
equity  for  the  preservation  and  protection  of  her  rights 
and  property,  as  if  unmarried/'184 

In  spite  of  all  this  the  idea  that  the  husband  had  a 
right  to  the  wife's  property  died  out  slowly  from  the 
minds  of  men,  although  the  courts  have  not  usually  up- 
held the  claim.  In  1877  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  held 
that  under  the  Code  of  1851  the  property  of  the  wife 
which  she  left  under  the  control  of  her  husband  did  not 
become  his  to  such  an  extent  that  at  his  death  it  descend- 
ed to  his  heirs  instead  of  to  his  wife.185  Indeed,  it  has 
become  an  uncontested  principle  that  a  wife  may  hold  a 
claim  against  her  husband  for  a  bona  fide  debt  even 
against  other  creditors.  An  illustration  of  this  ruling  is 
to  be  found  in  the  case  of  Stamy  v.  Laning  et  al.  in  which 


92      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  if  a  husband  conveyed 
property  to  his  wife  to  whom  he  was  indebted  and  who 
knew  of  his  indebtedness  to  others,  the  conveyance  would 
be  legal,  but  only  for  the  amount  owing  to  the  wife.  All 
in  excess  of  that  amount  would  be  subject  to  the  claims 
of  the  other  creditors.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  Jones  v. 
Brandt,  in  which  the  wife  gave  her  husband  money  to 
invest  for  her,  and  he  invested  it  in  real  estate  in  his  own 
name,  the  court  held  that  although  under  section  2499  of 
the  Revision  of  1860  the  property  was  the  husband's  in 
so  far  as  third  parties  who  were  ignorant  of  the  real 
ownership  were  concerned,  yet  under  section  2202  of  the 
Code  of  1873  it  constituted  a  debt  from  the  husband  to 
the  wife  and  she  could  collect  from  him.186 

The  various  court  decisions  dealing  with  the  property 
rights  of  women,  especially  married  women,  suggest  that 
they  owned  a  considerable  amount  of  property.  In  1886 
it  was  reported  that  673  women  owned  and  directed 
farms,  five  owned  greenhouses,  and  ninety  managed 
market  gardens  —  indeed,  it  was  claimed  that  three  wom- 
en in  Maquoketa  paid  more  taxes  than  all  the  city  officers 
together.187  Many  women  were  earning  money  in  other 
ways.  Keeping  boarders,  for  example,  was  declared  to 
be  an  independent  business,  and  the  proceeds  belonged 
to  the  wife.188 

In  a  case  decided  in  1890  the  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa 
ruled  that  land  purchased  by  the  wife  with  money  paid 
her  for  taking  care  of  her  husband's  mother  and  other 
money  earned  by  her,  could  not  be  taken  by  the  hus- 
band's creditors,  on  the  ground  that  they  believed  it  to  be 
the  husband's;  nor  could  the  crops  from  a  farm  worked 
by  the  wife  and  sons  be  held  for  the  husband's  debts, 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  93 

even  though  he  attended  to  the  business  affairs  and  listed 
the  property  to  the  assessor  in  his  own  name.189 

It  is  evident  that  the  courts  have  usually  decided 
cases  involving  the  property  rights  of  married  women  in 
accordance  with  the  law  of  equity  rather  than  with  the 
Common  Law.  The  failure  of  husband  and  wife  to  have 
an  understanding  concerning  financial  affairs  has  made 
the  decisions  more  difficult  than  they  otherwise  would 
have  been.  For  instance,  a  case  came  up  for  decision  in 
1894  in  which  the  husband  had  purchased  land  in  his  own 
name  with  money  derived  from  his  wife's  farm.  No 
agreement  that  the  money  so  used  should  be  returned 
was  made  and  the  court  decided  that  the  wife  could  not 
claim  that  the  property  was  held  in  trust  for  her.  The 
next  year,  on  the  other  hand,  the  court  decided  that  if  the 
wife  loaned  her  husband  money  on  condition  that  he 
should  convey  to  her  certain  land  and  he  conveyed  it  to 
her  the  same  day  that  a  judgment  was  rendered  against 
him,  the  conveyance  was  legal.190  By  the  time  the  Code 
of  1897  was  adopted,  the  right  of  married  women  to  their 
separate  property  and  wages  was  well  established.  The 
Code  summed  it  up  in  the  following  words:  "A  married 
woman  may  own  in  her  own  right  real  and  personal 
property,  acquired  by  descent,  gift  or  purchase,  and  man- 
age, sell  and  convey  the  same,  and  dispose  thereof  by 
will,  to  the  same  extent  and  in  the  same  manner  the  hus- 
band can  property  belonging  to  him."  The  joint  prop- 
erty, however,  remained  in  the  husband's  control.191 

A  brief  reference  to  a  few  court  decisions  will  com- 
plete this  discussion.  They  are,  for  the  most  part,  very 
favorable  to  the  wife's  claims.  In  the  case  of  Clark  Bros. 
v.  Ford,  decided  in  1905,  the  court  decided  that  an  agree- 


94      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

ment  made  between  the  husband  and  the  wife's  parents 
that  he  should  repay  her  the  money  they  advanced  to  him 
would  support  a  transfer  of  property  to  her,  even  though 
there  was  no  other  contract  and  irrespective  of  the  in- 
solvency of  the  husband.  Such  a  conveyance,  it  was  held, 
could  be  set  aside  only  by  showing  fraud.192 

Even  in  case  the  husband  conveyed  property  to  the 
wife  or  purchased  it  in  her  name  without  receiving  any- 
thing for  it,  such  a  conveyance  was  to  be  considered  a 
gift  unless  contrary  to  the  statute  or  unless  evidence  to 
the  contrary  was  offered,  and  she  could  not  at  his  death 
be  held  to  account  for  it  as  part  of  her  distributive 
share.193  In  this  case  no  third  parties,  except  perhaps 
the  other  heirs,  were  involved. 

The  old  Common  Law  gave  the  husband  absolute  con- 
trol over  the  wife's  property,  while  the  Iowa  Supreme 
Court  in  1915  ruled  that  if  the  husband  took  possession 
of  his  wife's  property  without  her  consent,  she  could 
bring  an  action  against  him  to  recover  it  as  if  he  were  a 
stranger.  Even  if  she  consented  to  his  use  of  the  prop- 
erty, she  might  recover  it  at  any  time  if  it  was  of  such  a 
character  that  his  creditors  had  no  reason  to  believe  that 
the  property  was  the  husband's.194 

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  DOWER 

The  right  of  the  wife  to  dower  and  that  of  the  hus- 
band to  curtesy  under  the  Common  Law  have  been  dis- 
cussed in  a  former  chapter.  The  Territorial  laws  of 
Michigan  and  Wisconsin  modified  them  only  slightly,  and 
at  the  time  of  the  organization  of  the  Territory  of  Iowa 
these  rights  remained  practically  the  same  as  under  the 
Common  Law.  Indeed,  in  January,  1839,  the  Iowa  legis- 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  95 

lature  passed  a  law  governing  the  distribution  of  estates 
of  deceased  persons  containing  a  proviso,  "saving  to  the 
widow,  in  all  cases,  her  dower,  and  to  the  husband  his 
courtesy,  according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law."195 

Another  law  adopted  at  the  same  time  provided  that 
any  devise  of  property  to  the  widow  by  the  husband's 
will  debarred  her  from  dower,  unless  she  renounced  the 
bequest  within  six  months.  Her  dower  interest  at  this 
time  was  fixed  at  one-third  of  the  real  estate  for  life  and 
she  was  given  a  distributive  share  of  one-third  of  the 
personal  property  "forever".  If  there  were  children 
they  received  the  remainder,  and  if  not,  it  went  to  the 
husband's  father,  or  if  he  were  dead,  to  the  mother.  A 
certain  amount  of  property,  including  a  bed,  wearing  ap- 
parel, one  cow,  one  horse,  household  furniture,  and  sup- 
plies for  one  year,  could  not  be  taken  for  the  husband's 
debts.  The  status  of  married  women  is  evident  from  a 
clause  in  this  act  which  declared  that  wills  should  be 
binding  unless  protested  within  five  years  after  being 
probated  "saving  to  infants,  femes  covert,  persons  ab- 
sent from  the  Territory,  or  non  compos  mentis,  the  like 
period  after  the  removal  of  their  respective  disabili- 
ties."196 

The  Code  of  1851  provided  that  one-third  of  all  real 
estate  which  had  belonged  to  the  husband  during  the 
period  of  the  marriage  and  to  which  the  wife  had  made 
no  relinquishment  of  her  rights  should,  at  the  death  of 
the  husband,  be  set  apart  for  the  wife,  if  she  survived, 
"as  her  property  in  fee  simple".  This  substitution  of 
permanent  ownership  of  the  one-third  for  the  life  tenure 
is  the  most  important  change  in  the  law  fixing  the  wife's 
dower  made  up  to  this  time,  but  it  was  repealed  in  1853 


96      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

and  the  Common  Law  right  substituted.  The  husband 
was  given  the  same  right  to  the  property  left  by  the  wife 
that  the  wife  had  in  his  property  if  she  survived  him  — 
that  is,  one-third  of  all  her  real  property  which  he  had 
not  joined  in  transferring  to  another  and  one-third  of  all 
personal  property  in  her  possession  at  the  time  of  her 
death.  The  estate  by  curtesy,  which  gave  him  all  of  her 
property  for  life,  was  abolished.197 

The  widow 's  dower  could  not  be  affected  by  will  unless 
she  consented  to  receive  the  bequest  instead  of  dower; 
and  if  there  were  no  children  and  the  husband  left  no 
will,  the  wife  received  one-half  of  his  estate  and  his 
father  the  other  half.  If  the  man  were  unmarried,  the 
father  received  it  all.  If  the  husband's  father  were  dead 
the  property  was  to  be  given  to  his  heirs,  and  if  he  left 
none,  the  mother  received  the  property,  and  if  both  the 
father  and  mother  were  dead  and  left  no  heirs,  the  wife 
—  or  her  heirs  —  was  to  receive  the  entire  estate.198 

It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  only  one-third  of  the 
estate  was  dower;  the  other  one-sixth  which  the  widow 
was  to  receive  if  there  were  no  children  and  no  will  was 
in  addition  to  dower.199 

The  Code  of  1851  appears  to  be  very  clear  and  spe- 
cific, but  the  assignment  of  dower  and  the  disposal  of  the 
remainder  of  the  estate  gave  rise  to  a  succession  of  law- 
suits. Some  of  these  are  of  interest  because  of  the  points 
of  law  they  involve  and  some  because  of  the  curious  com- 
plications they  present.  For  example,  in  1852  a  case 
came  up  for  decision  in  which  a  widow  sued  the  executor 
of  her  husband's  estate  for  $150  —  the  value  of  wheat 
cut  from  the  land  assigned  to  her  as  dower.  The  court 
decided  that,  although  under  the  Common  Law  growing 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  97 

crops  went  to  the  executor,  the  wheat  belonged  to  the 
widow,  since  her  dower  was  hers  absolutely  and  every 
thing  belonging  to  the  land  went  with  it.200 

Another  case  presented  still  another  phase  of  the  dif- 
ficulty of  administering  laws  concerning  the  disposition 
of  estates.  The  story  of  the  dispute  may  be  briefly  sum- 
marized. In  February,  1851,  the  husband  died,  and  in 
the  following  July,  a  child  was  born  which  died  soon 
afterwards.  According  to  the  Code,  the  widow  received 
one-third  as  dower,  and  the  child  the  remainder.  What 
then  became  of  the  child's  share  at  its  death?  The 
court  decided  that  in  conformity  with  sections  1410  and 
1411  of  the  Code  of  1851,  the  estate  of  any  child  dying 
unmarried  and  intestate  went  to  the  father,  if  living,  and 
if  he  were  dead,  was  to  be  disposed  of  as  if  it  had  been  in 
the  father's  possession  at  his  death.  Accordingly  the 
widow  in  this  case  received  one-third  of  the  child's  share 
and  the  husband's  father  or  his  heirs  the  remainder.201 

The  General  Assembly  sometimes  passed  special  laws 
which  were  contrary  to  the  general  laws.  Thus  on  Janu- 
ary 13, 1855,  a  law  was  passed  giving  to  Hannah  Everall, 
the  widow  of  Henry  Coats  who  had  died  without  other 
heirs,  the  right  to  hold  the  estate  free  from  the  control 
of  her  second  husband,  and  a  few  days  later  a  man  was 
given  authority  to  sell  his  property  free  from  the  dower 
right  of  his  wife,  although  she  was  to  have  dower  in  what 
he  left  at  his  death.202 

Much  confusion  in  the  matter  of  dower  arose  from 
the  combination  of  the  Common  Law  and  the  statute  law. 
An  illustration  is  found  in  a  case  decided  in  1855.  A 
widow,  who  held  title  to  real  estate  for  infant  children, 
remarried  and  later  made  a  deed  of  the  property  to  the 


98      LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

children,  the  husband  not  joining.  Her  second  husband 
took  possession  of  the  property  and  received  the  rents 
and  other  profits.  The  guardian  of  the  children  brought 
suit  to  recover  possession  for  the  children.  The  defend- 
ant claimed  the  land  by  right  of  the  Common  Law  as  his 
wife's  dower,  although  she  herself  made  no  claim  to  it. 
The  court  decided  that  the  property  was  never  the  wife 's 
in  her  own  right,  and  so  her  husband  had  no  right  to  it. 
Moreover,  dower  could  not  be  claimed  in  this  way,  for 
land  bought  by  one  person  with  money  belonging  to  an- 
other was  declared  to  be  held  in  trust.203 

In  1858  a  slight  change  was  made  in  the  disposition  of 
the  property  of  a  man  who  died  intestate.  If  he  left  a 
wife  but  no  children,  one-half  of  his  estate  went  to  his 
wife  and  the  remainder  to  his  parents.  If  no  wife  sur- 
vived him,  his  entire  estate  went  to  them;  but  if  the  fa- 
ther were  dead,  the  mother  received  only  a  life  estate  — 
the  property  at  her  death  descending  to  her  children  by 
the  father  of  the  intestate.  If  there  w^ere  no  such  heirs, 
the  property  was  to  be  divided  between  the  heirs  of  the 
father  and  mother.204  The  Code  of  1851,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, gave  the  property  to  the  ' '  father ' '  instead  of 
to  the  "  parents  ". 

The  Revision  of  1860  included  the  law  of  1853  which 
gave  the  widow  the  Common  Law  right  of  one-third  of 
the  husband's  personal  property  and  a  life  interest  in 
one-third  of  the  husband's  real  estate  instead  of  an  abso- 
lute title  to  it.  The  Revision  also  gave  an  alien  widow 
the  right  to  dower,  and  declared  that  no  property  exempt 
from  execution  in  the  hands  of  the  widow  as  the  head  of 
a  family  was  to  be  disposed  of  by  the  executor  of  the 
estate.  Two  years  later  the  legislature  amended  section 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  99 

2477  of  the  Revision  and  restored  the  right  of  the  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife  to  an  absolute  title  in  one-third 
of  the  real  estate  and  in  one-third  of  the  personal  prop- 
erty of  the  deceased  spouse.  According  to  this  law  the 
husband's  share  in  his  wife's  estate  was  also  known  as 
dower.205  In  1867  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  ruled  that 
under  section  2437  of  the  Revision  of  1860  a  widow  would 
not  inherit  the  share  of  a  child  which  died  before  the 
death  of  the  husband.206 

In  1862  the  General  Assembly  passed  an  act  provid- 
ing for  the  support  of  the  widow  and  minor  children  for 
one  year  at  the  expense  of  the  entire  esfate.207 

The  majority  of  the  laws  concerning  the  distribution 
of  estates  dealt  with  those  concerning  which  no  will  had 
been  made.  Indeed,  the  chief  legal  restriction  on  wills  at 
this  early  day  was  that  Which  assigned  the  one-third  to 
the  surviving  husband  or  wife.  This  could  not  be  willed 
away  unless  the  survivor  voluntarily  accepted  the  provi- 
sions of  the  will.  The  judicial  decisions,  however,  were 
frequently  conflicting.  In  1867  the  court  ruled  that  the 
widow  could  not  take  both  dower  and  the  homestead,  but 
the  following  year  permitted  the  widow  of  a  man  dying 
without  issue  to  receive  one-half  of  the  real  estate  and 
the  homestead. 

Again,  the  judges  decided  that  a  will  which  gave  the 
wife  one-third  of  the  real  estate  for  life  and  gave  the  re- 
mainder to  the  heirs  was  in  lieu  of  dower  because  the 
assignment  of  dower  would  have  interfered  with  the  pro- 
visions of  the  will.  The  next  year  they  ruled  that  a  wife 
did  not  forfeit  her  right  to  dower  by  choosing  a  will 
which  bequeathed  her  one  hundred  and  seventy  acres  of 
land  and  all  the  personal  property  for  life  or  until  she 


100    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

remarried,  when  it  was  to  be  divided  among  the  hus- 
band's heirs.208 

In  case  a  man  died  without  heirs  other  than  his  wife, 
the  Iowa  General  Assembly  sometimes  passed  special 
acts  giving  the  entire  estate  to  the  wife  instead  of  per- 
mitting one-half  of  it  to  escheat  to  the  State,  as  it  would 
otherwise  have  done.209 

Although  the  law  provided  that  the  personal  property 
of  an  intestate  decedent  should  be  divided  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  real  estate,  the  Supreme  Court  in  1872 
decided  that  section  2435  of  the  Revision  of  1860  did  not 
apply  to  personal  property  and  hence  the  widow  could 
not  obtain  her  share  of  such  property  when  the  husband 
disposed  of  it  by  will.210 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  declared  that  the  widow's 
interest  in  the  husband's  real  estate  was  not  subject  to 
his  debts  as  was  that  of  the  other  heirs ;  and  the  widow 
was  under  no  obligations  to  pay  any  portion  of  the  taxes 
levied  on  the  lands  of  her  deceased  husband  before  her 
dower  had  been  assigned.  The  allowance  of  support  for 
twelve  months  was  held  to  be  superior  to  the  claim  of  a 
creditor  on  the  estate,  but  her  dower  was  subject  to  a 
mortgage  executed  to  the  grantor  for  the  purchase 
price.211 

In  1870  section  2498  of  the  Revision  of  1860  which 
limited  the  right  of  the  mother  to  a  life  estate  in  the 
property  of  a  child  who  died  intestate  was  repealed,  and 
the  mother  was  given  absolute  possession  of  such  prop- 
erty.212 

The  Code  of  1873  made  some  changes  in  the  property 
interest  of  husband  and  wife.  One-third  of  all  legal  or 
equitable  estates  in  real  property  possessed  by  either 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  W6MEN  :  It)! 

was  to  go  to  the  survivor  in  fee  simple  at  the  death  of  the 
owner.  The  rights  of  dower  and  curtesy  were  abolished 
and  the  part  of  the  property  assigned  to  the  survivor  is 
henceforth  known  as  the  distributive  share,  although  the 
terms  —  especially  dower  —  continue  to  be  used  in  Iowa. 
The  widow  was  to  be  given  the  home  as  a  part  of  her 
share  if  she  desired  it;  and  the  widow  of  a  non-resident 
was  given  the  same  rights  in  the  estate  of  her  husband 
that  resident  women  had  except  as  against  purchasers 
from  the  husband.213 

If  the  property  was  not  easily  divided  one  of  the  heirs 
might  take  it  all  and  pay  off  the  rest ;  if  no  one  else  wished 
to  do  so,  the  widow  was  to  have  the  privilege.  The  Code 
of  1873  reversed  the  provision  in  the  Revision  of  1860  by 
providing  that  the  widow  should  receive  her  distributive 
share  instead  of  the  bequest  made  in  the  will  unless  she 
consented  to  take  under  the  will  within  six  months.214 
It  was  also  provided  that  the  wife  of  an  intestate  who 
left  no  children  or  parents,  and  whose  parents  left  no 
heirs,  should  receive  the  entire  estate.  The  General  As- 
sembly had  sometimes  made  provisions  of  this  nature  in 
particular  cases  and  it  was  made  a  general  rule  by  the 
commissioners  w^ho  drafted  the  Code.215 

The  interest  of  the  surviving  husband  and  wife  in  the 
property  of  the  other  was  thus  well  defined,  but  the  as- 
signment of  " dower ",  as  the  widow's  share  was  still 
called,  continued  to  be  a  fruitful  cause  of  dissension. 
The  husband's  share  does  not  appear  in  as  many  cases  — 
probably  because  few  wives  left  separate  estates.  A  few 
court  decisions  will  illustrate  some  of  the  questions  and 
the  attitude  of  the  judges  toward  them.  The  acceptance 
by  the  widow  of  a  bequest  of  a  life  estate  in  her  hus- 


102     LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

band's  lands,  it  was  declared  in  1875,  did  not  bar  her 
right  to  the  distributive  share.  In  case  the  estate  con- 
sisted of  several  tracts,  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  it 
was  proper  to  assign  to  the  widow  so  much  of  one  or  more 
than  one  as  constituted  one-third  of  the  whole.216 

The  wife's  claim  on  the  property  in  her  husband's 
name  during  his  life  was  not  so  easily  determined;  but 
in  1876  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  held  that,  although  her 
right  in  it  was  inchoate  during  his  life,  she  might  still 
prevent  fraudulent  alienation  of  it.  In  the  case  directly 
under  consideration  the  court  ruled  that  where  the  hus- 
band by  negligence  or  fraud  permitted  a  son  by  a  former 
marriage  to  acquire  title  by  a  sheriff's  deed,  the  wife 
might  subject  the  property  in  excess  of  the  amount  of 
the  judgment  to  her  claim  to  dower.217 

Furthermore,  there  is  evidence  that  even  at  that  time 
there  was  a  movement  to  include  personal  property  with 
real  estate  in  the  matter  of  alienation  without  the  wife's 
consent,  since  in  1880  a  petition  to  require  the  wife's 
signature  to  a  chattel  mortgage  was  introduced  into  the 
Senate.218 

In  the  following  year  the  court  interpreted  section 
2452  of  the  Code  of  1873  as  including  personal  as  well  as 
real  property  and  decided  that  the  husband  could  not 
by  will  either  before  or  after  marriage  deprive  the  wife 
of  her  one-third.  There  has,  however,  been  little  restric- 
tion on  his  right  to  dispose  of  it  before  his  death  either 
by  sale  or  gift,  and  the  wife's  consent  is  not  necessary. 
A  bill  was  introduced  into  the  Senate  in  1886  which  would 
have  prohibited  the  sale  of  household  goods  without  the 
consent  of  both  husband  and  wife,  but  it  failed  to  become 
a  law  at  that  time.219 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  103 

Two  cases  illustrate  some  of  the  difficulties  in  admin- 
istering estates.  In  one,  decided  in  1881,  the  husband 
willed  all  his  property  to  his  wife  until  the  youngest 
child  attained  a  certain  age.  The  court  ruled  that  one- 
third  was  hers  in  her  own  right  and  the  remainder  she 
held  in  trust  for  the  children.  In  the  second  case,  de- 
cided in  1900,  the  wife  was  given  support  from  the  entire 
estate  by  the  will,  and  the  court  awarded  her  one-third 
absolutely  and  support  from  the  remainder.220 

The  distributive  share  was  not  an  inheritance  accord- 
ing to  the  decision  of  Judge  J.  H.  Preston  of  the  District 
Court,  concerning  an  insurance  policy  of  $2000  payable 
to  the  "  heirs ",  for  the  judge  ruled  that  the  widow  was 
not  a  " legal  heir"  and  the  daughter  received  the  entire 
amount.  This  decision  was  affirmed  by  the  Supreme 
Court  in  1890.  The  Code  of  1897,  however,  specifically 
provided  that  the  phrase  ' '  legal  heirs ' ',  when  used  in  in- 
surance policies,  should  be  construed  to  include  the  hus- 
band or  wife  of  deceased.  Furthermore,  the  Supreme 
Court  decided  in  1904  that  where  the  wife  was  made  the 
sole  beneficiary  under  the  will,  she  was  entitled  to  all 
money  collected  for  his  death,  to  the  exclusion  of  their 
children.221 

In  1896  a  case  came  up  for  settlement  which  involved 
another  technicality.  The  widow  agreed  with  her  hus- 
band's executors  and  the  other  legatees  to  accept  the 
provision  of  the  will  in  consideration  of  $10,000.  She 
afterwards  claimed  her  distributive  share,  but  the  court 
ruled  that  she  had  yielded  her  right  to  all  real  property, 
although  she  might  have  had  both  dower  and  the  bequest 
if  her  consent  to  the  will  had  not  been  entered  on  the 
records.222 


104    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

The  General  Assembly  in  1896  made  the  wife's  signa- 
ture necessary  on  a  mortgage  of  exempt  property.  This 
provision  was  repeated  in  the  Code  of  1897  and  is  still  in 
force;  but  according  to  a  court  decision  the  husband 
might  sell  exempt  property  or  assign  exempt  earnings 
without  the  wife's  consent.  In  1906  a  law  was  passed 
requiring  the  wife's  signature  also  for  the  assignment  of 
wages.223 

The  Code  of  1897  made  very  few  changes  in  the  prop- 
erty rights  of  married  women.  The  legislature  in  1913, 
however,  passed  an  act  which  gave  the  entire  estate  of 
the  husband  who  had  no  children  to  the  widow  if  its  value 
was  under  $7500.  The  estate  in  excess  of  this  amount 
was  to  be  divided  between  the  wife  and  the  parents.  The 
same  rule  applied  to  the  husband's  share  in  the  wife's 
estate.224 

The  " judge  made"  laws  are  much  more  numerous. 
In  1903  the  court  decided  that,  in  case  the  husband's  will 
made  the  wife  sole  heir  and  legatee  along  with  a  further 
provision  that  at  her  death  it  should  go  to  certain  per- 
sons, the  second  devise  was  invalid  since  it  was  repug- 
nant to  the  first.  Another  interesting  decision  was 
handed  down  in  the  following  year.  Here  the  wife  had 
refused  to  accept  the  will  and  claimed  one-half  of  the 
estate,  there  being  no  children.  The  court  ruled  that  if 
she  refused  the  will  she  could  have  only  one-third  and  the 
husband 's  mother  the  other  two-thirds,  for  the  law  giving 
the  wife  one-half  was  only  in  case  there  was  no  will.223 

In  1882  the  widow  was  declared  to  have  the  right  to 
choose  between  the  homestead  for  life  and  her  distribu- 
tive share.  Occupancy  of  the  homestead  for  ten  years 
was  held  to  be  equivalent  to  an  election  to  take  the  home- 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  105 

stead.  A  similar  decision  was  handed  down  in  1890.228 
From  these  laws  and  decisions  it  appears  that  the  dis- 
tributive share  of  husband  and  wife  is  now  the  same  in 
law,  except  that  the  property  listed  as  the  husband's  is 
frequently  the  result  of  the  work  of  both  husband  and 
wife  and  in  such  cases  the  wife  receives  one-third  or  one- 
half  of  the  joint  accumulation  in  place  of  her  own  share 
and  the  part  of  the  husband's  share  assigned  her  by  law. 
This  distributive  share  can  not  be  alienated  except  by 
divorce,  or  by  a  definite  and  recorded  choice  of  a  bequest 
by  will,  or,  in  some  cases,  by  an  election  to  take  the  home- 
stead instead  of  the  distributive  share.  Indeed,  the 
courts  have  frequently  allowed  the  distributive  share 
and  either  the  bequest  or  the  homestead. 

ALIENATION  OF  DO  WEE 

The  Common  Law,  it  will  be  remembered,  made  the 
right  of  dower  difficult  to  alienate,  and  this  principle  was 
carried  into  the  laws  of  Iowa.  Apparently  the  leg- 
islators and  judges,  especially  in  the  early  days,  took  the 
attitude  that  women  were  accustomed  to  leave  business 
affairs  entirely  to  their  husbands  or  fathers  and  hence 
were  incapable  of  acting  for  their  own  best  interests. 
Indeed,  the  early  laws  are  the  severest  indictment  of  the 
position  of  wives  and  the  general  attitude  of  the  hus- 
bands towards  their  wives  in  business  matters.  Igno- 
rance on  the  part  of  the  wife  and  the  possibility  and  even 
the  probability  of  coercion  on  the  husband's  part  were 
apparently  taken  for  granted,  and  so  special  laws  were 
made  to  protect  the  wife. 

The  right  of  husband  or  wife  in  the  estate  of  the  other 
is,  of  course,  destroyed  by  divorce.  It  may  also  be  re- 


106    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

linquished  by  the  joining  of  the  husband  or  wife  with  the 
one  owning  the  property  in  making  a  deed  or  mortgage, 
or  by  an  agreement  entered  into  before  marriage.  Like- 
wise it  may  be  voluntarily  renounced  after  the  death  of 
the  owner  of  the  property  and  the  will  or  homestead 
right  chosen  instead.  Iowa  laws  and  courts,  however, 
have  almost  uniformly  prohibited  the  relinquishment  of 
the  dower  right  by  a  contract  between  husband  and  wife 
during  coverture. 

The  first  law  concerning  the  relinquishment  of  dower 
under  the  Territory  of  Iowa  was  passed  January  4,  1840. 
It  was  made  legal  for  a  married  woman  to  relinquish  her 
dower  interest  in  her  husband's  property  by  joining  with 
him  in  the  transfer  of  the  property  to  another,  but  she 
must  be  examined  apart  from  her  husband  and,  in  the 
presence  of  the  judges,  one  of  whom  must  personally 
know  her,  must  declare  that  she  knew  the  content  of  the 
conveyance  and  that  she  signed  it  voluntarily  and  not 
under  the  coercion  of  the  husband.  A  married  woman 
could  convey  her  own  real  estate  only  with  the  consent 
of  her  husband  and  must  also  declare  that  the  act  was  not 
due  to  his  compulsion.227 

This  law,  moreover,  was  enforced  by  the  courts:  in 
1853  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  the  widow  was 
entitled  to  a  life  estate  in  property  which  her  husband 
had  sold  in  1840,  the  wife  joining  in  the  deed,  because  the 
officer  before  whom  the  deed  was  made  failed  to  certify 
that  the  contents  of  the  deed  had  been  made  known  to 
the  wife  and  that  she  voluntarily  relinquished  her  dower 
as  required  by  the  act  of  1840.  This  decision  contained 
interpretations  of  two  other  points  of  law,  since  it  de- 
clared that  the  right  of  dower  was  governed  by  the  law 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  107 

in  force  at  the  time  the  conveyance  was  made  and  not  by 
that  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  husband. 
Consequently  the  widow  received  only  a  life  estate  as 
provided  by  the  act  %of  1839,  instead  of  an  absolute  title 
as  would  have  been  the  case  under  the  Code  of  1851.228 

In  1853  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  a  wife, 
through  a  trustee,  could  contract  with  her  husband  for 
separate  maintenance,  releasing  her  claim  for  support 
and  dower ;  but  she  could  not  do  so  without  the  trustee.229 
Moreover,  when  a  husband  and  wife  made  a  postnuptial 
contract  through  a  trustee  that  the  wife  should  have  her 
separate  property  in  return  for  $5000,  it  was  decided  that 
she  could  make  such  an  agreement  since  there  was  con- 
sideration. 

The  fact  that  a  wife  joined  with  her  husband  in  a  con- 
veyance of  real  estate  did  not,  according  to  the  Supreme 
Court,  make  her  responsible  for  the  contract ;  nor  did  the 
fact  that  she  signed  a  mortgage,  without  expressly  re- 
linquishing her  dower  right  as  required  by  the  law  of 
1840,  prevent  her  from  asserting  her  claim  to  dower  at 
the  death  of  her  husband.230 

The  laws  regulating  the  relinquishment  of  dower  are 
interesting  in  that  they  illustrate  the  general  movement 
towards  the  greater  independence  of  women  and  less  of 
the  paternalistic  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  government. 
In  1858,  for  example,  the  requirement  that  the  judge  be- 
fore whom  a  woman  signed  a  transfer  of  property,  must 
personally  know  her  and  explain  to  her  the  content  of 
the  paper  she  signed,  was  repealed.231 

Moreover,  the  Supreme  Court  decided  in  1862  that 
when  a  wife  joined  in  a  trust  deed,  without  reading  it, 
she  could  not  rely  on  this  to  free  her  from  the  conse- 


108    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OP  WO^IEN 

quences  as  against  an  innocent  purchaser.  A  decision 
involving  a  different  principle  was  handed  down  a  few 
years  later:  the  wife  signed  a  blank  mortgage  with  her 
husband  and  he  inserted  a  description  of  the  property 
of  the  wife  and  delivered  it  to  a  third  party  to  negotiate ; 
the  judges  decided  that  this  was  not  the  deed  of  the  wife 
and  was  invalid.232 

In  line  with  the  general  movement  to  recognize  wom- 
en as  responsible  for  their  acts,  the  Supreme  Court,  in 
1868,  decided  that  a  conveyance  in  which  the  wife  relin- 
quished dower  in  real  estate  would  be  supported  unless 
there  was  proof  of  fraud  or  coercion.  In  other  words, 
the  wife  would  be  presumed  to  have  acted  voluntarily 
unless  there  was  evidence  to  the  contrary;  while  under 
the  earlier  law  it  was  taken  for  granted  that  she  was 
controlled  by  the  husband.  Furthermore,  in  case  of  a 
separation,  the  wife  might  convey  her  interest  in  the  hus- 
band's property  to  him  without  the  intervention  of  a 
trustee.233 

The  courts  as  a  general  rule  have  declared  any  relin- 
quishment  of  dower  during  the  marriage  as  invalid  ex- 
cept in  case  of  transfer  to  another.  This  has  always  been 
the  rule  in  Iowa,  although  in  1875  the  court  decided  that 
if  a  wife  agreed  to  accept  a  certain  sum  in  lieu  of  dower 
and  the  husband  provided  for  this  in  a  will  which  the 
widow  at  first  accepted,  she  could  not  afterwards  claim 
her  dower.  This  was  prevented,  however,  by  the  election 
of  the  will  and  not  by  the  agreement.234 

The  Code  of  1873  definitely  prohibited  such  relin- 
quishment  of  "dower"  by  postnuptial  agreement,  de- 
claring that  ' '  when  property  is  owned  by  either  the  hus- 
band or  wife,  the  other  has  no  interest  therein  which  can 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  109 

be  the  subject  of  contract  between  them,  or  such  interest 
as  will  make  the  same  liable  for  the  contracts  or  liabilities 
or  either  the  husband  or  wife  who  is  not  the  owner  of  the 
property,  except  as  provided  in  this  chapter."235  In 
interpreting  this  section  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the 
provision,  declaring  that  "  dower "  was  limited  to  one- 
third  and  that  the  husband  or  wife  might  dispose  of  the 
other  two-thirds  by  will,  whether  there  were  children  or 
not.236  A  similar  case  was  decided  in  1889.  Here  the 
husband  and  wife  had  agreed  to  divide  the  estate  before 
his  death.  The  husband  later  conveyed  his  share  to  a 
third  party  without  the  wife's  signature,  and  after  his 
death  the  wife  claimed  her  one-third  of  this  property, 
which  was  awarded  to  her  on  the  ground  that  the  agree- 
ment was  contrary  to  public  policy  and  therefore  void: 
the  husband  could  not  convey  a  complete  title  without 
the  wife 's  signature,  nor  could  she  before  his  death  relin- 
quish what  was  merely  a  contingent  right.237 

Again,  in  1901  the  wife  was  awarded  ' l  dower "  al- 
though she  had  made  an  agreement  to  accept  certain 
lands  and  an  annuity  for  life  in  place  of  her  distributive 
share.238  A  variation  of  these  postnuptial  contracts  was 
later  held  valid.  A  husband  and  wife  agreed  to  unite 
their  estates  in  the  creation  of  a  trust  for  a  third  party 
who  was  to  come  into  possession  at  the  death  of  the  sur- 
vivor. The  husband  survived  and  remarried.  His  sec- 
ond wife  claimed  dower,  but  the  court  decided  that  the 
husband  held  possession  only  for  life  and  that  she  could 
not  recover.239  The  only  exception  to  this  rule  is  the 
interpretation  that  the  husband  and  wife  might  contract 
concerning  alimony  (section  2203  of  the  Code  of  1873 
notwithstanding),  although  the  proviso  was  added  that 


110    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

such  a  contract  would  not  be  held  valid  unless  reasonable 
and  just  to  the  wife.240 

It  appears  that  the  requirement  that  the  wife  must 
relinquish  dower  in  real  estate  to  complete  the  transfer 
did  not  prevent  the  sale  of  property  in  case  the  wife  re- 
fused to  sign,  but  the  property  remained  subject  to  the 
claim  of  the  wife  for  her  distributive  share.  Indeed,  it 
was  decided  in  1886  that  where  a  man  sold  land  without 
the  wife 's  signature  and  bought  other  property,  the  wife 
might  claim  dower  in  both.241 

Nor  could  the  dower  interest  of  the  wife  be  alienated 
by  the  husband  under  power  of  attorney,  for  under  sec- 
tion 3154  of  the  Code  of  1897  the  distributive  share  can 
not  be  the  subject  of  contract  between  them.  A  legal- 
izing act  in  this  matter  passed  in  1902  was  declared  to 
be  unconstitutional  and  void.242 

In  1913,  however,  a  provision  concerning  post-nup- 
tial agreements  was  made  to  read  as  follows:  "No 
conveyance  of  real  estate  heretofore  made,  wherein  the 
husband  or  wife  conveyed  or  contracted  to  convey  the 
inchoate  right  or  dower  to  the  other  spouse,  acting  as  the 
attorney  in  fact,  by  virtue  of  a  power  of  attorney  exe- 
cuted by  such  spouse,  such  power  of  attorney  not  having 
been  executed  as  a  part  of  a  contract  of  separation,  shall 
be  held  invalid  as  contravening  the  provisions  of  section 
thirty-one  hundred  fifty- four  of  the  code",  but  all  such 
conveyances  were  legalized.243 

The  attitude  of  the  lawmakers  and  judges  towards 
postnuptial  contracts  between  husband  and  wife  applied 
only  to  those  concerning  dower :  other  contracts  and  con- 
veyances based  upon  other  considerations  than  the  mar- 
riage relation  were  valid.244 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  111 

Antenuptial  contracts  have,  on  the  whole,  been  held 
valid  by  the  courts,  although  the  rule  has  been  to  protect 
the  widow's  one-third  interest.  For  example,  in  a  case 
in  which  the  woman  had  made  an  antenuptial  contract  to 
claim  "no  right  of  dower  or  homestead  in  or  to  any 
property  which  shall  belong  to  the  estate "  of  the  hus- 
band, the  widow  was  given  one-third  of  the  personal 
property  and  the  interest  on  $3000  for  life  as  provided 
for  in  the  contract.245 

In  case  the  wife  made  an  antenuptial  contract  to  re- 
linquish dower  on  consideration  that  the  husband  should 
repay  to  her  children  the  money  he  received  from  her,  or 
if  she  outlived  him,  she  was  to  receive  this  herself  and 
$1000  in  addition,  the  contract  was  declared  to  be 
valid.246 

A  mutual  antenuptial  relinquishment  of  interest  in 
each  other's  property  was  declared  in  1910  to  be  valid, 
but  only  so  far  as  it  applied  to  property  owned  at  the 
time  of  marriage.  The  allowance  for  one  year's  support, 
however,  was  declared  to  be  a  part  of  the  cost  of  admin- 
istration and  the  wife  could  not  cut  off  her  right  to  it  by 
an  antenuptial  agreement,  providing  the  allowance  itself 
was  proper.247 

The  complexity  of  these  marital  property  rights  may 
be  shown  by  a  case  decided  in  1887  where  the  wife  signed 
mortgages  releasing  her  dower  and  afterwards  became 
the  owner  of  the  senior  mortgage.  The  owner  of  the 
junior  mortgage  attempted  to  collect  from  her,  but  the 
court  ruled  that  he  could  not  recover  after  the  statutory 
time  had  expired.248 

These  laws  and  court  decisions  relate  almost  entirely 
to  the  voluntary  alienation  of  dower  by  the  wife:  the 


112    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

husband  is  usually  given  the  same  privileges,  but  cases 
concerning  his  claim  seldom  appear  in  the  courts.  The 
right  to  the  distributive  share  on  the  part  of  either  hus- 
band or  wife  may  be  lost  or  modified  in  other  ways. 
Divorce,  for  example,  automatically  extinguished  such 
claim.  One  case  in  which  a  claim  for  dower  was  filed 
after  a  divorce  had  been  granted  is  found  in  1850,  but 
this  was  merely  a  question  of  the  legality  of  the  di- 
vorce.249 

In  1911  the  General  Assembly  attempted  to  secure 
uniformity  and  diminish  litigation  by  passing  a  law  that 
all  conveyances  made  prior  to  1890  should  be  valid  even 
though  the  spouse  did  not  join,  unless  suit  should  be 
brought  within  a  year  after  the  act  went  into  effect.  In 
case  the  one  who  made  the  conveyance  was  still  alive,  the 
time  was  extended  to  two  years ;  nor  did  it  apply  to  suits 
already  instituted.  An  additional  law  was  passed  in 
1913  which  prohibited  action  for  recovery  of  the  distribu- 
tive share  in  property  conveyed  by  a  deed  of  trust  before 
January  1,  1890,  unless  suit  was  begun  by  March  1, 
1914.250 

The  " dower"  right  of  either  husband  or  wife  may  be 
alienated  in  other  ways  than  by  voluntary  relinquish- 
ment.  Such  alienation,  however,  is  unusual,  and  nearly 
always  is  brought  about  by  judicial  order.  In  1884  it 
was  decided  that  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  cred- 
itors was  a  judicial  sale  and  under  section  2440  of  the 
Code  of  1873  cut  off  the  wife 's  distributive  share.  The 
wife  could  not,  however,  be  compelled  by  a  court  of 
chancery  to  relinquish  her  interest  to  property  in  a  suit 
to  which  she  was  not  a  party.251 

It  was  likewise  decided  in  1908  that  an  entryman 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  113 

under  the  timber  culture  laws  of  the  United  States  had 
no  vested  right  in  the  land  until  the  patent  was  issued, 
and  upon  his  death  the  widow  would  have  no  dower  right, 
though  his  heirs  might  prove  up  by  right  of  purchase  and 
not  by  descent.  Under  the  laws  of  this  State  the  widow 
was  not  an  "heir"  and  acquired  no  interest  in  the  prem- 
ises.252 

A  sale  of  land  for  taxes,  it  was  held  in  1910,  cut  off 
the  widow's  claim  to  her  share  —  the  provision  in  the 
Revision  of  1860  that  a  married  woman  might  redeem 
land  from  tax  sale  being  held  to  refer  to  her  own  prop- 
erty and  not  to  inchoate  dower  right.253  On  the  other 
hand,  in  1914  the  Supreme  Court  declared  that  the  wife 's 
distributive  share  could  not  be  held  for  a  mechanic's  lien 
if  there  was  sufficient  other  property  to  pay  the  debt.254 

Perhaps  the  most  interesting  decision  of  all  was  hand- 
ed down  in  1904.  Section  3386  of  the  Code  of  1897,  which 
prohibited  a  murderer  from  inheriting  from  the  one 
murdered,  would  not,  the  judges  held,  prevent  a  wife  who 
had  murdered  her  husband  from  receiving  her  distribu- 
tive share  of  his  estate;  but  more  than  one-third  was 
denied  her  even  if  there  were  no  children.255 

Not  only  have  the  Iowa  courts  usually  protected  the 
widow's  right  to  her  distributive  share;  but  they  have 
sometimes,  though  not  always,  extended  this  protection 
to  transfers  of  property  immediately  preceding  marriage. 
In  1881  a  conveyance  of  real  estate  to  children  just  prior 
to  a  second  marriage,  and  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
wife,  was  held  not  to  be  a  fraud ;  but  in  1908  this  decision 
was  contradicted  and  the  widow  was  given  dower  in  such 
real  estate.  When  the  wife  knew  of  the  transfer,  how- 
ever, she  was  considered  to  have  agreed  to  it.256 

8 


114    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

The  most  striking  injustice  concerning  mutual  prop- 
erty rights  of  husband  and  wife  is  the  failure  to  give  the 
wife  a  control  over  personal  property  similar  to  that 
given  her  in  the  real  estate  in  the  husband's  name.  Fre- 
quently such  personal  property  has  been  acquired  partly 
as  the  result  of  the  wife's  efforts;  yet  it  is  usually  held 
in  the  husband's  name  and  he  has  absolute  control  over 
it.  An  illustration  is  found  in  a  case  decided  in  1884. 
The  wife  joined  the  husband  in  a  deed  to  real  estate  and 
the  husband  invested  the  money  in  other  property  which 
he  put  in  the  name  of  a  son.  As  a  result,  the  wife  re- 
ceived neither  dower  nor  homestead  right.257  Except  for 
minor  restrictions,  the  husband  can  dispose  of  personal 
property  as  he  wishes. 

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  CONTRACTS 

The  right  to  make  contracts  is,  of  course,  closely  as- 
sociated with  the  ownership  and  control  of  property  and 
involves  both  civil  rights  and  responsibilities.  As  in  the 
matter  of  property,  the  laws  of  Iowa  have  not  discrim- 
inated in  this  matter  against  unmarried  women ;  but  the 
status  of  married  women  has  been  a  matter  of  legislation 
and  court  adjudication. 

The  Common  Law  gave  the  wife  no  right  to  make 
contracts,  nor  could  she  be  held  responsible  for  one :  her 
husband  had  complete  authority  over  her  person,  her 
children,  and  her  property.  As  her  right  to  hold  prop- 
erty in  her  own  name  developed,  so  also  her  ability  to 
make  contracts  concerning  it  increased  and  her  responsi- 
bility was  made  to  correspond. 

In  Iowa  Territorial  days  the  husband  was  expected  to 
assume  the  care  of  his  wife's  property  and  to  defend  and 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  115 

prosecute  suits  concerning  it.  Indeed,  the  Legislative 
Assembly  passed  a  law  in  1838  making  it  the  duty  of  the 
husband  to  prosecute  a  suit  begun  by  the  wife  before 
marriage.258  This  was  not  intended  as  a  hardship  for 
women,  and  indeed  it  was  sometimes  offered  as  a  defense 
by  married  women  in  suits  to  compel  fulfilment  of  con- 
tracts. In  1848  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  reversed  a  de- 
cision of  the  Mahaska  District  Court  on  this  very  ground. 
The  facts  of  the  case  may  be  briefly  stated.  A  married 
woman  who  had  been  living  apart  from  her  husband  for 
two  years,  although  he  was  within  the  State,  made  a  con- 
tract concerning  land  which  was  to  be  deeded  to  her  when 
she  had  paid  a  certain  sum  of  money.  When  payment  of 
a  note  was  demanded  she  pleaded  the  defense  of  cover- 
ture. The  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  she  could  not  con- 
tract except  for  necessities  for  which  her  husband  and 
not  herself  was  liable.  In  reply  to  the  claim  that  since 
she  was  living  apart  from  her  husband  she  was  respon- 
sible for  her  debts,  the  court  said  "neither  will  a  mutual 
agreement  of  separation  release  her  from  the  legal  re- 
straint which  the  law  has  imposed  upon  her ;  nor  can  she 
in  this  way  become  restored  to  the  rights  which  attach  to 
a  feme  sole."259 

In  a  case  decided  in  1849  a  husband  and  wife  had 
jointly  contracted  for  buildings  on  the  land  belonging  to 
the  wife.  An  attempt  was  made  to  enforce  a  mechanic's 
lien,  but  the  objection  was  offered  that  a  married  woman 
could  not  make  a  binding  contract  and  her  property 
could  not  be  encumbered  by  another,  since  the  law  of 
1846  declared  that  a  married  woman  "shall  possess  the 
same  [property]  in  her  own  right ",  although  the  man- 
agement and  profits  belonged  to  her  husband  as  at  Com- 


116    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

mon  Law.  The  court,  however,  decided  that  the  wife's 
property  was  liable  for  a  debt  incurred  for  such  a  pur- 
pose, since  the  husband  and  wife  could  sell  or  mortgage 
her  real  estate.260 

The  Code  of  1851,  in  addition  to  the  other  sections 
concerning  property  rights,  included  the  provision  that 
"contracts  made  by  a  wife  in  relation  to  her  separate 
property  or  those  purporting  to  bind  herself  only,  do  not 
bind  the  husband. "  A  married  woman  abandoned  by 
her  husband  might  secure  permission  from  the  district 
court  to  transact  business  as  if  unmarried,  and  this  might 
include  the  right  to  control  any  property  the  husband 
might  have  left.  The  same  Code  also  gave  to  married 
women  the  right  to  convey  interest  in  real  estate  '  *  in  the 
same  manner  as  other  persons  ",261 

The  last  named  provision  soon  required  court  inter- 
pretation. If  a  married  woman  had  authority  to  convey 
property,  did  she  have  power  to  convey  it  to  her  hus- 
band? A  case  involving  this  question  was  decided  in 
1858.  A  wife  contracted  with  her  husband  to  relinquish 
all  claim  to  dower  for  a  consideration.  The  Supreme 
Court  held  that  she  could  contract  with  her  husband  even 
concerning  dower,  and  under  the  Code  of  1851  she  could 
be  compelled  to  fulfil  the  contract,  if  fairly  given,  al- 
though the  decision  contained  these  words:  "courts  of 
equity  will,  in  such  cases,  guard  with  jealous  care  the 
rights  of  the  wife ;  the  husband  will  be  held  to  the  strict- 
est fairness  and  integrity;  and  the  wife  will  not  be  de- 
prived of  her  property,  by  any  gift  or  transfer  procured 
by  fraud,  circumvention,  or  undue,  or  improper  influence. 
And  while  policy  would  dictate  in  such  cases,  that  a  trus- 
tee should  be  appointed,  to  protect  and  guard  the  inter- 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  117 

ests  of  the  wife,  yet  if  none  should  be  appointed,  we  know 
no  rule  which  declares  such  gifts  or  transfers  void,  in  the 
absence  of  fraud  or  unfair  dealing.  .  .  .  Or,  to  state 
the  proposition  in  another  form,  if,  under  the  principles 
of  the  common  law,  courts  of  equity  did  in  some,  and  in- 
deed in  many  instances,  give  full  effect  and  validity  to 
her  contracts,  why  should  she  not  be  bound  by  her  en- 
gagements, in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  unfair  dealing, 
under  a  statute  which  greatly  enlarges  her  powers  and 
privileges?  ....  Having  the  power  to  convey  her 
real  estate,  in  the  same  manner  as  other  persons,  no  rea- 
son is  perceived  why  she  might  not  convey  it  to  her  hus- 
band, and  in  return,  or  in  consideration  thereof,  she 
receive  from  him  a  grant  or  conveyance  of  other  prop- 
erty. If  so,  why  may  she  not,  for  a  money  consideration, 
make  or  execute  a  release  of  her  interest  in  his  real 
estate  ?"262 

This  decision  of  the  court,  however,  was  reversed  two 
years  later,  when  the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  a  wife 
could  not  contract  with  her  husband  except  through  a 
trustee :  the  provision  in  the  Code  of  1851  that  she  could 
convey  property  as  "any  other  persons ",  it  was  held,  did 
not  remove  this  restriction.  In  this  case  the  wife  had 
given  the  husband  $3800  of  her  own  money  with  the 
understanding  that  he  was  to  account  for  it.  She  after- 
wards left  him  and  sued  for  the  money,  but  the  court 
ruled  that  she  could  not  sue  her  husband  unless  she 
could  prove  cruelty  or  desertion,  nor  could  she  obtain 
separate,  support  even  out  of  her  own  money  unless  one 
of  these  charges  was  proven.263 

The  validity  of  a  married  woman's  contract  with  any 
one  other  than  her  husband  and  the  husband's  right  to 


118    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

make  contracts  for  the  wife  also  required  judicial  inter- 
pretation. In  one  case  the  husband,  claiming  the  right 
of  agent,  gave  a  mortgage  on  his  wife's  land.  The  Su- 
preme Court,  however,  denied  his  right  to  bind  the  wife 
by  a  contract  in  which  she  did  not  join.  The  court  also 
ruled  that  a  married  woman  might  maintain  an  action 
relating  to  her  separate  property  without  her  husband's 
joining  in  it.264 

Two  interesting  decisions  were  handed  down  at  the 
following  session  of  this  court.  In  one,  the  judges  ruled 
that  the  Code  of  1851  and  the  Revision  of  1860  intended 
to  protect  women  in  their  property  rights,  but  not  to  en- 
able them  to  make  contracts  of  all  kinds  or  to  carry  on  a 
general  business.  In  the  second  case  the  wife 's  earnings 
were  declared  to  belong  to  the  husband.265 

In  1858  the  General  Assembly  empowered  courts  of 
chancery  to  correct  mistakes  made  in  conveying  or  en- 
cumbering a  married  woman 's  property  or  in  relinquish- 
ing her  dower  to  the  same  extent  that  they  could  correct 
errors  in  the  conveyances  or  mortgages  of  other  per- 
sons.266 

The  Revision  of  1860  provided  that  whenever  a  mar- 
ried woman  was  a  party  to  a  suit  her  husband  must  be 
joined  with  her,  except  in  the  following  instances : 

1.  When  the  action  concerns  her  separate  property,  or  is 
founded  on  her  own  contract,  she  may  sue  and  be  sued  alone. 

2.  When  the  action  is  between  herself  and  her  husband,  she 
may  sue  and  be  sued  alone.    And  in  no  case  need  she  prosecute 
or  defend  by  guardian  or  next  friend. 

The  commissioners  made  the  following  comment  on 
this  section : 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  119 

The  substantive  laws  of  Iowa,  with  justice,  and  but  proper 
humanity,  concede  to  married  women  certain  rights  in  property. 
These  rights,  to  be  of  any  value,  must  be  accompanied  with 
adjective  rights,  which  will  secure  their  enjoyment.  The  right 
to  sue  follows  necessarily  from  the  right  of  property.  The  only 
reason  why,  under  the  common  law,  she  could  not  sue  at  law 
was,  that  as  she  had  no  rights  of  property,  she  had  no  occasion 
to  do  so  —  as  in  progress  of  humanity,  she  began  to  have  rights 
conceded  to  her  —  the  right  to  sue,  also  arose,  and  as  it  was  not 
recognized  by  common  law,  she  had  to  go  into  a  court  of  chancery 
to  enjoy  it.  It  would  have  been  easier  to  have  enacted  a  statute, 
allowing  such  suit  at  law;  but  there  were  many  reasons  why  in 
that  age,  the  equity  court  in  such  affairs  was  best.  But  all  these 
have  passed  away,  and  as  she  is  to  have  substantive  rights  which 
Iowa  has  already  said,  we  can  not  see  why  she  should  not  have 
all  the  rights  logically  sequent  thereto,  the  same  as  anybody  else. 
She  also  formally  had  to  sue  by  next  friend,  and  so  forth,  be- 
cause she  was  incapable  of  making  a  contract,  and  had  no  prop- 
erty to  pay  costs  with,  if  cast  in  the  suit.  But,  these  reasons  no 
longer  exist,  and  the  disabilities  based  on  them,  should  also 
logically  cease. 

Besides,  if  she  trades  and  becomes  liable,  what  sense  is  there 
in  not  allowing  her  creditor  to  sue  her,  as  any  other  person, 
ignoring  the  fact  of  marriage,  as  much  as  in  the  case  of  a  man,  a 
fact  which  has  no  longer  anything  to  do  with  the  liability.267 

The  Revision  of  1860  also  provided  that  when  a  mar- 
ried woman  was  sued  alone,  judgment  could  be  enforced 
against  her  separate  property  only;  but  if  she  sued, 
judgment  might  be  enforced  against  her  own  property 
1  '  or  her  husband  being  brought  in  by  rule,  execution  may 
issue  against  him  also,  unless  for  cause  he  show  that  he 
is  not  interested  in  the  suit  by  the  wife. ' '  If  the  husband 
and  wife  were  sued  jointly,  the  wife  might  defend  in  her 


120    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

own  right;  and  if  one  neglected  to  defend,  the  other 
might  defend  for  both.268 

It  is  noticeable  that  the  courts,  also,  began  to  recog- 
nize the  independence  of  women  so  far  as  contracts  were 
concerned.  This  recognition  became  especially  marked 
during  the  period  following  the  Civil  War.  Neither  the 
husband  nor  the  wife  could  convey  separate  property 
without  the  consent  of  the  other,  but  married  women 
gradually  acquired  freedom  in  other  financial  affairs. 

In  1865  the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  a  married 
woman  might  execute  a  mortgage  on  her  separate  prop- 
erty to  secure  certain  debts  of  her  husband  without  be- 
coming liable  for  other  debts,  the  validity  of  such  a  mort- 
gage depending  upon  whether  it  was  obtained  by 
improper  influence.  Nor  could  a  judgment  against  the 
entire  estate  of  the  wife  be  enforced  when  she  had  mort- 
gaged certain  property  to  secure  a  debt  of  the  husband. 
At  about  the  same  time  the  judges  decided  that  a  convey- 
ance by  a  married  woman  had  the  same  effect  as  one  by  a 
feme  sole  or  by  a  man  —  an  acknowledgment  being  neces- 
sary as  to  its  validity  in  the  case  of  third  parties,  but  not 
between  the  parties  themselves.269 

In  1870  the  section  of  the  Revision  of  1860  relating  to 
contracts  by  married  women  was  repealed  and  the  fol- 
lowing substituted  for  it:  " Contracts  may  be  made  by  a 
wife,  and  liabilities  incurred,  and  the  same  enforced  by 
or  against  her  to  the  same  extent  and  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  if  she  were  unmarried.  "27°  This  provision  has 
remained  practically  the  same  in  all  the  legislation  con- 
cerning the  rights  of  married  women  since  1870.  In  1877 
the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  made  the  following  comment  on 
the  sections  of  the  Code  of  1873  dealing  with  the  subject : 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  121 

These  provisions,  it  must  be  admitted,  completely  emancipate 
the  wife  from  all  the  bonds  recognized  by  the  common  law,  sav- 
ing those  of  affection,  and  moral  obligation.  Being  clothed  with 
all  the  natural  rights  enjoyed  by  the  husband  which  she  may 
exercise  free  from  his  control,  the  law  will  hold  her  subject  to 
the  same  rules  which  restrict  and  control  the  rights  of  the  hus- 
band, and  enforce  his  obligations  assumed  by  contract  or  im- 
posed by  law  for  the  protection  of  other  members  of  society. 
Coverture,  in  Iowa,  ought  to  be  no  shelter  to  the  wife  against 
the  enforcement  of  the  rights  of  others  growing  out  of  her  con- 
tracts. As  she  has  all  the  rights  of  the  husband,  she  must  assume 
all  his  obligations.  When  the  law  will  imply  a  contract  binding 
the  husband,  under  the  same  circumstances  it  will  raise  one 
against  the  wife.  In  short,  the  statute,  in  bestowing  upon  her 
equal  property  rights  with  the  husband,  imposes  upon  her  the 
same  obligations  he  bears.271 

The  responsibility  acquired  by  women  under  the  law 
of  1870  and  subsequent  enactments  appears  not  to  have 
been  entirely  appreciated,  for  in  a  number  of  cases  dur- 
ing the  seventies  there  is  evidence  of  a  desire  on  the  part 
of  married  women  to  escape  liability  by  pleading  cover- 
ture. The  courts,  however,  nearly  always  declined  to 
recognize  such  a  plea  as  valid.  In  1869  the  Iowa  Supreme 
Court  ruled  that  judgments  against  married  women  on 
•contracts  they  had  a  right  to  make  were  enforced  the 
same  as  those  against  other  persons  and  property  ac- 
quired after  the  making  of  the  contract  might  be  taken 
to  satisfy  the  debt.  And  again,  in  1871  the  same  court 
handed  down  a  decision  that,  if  a  married  woman  suf- 
fered judgment  to  be  rendered  against  her  in  an  action 
upon  a  note  in  which  she  was  co-maker  or  surety  for  her 
liusband,  she  could  not  escape  liability  by  pleading  cov- 
erture.272 


122    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

A  husband  might  act  as  agent  for  the  wife,  the  Su- 
preme Court  decided  in  1868,  but  could  bind  her  only 
when  authorized  to  do  so  when  his  acts  were  subsequently 
ratified  by  her  —  and  such  ratification  must  be  proven  by 
evidence  stronger  than  that  required  to  establish  ratifi- 
cation by  the  husband  of  an  act  of  the  wife  or  between 
third  parties.273 

Moreover,  the  vendor  of  real  estate,  it  was  decided  in 
1871,  was  not  relieved  of  his  contract  to  sell  land  to  a 
married  woman  on  the  ground  that  she  was  not  bound  by 
the  contract,  if  she  fulfilled  her  part  of  the  agreement. 
To  be  sure  the  provision  that  certain  contracts  could  not 
be  enforced  against  married  women  was  for  their  protec- 
tion, but  in  this  case  the  contract  could  be  enforced  in 
equity  and  the  seller  was  required  to  execute  the  deed.274 

Not  only  was  a  married  woman  permitted  to  make 
contracts  with  third  parties:  she  might  also  make  them 
with  her  husband.  Indeed,  in  1872  the  Supreme  Court 
ruled  that  a  transfer  of  personal  property  from  husband 
to  wife  was  valid,  although  the  contract  was  verbal  and 
secret.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  a  wife  gave  her  hus- 
band notes  or  money  to  deposit  for  her  in  the  bank  did 
not  subject  them  to  the  claims  of  the  husband's  creditors, 
since  the  ownership  of  the  notes  payable  to  the  wife  was 
evident  without  recording.  Also,  if  a  wife  loaned  money 
to  her  husband,  taking  a  promissory  note  therefor,  she 
stood  as  any  other  creditor  and  it  was  not  necessary  that 
the  claim  be  recorded.275 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  just  what  the  attitude  of  the 
judiciary  has  been  towards  the  right  of  contract  as  re- 
gards married  women.  For  example,  the  court  decided  in 
1879  that  under  the  Revision  of  1860  a  married  woman 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  123 

did  not  subject  her  property  to  liability  by  becoming 
surety  for  her  husband  on  a  promissory  note,  since  this 
was  not  a  separate  debt  in  the  sense  of  relating  to  her 
separate  property  or  purporting  to  bind  herself  only. 
"The  policy  of  the  statute  being  the  'more  effectual  pro- 
tection of  married  women,'  it  must  have  been  designed  to 
affect  such  contracts  as  that  of  the  case  at  bar,  and  the 
remedy  thereon  as  administered  in  courts  of  equity.  "276 

A  year  later,  the  Supreme  Court  declared  that  if  a 
married  woman  signed  a  deed  transferring  land  to  her 
husband's  son,  the  deed  was  valid  even  though  the  price 
was  misrepresented  to  her,  unless  she  would  not  other- 
wise have  signed  it.  But  if  the  paper  was  represented  to 
her  as  a  sale  when  it  was  really  a  gift,  her  dower  right 
would  not  be  barred  by  the  transfer.277 

There  seems  to  be  little  change  in  the  contract  rights 
of  married  women  after  1880,  and  very  little  litigation. 
In  1892  a  bill  was  introduced  into  the  Iowa  Senate  to 
give  a  wife  the  right  to  sue  her  husband  without  bond, 
but  it  was  indefinitely  postponed.278 

The  ten  years  following  the  adoption  of  the  Code  of 
1897  furnished  a  number  of  court  decisions  which  point 
to  the  conclusion  that  by  this  time  the  wife's  right  to 
make  contracts,  even  with  her  husband  —  except  con- 
cerning dower  right  —  was  conceded.  The  difficulty  now 
lay  in  safe-guarding  the  rights  of  third  parties  —  partic- 
ularly creditors  of  the  husband.  The  courts  apparently 
adopted  the  rule  that  a  wife  was  to  be  treated  as  any 
other  person  unless  there  was  evidence  of  collusion  on 
the  part  of  husband  and  wife  to  defraud  third  parties. 
Naturally  such  evidence  was  hard  to  find,  and  most  of 
the  decisions  are  in  favor  of  the  wife. 


124    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

A  man's  creditors,  it  was  decided  in  1897,  could  not 
object  to  a  married  man's  paying  his  wife  ten  per  cent 
interest  by  oral  agreement  on  money  loaned  by  her. 
Also,  a  debt  from  husband  to  wife  would  sustain  a  chat- 
tel mortgage  by  the  former  to  the  latter  against  the 
claims  of  his  creditors,  although  such  a  debt  arose  from  a 
loan  of  money  which  she  exacted  from  him  as  a  condition 
of  executing  a  conveyance  of  the  homestead  at  a  time 
when  he  could  make  her  a  valid  gift,  or  before  he  became 
insolvent.279 

On  the  other  hand,  a  conveyance  of  property  by  the 
husband  to  the  wife  was  invalid  as  against  the  claims  of 
his  creditors  if  made  in  consideration  of  money  pre- 
viously furnished  him  without  special  arrangement  to 
repay  it.280 

A  more  unusual  case  arose  when  a  man  conveyed 
property  to  his  divorced  wife  in  consideration  of  past 
support  for  herself  and  child,  although  she  had  deserted 
him  without  cause.  The  court  here  ruled  that  this  trans- 
fer was  void  as  against  his  creditors  in  so  far  as  the 
value  of  the  land  exceeded  the  amount  owed.281 

The  legal  fiction  of  the  oneness  of  husband  and  wife 
continued  to  be  recognized  in  the  courts,  except  where 
modified  or  changed  by  express  statutory  enactments, 
and  therefore  a  wife  might  not  sue  her  husband  on  his 
personal  contract  during  coverture,  though  she  might 
bring  action  against  him  for  property  rights  arising  from 
a  partnership.282 

Indeed,  it  was  decided  in  1904  that  a  contract  by  which 
a  husband  agreed  to  give  his  wife  one-half  interest  in  all 
property  coming  into  their  possession  in  return  for 
money  furnished  by  her  from  her  separate  estate  was 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  125 

valid  under  section  3155  of  the  Code  of  1897.  This  sec- 
tion also  entitled  a  married  woman  to  maintain  an  action 
against  her  husband  for  the  payment  of  a  promissory 
note  given  in  return  for  money  loaned  to  the  husband; 
and  if  she  did  not  take  advantage  of  this  provision,  the 
statute  of  limitations  would  run  against  this  debt  as 
against  any  other.283 

One  other  question  concerning  this  subject  requires 
brief  mention.  If  contracts  or  conveyances  concern  both 
husband  and  wife  and  one  refuses  to  sign,  what  is  the 
status  of  the  one  who  has  made  the  agreement!  The 
Iowa  Supreme  Court  answered  this  question  in  1905  by 
ruling  that  a  contract  by  the  husband  alone  is  void  as  to 
husband  and  wife,  and  damages  could  not  be  obtained 
from  the  husband  for  failure  to  fulfil  such  a  contract.284 

IN  THE   MATTER  OF  HOMESTEAD 

The  lawmakers  and  judges  of  Iowa  early  recognized 
the  advantage  of  keeping  the  family  together,  even  at 
the  expense  of  the  creditors,  and  from  this  idea  there 
developed  the  homestead  right  or  the  special  exemption 
of  property  owned  by  the  head  of  a  family  and  used  as  a 
home.  The  Code  of  1851  declared  that  "the  homestead 
of  every  head  of  a  family  is  exempt  from  judicial  sale" 
if  there  was  no  law  to  the  contrary.  Furthermore,  a 
widow  or  widower,  though  without  children,  was  to  be 
deemed  the  head  of  a  family  while  continuing  to  occupy 
the  house  used  as  such  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the 
husband  or  wife.  These  provisions,  with  some  minor 
additions,  have  been  repeated  in  every  code  since  1851. 285 

As  a  general  rule  the  husband  was  considered  the 
head  of  the  family  and  was  entitled  to  a  homestead  right, 


126    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

If  he  were  dead  the  right  devolved  upon  the  widow,  or  if 
the  homestead  belonged  to  the  wife  the  homestead  might 
still  be  occupied  by  the  husband  after  her  death.  In 
either  case  the  debts  of  the  owner,  with  a  few  exceptions, 
could  not  be  collected  from  it.  The  Code  of  1897  also  in- 
cluded divorced  persons  in  this  exemption;  and  the  Su- 
preme Court  decided  in  1880  that  an  unmarried  woman 
who  was  caring  for  her  sister's  children  was  entitled  to 
this  homestead  exemption.286 

To  insure  this  special  exemption,  however,  the  home- 
stead must  be  platted  in  accordance  with  law;  and  this 
the  husband  could  do  without  the  wife 's  consent,  although 
he  could  not  sell  or  encumber  it,  once  it  was  selected, 
without  her  agreement.287 

In  1864  a  case  was  decided  which  illustrates  a  pecu- 
liar idea  of  the  property  rights  of  the  wife.  It  involved 
the  legality  of  a  deed  to  the  homestead  to  which  the  hus- 
band had  signed  both  his  own  and  his  wife's  name.  The 
Supreme  Court  decided  that  this  was  not  the  deed  of  the 
wife,  although  the  evidence  showed  that  the  husband  had 
signed  other  conveyances  in  the  same  way.288  Further- 
more, it  was  later  decided  that  even  if  the  wife  signed  a 
mortgage  on  the  homestead  in  relinquishment  of  dower, 
the  mortgage  was  invalid,  since  the  presumption  was  that 
she  joined  only  in  the  release  of  dower  and  not  in  rela- 
tion to  the  homestead  right,  unless  this  was  definitely 
stated.259  The  wife,  the  court  decided,  might  devise  a 
homestead  in  her  name,  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  sur- 
viving husband.290 

In  1878  it  was  decided  that  at  the  death  of  the  hus- 
band the  wife  was  entitled  to  have  the  homestead  as- 
signed to  her  as  a  part  of  her  dower  if  she  so  desired ;  but 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  127 

she  was  not  entitled  to  both  dower  and  the  homestead. 
This  was  true,  the  courts  decided,  even  though  the  hus- 
band had  promised  a  son  the  homestead  if  he  remained 
on  the  farm.  But  there  appears  to  have  been  some  in- 
decision as  to  later  cases  in  which  both  dower  and  the 
homestead  were  claimed  by  the  widow.  At  one  time  the 
Supreme  Court  decided  that  she  could  not  have  both;  at 
another  time  it  ruled  that  a  widow  might  occupy  the 
homestead  for  ten  years  and  later  claim  her  distributive 
share  in  spite  of  section  3369  of  the  Code  of  1873.  In 
case  the  widow  definitely  chose  one  or  the  other,  the 
courts  usually  decided  against  any  claim  for  the  other 
share.  If  the  distributive  share  was  chosen,  the  home- 
stead was  no  longer  exempt  and  could  be  taken  for  debts 
contracted  by  the  owner  before  that  time.291 

The  husband  has  the  same  right  to  the  homestead 
owned  by  the  wife  at  her  death.292  Indeed,  in  the  matter 
of  homestead  right,  the  law  apparently  makes  no  dis- 
tinction between  husband  and  wife,  except  to  specify  that 
the  husband  is  the  head  of  the  family  and  entitled  to  the 
homestead  right  so  long  as  he  is  alive  or  not  legally  dis- 
qualified for  some  reason. 

THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  ESTATES 

In  the  matter  of  administering  on  estates  the  early 
Iowa  laws  were  not  especially  favorable  to  married  wom- 
en, although  widows  and  single  women  were  under  no 
disability  in  this  matter  if  they  were  otherwise  qualified. 
A  law  passed  in  January,  1839,  provided  that  the  widow 
was  to  have  the  preference  in  choosing  an  administrator, 
if  she  wished  to  act  and  no  administrator  had  been  ap- 
pointed by  will ;  at  the  same  time,  the  legislature  enacted 


128    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

a  law  that  if  the  administrator  appointed  by  will  were 
under  seventeen  years  of  age,  of  unsound  mind,  con- 
victed of  any  infamous  crime,  or  a  married  woman,  a  new 
administrator  must  be  appointed,  unless  the  husband  — 
in  the  case  of  the  married  woman  —  should  give  bond 
with  her  for  faithful  performance  of  duty.293 

In  addition  to  the  general  laws,  the  early  legislators 
felt  that  it  was  their  duty  to  oversee  the  work  of  the  few 
women  administrators.  For  example,  on  January  4, 
1842,  a^  special  act  was  passed  permitting  an  "  adminis- 
tratrix "  to  sell  land  belonging  to  her  husband's  estate. 
Three-tenths  of  the  land  was  assigned  to  her  as  dower 
and  minute  regulations  were  made  for  the  conduct  of  the 
transaction.294 

The  Code  of  1851  made  a  decided  change  in  the  status 
of  married  women  in  respect  to  this  matter.  Married 
women  were  to  be  permitted  to  act  as  executors  of  estates 
independently  of  their  husbands  and  a  woman 's  marriage 
subsequent  to  her  appointment  did  not  render  her  in- 
capable of  serving.295 

Since  that  time  there  has  been  little  discrimination 
between  men  and  women  in  the  matter  of  settling  es- 
tates, though  naturally  men  are  more  frequently  ap- 
pointed since  they  are  generally  more  accustomed  to 
financial  responsibilities.  In  1884  the  Supreme  Court 
declared  that  there  was  no  restriction  in  law  upon  the 
wife's  right  to  act  as  administrator  on  her  husband's 
estate  if  none  had  been  appointed  by  will,  but  some  dis- 
cretion was  left  with  the  judge,  for  the  wife  might  be 
insane  or  incapable  of  acting.  In  the  case  on  trial,  the 
resident  mother  instead  of  the  non-resident  wife  had  been 
appointed.296 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  129 

THE  DISPOSAL  OF  PEOPERTY 

The  wife's  right  to  dispose  of  her  own  property  by 
will,  subject  always  to  the  dower  or  distributive  share  of 
the  husband,  has  been  generally  recognized  in  Iowa.  As 
a  rule  her  right  to  do  this  has  been  the  same  as  that  of 
the  husband.  The  Code  of  1851  provided  that  a  married 
woman  might  "convey  her  interest  in  real  estate  in  the 
same  manner  as  other  persons.  "297 

IN  THE  MATTEK  OF  SUPPORT 

Under  the  Common  Law  the  husband  was  legally 
bound  to  support  his  wife  and  children  in  accordance 
with  the  social  standards  of  the  class  to  which  he  be- 
longed; but  if  she  refused  to  live  where  he  selected  the 
home,  she  could  not  demand  support.  All  property  owned 
by  the  wife  and  all  money  earned  by  the  wife  either  be- 
fore or  after  marriage  became  the  husband's,  and  was 
liable  for  his  debts.  The  wife,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
not  held  responsible  either  for  her  own  or  her  husband's 
debts  or  contracts,  for  she  had  no  property  from  which 
the  debt  could  be  collected.  The  wife  could  purchase 
necessities  and  charge  them  to  the  husband,  and  he  also 
became  responsible  for  her  debts  contracted  before 
marriage. 

It  appears  that  the  early  lawmakers  were  interested 
in  preventing  the  expenditure  of  money  for  poor  relief, 
and  this  is  doubtless  the  motive  for  the  law  passed  by  the 
Legislative  Assembly  in  1839,  which  provided  that  mar- 
ried vagrants  who  had  been  arrested  might  be  released 
if  they  furnished  bonds  and  promised  to  support  their 
families.  Money  earned  by  such  men  during  the  period 
of  their  arrest  was  to  be  used  for  the  benefit  of  their 


130    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

families.  Indeed,  a  husband  might  be  compelled  to  give 
bail  to  support  his  wife  if  she  feared  that  he  intended  to 
abandon  her.298 

The  Common  Law  rule  that  a  husband  must  support 
his  wife,  however,  was  joined  to  the  provision  that  the 
wife  must  live  with  her  husband  at  any  place  of  his 
choosing.  If  she  refused  he  was  not  compelled  to  sup- 
port her.  Iowa  law  did  not  quite  accept  this  rule,  for 
even  before  statutes  were  enacted  to  that  effect  it  was 
generally  recognized  that  some  conditions  necessitated 
the  wife's  leaving  home.  However,  a  Territorial  court 
decided  in  1841  that  a  husband  was  not  responsible  for 
the  debts  of  his  wife  if  she  left  him ;  but  if  he  drove  her 
away  he  virtually  gave  her  a  bill  of  credit  for  neces- 
saries.299 

Husbands  whose  wives  left  them,  whether  for  good 
cause  or  not,  frequently  attempted  to  safeguard  them- 
selves and  punish  the  wives  by  publishing  notices  such 
as  the  following: 

TAKE  NOTICE 

I  hereby  forewarn  all  persons  against  trusting  my  wife, 
Gratia  Hart,  on  my  account,  as  I  am  determined  to  pay  no  debts 
of  her  contracting  unless  compelled  by  law. 

HENRY  HART.300 

The  Code  of  1873  provided  that  if  either  husband  or 
wife  abandoned  the  other  for  a  year  without  providing 
for  the  family,  the  other  might  obtain  authority  from  the 
district  court  to  administer  the  property;  but  the  Su- 
preme Court  decided  that  this  did  not  affect  the  wife's 
Common  Law  agency  by  which  she  might  carry  on  his 
business  in  his  absence.  All  contracts  thus  made  were 
declared  valid.301 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  131 

In  1887  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  a  wife 
who  voluntarily  left  her  husband  and  was  not  herself 
free  from  fault  could  not  obtain  separate  support ;  but  in 
1894  it  decided  that  the  husband  was  liable  for  medical 
aid  furnished  the  wife  while  the  couple  were  living  apart 
by  agreement  —  the  physician  being  ignorant  of  the  sep- 
aration.302 

That  husbands,  in  many  cases,  did  not  voluntarily 
provide  for  their  wives  and  families  is  evident  from  the 
agitation  for  a  criminal  law  governing  this  subject.  At 
first  it  aroused  only  ridicule,  as  is  shown  by  the  following 
resolution  introduced  in  the  Iowa  Senate  in  connection 
with  a  bill  to  provide  penalties  for  the  crime  of  desertion : 

If  any  woman,  without  good  cause,  abandon  or  desert  her 
husband,  and  shall  refuse  or  neglect  to  provide  for  such  husband, 
she  shall  be  liable  to  the  same  penalties,  and  the  same  rules  of 
evidence  shall  be  applicable.803 

The  increasing  problem  of  caring  for  such  families, 
however,  removed  the  question  from  the  realm  of  the 
humorous,  and  in  1902  and  1904  bills  to  protect  wives  and 
families  from  such  desertion  were  introduced  but  failed 
of  enactment.304 

At  the  next  session  of  the  General  Assembly,  Gov- 
ernor Cummins  denounced  desertion  and  urged  that  steps 
be  taken  to  punish  it  as  a  crime  "against  the  fundamen- 
tal compact  of  society. ' '  The  House  passed  a  bill  making 
desertion  a  misdemeanor,  but  the  measure  was  indef- 
initely postponed  in  the  Senate.  Governor  Cummins  in 
his  message  in  1907  urged  the  passage  of  an  act  which 
would  "make  it  a  crime  for  a  man  to  desert  his  family 
without  good  cause,  and  to  refuse  to  support,  without 
good  reason,  his  wife  and  children. "  "We  ought ",  he 


132    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OP  WOMEN 

continued,  "to  do  something  to  check  the  rapidly  grow- 
ing habit  of  repudiating  the  most  sacred  obligations 
which  a  man  ever  assumes/'  A  bill  making  desertion  of 
a  wife  or  minor  children  a  crime  and  permitting  the  hus- 
band or  wife  to  testify  against  the  other  in  such  cases 
was  adopted  by  the  legislature  at  this  session.305 

The  General  Assembly  also  incorporated  the  follow- 
ing section  in  the  supplement  to  the  Code  adopted  in 
1907: 

Every  person  who  shall,  without  good  cause,  wilfully  neglect 
or  refuse  to  maintain  or  provide  for  his  wife,  she  being  in  a 
destitute  condition,  or  who  shall,  without  good  cause,  abandon 
his  or  her  legitimate  or  legally  adopted  child  or  children  under 
the  age  of  sixteen  years,  leaving  such  child  or  children  in  a  desti- 
tute condition,  or  shall,  without  good  cause,  wilfully  neglect  or 
refuse  to  provide  for  such  child  or  children  they  being  in  a 
destitute  condition,  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  desertion  and,  upon 
conviction,  shall  be  punished  by  imprisonment  in  the  peniten- 
tiary for  not  more  than  one  year,  or  by  imprisonment  in  the 
county  jail  for  not  more  than  six  months. 

Furthermore,  in  all  such  prosecutions  the  husband  or 
wife  might  testify  against  each  other.306 

In  1906,  just  before  the  adoption  of  the  sections  above 
referred  to,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  decided  that  a  hus- 
band who  expelled  his  wife  from  the  home  must  support 
her  whether  the  act  was  justifiable  or  not.307  Two  years 
later  it  ruled  that  a  man  could  not  lawfully  abandon  his 
wife  and  minor  children  except  for  a  cause  that  would 
entitle  him  to  a  judicial  separation.308  The  section  in  the 
Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1907,  transfers  the 
action  in  case  of  desertion  from  a  civil  action  between 
husband  and  wife  to  a  criminal  proceeding  in  which  the 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  133 

State  is  the  plaintiff  but  desertion  is  still  one  of  the 
causes  for  which  a  divorce  may  be  granted. 

LIABILITY  FOB  DEBTS 

In  America  the  wife 's  property  has  generally  not  vest- 
ed in  the  husband,  although  the  early  laws  made  few  re- 
strictions so  far  as  the  real  control  of  it  by  the  husband 
was  concerned.  The  Code  of  1851  provided  that  the  per- 
sonal property  of  the  wife  should  remain  hers  after  mar- 
riage, although  it  might  be  taken  for  the  husband 's  debts 
unless  she  filed  a  notice  of  her  ownership  with  the  county 
recorder.  This  action  also  enabled  her  to  collect  her 
property  from  the  husband's  estate.  The  intention,  of 
course,  was  the  protection  of  third  parties ;  consequently 
bank  stock  and  similar  securities  did  not  need  to  be  re- 
corded, since  the  name  of  the  owner  was  evident.  Con- 
tracts made  by  the  wife  concerning  her  separate  property 
did  not  bind  the  husband.  All  these  provisions  referred 
to  debts  other  than  family  expenses,  since  the  Code  pro- 
vided that  "the  expenses  of  the  family,  the  education  of 
the  children,  and  such  other  obligations  as  come  within 
the  equity  of  this  provision,  are  chargeable  upon  the 
property  of  both  husband  and  wife  or  of  either  of  them, 
and  in  relation  thereto  they  may  be  sued  jointly  or  the 
husband  separately/'  In  1913  it  was  provided  that 
either  the  husband  or  the  wife  could  be  sued  separately 
as  well  as  jointly.309 

Since  it  has  been  possible  to  collect  family  expenses 
from  property  belonging  to  the  wife,  it  will  be  of  interest 
to  note  the  court  decisions  as  to  what  constitute  family 
expenses.  As  might  be  expected  the  rulings  have  merely 
dealt  with  particular  cases  and  have  not  established  any 


134    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

general  standard.  The  separate  property  of  the  wife  has 
been  held  liable  for  the  price  of  a  piano  used  by  the  fam- 
ily, although  it  was  purchased  by  the  husband  on  his 
individual  credit ;  but  a  reaping  machine  was  not  consid- 
ered a  family  expense,  nor  was  the  cost  of  feed  for  a 
horse  used  in  the  husband's  business  but  not  used  by  the 
family.310 

When  the  money  of  the  wife  was  used  by  the  husband 
for  ordinary  living  expenses  with  her  consent  and  with- 
out any  agreement  for  repayment,  the  Supreme  Court 
held  that  she  could  not  recover  it  from  the  husband's 
estate ;  but  one  who  advanced  money  to  the  husband  for 
family  expenses  could  not  claim  a  lien  on  the  wife's  sep- 
arate property  unless  the  loan  was  made  at  her  request, 
or  the  original  account  was  assigned  to  the  lender.311 
Neither  could  the  wife  be  charged  with  attorney's  fees 
and  interest  at  ten  per  cent  on  a  debt,  because  her  hus- 
band gave  a  note  to  that  effect,  although  the  debt  itself 
could  legally  have  been  collected  from  her  property. 
Indeed,  the  court  ruled  that  she  could  not  be  charged 
with  money  borrowed  by  the  husband  and  used  for  family 
expenses.312 

In  1894  an  unimportant  but  interesting  question  came 
before  the  Supreme  Court  for  decision.  Was  a  married 
woman  liable  for  the  price  of  an  atlas  purchased  by  the 
husband  in  spite  of  the  wife's  protest?  The  husband 
gave  a  note,  and  upon  his  failure  to  pay  the  wife  was 
sued.  The  court  decided  that  this  was  not  a  family  ex- 
pense, especially  since  she  opposed  the  purchase.  This 
conclusion  was  not  only  reasonable  but  was  supported  by 
precedent,  for  in  an  earlier  case  the  court  had  decided 
that  the  husband  did  not  have  to  pay  for  supplies  not 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  135 

actually  necessary  when  he  had  forbidden  such  pur- 
chase.313 

Some  of  these  cases  present  peculiar  features.  For 
example,  in  1897  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  decided  that  a 
diamond  shirt  stud,  purchased  and  worn  by  the  husband, 
was  a  family  expense  chargeable  upon  the  wife's  estate 
because  it  was  used  to  fasten  clothing.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  later  decision  ruled  that  the  wife's  property 
could  not  be  held  for  the  expense  of  caring  for  her  insane 
husband  at  Independence,  since  such  treatment  was  not 
a  family  expense.  The  reason  for  this  conclusion  was 
based  on  the  Common  Law  which  did  not  hold  the  wife 
financially  responsible  for  her  husband's  care  or  sup- 
port; since  no  statute  made  her  liable  for  such  care,  the 
Common  Law  was  still  in  force.  A  case  similar  to  this  in 
law  but  not  in  equity  was  decided  in  1909.  This  was  a 
claim  against  the  wife  for  her  husband's  board  while  he 
was  absent  from  home  in  contemplation  of  a  separation. 
This,  too,  was  decided  in  favor  of  the  wife  under  the 
Common  Law.314 

Under  section  3165  of  the  Code  of  1897  it  was  decided 
by  the  courts  that  a  judgment  against  the  husband  alone 
for  family  expenses  might  be  enforced  against  the  prop- 
erty of  the  wife,  but  she  might  refuse  to  expend  profes- 
sional earnings  unless  her  husband  promised  to  repay 
her;  and  the  transfer  of  property  as  a  result  of  such  a 
promise  was  legal  and  could  not  be  set  aside  by  the  hus- 
band's creditors.313  From  these  cases  it  is  evident  that 
the  wife's  legal  protection  in  this  respect  depended  on 
her  ability  to  make  bargains  with  her  husband. 

Among  the  latest  decisions  concerning  the  term  l '  fam- 
ily expenses"  is  one  which  held  that  the  wife  could  not  be 


136     LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

compelled  to  pay  for  beer  purchased  by  the  husband, 
evidence  that  it  was  used  upon  the  table  being  imma- 
terial.316 

It  is  evident  from  a  study  of  such  cases  that  nothing- 
has  been  decided  except  that  a  married  woman  is  respon- 
sible for  family  expenses  if  she  has  property  in  her  own 
name ;  but  no  rule  has  been  established  as  to  what  consti- 
tutes family  expenses. 

Another  aspect  of  the  question  of  the  financial  re- 
sponsibilities of  husbands  and  wives  relates  to  their  lia- 
bility for  the  other 's  debts  when  not  for  family  expenses. 
It  is  clear  that  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Code  of 
1851  the  husband  still  exercised  considerable  control  over 
the  wife's  property,  for  in  1853  a  case  was  decided  by 
the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  which  involved  the  validity  of  a 
lease  signed  by  the  husband  alone,  affecting  land  held  by 
the  wife  at  the  time  of  her  marriage.  At  the  time  the 
dispute  arose  the  couple  were  divorced,  but  the  husband 
still  claimed  that  the  lease  was  valid.  The  court  decided 
that  such  a  lease  bound  only  the  husband  and  ceased 
when  his  interest  in  the  property  ended  —  as  it  did  when 
the  divorce  was  granted.  Otherwise,  the  judge  who 
wrote  the  decision  remarked,  the  right  of  curtesy  might 
be  made  permanent.317 

Another  case  decided  at  about  the  same  time  shows 
the  contrast  between  the  Common  Law  and  statutory  law 
in  regard  to  the  wife's  position.  The  question  involved 
in  this  case  was  whether  or  not  the  husband  was  liable 
for  debts  contracted  by  the  wife  before  marriage.  The 
court  held  that  under  the  Common  Law  he  was  respon- 
sible for  such  debts,  but  under  the  Code  of  1851  he  was 
not  liable  if  the  debts  at  the  time  purported  to  bind  her 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  137 

only.318  Although  the  Code  plainly  stated  that  the  wife's 
property  was  not  liable  for  the  husband's  debts  if  the 
ownership  was  known,  yet  that  very  question  came  up  in 
1854  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  hold  the  property, 
bought  and  managed  by  the  wife,  for  the  husband's  debts. 
The  court  had  little  difficulty  in  deciding  that  the  wife's 
property  could  not  be  held,  especially  since  the  husband's 
creditor  knew  of  the  wife's  ownership  and  had  himself 
had  financial  dealings  with  her.319 

The  Iowa  Supreme  Court  has  been  extremely  favor- 
able to  the  property  rights  of  married  women  as  against 
the  claims  of  the  husband's  creditors,  and  the  laws  have 
attempted  to  protect  her  rights  without  injuring  third 
parties.  It  is  interesting  to  follow  the  steps  by  which 
the  lawmakers  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  was  so 
reasonable  for  a  married  woman  to  own  property  that 
special  notice  need  not  be  given  of  that  fact. 

The  Revision  of  1860  made  few  changes  in  the  prop- 
erty rights  of  married  women.  Notice  of  the  wife 's  own- 
ership was  required  except  for  bank  stock  and  similar 
forms,  which  need  not  be  listed  unless  given  to  the  wife 
by  the  husband.  The  husband  was  not  liable  for  the 
debts  contracted  by  the  wife  concerning  her  separate 
property;  nor  was  she  liable  for  his  debts,  except  for 
family  expenses.  A  married  woman,  if  abandoned  by 
her  husband,  might  secure  permission  from  the  court  to 
act  independently  and  might  then  manage  the  husband's 
property  —  if  he  left  any.  The  husband  could  obtain 
the  control  of  the  wife's  property  in  like  manner  if  she 
deserted  him.320 

A  decision  which  was  rather  unusual  in  its  interpre- 
tation of  women's  property  rights  was  handed  down  in 


138    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

1864,  reversing  the  decision  of  the  lower  court.  The  case 
may  be  briefly  summarized.  W.  M.  Roselle  and  his  wife, 
Lucinda  Roselle,  left  a  debt  of  $200  in  Piqua,  Ohio,  when 
they  came  to  Iowa.  The  creditors  got  a  judgment  and 
levied  on  a  house  purchased  by  the  wife  in  Burlington, 
Iowa,  with  money  earned,  as  she  claimed,  by  millinery 
work.  The  court  decided  that  it  did  not  matter  whether 
it  was  her  money  or  her  husband 's,  since  the  Code  of  1851 
superseded  the  Common  Law  only  in  respect  to  property 
inherited,  and  not  to  that  earned  by  her.  By  the  rules  of 
the  Common  Law,  which  it  was  declared  governed  this 
case,  "the  money  which  Lucinda  earned  in  dressmaking 
vested  at  once  in  her  husband ;  and  if  she  purchased  real 
estate  with  it,  taking  the  title  in  her  own  name,  she  holds 
the  property  simply  in  trust  for  her  husband  and  his 
creditors."321 

This  reactionary  decision  practically  took  away  from 
the  wife  her  right  to  her  wages  and  earnings,  for  it  limit- 
ed the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  1851  and  the  Revision  of 
1860  to  inherited  property.  It  was  not,  however,  agreed 
to  by  the  General  Assembly  and  in  1866  a  law  was  passed 
providing  that  the  earnings  of  a  married  woman  whose 
husband  did  not  support  her  should  be  held  in  her  own 
right  exempt  from  her  husband's  debts,  although  they 
could  be  taken  for  her  own  debts  and  for  family  expenses 
unless  protected  by  special  laws.  Property  purchased 
with  such  earnings  was  also  exempt,  and  it  was  not  neces- 
sary for  the  wife  to  file  a  notice  of  her  ownership.822  It  is 
difficult  to  realize  that  previous  to  the  passage  of  this  law 
a  husband  might  entirely  neglect  his  wife  and  family,  and 
yet,  if  the  wife  unaided  managed  to  acquire  any  prop- 
erty, he  might  incur  any  indebtedness  he  pleased  and  his 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  139 

creditors  could  collect  from  the  wife.  Furthermore,  it 
was  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court,  that  same  year,  that 
the  wife  might  sell  or  trade  her  separate  property  for 
other  property  without  subjecting  the  profits  to  seizure 
for  the  payment  of  her  husband's  debts.323 

In  1870  the  section  of  the  Revision  of  1860  concerning 
the  liabilities  of  husband  and  wife  for  the  debts  of  the 
other  was  somewhat  modified.  The  new  law  reads  in 
part  as  follows: 

Neither  husband  nor  wife  is  liable  for  the  debts  or  liabilities 
of  the  other  incurred  before  marriage,  and  except  as  herein  oth- 
erwise declared  they  are  not  liable  for  the  separate  debts  of  the 
other;  nor  are  the  wages,  earnings,  or  property  of  either,  nor  is 
the  rent  or  income  of  such  property,  liable  for  the  separate  debts 
of  the  other.324 

In  spite  of  this  apparently  clear  rule  that  neither  hus- 
band nor  wife  was  responsible  for  the  debts  of  the  other 
contracted  before  marriage,  the  right  to  satisfy  a  judg- 
ment against  the  husband  for  debts  contracted  before  his 
marriage  by  levying  on  the  wife's  property  was  claimed 
in  a  case  decided  in  1873.  The  judge  of  the  lower  court 
gave  the  following  as  a  part  of  his  instructions  to  the 
jury :  *  '  The  separate  and  individual  property  of  the  wife, 
and  the  income  and  rent  of  her  property  are  not  subject 
to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  the  husband  that  were 
contracted  prior  to  their  marriage,  even  though  the  same 
should  be  left  under  the  control  of  her  husband,  and  no 
notice  given  of  her  ownership."323  The  Supreme  Court 
affirmed  the  decision  of  the  lower  court  and  denied  the 
liability  of  the  wife  for  such  debts. 

This  case  illustrates  the  difference  between  the  old 
Common  Law  and  the  statutory  law  of  Iowa  concerning 


140    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  liability  of  the  wife  for  the  husband's  debts.  Under 
the  Common  Law  the  wife  was  not  responsible  for  any 
of  her  husband's  debts  —  indeed,  she  could  not  be  held 
responsible  for  her  own  debts,  for  she  was  not  recognized 
as  a  legal  person  and  all  property  owned  by  her  at  mar- 
riage or  acquired  by  her  after  marriage  became  the 
property  of  her  husband.  As  a  result  of  this  rule  the 
wife's  property  could  be  taken  for  the  husband's  debts 
whether  incurred  before  or  after  marriage,  for  it  was 
not  hers  but  his  as  soon  as  the  marriage  service  was 
completed.  The  husband,  however,  became  responsible 
for  all  debts  of  the  wife  and  for  all  damages  for  torts 
committed  by  her.  Under  the  Iowa  law,  as  interpreted 
by  this  decision,  the  wife's  property  did  not  vest  in  the 
husband  and  could  be  held  for  his  debts  only  when  she 
allowed  the  husband  to  manage  it  and  so  gave  third 
parties  reason  to  believe  that  he  owned  it.  In  the  case 
of  debts  contracted  before  marriage  the  wife's  property 
could  not  be  held  liable  under  any  circumstances. 

A  notice  published  in  a  newspaper  in  Iowa  in  1886 
illustrates  this  change  in  the  status  of  married  women. 
It  was  based  upon  the  public  warnings  frequently  issued 
by  husbands  and  had  more  standing  in  law  than  such  no- 
tices, since  the  husband  could  not  escape  the  just  debts 
incurred  by  the  wife  for  support  by  a  public  statement 
while  notice  of  the  wife 's  ownership  of  property  was  suf- 
ficient to  exempt  it  from  the  husband 's  debts.  The  ironic 
parody  was  as  follows : 
To  whom  it  may  concern: 

J.  E.  Ballard  having  left  my  bed  and  board,  without  just 
cause  and  provocation,  I  will  pay  no  more  debts  of  his  contract- 
ing from  this  date.  MARY  E.  BALLARD.326 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  141 

The  rule  that  a  wife  must  file  a  notice  of  her  owner- 
ship if  she  wished  to  hold  her  property  exempt  from  the 
debts  of  her  husband  contracted  after  marriage  was 
omitted  in  the  Code  of  1873.  The  section  dealing  with 
the  question  was  drafted  as  follows:  "When  property  is 
owned  by  either  husband  or  wife,  the  other  has  no  inter- 
est therein  which  can  be  the  subject  of  contract  between 
them,  or  such  interest  as  will  make  the  same  liable  for 
the  contracts  or  liabilities  of  either  the  husband  or  wife 
who  is  not  the  owner  of  the  property,  except  as  provided 
in  this  chapter. "  This  exception  referred  to  debts  for 
family  expenses.  No  notice  of  ownership  was  re- 
quired.327 

It  is  clear  that  the  attempt  to  protect  the  wife 's  prop- 
erty sometimes  led  to  fraud  and  injustice  to  others.  For 
example,  in  the  case  of  Miller  v.  Hollingsworth,  decided 
in  1873,  the  wife  refused  to  pay  for  lumber  purchased  by 
the  husband  for  use  on  her  property  with  her  knowledge 
and  consent,  on  the  ground  that  she  could  not  be  com- 
pelled to  pay  her  husband's  debts.  The  court  decided 
that  the  creditor  could  take  a  lien  on  the  wife 's  property, 
since  the  debt  was  incurred  for  her  benefit  and  with  her 
consent.328 

In  a  later  case  property  in  the  wife 's  name  which  had 
been  paid  for  with  money  loaned  by  the  husband  who  was 
insolvent,  and  was  managed  by  him,  was  held  subject  to 
the  claims  of  the  husband's  creditors  to  whom  he  owed 
money  at  the  time  the  money  was  given  to  the  wife.329 

The  reason  for  the  decisions  in  these  cases  is  evi- 
dently the  appearance  of  fraud.  Where  the  suggestion 
of  an  agreement  between  husband  and  wife  for  the  pur- 
pose of  defrauding  third  parties  is  absent,  the  courts 


142    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

have  usually  protected  the  wife's  property.  For  exam- 
ple, in  the  case  of  Hoag  &  Steere  v.  Martin,  the  Supreme 
Court  decided  that  land  purchased  by  the  wife  with 
money  paid  her  for  taking  care  of  her  husband 's  mother 
and  other  money  earned  by  her  could  not  be  held  for  the 
husband's  debts  on  the  ground  that  his  creditors  believed 
it  to  be  his ;  nor  could  the  crops  from  a  farm,  worked  by 
the  wife  and  sons,  be  held,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
husband  attended  to  the  business  and  even  listed  the 
property  with  the  assessor  as  his  own.330 

In  1894  section  3072  of  the  Code  of  1873,  which  pro- 
vided for  the  exemption  of  certain  property  of  a  debtor 
who  was  the  head  of  a  family,  was  amended  so  that  any 
man  who  was  the  head  of  a  family  and  any  woman  wheth- 
er she  was  the  head  of  a  family  or  not  might  hold  fifty 
dollars  worth  of  poultry  exempt  from  execution.  Why 
this  particular  form  of  property  should  be  specifically 
mentioned  is  not  clear.  Two  years  later  the  General  As- 
sembly passed  a  law  that  no  lien  on  exempt  personal 
property  was  valid  unless  husband  and  wife  signed  it,  if 
the  owner  was  married.331 

The  Code  of  1897  repeated  most  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Code  of  1873  concerning  the  liabilities  of  husbands 
and  wives  for  each  other's  debts.  The  Common  Law 
principle  that  the  husband  was  held  responsible  for  debts 
incurred  for  or  by  the  wife  for  necessities  suitable  to  her 
station  was  retained,  but  it  was  provided  that  he  was  not 
responsible  for  damages  for  civil  injuries  committed  by 
the  wife  unless  he  would  be  liable  if  the  marriage  did  not 
exist.  Either  husband  or  wife  might  bring  action  against 
the  other  to  recover  property  belonging  to  them.832  Very 
little  that  is  new  is  to  be  found  either  in  the  Supplement 


PROPERTY  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  143 

to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1907  or  in  the  two  following  supple- 
ments ;  indeed,  very  little  remains  to  be  done  in  respect 
to  women's  property  rights  except  in  the  matter  of  the 
family  property  which  is  now  almost  entirely  in  the 
hands  of  the  husband. 

In  addition  to  the  cases  already  cited,  several  others 
deserve  mention  here,  although  they  involve  somewhat 
different  aspects  of  the  question  of  financial  responsi- 
bility. Two  of  these  cases  deal  with  the  responsibility  of 
a  husband  for  the  support  of  an  insane  wife  who  had  been 
sent  to  a  hospital  for  the  insane.  The  first  decision, 
handed  down  in  1877,  was  that  under  Chapter  26  of  the 
laws  of  1874  the  husband  was  not  liable  for  the  wife's 
expenses.  The  second,  in  1909,  declared  that  under  sec- 
tion 2297  of  the  Code  the  husband  was  a  "  relative "  and 
could  be  compelled  to  reimburse  the  county  for  the  ex- 
pense of  caring  for  his  insane  wife  at  a  hospital.333 

A  third  case  involves  the  duty  of  a  husband  to  pay 
for  the  support  of  his  wife  and  also  indicates  under  what 
circumstances  a  wife  might  refuse  to  live  in  the  home 
selected  by  the  husband  and  still  be  entitled  to  support. 
The  district  court  judge  ruled  that  l '  the  husband,  in  law, 
is  not  bound  to  furnish  board  and  necessaries  at  any  place 
other  than  at  his  own  choosing,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
wife  to  accommodate  herself  to  the  surroundings  and 
conditions  of  the  husband".  The  Supreme  Court,  how- 
ever, did  not  concur  in  this  decision.  If  this  were  so, 
the  Supreme  Court  declared,  the  husband  might  re- 
quire the  wife  to  live  in  a  totally  unfit  place.334  In  1910 
the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
husband  to  see  that  his  wife  had  proper  burial,  but  if  she 
left  an  estate  he  could  recover  the  amount  from  it.33S 


X 

WOMEN  IN  INDUSTRY 

THE  women  in  any  community  may,  for  convenience,  be 
considered  in  four  groups  as  regards  source  of  support 
and  employment.  Of  these  the  first  may  be  called  the 
leisure  group,  since  it  includes  all  women  who  possess 
sufficient  means  to  live  without  working  and  all  married 
women  whose  husbands  are  able  to  support  them  without 
any  economic  contribution  from  the  wives.  This  does 
not  mean  that  these  women  are  idle,  but  rather  that  there 
is  no  interrelation  between  their  work  and  their  manner 
of  living. 

From  this  class,  in  which  the  women  are  almost  wholly 
free  from  economic  responsibility,  we  pass  by  almost  im- 
perceptible degrees  to  a  second  class  which  includes  all 
women  working  at  home  without  any  specified  remunera- 
tion. Married  women,  of  course,  constitute  the  great 
body  of  this  group.  They  contribute  more  or  less  effec- 
tively to  the  economic  welfare  of  the  family,  but  they  are 
not  included  in  the  enumeration  of  women  engaged  in 
"gainful  occupations ".  Some  of  these  women  have  suf- 
ficient leisure  for  recreation  and  intellectual  development, 
and  have  enough  economic  independence  to  make  their 
lives  very  satisfactory ;  but  many,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
overworked  and  are  denied  any  control  of  the  family 
income.  The  only  amount  guaranteed  to  the  wife  by  law 
is  support  and  a  distributive  share  in  the  husband 's 
estate  at  his  death.  The  wife's  position  depends  very 

144 


WOMEN  IN  INDUSTRY  145 

largely  upon  the  husband's  earning  ability  and  upon  his 
attitude  toward  her,  since,  although  the  law  may  guar- 
antee a  wife  certain  rights,  it  is  frequently  true  that  the 
women  whose  rights  are  denied  are  the  ones  who  are 
either  ignorant  of  the  laws  or  are  unable  to  assert  their 
rights. 

A  third  class  is  composed  of  women  engaged  in  busi- 
ness or  in  professional  pursuits.  Here  belong  lawyers, 
physicians,  business  women,  teachers,  librarians,  trained 
nurses,336  and  all  women  who  occupy  executive  or  admin- 
istrative positions.  These  women  are  frequently  under- 
paid; but  working  conditions  are  usually  good  and  the 
general  standard  of  intelligence  and  training  is  above  the 
average.  This  class,  having  already  been  considered  in  a 
separate  chapter,  requires  no  further  discussion  in  this 
place. 

The  women  who  perform  manual  labor  for  wages 
make  up  the  class  usually  in  mind  when  the  condition  of 
working  women  is  discussed.  In  this  group  belong  fac- 
tory operatives,  telephone  employees,  workers  in  laun- 
dries, hotels,  and  restaurants,  clerks  in  stores,  and  those 
employed  in  unskilled  trades. 

NUMBER  OF  WOMEN  WAGE  EAENEES 

It  is  difficult  to  secure  statistics  for  the  various 
branches  of  industry,  since  the  plans  of  enumeration  dif- 
fer and  the  industrial  groups  change  from  time  to  time. 
An  idea  of  the  number  of  women  employed  outside  the 
home  and  some  of  the  industries  followed  may  be  gained 
from  the  following  table  which  can  be  only  approximately 
correct  since  a  wide  divergence  in  the  plans  of  the  enu- 
merator^ is  evident.337 

10 


146    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 


x 

0 

o 

a 

^  < 

S  j 

I 

82 

ta  ^ 

0 

efi 

*  0 

<  s 

§n§ 

3 

§ 

»  (^ 

M 

P  X  K 

A 

o 

21 

| 

O 

3    1 

3 
o 

o 

1870 

356 

19,953 

59 

2,758 

23,126 

1880 

1,386 

34,357 

|    660 

8,442 

44,845 

1890 

8,094 

18,800 

33,016 

4,431 

16,076 

80,417 

1900 

8,132 

23,285 

43,350 

10,820 

21,296 

106,883 

1910 

9,557 

28,864 

44,031 

13,299 

24,466 

10,802 

131,514 

1915 

4,495 

30,307 

32,318 

28,392 

14,200 

110,115 

Many  of  the  apparent  variations  in  these  statistics 
are  of  interest  because  of  certain  changes  in  status  which 
they  indirectly  reveal.  For  example,  the  19,953  women 
said  to  be  employed  in  "professional  and  personal "  ser- 
vice in  1870  included  the  group  later  classed  as  domestic 
employees ;  only  4472  of  them  were  teachers,  and  a  very 
small  number  were  in  strictly  professional  work. 

The  decrease  in  the  total  number  of  women  gainfully 
employed  according  to  the  Iowa  census  of  1915,  as  com- 
pared with  the  number  given  by  the  Federal  census  in 
1910,  is  probably  due  to  a  less  inclusive  enumeration  of 
women  occasionally  employed  outside  the  home,  for  it  is 
most  apparent  in  the  number  of  women  engaged  in  agri- 
culture, domestic  service,  and  manufacturing ;  while  there 
is  an  increase  in  the  number  of  women  in  professional 
work  and  in  certain  commercial  lines. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  possible  that  the  number  of 
women  employed  in  Iowa  was  really  smaller  in  1915  than 
it  was  in  1910,  since  the  State  has  been  prosperous  and 
there  has  been  less  necessity  for  women  to  work  outside 
of  the  home.  Under  war  conditions  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  women  employed  is  very  probable. 


WOMEN  IN  INDUSTRY  147 

In  1910  it  was  estimated  that  15.5%  of  the  women  of 
Iowa  over  ten  years  of  age  were  engaged  in  remunerative 
employment,  and  the  majority  of  women  so  employed  be- 
longed to  the  group  of  industrial  workers.  Only  ten 
States  had  a  smaller  per  cent  of  women  working  at  that 
time.388 

PROTECTION  OF  WOMEN  IN  INDUSTRY 

Since  Iowa  is  not  predominantly  an  industrial  State 
and  the  number  of  women  employed  is  relatively  small, 
little  attention  has  been  paid  to  conditions  surrounding 
them  while  at  work.  It  has  been  taken  for  granted  that 
women  were  responsible  for  any  contract  they  made,  and 
that  it  was  not  the  duty  of  the  State  to  interfere  if  the 
work  was  dangerous,  the  pay  inadequate,  or  the  hours  too 
long.  Competition  was  considered  beneficial,  and  women 
must  take  the  consequences  if  they  entered  the  industrial 
field. 

Gradually  thinking  people  have  awakened  to  the  fact 
that  competition  is  not  beneficial  to  those  workers  who 
are  too  inexperienced  or  uneducated  to  determine  their 
best  interests.  The  limited  number  of  employments  open 
to  women  has  also  handicapped  them  in  the  struggle  for 
a  living.  But  aside  from  the  personal  interest  of  the 
women  themselves,  it  has  also  come  to  be  realized  that 
many  of  these  women  are  or  will  become  mothers  and 
what  affects  their  intelligence,  health,  or  morals  concerns 
also  the  future  of  the  State 's  citizens. 

Iowa  has  been  slow  to  act  in  this  matter,  partly  be- 
cause of  indifference  and  partly  because  women  have, 
until  quite  recently,  been  employed  largely  in  establish- 
ments where  only  a  few  were  needed  and  where  the  em- 
ployer worked  with  them.  It  is  probable  also  that  the 


148     LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

opportunity  for  education  and  the  economic  freedom  of 
women  made  special  protection  less  necessary  than  in 
States  where  home  conditions  forced  girls  to  work  at  an 
early  age. 

As  the  number  of  women  workers  increased,  however, 
and  conditions  changed  from  rural  to  urban  and  manu- 
facturing developed,  the  need  for  the  special  protection 
of  workers,  and  especially  of  women  and  girls,  increased. 
As  early  as  1874  a  law  was  passed  excluding  children  and 
women  from  work  in  mines.  The  first  act  which  dealt 
with  the  welfare  of  women  workers  was  passed  in  1892, 
when  the  General  Assembly  enacted  a  law  requiring  em- 
ployers to  provide  seats  for  female  employees  and  to  per- 
mit them  to  use  them  whenever  the  work  would  permit. 
Violations  of  this  law  were  punishable  by  a  fine  of  ten 
dollars,  and  the  county  attorney  was  assigned  the«duty  of 
prosecuting  violators.  Ten  years  later  the  Commissioner 
of  Labor  was  given  supervision  over  the  matter,339  but 
the  law  appears  to  be  difficult  to  enforce,  because  so  much 
is  left  to  the  employer  and  the  fine  is  so  small. 

According  to  the  Code  of  1897  no  woman  could  be  em- 
ployed in  a  mulct  saloon.  A  law  passed  in  1906  forbade 
the  employment  of  any  girl  under  sixteen  in  any  occupa- 
tion requiring  constant  standing  or  at  any  dangerous 
employment.340  What  is  sometimes  called  the  Factory 
Act  of  1902  repeated  the  prohibition  as  to  dangerous  em- 
ployments for  children  under  sixteen  and  also  stated  that 
no  person  under  that  age  and  no  female  under  eighteen 
was  to  be  permitted  to  clean  machinery  while  in  mo- 
tion.341 

These  laws  include  practically  all  legislation  for  the 
protection  of  women  workers  in  Iowa.  No  attempt  has 


WOMEN  IN  INDUSTRY  149 

been  made  here  to  cover  labor  legislation  in  general,  since 
this  study  deals  only  with  laws  relating  specifically  to 
women.  Neither  have  child  labor  laws  been  included  ex- 
cept where  distinctions  are  made  between  boys  and  girls. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  Iowa  has  little  labor  legislation  of 
any  kind.  At  present  this  State  is  one  of  the  six  in  the 
United  States  without  any  limitation  upon  the  number  of 
hours  women  may  work.342 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  remedy  this  situation, 
but  either  the  interest  of  employers,  the  indifference  of 
the  legislators,  or  a  failure  to  realize  the  importance  of 
safeguards  have  thus  far  prevented  the  success  of  such 
measures.  For  example,  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the 
Iowa  Senate  in  1917  to  prohibit  the  employment  of  wom- 
en more  than  ten  hours  a  day  or  more  than  fifty-four 
hours  a  week  and  also  between  10  P.  M.  and  6  A.  M., 
except  certain  groups  such  as  stenographers,  managers, 
and  women  in  executive  or  administrative  positions.  No 
women  under  twenty-one,  except  telephone  and  telegraph 
operators,  were  to  be  permitted  to  work  after  9  P.  M.  and 
these  only  if  over  eighteen  years  of  age.  Forty-five  min- 
utes intermission  for  dinner  was  required  except  in  the 
case  of  those  working  less  than  eight  hours  a  day,  and  no 
woman  employee  was  to  be  permitted  to  work  more  than 
six  hours  without  such  intermission.  This  act  did  not 
apply  to  women  in  domestic  service,  graduate  nurses,  and 
those  working  on  farms  and  in  canning  factories.  Each 
employer  was  to  be  required  to  post  a  list  of  the  women 
employees,  together  with  the  hours  of  work  for  each. 
Small  fines  were  provided  for  the  infraction  of  any  of 
these  requirements.  This  bill  was  lost  in  the  sifting  com- 
mittee, as  was  a  similar  one  in  the  House.  Another  bill 


150    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

which  was  intended  to  prohibit  the  employment  of  either 
men  or  women  in  hotels  or  eating  houses  more  than  six 
days  a  week  was  also  lost.343 

In  1913,  however,  the  General  Assembly  made  provi- 
sion for  a  woman  factory  inspector,344  and  Mrs.  Ellen  M. 
Eourke  was  appointed  to  this  position.  Her  duty  con- 
sisted largely  of  investigation,  since  there  were  few  laws 
to  enforce.  Her  reports  of  1914  and  1916  deal  largely 
with  the  results  of  her  study  of  conditions  among  certain 
groups  of  working  women. 

The  first  report  dealt  with  women  in  stores  and  in 
hotels  and  restaurants  in  various  cities  of  the  State.  Not 
all  of  the  employees  were  reached,  nor  was  the  number 
of  places  visited  large,  but  the  report,  nevertheless,  gives 
an  insight  into  the  working  conditions  of  Iowa  women. 
The  second  report  took  up  two  other  classes  of  workers, 
also  presenting  different  requirements  and  working  con- 
ditions. These  were  telephone  operators  and  women 
workers  in  laundries. 

Wages  ranged  from  five  dollars  a  week  to  twenty-one, 
but  the  larger  per  cent  of  these  women  received  between 
six  and  seven  dollars  a  week  —  the  rate  being  slightly 
higher  for  those  living  away  from  home  than  for  those  at 
home.  Iowa,  it  may  be  said,  has  no  minimum  wage  law 
for  either  women  or  men.  Working  conditions  were  re- 
ported as  fairly  good  and  with  a  tendency  to  improve. 
The  hours  of  work  varied  from  seven  and  one-half  to 
eleven  hours  a  day  and  from  fifty-five  to  sixty  hours  a 
week,  but  some  women  were  working  thirteen  hours  a  day 
in  rush  seasons. 

The  relation  of  education  to  the  kind  of  work  secured 
is  suggested  by  the  report  that  forty-two  per  cent  of  the 


WOMEN  IN  INDUSTRY  151 

women  working  in  laundries  and  fifty-four  and  four- 
tenths  per  cent  of  those  employed  in  hotels  and  restaur- 
ants had  left  school  between  the  second  and  eighth 
grades ;  while  forty-nine  and  eight-tenths  per  cent  of  the 
store  employees  and  eighteen  per  cent  of  the  telephone 
operators  left  school  between  the  fourth  and  eighth 
grades,  and  seventy-eight  and  five-tenths  per  cent  of  the 
telephone  workers  had  a  grammar  school  education.345 


XI 
RECAPITULATION  OF  LEGAL  STATUS 

THE  foregoing  chapters  indicate  how,  step  by  step,  wom- 
en in  Iowa  have  secured  rights  and  privileges  denied  to 
their  sex  by  the  Common  Law.  Once  acquired,  these 
rights  have  seldom,  if  ever,  been  lost.  As  a  result  the 
progress  of  women  towards  equality  in  civil  affairs  has 
been  sure  although  the  reform  has  been  gradual.  More- 
over, this  advance  has  been  free  from  much  of  the  bitter- 
ness which  has  characterized  struggles  where  rights 
fully  recognized  and  strongly  desired  have  long  been 
denied. 

It  has  been  seen  that,  at  the  beginning  of  Iowa  history, 
the  rights  of  women  —  especially  married  women  —  were 
largely  fixed  by  the  Common  Law,  which  denied  to  the 
wife  a  separate  personality.  To-day,  women  may  attend 
all  State  supported  schools  from  the  kindergarten  to  the 
University.  They  may  also  be  employed  as  teachers  in 
any  of  these  schools,  and  the  proportion  of  women  teach- 
ers is  constantly  increasing.  The  professions  also  are 
open  to  women  on  equal  terms  in  so  far  as  they  are  regu- 
lated by  the  State. 

In  the  matter  of  property  rights,  men  and  women  are 
also  theoretically  equal.  Even  married  women  may  own 
property,  make  contracts,  and  prosecute  and  defend  ac- 
tions in  court  without  being  subject  to  the  control  of 
their  husbands.  The  distributive  share  in  the  property 
of  the  other  spouse  is  the  same  for  husbands  and  wives, 

152 


RECAPITULATION  OF  LEGAL  STATUS  153 

and  the  requirements  for  the  transfer  of  real  estate  are 
also  identical  for  both.  In  one  respect  only  does  it  ap- 
pear that  this  rule  is  unfair  to  wives.  The  property  ac- 
quired by  the  joint  efforts  of  the  husband  and  wife  is 
usually  in  the  husband's  name.  In  the  case  of  real  estate 
the  wife  can  not  be  deprived  of  her  distributive  share 
without  her  consent ;  but  even  this  may  give  her  only  one- 
third  of  the  property;  while  personal  property  may  be 
wasted  or  given  away  by  the  husband  during  his  life 
without  the  wife's  knowledge  or  consent. 

The  husband,  however,  is  still  legally  responsible  for 
the  support  of  his  wife,  as  well  as  of  the  minor  children ; 
while  the  wife  has  no  corresponding  responsibility  for 
the  husband's  maintenance,  except  that  the  wife  is  jointly 
liable  for  the  expenses  of  the  home  if  she  has  money  of 
her  own.  The  desertion  of  a  destitute  wife  or  minor  chil- 
dren by  the  husband  or  of  such  children  by  the  mother  is 
now  a  criminal  offence  punishable  by  a  penitentiary 
sentence. 

The  mother  is  joint  guardian  of  her  minor  children 
and  is  likewise  responsible  for  their  support  and  educa- 
tion. A  comparison  of  the  court  decrees  in  divorce  cases 
shows  that  the  mother  is  usually  preferred  to  the  father 
in  the  awarding  of  minor  children  if  other  things  are 
equal.  Mothers'  pensions  are  also  provided  to  enable 
widows  or  wives  whose  husbands  are  inmates  of  State 
institutions  to  maintain  their  children  at  home. 

The  causes  for  which  divorces  may  be  granted  in  Iowa 
number  five  for  women  and  six  for  men,  although  the 
sixth  cause  for  which  a  husband  may  secure  a  divorce 
makes  little  difference.  The  five  causes  common  to  both 
are  adultery,  desertion,  drunkenness,  inhuman  treatment, 


154    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

and  conviction  for  a  felony.  Wives,  however,  in  this 
State  secure  a  majority  of  the  divorces.  From  1886  to 
1906  this  proportion  was  about  three  to  one. 

The  position  of  women  in  criminal  affairs  is  supposed 
to  be  the  same  as  that  of  men.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is 
probable  that  women  are  usually  treated  more  leniently 
than  men.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  influence  of  the  Com- 
mon Law  rule  that  a  wife  was  exempt  from  punishment 
in  many  cases  if  the  husband  was  present,  and  partly  to 
the  fact  that  decisions  in  criminal  trials  are  made  by 
juries  of  men  only  and  are  unconsciously  influenced  by 
the  spirit  of  chivalry.  On  the  other  hand,  in  cases  in- 
volving certain  forms  of  immorality,  the  jurors  may  be 
influenced  by  sex  loyalty.  Women  may  testify,  however, 
on  the  same  terms  as  men,  and  may  also  plead  cases  in 
any  Iowa  court. 

In  the  field  of  industry  women  are  free  to  make  con- 
tracts and  collect  their  wages  even  when  married.  But 
Iowa  has  been  slow,  indeed,  to  enact  protective  legisla- 
tion. This  has  been  due  partly  to  the  fact  that  compara- 
tively few  women  in  Iowa  are  engaged  in  factory  work  or 
similar  employments.  Doubtless  a  sense  of  equal  ability 
on  the  part  of  most  Iowa  women  and  the  general  con- 
servatism of  the  State  have  also  been  factors  in  retard- 
ing such  legislation.  In  1915  about  110,000  women  were 
reported  as  gainfully  employed  outside  the  home. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  in  civil  affairs  no  marked 
injustice  to  women  is  to  be  observed  in  Iowa :  discrimina- 
tion against  them  is  confined  almost  entirely  to  political 
matters.  The  path  to  this  equality,  however,  has  not  been 
free  from  laws  and  court  decisions  which  have  threatened 
the  property  rights  of  wives,  their  right  to  obtain  justice 


RECAPITULATION  OF  LEGAL  STATUS  155 

through  legal  procedure,  the  claim  of  mothers  to  their 
children,  and  the  right  of  all  women  to  choose  their  occu- 
pations or  professions  without  legal  restriction  or  dis- 
crimination. That  the  civil  status  of  women  in  Iowa  is 
so  fortunate  is  due  to  a  variety  of  causes.  Pioneer  life 
fostered  independence  and  equality.  Women  who  settled 
here  have  been,  for  the  most  part,  intelligent  and  edu- 
cated ;  while  the  lawmakers  and  judges  have  been  respon- 
sive to  the  demand  for  reform  when  once  their  attention 
has  been  called  to  unjust  treatment  of  women. 


PART  II 
POLITICAL  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN  IN  IOWA 


157 


XII 
EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

So  closely  are  the  political  movements  in  one  State  re- 
lated to  similar  movements  in  other  States  and  through- 
out the  Nation  that  it  will  be  well  to  follow  briefly  the 
growth  of  equal  suffrage  in  the  United  States  before 
tracing  its  history  in  detail  in  Iowa. 

EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  PRIOR  TO  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

The  equal  suffrage  or  equal  rights  movement  may  be 
said  to  have  appeared  in  Massachusetts  as  early  as  1638 
when  the  discussion  of  religious  topics  by  Mrs.  Anne 
Hutchinson  incurred  the  double  condemnation  of  the 
magistrates  —  first  because  of  her  criticism  of  the  teach- 
ings of  the  men  in  authority,  and  secondly  because,  being 
a  woman,  she  had,  in  their  opinion,  no  right  to  speak  at 
all.346 

Another  woman  who  at  an  early  day  asserted  her 
equality  before  the  law  was  Margaret  Brent  of  Mary- 
land, a  sister  of  Giles  Brent,  a  prominent  planter.  She 
received  a  grant  of  land  in  1638  and  for  a  number  of 
years  occupied  a  position  of  influence  and  authority,  act- 
ing as  the  administrator  of  Governor  Leonard  Calvert's 
estate,  as  the  guardian  of  his  children,  and  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  absent  Lord  Baltimore.347 

Even  during  the  Eevolution  there  appeared  voices 
prophetic  of  the  future,  although  it  can  not  be  said  that 
there  were  serious  demands  for  equal  suffrage  at  the 

159 


160     LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

time.  Abigail  Adams  wrote  to  her  husband  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  discus- 
sion of  the  new  government  to  be  established:  "I  long 
to  hear  that  you  have  declared  an  independence  .  . 
.  .  And  by  the  way,  in  the  new  code  of  laws  .  . 
.  .  I  desire  you  would  remember  the  ladies,  and  be 
more  generous  and  favorable  to  them  than  your  ances- 
tors. Do  not  put  such  unlimited  power  into  the  hands  of 
the  husbands!  Eemember,  all  men  would  be  tyrants  if 
they  could !"  Mercy  Otis  Warren  was  likewise  among 
the  few  who  urged  the  recognition  of  women  in  the  new 
Democracy.  It  was,  indeed,  a  significant  coincidence  that 
Thomas  Paine 's  Rights  of  Man  and  Mary  Wollstone- 
craft's  A  Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Woman  were  pub- 
lished during  the  same  decade,  although  in  different  coun- 
tries. Thomas  Paine  was  probably  the  first  prominent 
man  in  America  to  advocate  equal  political  privileges  for 
women  —  that  is,  a  real  democracy  of  men  and  women.348 
It  is  a  curious  fact  that  women  were  legal  voters  in 
New  Jersey  from  1776  to  1807,  under  the  Constitution 
which  was  adopted  two  days  before  the  Declaration  of 
Independence.  This  instrument  provided  that  "all  in- 
habitants" who  possessed  certain  age  and  property  qual- 
ifications might  vote;  and  the  legislature  in  1790  spe- 
cifically recognized  that  this  provision  was  intended  to 
include  women  by  the  use  of  the  double  pronoun  "he  or 
she"  in  a  law  concerning  residence  qualifications.  In 
1807,  however,  the  legislature  disqualified  women  in 
spite  of  the  Constitution;  and  in  1844  the  Constitution 
was  itself  revised  so  that  only  "white  male  citizens" 
could  vote.349  This  premature  grant  of  suffrage  was 
largely  the  result  of  Quaker  influence,  since  among  them 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES     161 

men  and  women  were  considered  equal.  Its  failure  was 
due  partly  to  the  social  standards  of  the  time  which  lim- 
ited women's  activities  to  household  duties,  and  partly  to 
the  development  of  the  struggle  over  negro  suffrage. 

The  idea  of  equal  suffrage  was  not  seriously  consid- 
ered, much  less  adopted,  by  the  founders  of  the  new 
republic.  Although  women  were  generally  treated  with 
consideration,  Harriet  Martineau,  who  visited  the  United 
States  in  1837,  found  the  position  of  the  women  so  de- 
pendent and  restricted  that  she  raised  the  question 
whether  "the  principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence bear  no  relation  to  half  of  the  human  race?"350 

It  was  not  until  about  1840  that  the  women  of  the 
United  States  began  to  realize  the  disadvantages  of  po- 
litical inequality.  Among  those  who  opposed  slavery 
there  were  many  women  who  came  to  understand  the 
value  of  the  franchise  in  securing  reforms.  At  the  anti- 
slavery  conference  held  in  London  in  1840  Lucretia  Mott, 
Elizabeth  Cady  Stanton,  and  Esther  Moore  —  American 
women  delegates  —  were  refused  admission  in  spite  of 
the  protests  of  Wendell  Phillips,  Henry  B.  Blackwell, 
William  Lloyd  Garrison,  and  others.351  Stung  by  this 
humiliation  and  by  the  general  disregard  of  equal  rights, 
these  women  began  an  agitation  for  the  removal  of  the 
political  disabilities  of  women.  The  question  was  dis- 
cussed in  the  New  York  constitutional  convention  in 
1846,  and  it  is  said  that  later  defenders  of  the  equal  suf- 
frage cause  have  seldom  added  anything  to  the  argu- 
ment made  there  by  George  William  Curtis.352 

Perhaps  the  first  attempt  at  organized  effort  among 
the  women  was  the  call  for  a  convention  to  meet  at  Seneca 
Falls,  New  York,  in  July,  1848.  The  call  was  issued  by 

11 


162    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Lucretia  Mott,  Martha  Wright,  Elizabeth  Cady  Stanton, 
and  Mary  Ann  McClintock ;  and  the  meeting  was  presided 
over  by  James  Mott,  the  Quaker  reformer.  The  conven- 
tion proclaimed  the  equality  of  men  and  women  and  de- 
manded for  women  their  "  immediate  admission  to  all 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States ",  including  the  right  to  vote.  Two  years  later 
there  assembled  at  Worcester,  Massachusetts,  the  first 
National  Woman's  Rights  Convention  held  in  this  coun- 
try. The  call  for  this  meeting  was  signed  by  Lucy  Stone 
and  fifty-five  other  women  and  by  thirty-three  men,  many 
of  whom  were  prominent  in  anti-slavery  circles.353 

It  is  a  fact  worthy  of  notice  that  the  women's  rights 
movement  and  the  abolition  movement  were  very  closely 
associated.  The  social  conscience  of  the  people  was  be- 
ing slowly  awakened,  and  women  resented  the  fact  that 
they  were  without  political  power  to  assist  in  putting 
down  what  some  of  them  felt  was  a  gigantic  evil.  At  the 
same  time  Sojourner  Truth,  the  negro  woman  who  trav- 
eled through  the  North  advocating  the  abolition  of  slav- 
ery, dismissed  the  women's  rights  question  with  the 
remark  that  "Ef  women  want  any  rights  more'n  dey's 
got,  why  don't  dey  jes'  take  'em,  an'  not  be  talkin'  about 
it?"354 

EQUAL   SUFFRAGE   SINCE   THE   CIVIL   WAE 

The  Civil  War  resulted  in  the  freedom  and  the  en- 
franchisement of  the  negroes  who  were  for  the  most  part 
illiterate  and  unprepared  for  the  duties  of  citizenship. 
This  grant  of  suffrage  to  a  class  of  men  who  were  not 
prepared  for  citizenship  had  two  results  on  the  woman 
suffrage  question.  The  friends  of  the  measure  insisted 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES     163 

that  it  was  unjust  to  permit  the  ignorant  negro  to  vote 
and  at  the  same  time  continue  the  disfranchisement  of 
white  women  who  were  better  qualified.  On  the  other 
hand,  enemies  of  the  extension  of  suffrage  to  women 
pointed  to  the  failure  of  negro  suffrage  as  a  proof  that  it 
was  unwise  to  further  increase  the  electorate ;  while  those 
who  were  opposed  to  the  enfranchisement  of  the  negroes 
frequently  urged  that  it  was  no  more  unjust  to  deprive 
the  negroes  of  the  suffrage  than  it  was  to  disfranchise 
the  white  women. 

In  1869  Wyoming,  then  a  Territory,  granted  the  fran- 
chise to  women  almost  without  opposition;  and  in  1890 
the  State  of  Wyoming  entered  the  Union  with  equal  suf- 
frage, thus  becoming  both  the  first  Territory  and  the 
first  State  to  fulfil  the  pledge  of  democracy  in  regard 
to  the  franchise.  When  it  was  suggested  in  Congress 
that  the  equal  suffrage  clause  in  the  Wyoming  Constitu- 
tion might  have  to  be  abandoned,  the  Wyoming  legisla- 
ture replied :  "  We  will  remain  out  of  the  Union  a  hundred 
years  rather  than  come  in  without  woman  suffrage.  "355 

Most  States,  however,  preferred  a  limited  application 
of  the  principle  of  equal  suffrage,  even  if  the  men  were 
willing  to  concede  to  women  the  justice  of  a  share  in 
political  power.  Thus  there  developed  five  general  forms 
of  State  or  local  enfranchisement:  complete  suffrage, 
school  suffrage,  municipal  suffrage,  tax  suffrage,  and 
presidential  suffrage.  In  many  cases  there  was  a  com- 
bination of  these  general  forms,  so  that  a  great  diversity 
of  provisions  is  to  be  found  in  the  various  States.  A  few 
instances  will  illustrate  the  different  forms  under  which 
the  principle  of  equal  suffrage  has  been  applied. 

Kansas  adopted  a  limited  form  of  school  suffrage  in 


164    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

1861,  an  experiment  that  was  later  adopted  by  the  fol- 
lowing Commonwealths :  Michigan  in  1875 ;  Minnesota  in 
1875 ;  Colorado  in  1876 ;  New  Hampshire  in  1878 ;  Oregon 
in  1878;  Massachusetts  in  1879;  New  York  in  1880;  Ver- 
mont in  1880;  Nebraska  in  1883;  New  Jersey  in  1887; 
Kansas  in  1887;  North  and  South  Dakota  in  1887;  Ari- 
zona in  1887 ;  Montana  in  1887 ;  Oklahoma  in  1890 ;  Illi- 
nois in  1891;  Connecticut  in  1893;  Ohio  in  1894;  Dela- 
ware in  1898;  Wisconsin  in  1900;  and  New  Mexico  in 
1910.  Iowa  adopted  a  form  of  tax  suffrage  in  1894,  and 
Louisiana  passed  a  similar  law  in  1898. 

In  the  meantime,  some  of  the  other  western  States 
followed  the  example  of  Wyoming  by  adopting  complete 
suffrage.  Colorado  took  the  step  in  1893;  while  Idaho 
and  Utah  enfranchised  their  women  citizens  in  1896. 
Then  for  fourteen  years  the  cause  of  constitutional  equal 
suffrage  appeared  to  be  unsuccessful,  though  no  serious 
attempt  was  made  to  abolish  it  in  the  four  States  where 
it  had  been  established.  It  is  now  evident  that  this  was  a 
period  of  growth  and  not  of  stagnation,  since  seven 
States  adopted  constitutional  equal  suffrage  during  the 
four  years  between  1910  and  1914 :  Washington  in  1910 ; 
California  in  1911 ;  Arizona,  Kansas,  and  Oregon  in  1912 ; 
and  Nevada  and  Montana  in  1914.  The  Territory  of 
Alaska  adopted  equal  suffrage  in  1913. 

By  1914  practically  all  the  far  western  States  had  re- 
moved the  sex  qualification  for  voting.  Eastern  States 
were  more  conservative,  and  it  was  not  until  1913  that 
any  progress  —  aside  from  the  limited  school  or  bond 
suffrage  —  was  made  east  of  the  Mississippi  River.  In 
that  year  the  Illinois  legislature,  acting  under  authority 
of  the  United  States  Constitution,  which  provides  that 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES     165 

the  State  legislatures  shall  prescribe  the  method  of  elect- 
ing presidential  electors,  conferred  upon  the  qualified 
women  of  Illinois  the  right  to  vote  for  presidential  elec- 
tors. At  the  same  time  the  right  to  vote  for  certain  State 
and  local  officers  not  provided  for  in  the  State  Constitu- 
tion was  also  included  in  the  act. 

The  course  pursued  in  Illinois  has  proven  popular  in 
States  whose  Constitutions  are  difficult  to  amend.  In 
1917  six  States  followed  the  example  of  Illinois,  namely : 
Indiana,  North  Dakota,  Ohio,  Rhode  Island,  Michigan, 
and  Nebraska.  Three  of  the  six,  North  Dakota,  Ohio, 
and  Nebraska,  included  municipal  as  well  as  presidential 
suffrage.  Arkansas,  at  the  same  time,  extended  to  wom- 
en the  right  to  vote  at  primary  elections  and  Texas  adopt- 
ed a  similar  law  in  the  following  year.  Since  these  are 
one-party  States,  the  primary  is  equivalent  to  an  election, 
and  so  the  political  power  granted  by  the  two  statutes  is 
important.  In  Indiana,  however,  the  law  was  declared  to 
be  unconstitutional  by  the  State  Supreme  Court ;  while  in 
Ohio  the  bill  was  submitted  to  the  voters  at  the  election 
in  November,  1917,  under  the  referendum,  and  was  de- 
feated by  a  large  majority.  The  supporters  of  the  meas- 
ure signified  their  intention  of  appealing  the  matter  to 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  on  the  ground  that  by 
the  Federal  Constitution,  the  State  legislature  and  not 
the  voters  determines  how  and  by  whom  presidential 
electors  are  to  be  chosen.  According  to  a  decision  of  the 
Ohio  court  Ohio  cities  under  home  rule  charters  may 
confer  municipal  suffrage  upon  women. 

The  most  important  advance,  however,  was  the  suc- 
cess of  the  equal  suffrage  amendment  in  New  York.  De- 
feated in  1915  by  a  majority  of  nearly  195,000  votes,  the 


166    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

amendment  was  re-submitted  at  the  November  election 
in  1917  and  was  adopted  by  a  majority  of  over  100,000. 
This  victory  added  forty-five  presidential  electors  to  the 
number  already  affected  by  women's  votes  and  gives 
promise  of  the  ultimate  success  of  equal  suffrage  through- 
out the  United  States.  South  Dakota,  Michigan,  and  Okla- 
homa followed  New  York's  example  in  November,  1918. 
Through  these  State  laws  women  have  secured  an  in- 
fluential position  in  Federal  as  well  as  local  affairs.  In 
the  fifteen  equal  suffrage  States,  together  with  the  four 
which  have  presidential  suffrage  and  the  two  in  which 
women  may  vote  at  primary  elections,  women  now  have  a 
voice  in  the  election  of  two  hundred  and  thirteen  presi- 
dential electors,  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  and  thirty-four  Senators. 
With  the  two  leading  parties  of  nearly  equal  strength  the 
women  voters  can  not  safely  be  disregarded  by  party 
leaders,  since  about  ten  million  women  are  now  (1918) 
entitled  to  vote  in  the  election  of  President  and  Vice 
President.356 

AGITATION  FOR  FEDERAL  AMENDMENT 

Early  demands  for  equal  suffrage  were  generally  d* 
rected  toward  action  by  individual  States,  for  the  dc^- 
trine  of  State  sovereignty  in  such  matters  was  unques- 
tioned before  the  Civil  War.  The  fourteenth  amendment 
conferred  citizenship  upon  the  negroes;  while  the  fif- 
teenth amendment  was  adopted  to  make  their  political 
rights  secure.  At  the  time  the  women  asked  that  "sex" 
be  included  in  this  amendment ;  but  their  wishes  were  dis- 
regarded, the  leaders  urging  that  it  would  be  too  much 
to  ask  the  voters  to  grant  suffrage  to  women  and  to 
negroes  at  the  same  time. 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES     167 

There  was  also  an  effort  made  to  secure  suffrage  for 
women  under  the  fourteenth  amendment,  on  the  ground 
that  since  it  recognized  the  citizenship  of  both  men  and 
women  it  must  have  been  the  intention  of  the  framers  of 
the  amendment  that  all  citizens  should  vote.  In  order  to 
test  this  view,  Miss  Susan  B.  Anthony,  with  several  other 
women,  registered  and  voted  at  an  election  for  United 
States  Eepresentatives  in  New  York  in  1872.  Miss 
Anthony  was  arrested  and  tried  in  the  United  States  Cir- 
cuit Court  on  the  charge  that  she  ' i  did  knowingly,  wrong- 
fully, and  unlawfully  vote  for  a  Representative  in  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  ....  without  a  law- 
ful right  to  vote  in  said  election  district  (the  said  Susan 
B.  Anthony  being  then  and  there  a  person  of  the  female 
sex)  ".  She  was  found  guilty  and  fined  one  hundred  dol- 
lars and  costs.357 

Even  before  the  final  adoption  of  the  fifteenth  amend- 
ment, a  sixteenth  amendment  to  confer  suffrage  upon 
women  was  introduced  in  Congress  by  Representative 
George  W.  Julian  of  Indiana.  The  resolution  secured 
some  support,  but  not  sufficient  to  bring  it  to  a  vote. 
Since  1878  the  Susan  B.  Anthony  amendment,  as  this 
proposed  modification  of  the  Constitution  has  come  to  be 
called,  has  been  presented  again  and  again  in  Congress. 
In  1882  both  houses  provided  for  woman  suffrage  com- 
mittees, but  the  House  committee  was  discontinued  in 
1884  and  was  not  reestablished  until  1918.  Equal  suf- 
frage matters  in  the  House  were  usually  referred  to  the 
judiciary  committee,  which  seldom  reported  a  bill  on  this 
subject  and  was  generally  opposed  to  any  change.  The 
Senate  committee  was  much  more  active  and  its  reports 
were  more  often  favorable.358 


168    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

The  history  of  the  struggle  for  the  submission  of  a 
Federal  amendment,  however,  is  too  long  to  be  recited  in 
detail  in  this  connection.  That  supporters  of  equal 
suffrage  were  not  entirely  lacking  is  evident  from  the 
minority  reports  of  committees  to  which  the  question  was 
submitted.  In  1884  a  minority  report  written  by  Mr. 
Thomas  B.  Reed  of  Maine  and  signed  by  Mr.  E.  B.  Tay- 
lor of  Ohio,  Mr.  M.  A.  McCoid  of  Iowa,  and  Mr.  T.  M. 
Browne  of  Indiana  was  submitted  to  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. No  one  can  accuse  Thomas  B.  Reed,  long  the 
"Czar"  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  of  being  ultra- 
radical,  sentimental,  or  visionary.  This  expression  of 
approval  by  men  from  conservative  States,  although  rep- 
resenting the  minority  of  the  committee,  contains  some 
pertinent  comments  on  the  merits  of  equal  suffrage. 
Some  of  the  striking  sentences  in  this  report  read  as 
follows : 

No  one  who  listens  to  the  reasons  given  by  the  superior  class 
for  the  continuance  of  any  system  of  subjection  can  fail  to  be 
impressed  with  the  noble  disinterestedness  of  mankind.  .  .  . 
Hence,  when  it  is  proposed  to  give  to  the  women  of  this  country 
an  opportunity  to  present  their  case  to  the  various  State  legis- 
latures to  demand  of  the  people  of  the  country  equality  of  polit- 
ical rights,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  that  the  reasons  on  which 
the  continuance  of  the  inferiority  of  women  is  urged,  are  drawn 
almost  entirely  from  a  tender  consideration  for  their  own  good. 
The  anxiety  felt  lest  they  should  thereby  deteriorate,  would  be 
an  honor  to  human  nature  were  it  not  an  historical  fact  that  the 
same  sweet  solicitude  has  been  put  up  as  a  barrier  against  every 
progress  which  women  have  made  ever  since  civilization  began. 
.  .  .  Words  change  nothing.  Prejudices  are  none  the  less 
prejudices  because  we  vaguely  call  them  ''nature"  and  prate 
about  what  nature  has  forbidden  when  we  only  mean  that  the 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES     169 

thing  we  are  opposing  has  not  been  hitherto  done.  "Nature" 
forbade  a  steamship  to  cross  the  Atlantic  the  very  moment  it  was 
crossing,  and  yet  it  arrived  just  the  same  .... 

We  believe  in  the  educating  and  improving  effect  of  partici- 
pation in  government.  We  believe  that  every  citizen  in  the 
United  States  is  made  more  intelligent,  more  learned,  and  better 
educated  by  his  participation  in  politics  and  political  campaigns 
.  .  .  .  If,  then,  discussion  of  public  affairs  among  men  has 
elevated  them  in  knowledge  and  intelligence,  why  will  it  not  lead 
to  the  same  results  among  women?  It  is  not  merely  education 
that  makes  civilization,  but  diffusion  of  education  .V  .  . 
Every  improvement  in  the  status  of  women  in  the  matter  of 
education  has  been  an  improvement  to  the  whole  race.  .  »  . 

It  is  sometimes  asserted  that  women  now  have  a  great  influ- 
ence in  politics  through  their  husbands  and  brothers.  That  is 
undoubtedly  true.  But  that  is  just  the  kind  of  influence  which 
is  not  wholesome  for  the  community,  for  it  is  influence  unaccom- 
panied by  responsibility  .  .  .  . 

We  conclude,  then,  every  reason  which  in  this  country  be- 
stows the  ballot  upon  man  is  equally  applicable  to  the  proposi- 
tion to  bestow  the  ballot  upon  woman,  that  in  our  judgment  there 
is  no  foundation  for  the  fear  that  woman  will  thereby  become 
unfitted  for  all  the  duties  she  has  hitherto  performed.359 

The  first  vote  upon  the  Susan  B.  Anthony  amend- 
ment was  taken  in  the  Senate  on  January  25,  1887,  and 
resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the  measure  by  a  vote  of  sixteen 
to  thirty- four  —  twenty-six  Senators  being  absent.  The 
Senate  again  defeated  equal  suffrage  on  March  19, 
1914.360  In  1915  the  Mondell  Resolution,  as  the  House 
bill  for  equal  suffrage  by  Federal  amendment  was  called, 
was  brought  to  a  vote  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  United  States,  and 
though  it  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  174  to  204,  the  debate 


170    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

in  which  equal  suffrage  was  championed  by  men  like 
Frank  W.  Mondell  of  Wyoming,  Edward  Keating  of 
Colorado,  E.  A.  Hayes  of  California,  Nicholas  J.  Sinnott 
of  Oregon,  and  Martin  B.  Madden  of  Illinois,  has  had 
some  influence  in  later  State  campaigns.  The  first  sec- 
tion of  the  proposed  amendment  read  as  follows:  "The 
right  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  vote  shall  not  be 
denied  or  abridged  by  the  United  States  or  by  any  State 
on  account  of  sex."361 

The  campaign  of  1916  brought  the  suffrage  question 
still  more  plainly  before  the  people,  though  it  was  not  a 
vital  issue.  Both  Kepublicans  and  Democrats,  as  well  as 
the  minor  parties,  favored  equal  suffrage  in  some  form  in 
their  platforms.  The  Eepublican  candidate  for  Presi- 
dent announced  that  he  was  in  favor  of  Federal  action; 
President  Wilson  went  only  so  far  as  to  favor  State 
action.362 

The  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  World 
War  in  1917  brought  new  influences  to  bear  upon  the  men 
and  women  of  the  country.  The  emphasis  on  democracy 
and  the  sacrifices  and  ability  of  the  women  of  the  country 
strongly  reenforced  their  claim  for  a  share  in  the  gov- 
ernment. This  influence  combined  with  the  political 
power  of  the  States  in  which  women  enjoy  more  or  less 
enfranchisement  secured  a  marked  success  in  Congress 
in  spite  of  the  concentration  of  attention  on  the  war.  On 
January  10,  1918,  the  constitutional  amendment  provid- 
ing that  political  rights  should  not  be  denied  on  account 
of  sex  was  passed  by  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  by  a 
vote  of  274  to  136  —  exactly  the  necessary  majority. 
On  the  first  of  October,  however,  this  amendment  failed 
of  adoption  in  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  53  to  31,  in  spite  of 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES     171 

a  strong  plea  for  its  passage  on  the  part  of  President 
Wilson.  Later  this  vote  was  reconsidered  and  the  amend- 
ment still  awaits  the  final  action  of  the  Senate. 

NOTE  ON  EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 

Equally  noteworthy  has  been  the  progress  of  equal  suffrage 
in  foreign  countries.  In  New  Zealand  women  were  enfranchised 
in  1893 ;  the  Australian  provinces  granted  full  suffrage  to  women 
between  1895  and  1908.  Finland,  a  Russian  province,  followed 
in  1906,  Norway  in  1913,  and  Denmark  in  1915 ;  while  Iceland, 
Manitoba,  Saskatchewan,  Alberta,  and  British  Columbia  granted 
full  suffrage  in  1916,  and  Ontario  followed  in  1917.  English 
women  have  had  local  suffrage  for  many  years,  and  in  1917 
Parliament  by  vote  of  387  to  57,  granted  full  political  rights 
to  all  women  over  thirty  years  of  age  who  have  certain  other 
qualifications.  Canada  also  enacted  a  suffrage  law  as  a  war 
measure,  giving  the  parliamentary  franchise  to  all  properly 
qualified  women  in  the  Dominion  who  have  close  relatives 
serving  in  the  Canadian  army.  Other  countries  have  vari- 
ous forms  of  restricted  suffrage  for  women.  The  Russian  Revo- 
lution of  1917  brought  theoretical  equality  in  political  affairs; 
but  in  the  chaotic  state  of  the  government  at  the  close  of  its  first 
year,  the  right  to  vote  does  not  appear  to  be  effective  in  deciding 
vital  public  questions.  The  question  of  equal  suffrage  has  be- 
come one  of  importance  in  all  European  countries  because  of  the 
emphasis  on  democracy  during  the  war.364 


XIII 

EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA 
1838-1865 

WHEN  Iowa  became  a  Territory  in  1838  the  struggle  for 
"women's  rights M,  as  the  movement  was  then  called,  was 
just  beginning.  Like  all  new  movements  it  was  unorgan- 
ized and  chaotic,  its  advocates  being  scarcely  conscious 
of  the  end  desired  and  lacking  any  agreement  as  to  the 
means  to  be  employed.  Dress  reform,  the  abolition  of 
the  institution  of  marriage,  and  similar  radical  measures 
were  demanded  by  a  few  extremists;  while  the  majority 
of  the  people  looked  with  suspicion  upon  even  the  reason- 
able demands  for  reform. 

Only  a  few  women  and  fewer  men  were  interested  in 
bringing  about  more  equitable  provisions  in  the  laws  for 
women  and  removing  unjust  discriminations  against 
them.  In  the  frontier  Territory,  where  the  struggle  with 
the  wilderness  was  most  acute,  the  interest  was  even  less 
than  in  the  more  thickly  settled  communities  where  there 
was  more  leisure.  The  laws  of  the  Territory  permitted 
only  free  white  male  citizens  to  vote  —  a  condition  which 
was  accepted  at  first  without  question.  Indeed,  it  is 
probable  that  the  language  of  the  law  was  intended  to 
disfranchise  colored  men,  rather  than  women,  who  were 
not  even  expected  to  want  to  vote.365 

It  seems  that  the  question  of  equal  suffrage  first  arose 
in  the  Iowa  legislature  in  the  session  of  1843-1844.  On 
one  occasion  the  House  of  Representatives  passed  a  reso- 

172 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  173 

lution  that  "the  ladies  be  permitted  to  take  seats  within 
the  Bar  of  this  House  at  pleasure,  and  that  the  Sergeant- 
at-Arms  be  instructed  to  furnish  seats  for  their  accom- 
modation. "366  There  was  some  discussion  of  the  subject 
of  equal  suffrage  at  this  time ;  but  the  legislators  had  no 
intention  of  changing  the  electoral  qualifications,  al- 
though it  was  said  that  "two  or  three  went  into  regular 
spread-eaglism  and  aired  their  shallowness,  their  conceit 
and  their  devotion  to  women,  as  a  parlor  ornament."367 

Even  the  request  for  political  enfranchisement  was  at 
that  time  unusual  —  nor  was  it  taken  seriously  when  pre- 
sented. As  the  question  of  negro  slavery  became  more 
and  more  a  threat  of  national  division,  people  became 
less  inclined  to  look  with  favor  upon  attempts  to  over- 
throw the  established  order.  No  two  classes  of  society 
in  America  were  more  widely  separated  from  each  other 
than  the  negro  slaves  of  the  South  and  the  white  women 
of  Iowa;  yet  somehow  men  seemed  to  feel  that  any 
change  in  the  status  of  one  group  might  result  in  the 
overthrow  of  the  whole  social  order. 

When  the  Constitution  of  1844  was  being  drafted  a 
disagreement  arose  over  the  question  of  negro  suffrage. 
A  committee  appointed  to  investigate  the  subject  re- 
ported adversely  to  the  negroes,  basing  its  conclusion  on 
the  principle  that  suffrage  was  not  a  natural  right.  The 
report  reads  in  part  as  follows : 

Females  by  the  arbitrary  rules  of  society  are  excluded  and 
debarred  from  many  things  which  males  consider  rights  and  high 
privileges  —  such  as  the  elective  franchise,  holding  office,  &c. 
Now  in  these  cases  the  female  and  infant  are  denied  what  we 
abstractedly  term  unalienable  rights  and  they  submit  without 
complaint  or  murmur.  No  one  thinks  of  sympathizing  with  them 


174    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

in  their  deprivations. —  The  philanthropist  has  never  had  occa- 
sion to  commiserate  their  fate ;  —  still  it  is  in  those  respects  the 
same  as  the  citizen  of  color.  The  negro  is  surely  no  better  than 
our  wives  and  children,  and  should  not  excite  sympathy  when 
they  desire  the  political  rights  which  they  are  deprived  of.368 

This  report  doubtless  expressed  the  opinion  of  the 
members  of  the  convention,  since  the  Constitution  which 
they  framed  gave  only  white  male  citizens  the  right  to 
vote,  although,  it  declared  that  "all  men  are  by  nature 
free  and  independent,  and  have  certain  unalienable 
rights  ".36S 

In  connection  with  certain  provisions  of  the  Code  of 
1851  there  is  an  interesting  illustration  of  the  influence 
of  custom  in  the  interpretation  of  laws :  it  is  provided  in 
one  section  that  if  ' '  any  person ' '  is  challenged  at  an  elec- 
tion, he  must  take  an  oath  that  he  is  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States ;  and  in  another  section  it  is  provided  that 
"if  any  person  utter  or  pass  or  tender  in  payment  as  true 
any  false,  altered,  forged,  or  counterfeit  note  .... 
he  shall  be  punished  by  imprisonment  ".37°  In  the  first 
case  "any  person "  has  been  construed  as  referring  only 
to  men ;  in  the  second  instance  the  same  phrase  used  with 
the  masculine  gender  was  held  to  mean  either  a  man  or  a 
woman. 

Moreover,  in  those  early  days  attempts  of  women  to 
influence  legislation  even  indirectly  were  frequently  re- 
ceived with  ridicule  —  as  when  a  member  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  moved  to  refer  petitions  from  women 
and  boys  on  the  subject  of  prohibition  to  a  committee  on 
"women's  rights  and  children's  follies."371  Even  among 
school  teachers  where  the  women  nearly  equalled  the  men 
in  number  there  was  little  support  of  equal  suffrage : 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  175 

thus  a  resolution  that  "  females  should  enjoy  the  right 
of  suffrage  in  school  matters"  introduced  in  the  State 
Teachers'  Association  in  1859  was  tabled.372 

In  the  constitutional  convention  of  1857  advocates  of 
equal  suffrage  were  met  with  the  same  argument  which 
had  been  used  in  1844,  but  the  real  question  to  be  settled 
was  that  relating  to  the  political  status  of  free  negroes. 
The  report  of  the  committee  of  the  Convention  of  1844 
was  urged  against  any  change  and  it  was  finally  decided 
to  retain  the  words  " white  male"  in  the  new  Constitu- 
tion. As  a  matter  of  fact  there  was  no  serious  consider- 
ation of  the  proposition  to  confer  the  suffrage  upon 
women,  although  some  of  the  delegates  doubtless  would 
have  voted  for  the  reform.373 

An  effort  to  arouse  interest  in  women's  rights,  how- 
ever, was  being  made.  In  1854  Frances  Dana  Gage  of 
Ohio  gave  a  series  of  lectures  in  the  southeastern  part  of 
Iowa  on  temperance  and  the  status  of  women ;  and  in  the 
following  year  Mrs.  Amelia  Bloomer  of  Council  Bluffs 
began  her  work  here  as  a  lecturer  and  writer.374  Before 
the  work  along  this  line  had  been  well  organized,  there 
came  the  four  years  of  war  which  were  to  decide  the  fate 
of  the  institution  of  slavery  and  the  question  of  State 
sovereignty. 


XIV 

EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA 
1865-1890 

THE  Civil  War  temporarily  overshadowed  the  struggle 
for  the  equality  of  women  in  civil  and  political  affairs; 
but  in  the  end  the  war  gave  an  added  impetus  to  the 
movement  by  giving  theoretical  equality  to  the  freed 
slaves.  Thus,  the  debate  over  the  status  of  the  colored 
men  involved  many  other  questions  and  aroused  a  new 
interest  in  the  duties  and  privileges  of  citizens  and  the 
qualifications  for  the  franchise.  Various  restrictions 
were  proposed  by  those  who  feared  the  extension  of  the 
electorate  by  the  fifteenth  amendment.  The  payment  of 
taxes  and  the  ability  to  read  and  write  were  among  the 
tests  proposed,  and  these  qualifications  were  cited  as 
arguments  for  the  admission  of  women  to  the  suffrage. 
Women  who  paid  taxes  protested  against  "  taxation 
without  representation ",  and  many  who  had  hitherto 
ignored  the  claims  of  women  to  a  part  in  what  claimed 
to  be  a  democracy  began  to  recognize  the  injustice  of  dis- 
franchising educated  women  while  permitting  the  most 
ignorant  men  to  vote.  At  the  same  time  those  who  op- 
posed negro  suffrage  sometimes  advocated  woman  suf- 
frage merely  to  emphasize  what  they  regarded  as  the 
absurdity  of  universal  suffrage. 

The  most  striking  characteristic  of  the  discussions  of 
this  period  was  the  confusion  of  ideas,  which  may  be 
illustrated  by  two  quotations  from  an  Iowa  newspaper. 

176 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  177 

One  concerned  the  relation  of  suffrage  and  the  holding 
of  property  and  read  as  follows: 

Miss  Dr.  Harriet  R.  Hunt,  of  Boston  has  issued  her  twelfth 
annual  protest  against  taxation  without  suffrage.  The  natural 
right  of  woman  to  be  man  is  as  evident  as  the  right  of  a  hen  to 
crow;  there  is  no  use  arguing  the  case. 

The  other  item  was  a  reply  to  a  suggestion  that  only 
those  who  could  read  and  write  should  be  permitted  to 
vote.  The  editor  opposed  the  suggestion  with  the  fol- 
lowing comment: 

Do  the  gentlemen  propose  to  restrict  taxation  to  those  who 
can  read? 

No !  they  desire  to  create  a  governing,  aristocratic  class,  who 
shall  do  the  voting,  and  create  taxes  to  be  paid  by  emigrants  who 
can't  read  english,  or  natives  [who]  are  so  unfortunate  as  to 
have  no  education.  This  attack  upon  universal  suffrage  is  one 
of  the  means  by  which  the  ' '  public  debt  is  to  be  made  effective. ' ' 

At  the  same  time  there  was  a  movement  to  enfran- 
chise foreigners.  The  platform  of  the  Democratic  State 
Convention  in  1867  contained  a  plank  favoring  an  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  giving  foreign-born  men  the 
right  to  vote,  providing  they  had  declared  their  intention 
of  becoming  citizens  and  had  resided  one  year  in  the 
State.375 

Women,  too,  now  began  to  realize  more  fully  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  ballot.  In  1866  there  was  presented  in 
the  Iowa  House  of  Representatives  a  petition  from  some 
women  of  Clinton  County  ' l  praying  for  an  amendment  to 
the  Constitution  so  that  the  women  of  Iowa  may  have  the 
right  of  suffrage;  claiming  that  they  represent  nearly 
one-half  of  the  entire  population  of  the  State,  and  also 

12 


178    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

one-half  of  its  stability,  intelligence,  and  virtue ;  that  they 
are  counted  in  the  basis  of  representation,  yet  are  gov- 
erned and  taxed  without  their  consent,  and  punished  for 
violation  of  law  without  judge  or  jury;  and  claiming 
further,  that  life,  liberty,  and  property,  are  uncertain  so 
long  as  the  ballot,  the  only  weapon  of  self-protection,  is 
not  in  the  hands  of  every  citizen. "  A  resolution  was 
also  introduced  in  the  House  providing  that  the  "Com- 
mittee on  Constitutional  Amendments  be  instructed  to 
inquire  into  the  expediency  of  striking  out  the  word 
'male'  where  it  occurs  in  the  Constitution  in  relation  to 
franchise.  "37° 

During  the  discussion  over  the  proposed  extension  of 
the  franchise  in  the  General  Assembly  in  1868  a  more 
definite  resolution  was  introduced  by  Representative 
Wilson  of  Davis  County,  which  read  as  follows : 

WHEREAS,  We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self  evident,  that  all 
men  are  created  equal,  and  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  cer- 
tain inalienable  rights,  that  to  secure  these  rights  governments 
are  instituted  deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed;  and, 

WHEREAS,  We  believe  ''men,"  in  the  memorable  document 
from  which  we  quote,  refers  to  the  whole  human  race,  regardless 
of  nationality,  or  sex;  and 

WHEREAS,  We  recognize  the  fact,  that  as  a  general  principle, 
taxation  and  representation  should  be  co-extensive ;  and 

WHEREAS,  It  is  a  fact  that  women  are  compelled  to  give 
allegiance,  and  pay  taxes,  to  a  government,  in  the  enactment  of 
whose  laws,  they  have  been,  and  still  are,  denied  a  voice.  There- 
fore, 

Be  it  Resolved  as  the  sense  of  this  House,  That  steps  should 
be  taken  looking  towards  a  change  in  the  constitution  of  this 
State  so  as  to  allow  women  the  right  of  franchise,  for  the  proper 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  179 

use  of  which,  her  quick  perception,  strong  intellect,  and  above 
all,  her  high  sense  of  right  and  justice,  have  proven  her  so  well 
qualified. 

Although  favorably  reported  by  the  committee  on 
constitutional  amendments,  this  resolution  was  not  even 
voted  upon.  At  the  same  time,  the  legislators  voted  for 
an  amendment  to  strike  out  the  word  "white"  from  the 
Constitution  —  an  amendment  which  was  later  adopted 
by  a  popular  vote  of  105,384  to  81,119.377 

The  adoption  of  this  amendment  emphasized  the  in- 
equality in  the  position  of  women  and  aroused  a  number 
of  women  to  begin  a  campaign  of  education  among  the 
people  of  the  State.  In  1868  Mrs.  Martha  H.  Brinkerhoff 
made  a  lecture  tour  through  the  northern  counties,  organ- 
izing societies  for  the  promotion  of  equal  suffrage.  Mrs. 
Annie  C.  Savery  of  Des  Moines  also  gave  a  lecture  at  that 
place  on  equal  suffrage,  and  in  February,  1870,  she  gave 
a  toast  on  the  same  subject  at  a  Masonic  banquet.378 

The  first  resolution  providing  for  the  submission  of 
a  constitutional  amendment  conferring  suffrage  upon 
women  in  Iowa  was  introduced  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives by  Mr.  John  P.  Irish  in  1870 ;  and  the  journals 
show  that  it  was  passed  by  both  houses  —  the  vote  being 
fifty-four  to  thirty-five  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  thirty-two  to  eleven  in  the  Senate.  A  motion  to  sub- 
mit the  question  to  a  vote  of  the  women  before  the 
amendment  should  be  presented  to  the  next  General  As- 
sembly was  voted  down  in  the  Senate.  The  Republican 
State  Convention,  which  met  at  Des  Moines  in  July,  1871, 
approved  the  submission  of  the  amendment  to  the  voters ; 
but  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  majority  of  the  dele- 
gates were  in  favor  of  its  adoption.379 


180     LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

According  to  constitutional  requirements  the  resolu- 
tion was  presented  to  the  General  Assembly  in  1872. 
The  members  at  this  time,  however,  were  either  new  men 
or  they  had  changed  their  minds  in  the  interval  for  the 
resolution  was  defeated  in  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of 
twenty-two  to  twenty-four,  although  it  received  a  vote  of 
fifty-five  to  thirty-nine  in  its  favor  in  the  House.  Later 
the  House  recommitted  the  bill  to  provide  for  the  popu- 
lar vote  on  the  amendment.  The  fact  that  at  least  five 
Senators  who  had  voted  for  the  measure  in  1870  voted 
against  it  in  1872  suggests  that  perhaps  the  General  As- 
sembly did  not  really  intend  to  make  the  resolution 
effective:  the  members  may  have  been  merely  bidding 
for  the  good  will  of  the  women  and  the  support  of  certain 
groups  of  men  by  political  log-rolling  when  there  was  no 
immediate  danger  of  the  realization  of  equal  suffrage.880 

There  was  also  a  facetious  proposal  in  the  House  in 
1872  to  strike  out  the  word  "male"  from  the  law  regu- 
lating work  on  roads.  This  too  was  rejected.  A  resolu- 
tion to  permit  Mrs.  J.  G.  Swisshelm  to  use  the  hall  of  the 
House  for  the  purpose  of  delivering  a  lecture  on  woman 
suffrage  was  adopted.  But  the  most  interesting  bill  in 
the  light  of  recent  developments  was  the  one  introduced 
by  Mr.  John  P.  Irish,  the  sponsor  of  the  suffrage  resolu- 
tion :  it  provided  that  women  should  be  given  the  right  to 
vote  for  presidential  electors.  This  bill  was  never  re- 
ported, and  so  there  is  no  vote  recorded  thereon:381  as 
usual,  the  General  Assembly  avoided  decisive  action. 

In  the  meantime  a  curious  though  unimportant  inci- 
dent occurred  at  Clarinda,  where  the  registry  board  in 
March,  1871,  decided  that  women  over  twenty-one  years 
of  age  were  entitled  to  vote.  It  appears  that  the  names 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  181 

of  the  women  considered  eligible  were,  according  to  the 
informal  system  of  registration  then  in  use,  placed  on  the 
roll.  "Several  gentlemen ",  reported  a  contemporary 
newspaper,  "  'got  on  their  ear'  about  it  and  erased  their 
wives'  names.  Several  ladies  got  their  precious  backs  up 
also,  and  erased  their  own  names.  None  but  the  sons  of 
Adam,  however,  offered  to  vote,  and  Clarinda  is  now  as 
peaceable  as  Mary's  little  lamb."382 

It  is  evident  that  at  this  time  the  demand  for  equal 
political  rights  was  not  widespread  even  among  the  wom- 
en of  Iowa.883  A  peculiar  feature  of  the  suffrage  discus- 
sion at  this  time  possibly  accounts  for  the  attitude  of 
many  of  the  opponents  of  suffrage.  This  was  the  associ- 
ation of  political  equality  with  "free  love",  which  was 
largely  the  result  of  the  teachings  of  some  eastern  ex- 
tremists who  believed  that  the  total  emancipation  of 
women  demanded  the  dissolution  of  permanent  marriage 
ties.  There  is  no  evidence  that  any  such  views  were  held 
by  the  Iowa  suffrage  workers,  but  their  advocacy  in 
other  places  influenced  many  women  to  oppose  equal 
suffrage  because  they  feared  that  its  adoption  meant  a 
social  revolution.  On  the  contrary,  the  majority  of  the 
Iowa  suffrage  leaders  —  like  Mrs.  Margaret  W.  Camp- 
bell and  Mrs.  Amelia  Bloomer  —  were  happily  married 
and  were  being  assisted  in  the  work  by  their  husbands. 
To  many,  however,  there  was  no  middle  ground  between 
free  love  and  the  complete  subordination  of  women. 

The  trepidation  with  which  the  triumph  of  political 
equality  was  contemplated  is  evident  from  a  letter 
signed  "R.  W.  T."  and  published  in  the  Iowa  State 
Weekly  Register  in  1871.  Asserting  that  equal  suffrage 
meant  the  overthrow  of  the  institution  of  marriage,  the 


182    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

writer  expressed  the  hope  that  the  women  of  Iowa  would 
"remember  that  it  involves  every  principle  of  morality 
and  religion.  Tis  true,  that  anti-suffrage  women  in  gen- 
eral, shun  notoriety  and  are  not  willing  to  have  their 
names  go  before  the  public,  but  a  sacrifice  must  be  made, 
if  we  would  preserve  inviolate  the  Eepublic,  that  our 
husbands,  sons  and  brothers  have  so  recently  given  their 
lives  to  serve.  Allow  the  principles  that  suffragists  are 
promulgating  to  take  firm  root  in  society,  become  the  law 
of  our  land,  and  our  choicest  treasures,  the  dear  little 
daughters  of  to-day,  will  before  the  close  of  the  next 
decade  become  a  prey  to  the  licentious  libertine/7384 

In  another  letter  the  same  writer  declared :  "  I  would 
have  every  woman  educated  in  the  best  schools,  and  in 
the  highest  manner  possible,  and  wherever  and  whenever 
she  is  capable  of  performing  men's  labor  equally  as  well 
as  men,  I  would  have  her  have  the  same  pay ;  but  there  is 
something  revolting  and  unwomanly  in  this  uproar  and 
clamor  for  the  ballot,  and  demanding  all  of  men's  so 
called  privileges  —  free  love  not  excepted."385 

That  the  majority  of  the  American  equal  suffrage 
leaders  repudiated  any  connection  between  the  demand 
for  the  franchise  and  the  extreme  social  views  held  by 
some  of  the  reformers  of  the  day  is  evidenced  by  the 
following  resolution  which  was  adopted  at  the  meeting 
of  the  American  Woman  Suffrage  Association  in  1871 : 

That  the  claim  of  women  to  participate  in  making  the  laws 
she  is  required  to  obey,  and  to  equality  of  rights  in  all  directions, 
has  nothing  to  do  with  special  social  theories,  and  that  the  recent 
attempts  in  this  city  and  elsewhere  to  associate  the  Woman 
Suffrage  cause  with  the  doctrines  of  Free  Love,  and  to  hold  it 
responsible  for  the  crimes  and  follies  of  individuals,  is  an  out- 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  183 

rage  upon  common  sense  and  decency,  and  a  slander  upon  the 
virtue  and  intelligence  of  the  women  of  America.386 

It  is,  however,  a  fact  that  the  suspicion  that  in  some 
mysterious  way  equal  suffrage  meant  the  overthrow  of 
the  whole  social  order  deterred  many  women  from  seek- 
ing the  franchise.  It  was  not,  of  course,  clear  how  this 
moral  catastrophe  was  to  result  from  the  simple  act  of 
dropping  a  ballot  in  a  box;  but  the  suggestion  had  been 
made  and  arguments  pointing  out  the  lack  of  any  rela- 
tionship between  voting  and  immorality  were  ineffective 
until  the  common  sense  of  the  majority  of  women  gradu- 
ally recognized  the  absurdity  of  the  objection.  Indeed, 
it  was  said  that  in  1871  when  Susan  B.  Anthony  lectured 
on  woman  suffrage  at  Cedar  Rapids  and  asked  all  the 
women  who  were  favorable  to  signify  their  conviction 
by  rising,  only  one  "fair  Eapidan  arose ",387 

Inside  the  Iowa  equal  suffrage  ranks  there  were  lead- 
ers who  proposed  the  repudiation  of  the  doctrines  of 
enthusiasts  like  Mrs.  Victoria  C.  Woodhull.  Others  in- 
sisted that  the  charge  of  immorality  should  be  merely 
disregarded:388  they  argued  that  it  was  unnecessary  for 
the  women  of  Iowa  to  publicly  assert  that  they  were  not 
working  for  free  love,  since  it  was  as  impossible  as  an 
organized  movement  to  legalize  murder. 

This  dread  of  social  anarchy  was  not,  however,  uni- 
versal. The  Iowa  Press  Convention  at  Marshalltown  in 
1871  permitted  the  women  visitors  to  vote  for  the  presi- 
dent, and  the  comment  of  one  of  the  editors  present  was 
distinctly  favorable.  "We  noticed  several  gentlemen", 
he  declared,  "rising  from  their  seats  to  shake  hands 
with  their  wives  over  their  first  vote.  It  was  a  picture 
for  an  Anna  Dickinson  or  a  Tilton,  but  not  much  of  a 


184    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

picture  for  Judge  Clagett  and  his  fellow-believer,  Sny- 
der,  of  the  Cedar  Falls  Gazette.  It  will  be  nothing  when 
they  get  used  to  it,  as  it  seems  foreordained  they  some 
day  shall. "389 

Nor  were  all  women  deterred  from  participation  in 
political  interests  by  the  prophecies  of  evil:  five  women 
appeared  in  the  Republican  County  Convention  in  Mont- 
gomery County  in  1871,  where  a  Mrs.  Flagg  was  a  candi- 
date for  the  nomination  as  county  superintendent.390 

Women  also  took  some  part  in  the  presidential  cam- 
paign of  1872.  Indeed,  a  notice  of  a  Republican  rally  at 
Des  Moines  informed  the  people  that  the  meeting  "will 
be  addressed  by  Iowa's  most  gifted  woman  orator, 
Matilda  Fletcher  .  .  .  .-.  •  The  ladies  are  especially 
invited  to  be  present,  and  hear  the  good  cause  of  Repub- 
licanism eloquently  advocated  by  one  of  their  own  sex." 
A  Democratic  paper  commented  on  the  fact  that  the 
woman  who  was  making  speeches  in  favor  of  President 
Grant  had  formerly  written  "  poetry "  protesting  against 
the  corruption  of  his  first  administration.  "A  lady", 
the  editor  conceded,  "is  fortunately  not  required  to  be 
consistent."391 

Furthermore,  about  this  time  there  developed  in  the 
State  of  Iowa  an  organization  which  was  to  have  great 
influence  on  the  suffrage  question  —  especially  in  the 
matter  of  training  women  in  organized  public  work. 
This  was  the  association  first  organized  at  Dubuque  on 
April  17,  1869,  under  the  name  of  the  "Northern  Woman 
Suffrage  Association",  of  which  Mrs.  D.  S.  Wilson  was 
the  president.  In  June  of  the  following  year  the  first 
State  convention  met  at  Mount  Pleasant  where  the 
'"Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association"  was  organized. 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  185 

The  first  president  of  the  new  organization  was  General 
Henry  O'Connor,  then  Attorney  General  of  Iowa.  Mrs. 
Amelia  Bloomer,  Miss  Nettie  Sanford,  Mrs.  F.  W. 
Palmer,  Joseph  Dugdale,  and  John  P.  Irish  were  the  first 
vice  presidents.  Mrs.  Arabella  Mansfield  was  chosen 
secretary,  and  Mrs.  Annie  C.  Savery  was  named  cor- 
responding secretary.392 

At  the  second  convention  held  at  Des  Moines  in  Octo- 
ber, 1871,  a  resolution  was  adopted  claiming  the  right  of 
suffrage  for  women,  on  the  ground  that  women  are  per- 
sons and  that  under  the  fourteenth  amendment  to  the 
United  States  Constitution,  they  had  the  right  to  vote. 
Among  the  speakers  at  this  time  were  Mr.  Euttkay  of 
Des  Moines  (a  nephew  of  Louis  Kossuth)  and  Mrs. 
Annie  C.  Savery,  also  of  Des  Moines.  Mrs.  Savery  de- 
nied any  connection  between  the  propaganda  for  free 
love  and  the  demand  for  equal  suffrage ;  and  she  declared 
that  if  the  ballot  was  the  source  of  corruption,  men  also 
should  be  protected  against  the  infection.  Mrs.  Bloomer 
was  elected  president  for  the  following  year. 

The  third  convention,  it  appears,  was  not  held  until 
March,  1873.  Of  this  meeting  a  prominent  editor  wrote 
these  words:  " While  we  have  always  been  favorable  to 
woman  suffrage  as  a  principle,  we  confess  we  think  these 
associations  and  conventions  and  leagues  formed  for  the 
furtherance  of  this  principle  alone,  do  more  harm  than 
good".393 

Among  the  activities  of  the  suffrage  workers  in  these 
early  years  was  the  organization  of  local  societies  and 
the  distribution  of  literature  from  a  cottage  on  the  State 
fair  grounds.  One  of  the  first  of  the  local  societies  was 
the  Polk  County  Suffrage  Society,  organized  on  October 


186     LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

25,  1870.  About  the  same  time  another  society  with  fifty 
members  was  organized  at  Burlington.  Societies  were 
also  formed  at  Algona,  and  at  Independence,  where  Mrs. 
Narcissa  T.  Bemis,  who  was  later  president  of  the  State 
association,  was  an  active  leader.394 

Equal  suffrage  petitions  continued  to  reach  the  legis- 
lature; and  the  suffrage  amendment  was  almost  without 
fail  introduced  in  each  General  Assembly  from  1870  to 
the  present  time  (1918).  The  legislators  seem  to  have 
pursued  the  policy  of  passing  the  resolution  in  one  house 
and  rejecting  it  in  the  other,  or  of  passing  it  in  both 
houses  of  one  General  Assembly  and  rejecting  it  at  the 
next  session.  Many  of  the  influential  members  were 
doubtless  sincere  in  their  support  of  the  proposed  change, 
but  few  of  them  were  willing  to  make  the  adoption  of  the 
amendment  an  important  issue  in  a  political  campaign. 

Both  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Eepresentatives 
passed  the  equal  suffrage  amendment  in  1874.  The  vote 
was  similar  to  that  of  1870  —  being  fifty-six  to  thirty- 
eight  in  the  House,  and  twenty-seven  to  twenty-one  in 
the  Senate.  Furthermore,  the  Eepublican  State  Conven- 
tion at  its  meeting  in  July,  1874,  went  on  record  as  favor- 
able to  the  submission  of  the  equal  suffrage  amend- 
ment.395 

Samuel  J.  Kirkwood,  ex-Governor  of  the  State,  when 
questioned  concerning  his  attitude  toward  equal  suffrage 
during  the  campaign  of  1875,  replied  that  he  "  honestly 
hoped  to  see  the  day  when  in  going  to  the  polls  we  shall 
take  our  wives,  daughters,  and  sisters  with  us",  and  he 
believed  that  "many  of  us  would  live  to  see  such  a 
day."396  Governor  Cyrus  C.  Carpenter  also  pledged  his 
support,  declaring  that  he  had  never  been  able  to  dis- 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  187 

cover  any  argument  to  sustain  his  own  right  to  vote  that 
did  not  equally  apply  to  women. 

Indeed,  sentiment  ran  more  strongly  in  favor  of  wom- 
an suffrage  in  1876  than  for  many  years  thereafter.  The 
appeal  of  the  Centennial  celebration  and  the  recognition 
of  the  injustice  of  enfranchising  the  ex-slaves  while  re- 
fusing equal  privileges  to  white  women  made  many 
friends  for  the  suffrage  cause,  although  the  majority  of 
both  men  and  women  remained  hostile  or  indifferent.  In 
the  spring  of  1876  an  Iowa  paper  copied  from  an  edi- 
torial which  appeared  in  the  Minneapolis  Tribune  the 
following  statement  concerning  equal  suffrage  in  school 
affairs  in  Minnesota:  "Nearly  all  the  ladies  voting  came 
in  groups  from  four  to  six  in  number,  the  men  stepping 
aside  until  their  ballots  were  placed  in  the  special  de- 
posit provided  for  them,  and  then  the  party  would  leave 
for  home,  leaving  their  brothers  somewhat  astounded 
that  ' woman's  suffrage'  could  be  so  courteously  and  ef- 
fectively demonstrated."  Upon  which  the  Iowa  editor 
commented :  '  *  Come  to  think  of  it,  however,  it  is  not  mar- 
vellously strange  that  American  men  do  not  maltreat 
their  wives  and  sisters  and  mothers  when  assembling  to 
exercise  their  legal  rights  at  the  ballot-box.  Civility  to 
women  is  not  an  exceptional  trait  in  this  country.  "397 

Governor  Carpenter  in  his  biennial  message  in  Janu- 
ary, 1876,  favored  the  adoption  of  the  suffrage  amend- 
ment and  suggested  that  the  anniversary  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  was  a  very  appropriate  time  to 
celebrate  "the  doctrine  that  taxation  and  representation 
are  of  right  inseparable  " ;  but  in  spite  of  this  appeal  the 
Senate  defeated  the  resolution  to  submit  the  amendment 
to  the  voters  first  by  a  vote  of  twenty-two  to  twenty-four 


188     LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

and  upon  reconsideration  by  a  vote  of  twenty-two  to 
twenty-three.  The  House  of  Representatives  passed  the 
resolution  by  a  vote  of  fifty-four  to  forty,  but  the  adverse 
action  of  the  Senate  killed  the  proposed  amendment.388 

Two  years  later  the  House  of  Representatives,  after 
rejecting  the  amendment,  reconsidered  the  resolution 
and  adopted  it  by  a  vote  of  fifty-five  to  forty-two.  Ap- 
parently the  Senate  did  not  vote  upon  the  question, 
although  a  resolution  was  introduced  and  referred  to  the 
committee  on  constitutional  amendments  which  recom- 
mended indefinite  postponement.  In  1880  the  House 
again  favored  the  amendment  of  the  Constitution  to  give 
women  the  right  to  vote  and  to  sit  in  the  legislature ;  but 
to  this  resolution  the  Senate  refused  to  agree.  A  reso- 
lution giving  school  suffrage  to  women  was  also  favored 
by  the  House  committee  but  not  by  the  House,  although 
the  Senate  approved  this  measure  by  a  vote  of  twenty- 
seven  to  seventeen.399 

Various  petitions  presented  at  this  session  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  indicate  that  the  suffrage  advocates  were 
planning  attacks  on  different  fronts.  In  addition  to  the 
numerous  requests  for  constitutional  suffrage,  there  was 
a  petition  for  woman  suffrage  in  educational  matters  and 
one  for  a  law  to  exempt  women  property-owners  from 
taxation  until  they  were  given  the  right  to  vote.400 

Moreover,  the  equal  suffrage  movement  was  attract- 
ing attention  outside  the  legislature  and  the  suffrage 
organizations.  The  State  Temperance  Convention  in 
1877  and  again  in  1879  declared  for  equal  suffrage  as  a 
means  of  enabling  women  to  aid  in  the  protection  of  the 
homes ;  and  the  Greenback  State  Convention  in  its  meet- 
ing at  Marshalltown  in  1881  advocated  "  equal  political 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  189 

rights  for  all  men  and  women ",  and  emphasized  their 
conviction  by  nominating  a  woman  for  Superintendent  of 
Public  Instruction,  although  lawyers  in  the  convention 
declared  that  she  could  not  qualify  if  elected.  The  nom- 
inee, however,  solved  the  difficulty  by  refusing  to  serve, 
declaring  that  she  did  not  want  to  vote  and  that  she 
favored  the  Eepublican  party  rather  than  the  Greenback. 
A  similar  declaration  of  support  was  made  by  this  party 
in  1883.401 

The  next  few  years  saw  the  parties  in  Iowa  engaged 
in  a  struggle  over  the  question  of  prohibition.  Equal 
suffrage  was,  indeed,  much  discussed,  but  chiefly  as  it  was 
supposed  to  affect  or  be  influenced  by  the  liquor  question. 
The  Nineteenth  General  Assembly  in  1882  passed  the 
much  introduced  resolution  for  equal  suffrage;  but  the 
House  of  the  Twentieth  General  Assembly  indefinitely 
postponed  the  measure,  although  the  Senate  at  this  time 
passed  it  by  a  vote  of  twenty-six  to  twenty-four.  This,  it 
may  be  noted,  gave  the  women  a  victory  in  three  of  the 
five  necessary  votes  on  the  subject  —  two  in  the  House, 
two  in  the  Senate,  and  the  final  vote  by  the  men  of  the 
State.  Possibly  the  success  of  the  resolution  might  have 
been  even  greater  had  the  Governor  aided  in  any  way; 
but  Buren  E.  Sherman,  in  his  message  to  the  legislature 
in  1884,  refused  to  approve  equal  suffrage,  although  he 
declared  that  he  was  in  favor  of  submitting  the  amend- 
ment to  the  voters  as  a  question  of  "important  and  gen- 
eral interest ".  Some  of  the  newspapers  of  the  State 
adopted  the  same  policy,  but  it  is  possible  that  their 
object  was  rather  to  divert  attention  from  the  debate 
over  prohibition  than  to  assist  the  equal  suffrage 
cause.402 


190    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WO^IEN 

The  report  of  the  Senate  committee  on  constitutional 
amendments  in  1884  contained  the  following  endorsement 
of  equal  suffrage : 

First.  The  principle  is  axiomatic,  that  the  just  powers  of  a 
free  representative  government  are  derived  from  the  consent  of 
the  governed. 

Second.  That  American  civilization,  law  and  conscience  rec- 
ognize woman  as  a  subject  of  government,  as  a  person  and  as  a 
citizen  in  many  respects  equally,  and  in  some  respects  more 
directly  interested  in  the  enactment  and  enforcement  of  law  and 
in  giving  direction  to  the  administration  of  government  than 
man. 

Third.  That  it  is  only  fairness  and  justice  to  determine,  as 
a  general  principle,  that  burdens  and  privileges,  taxation  and 
representation,  if  not  altogether  identical,  should  be  equal  and 
coextensive. 

Fourth.  That  woman  would  doubtless  vote  quite  as  intelli- 
gently as  man. 

Fifth.  That  her  participation  in  the  elective  franchise  would 
tend  to  elevate  rather  than  degrade  politics. 

Sixth.  That  there  is  no  sufficient  reason  why  her  admission 
to  share  with  man  in  the  direction  and  control  of  governmental 
affairs  may  not  and  will  not  tend  to  advance  the  best  interests  of 
all  classes  in  the  commonwealth. 

The  majority  of  the  committee  therefore  recommend  the 
adoption  of  the  joint  resolution  in  order  that  the  proposed 
amendment  may  be  submitted  to  the  people.403 

In  the  meantime,  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Associa- 
tion had  been  holding  a  State  meeting  each  year,  endeav- 
oring to  arouse  interest  in  what  the  members  felt  was  the 
next  step  towards  democracy.  They  adopted  as  their 
slogan  a  variation  of  the  Iowa  State  motto  which  read, 
"Our  liberties  we  prize,  our  rights  we  will  secure",  and 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  191 

made  efforts  to  secure  publicity  for  their  side  of  the 
question  through  the  newspapers.  At  first  it  was  difficult 
to  interest  these  organs  of  public  opinion  because  the 
editors  refused  to  consider  the  subject  of  equal  suffrage 
seriously :  they  were  inclined  rather  to  ridicule  the  activi- 
ties of  the  women.  By  1884,  however,  one  hundred  and 
fifty  newspapers  had  signified  their  willingness  to  print 
suffrage  articles,  although  they  generally  made  it  clear 
that  they  disapproved  of  the  proposed  addition  to  the 
electorate.404 

There  is  something  pathetic  in  the  efforts  of  the  wom- 
en who  gathered  year  after  year  to  consider  the  cause  so 
important  to  them,  handicapped  as  they  were  by  the  lack 
of  votes  which  men  have  ever  relied  upon  to  further  re- 
form. Among  the  women  who  stood  out  because  of  their 
devotion  to  this  work  were  Mrs.  Margaret  W.  Campbell, 
Mrs.  Martha  C.  Callanan,  Miss  Roma  Woods,  Mrs.  Mary 
B.  Welch,  Mrs.  B.  F.  Gue,  and  a  long  list  of  others  who 
braved  ridicule  and  discouragement  without  giving  up 
the  fight.405 

Local  suffrage  clubs,  or  political  equality  clubs  as 
they  were  coming  to  be  called,  were  also  organized  in 
various  towns  and  counties  throughout  the  State ;  and  in 
1888  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association  adopted  the 
plan  of  choosing  a  president  for  every  congressional  dis- 
trict and  a  superintendent  for  every  county.  The  clubs 
thus  organized  were  of  various  types,  but  most  of  them 
were  open  to  all  who  cared  to  join  or  to  attend.  Their 
object  was  chiefly  to  get  the  women  interested  in  govern- 
ment and  to  develop  in  them  a  sense  of  civic  responsi- 
bility. By  this  time,  in  other  words,  the  suffrage  forces 
had  practically  abandoned  the  claim  that  political  rights 


192    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

were  conferred  on  women  by  the  fourteenth  amendment 
to  the  Federal  Constitution  or  by  natural  right:  they 
were  beginning  to  realize  that  participation  in  the  gov- 
ernment could  be  secured  only  when  the  demand  for  it 
was  general  and  the  women  were  qualified  to  vote.  In 
Iowa  there  was  happily  no  inferiority  of  women  in  gen- 
eral education  or  intelligence ;  it  was  necessary,  however, 
that  women  should  acquire  familiarity  with  forms  of 
organization,  with  the  administration  of  the  government, 
and  with  social  conditions.  Thus,  the  development  of  the 
general  women 's  clubs,  while  wholly  distinct  from  the 
suffrage  movement  as  such,  was  really  an  important  fac- 
tor in  creating  a  wider  interest  for  women.406 

Mrs.  Carrie  Lane  Chapman  (Catt),  who  was  chosen 
State  lecturer  and  organizer  for  the  Suffrage  Associa- 
tion in  1889,  gave  a  strong  impetus  to  the  suffrage  propa- 
ganda. '  She  began  her  work  on  November  18,  1889,  by 
organizing  a  Political  Equality  Club  at  Sioux  City;  and 
she  continued  in  the  work  until  1890,  when  she  removed 
from  Iowa.407 

The  organization  of  local  clubs  with  active  members 
continued,  although  the  number  of  such  associations  was 
never  exactly  known  since  many  were  not  reported,  while 
others  broke  up  soon  after  their  organization.  Their 
chief  work  was  the  distribution  of  literature  and  the  dis- 
cussion of  public  questions.  Nor  were  women  the  only 
speakers.  President  Aylesworth  of  Drake  University 
gave  the  evening  address  at  one  of  the  meetings  of  the 
Marion  County  Political  Equality  Association,  and  Gen- 
eral James  B.  Weaver  spoke  at  one  of  the  Polk  County 
meetings.  Similar  addresses  were  given  by  other  prom- 
inent men  at  various  places,  serving  the  double  purpose 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  193 

of  educating  the  women  in  public  affairs  and  awakening 
the  men  to  the  justice  of  the  claims  of  the  women.408 

One  of  the  men  asked  to  give  an  address  before  the 
Woman  Suffrage  Association  in  1889  was  George  A. 
Gates,  then  President  of  Grinnell  College.  He  was  com- 
pelled to  refuse  because  of  other  duties,  but  he  concluded 
his  letter  by  saying:  "The  cause  of  extending  suffrage 
to  women  is  one  in  which  I  am  considerably  interested, 
never  having  been  able  to  discover  worthy  reasons  why 
suffrage  should  be  denied  them.  Indeed,  I  have  thought 
that  after  awhile  we  may  come  around  and  ask  them  to 
help  us  —  a  change  from  the  present  condition  of  things 
—  rather  than  think  of  allowing  them  to  do  so."409 

In  1879  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association  was 
affiliated  with  the  American  Woman  Suffrage  Associa- 
tion and  sent  delegates  to  its  meeting.  The  Iowa  repre- 
sentatives to  the  meeting  at  Washington  in  1890,  for  ex- 
ample, were  Mrs.  Margaret  W.  Campbell  of  Des  Moines, 
Mr.  and  Mrs.  James  Callanan  of  Des  Moines,  Mrs.  Nar- 
cissa  T.  Bemis  of  Independence,  and  Mrs.  Carrie  Lane 
Chapman  of  Charles  City.  Mrs.  Amelia  Bloomer  of 
Council  Bluffs  and  Mrs.  Margaret  S.  Cowgill  of  West 
Liberty  were  made  honorary  vice  presidents  of  the  na- 
tional organization.410  In  November,  1891,  the  Iowa 
Woman  Suffrage  Association  was  incorporated.  Six 
years  later  its  name  was  changed  to  the  Iowa  Equal 
Suffrage  Association,  since  it  was  felt  that  equal  suffrage 
and  not  woman  suffrage  was  the  principle  for  which  the 
Association  was  working.411 

In  the  meantime,  the  old  story  of  the  constitutional 
amendment  was  being  repeated  in  the  legislature.  Gov- 
ernor William  Larrabee  in  his  inaugural  message  on 

13 


194    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

January  14,  1886,  declared  that  a  "  large  number  of  our 
best  people  favor  the  extension  of  suffrage  to  women ", 
but  he  advocated  municipal  or  school  suffrage  as  an  ex- 
periment. Moreover,  the  chief  executive  emphasized 
property  rights  rather  than  the  franchise  in  the  follow- 
ing words : 

It  is  clear  to  me  that  one  thing  is  of  vastly  more  importance 
to  them  [the  women]  than  the  ballot,  and  that  is  to  acquire  and 
to  hold  in  their  own  name  and  right  a  larger  share  of  property. 
This  is  essential  to  secure  their  real  independence.412 

In  spite  of  the  recommendations  of  the  Governor  and 
the  flood  of  petitions  sent  to  the  legislature,  equal  suf- 
frage was  not  favored  by  the  Twenty-first  General  As- 
sembly. The  Senate  passed  the  joint  resolution  looking 
towards  a  constitutional  amendment  by  a  vote  of  twenty- 
nine  to  seventeen;  while  the  bill  to  grant  municipal 
suffrage  to  women  did  not  get  beyond  the  judiciary  com- 
mittee to  which  it  was  referred.  The  House  failed  to  act 
upon  the  constitutional  amendment  resolution,  and  a  bill 
granting  both  municipal  and  school  suffrage  to  women 
was  never  called  up  for  a  vote,  although  the  committee 
which  considered  it  recommended  its  passage.413 

Interest  in  the  cause,  however,  remained  unabated  on 
the  part  of  the  women  who  felt  the  injustice  of  disfran- 
chisement.  It  was  in  1886  that  the  publication  of  The 
Woman's  Standard,  a  paper  devoted  to  the  suffrage  cause 
and  to  political  news  of  interest  to  suffrage  workers,  was 
begun  by  a  group  of  Iowa  women.  The  paper  was  partly 
supported  by  the  Woman  Suffrage  Association.  Two 
comments  will  illustrate  the  reaction  of  newspaper  edi- 
tors towards  this  enterprise.  One  paper  contained  the 
following  endorsement: 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  195 

It  shows  that  the  idea  of  woman  suffrage  is  taking  hold  here, 
and  that  it  is  going  to  be  fought  out  in  Iowa.  We  never  could 
understand  why  a  woman  didn't  have  just  as  much  right  as  a 
man  has  to  vote. 

A  different  opinion  was  expressed  by  an  editor  who 
described  the  new  organ  in  these  words : 

The  Woman's  STANDARD  is  a  nicely  printed  eight-page  jour- 
nal, with  able-bodied  editorials,  and  communications  by  women 
who  are  tired  making  soap  and  rocking  the  cradle.  From  this 
on  many  a  man  will  be  going  around  with  his  suspenders 
fastened  by  a  shingle  nail.  So  far  as  we  are  concerned  we  are 
willing  women  should  have  the  ballot  if  they  can  get  it,  and  do 
away  with  side-saddles  if  they  prefer  to  ride  the  other  way.414 

In  general  the  Iowa  newspapers  opposed  suffrage  for 
women  at  this  time,  although  some  of  them  gave  the 
matter  considerable  publicity.  The  Cedar  Rapids  Re- 
publican employed  Mrs.  L.  M.  Latham  to  conduct  a  wom- 
an suffrage  department  in  its  columns.  When  the  Stand- 
ard was  first  issued  it  was  said  that  equal  suffrage  was 
favored  by  only  one  Democratic  paper  in  the  State  —  the 
Keokuk  Constitution.  Many  Eepublican  papers  opposed 
the  movement.  One  of  the  papers  published  in  the  Ger- 
man language  denounced  the  entire  movement  because 
the  editor  believed  only  bad  women  would  vote  if  they 
were  given  the  ballot.415 

Moreover,  on  the  part  of  the  equal  suffrage  leaders  at 
this  time  there  was  an  inclination  to  claim  municipal 
suffrage  without  a  specific  act  of  the  General  Assembly, 
on  the  ground  that  women  were  entitled  to  the  privilege 
by  the  Constitution.  The  Attorney  General,  however, 
decided  that  this  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  was 
not  sound.416 


196    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Some  encouragement  was  given  to  the  women  by  Gov- 
ernor William  Larrabee,  who  in  an  address  at  Straw- 
berry Point,  on  October  26,  1886,  commented  upon  the 
large  number  of  women  present  at  a  political  speech  and 
upon  the  lack  of  women  tramps  and  the  few  women  pris- 
oners. Indeed,  it  appears  that  equal  suffrage  was  pub- 
licly endorsed  by  the  men  who  supported  the  fusion 
ticket  of  the  Prohibition-Eepublican-Knights-of-Labor 
forces  in  the  election  of  1886.  In  commenting  upon  one 
of  the  candidates  for  Congress,  a  Democratic  paper  de- 
clared that ' i  the  democratic  party  stands  as  the  opponent 
of  female  suffrage,  and  we  think  will  maintain  that  stand. 
If  Mr.  0  'Meara  supports  his  platform,  then  he  supports 
woman  suffrage  and  has  no  claim  on  the  vote  of  any 
democrat,  or  any  one  who  opposes  woman  suffrage. 
This  doctrine  is  distinctively  republican. ' ' 

In  his  first  biennial  message  delivered  in  January, 
1888,  Governor  Larrabee  again  mentioned  equal  suffrage, 
emphasizing  especially  municipal  suffrage,  which  he  de- 
clared was  " favored  by  many  of  our  best  citizens."  "It 
is  claimed ",  continued  the  Governor,  "by  those  who  ad- 
vocate this  that  it  is  not  only  right  and  just,  but  that  it 
would  so  reenforce  the  better  element  of  the  population 
of  our  cities  as  to  secure  a  more  perfect  enforcement  of 
the  criminal  laws  and  greatly  improve  the  government 
of  our  municipalities.  The  experiment  might  be  a  safe 
one,  for  if  women  should  not  avail  themselves  of  the 
privilege  when  conferred,  or  if  the  results  were  unsatis- 
factory, the  same  power  that  bestowed  the  franchise 
could  revoke  it."417  This  statement  could  scarcely  be 
considered  a  recommendation,  although  it  was  more 
favorable  than  omitting  the  subject  altogether,  as  most 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  197 

messages  had  done  and  the  Governor  was  criticized  for 
what  he  had  said  by  the  papers  opposed  to  suffrage. 

Expressing  approval  of  municipal  suffrage,  the  Cedar 
Rapids  Republican  declared  that  the  Governor  had  not 
gone  far  enough.  '  '  Then, ' '  said  the  editor,  * l  if  they  don 't 
take  enough  interest  in  city  government,  city  schools, 
city  improvements,  etc.,  to  vote  their  preferences  for 
men  to  execute  the  public  will,  why  then  —  But  we  '11  not 
attempt  to  cross  a  stream  before  we  come  to  it."418 
Another  paper  declared  that  the  "time  is  ripe  for  wom- 
an suffrage.  Other  States  are  adopting  it.  Let  not  Iowa 
remain'  behind.  "419 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  many  of  the  legislators 
were  not  favorable  to  the  extension  of  the  suffrage,  for 
the  House  bill  granting  municipal  suffrage  to  women  was 
defeated  by  a  vote  of  fifty-three  to  forty-four.  Various 
reasons  were  given  in  explanation  of  the  negative  votes : 
some  declared  that  they  believed  the  bill  to  be  unconsti- 
tutional; others  considered  it  inexpedient;  while  still 
others  objected  to  permitting  women  in  one  place  to  vote 
while  those  in  another  could  not.  A  joint  resolution  pro- 
viding for  a  constitutional  amendment,  which  was  not 
open  to  at  least  two  of  these  objections,  was  finally 
adopted  by  a  vote  of  sixty-six  to  twenty-six  after  having 
been  once  rejected.  The  Senate  apparently  did  not  dis- 
cuss the  subject  during  this  session,  although  a  resolu- 
tion was  introduced  and  recommended  for  passage  by 
the  committee.  It  is  said  that  on  February  16,  1888, 
Mrs.  Helen  M.  Gougar  addressed  the  House  committee 
on  municipal  suffrage  —  the  first  time  a  woman  had 
spoken  in  the  hall  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  the 
new  capitol  building.420 


198    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Among  the  opponents  of  equal  suffrage  during  this 
session  was  J.  S.  Clarkson  of  the  Iowa  State  Register, 
who  based  his  opposition  on  the  ground  of  policy.  The 
Republicans  having  taken  a  progressive  stand  on  the 
matter  of  prohibition  now  hesitated  to  take  a  step  for- 
ward in  suffrage  reform,  since  in  advocating  prohibition 
they  had  already  left  a  large  number  of  their  constituents 
far  in  the  rear.  Another  advance,  it  was  feared,  would 
alienate  still  other  members  —  a  risk  which  the  party 
could  not  afford  to  take.  Of  course  there  were  no  votes 
of  women  to  lose;  but  the  men  who  opposed  equal  suf- 
frage were  invaluable  to  the  party's  success  and  must 
not  be  offended.  The  position  of  the  Register  on  equal 
suffrage  did  not,  however,  prevent  the  editor  from  urg- 
ing the  women  of  Iowa  to  aid  in  the  election  of  Harrison 
and  Morton.421 

When  the  General  Assembly  convened  in  1890  the 
equal  suffrage  forces  concentrated  their  efforts  on  school 
and  municipal  suffrage,  no  determined  attempt  being 
made  to  secure  action  on  the  constitutional  amendment. 
Governor  Larrabee  again  advocated  the  limited  form  of 
enfranchisement,  this  time  calling  attention  to  the  status 
of  women  in  other  States.  His  observations  had  appar- 
ently convinced  him  that  equal  suffrage,  where  it  was  in 
vogue,  was  at  least  reasonably  successful  for  his  message 
contained  the  following  conservative  endorsement: 

The  continued  good  results  of  its  exercise  in  our  sister  state 
Kansas  re-enforce  the  arguments  in  favor  of  trying  the  experi- 
ment in  Iowa.  In  many  of  the  states  women  vote  for  members 
of  school-boards,  and  I  see  no  reason  why  they  should  not  do  so 
here.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  territory  of  Wyoming,  after 
years  of  experience  with  woman  suffrage  at  all  elections,  has 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  199 

recently  with  great  unanimity  ingrafted  the  principle  into  the 
constitution  with  which  it  is  now  seeking  to  enter  the  Union.422 

This  argument  did  not  prove  sufficient  to  overcome 
the  active  opposition  or  inertia  of  the  legislature,  which 
found  other  questions  more  important.  Two  bills  on  the 
subject  were  introduced  in  both  House  and  Senate:  one, 
to  give  women  school  suffrage,  and  another  granting 
them  municipal  suffrage.  Neither  proposition  came  to  a 
vote  in  the  Senate.  The  bill  granting  school  suffrage 
was  reported  favorably  by  the  House  committee,  but  was 
defeated  by  a  vote  of  eight  to  thirty-one ;  while  the  prop- 
osition for  municipal  suffrage  was  smothered  in  the  com- 
mittee to  which  it  had  been  referred.423  The  constitu- 
tional amendment  to  give  women  the  franchise  did  not 
come  up  at  this  session. 

When  the  Iowa  Suffrage  Association  met  for  its 
nineteenth  annual  convention  in  December,  1890,  the 
members  drew  up  resolutions  ignoring  the  failure  of 
equal  suffrage  in  the  preceding  General  Assembly  and 
declaring  that  "we  recognize  in  Wyoming  the  true  and 
just  form  of  State  government,  and  congratulate  the 
nation  upon  its  admission  with  unrestricted  suffrage". 
These  resolutions  also  included  a  vote  of  thanks  to  cer- 
tain Des  Moines  papers  for  their  complete  reports  of  the 
proceedings ;  and  to  one  of  them  the  committee  extended 
"our  further  appreciation  of  the  free  advertising  given 
our  cause  through  its  disparaging  editorials.  "424 


XV 

EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA 
1890-1918 

IN  some  respects  the  outlook  for  equal  suffrage  in  1890 
was  more  discouraging  than  it  had  been  at  any  time 
since  the  Civil  War.  The  interest  aroused  by  the  adop- 
tion of  the  thirteenth,  fourteenth,  and  fifteenth  amend- 
ments to  the  Federal  Constitution  had  been  counteracted 
by  the  early  failure  of  negro  suffrage:  the  country  had 
begun  to  realize  that  to  confer  political  rights  upon  unfit 
persons  was  a  mistake  —  a  state  of  mind  which  seemed 
to  strengthen  opposition  to  equal  suffrage.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  example  of  the  western  States  was  encourag- 
ing; but  failures  in  government  usually  occupy  a  much 
greater  share  of  attention  than  successes  —  especially 
when  an  excuse  for  inaction  is  desired. 

Governor  Boies,  who  did  not  mention  equal  suffrage 
in  any  of  his  messages,  was  considered  an  opponent  of 
the  measure,  so  that  the  indifference  of  the  General  As- 
sembly during  his  administration  was  proba'bly  not  dis- 
pleasing to  him.  At  the  same  time  prejudice  and  indiffer- 
ence were  being  gradually  overcome  by  the  education  of 
women  in  the  methods  of  handling  public  affairs  and  by 
the  slowly  increasing  emphasis  on  social  rather  than 
purely  economic  problems.  In  the  summer  of  1890  Mr. 
Terence  V.  Powderly,  the  leader  of  the  Knights  of  Labor, 
advocated  the  admission  of  women  to  that  order  —  which 
was  really  a  political  organization.  He  also  championed 

200 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  201 

equal  suffrage  and  equal  pay  for  the  same  work,  but  his 
party  was  not  sufficiently  successful  to  challenge  action 
on  the  part  of  the  two  leading  parties.425 

Several  bills  were  introduced  in  the  Twenty-fourth 
General  Assembly  concerning  equal  suffrage.  One,  pre- 
sented by  Senator  Engle,  proposed  to  give  women  the 
ballot  by  statutory  enactment ;  another  revived  the  prop- 
osition first  made  by  Mr.  Irish  and  provided  for  equal 
suffrage  in  voting  for  presidential  electors.  A  Senate 
joint  resolution  proposed  a  constitutional  amendment  to 
strike  out  the  word  ' '  male ' '  in  the  sections  relating  to  the 
franchise  and  membership  in  the  General  Assembly ;  but 
all  these  measures  were  smothered  in  committees  in  the 
Senate.  Four  bills  on  the  same  subject  were  introduced 
in  the  House:  one  to  confer  municipal  suffrage  upon 
women;  another  granting  them  school  suffrage;  a  third, 
giving  them  general  suffrage;  and  a  fourth,  to  give  wom- 
en the  right  to  vote  for  presidential  electors.  The 
municipal  suffrage  bill  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  twenty-seven 
to  fifty-four;  the  one  for  school  suffrage  failed  by  a  vote 
of  twenty-nine  to  fifty-three;  while  the  others  were  in- 
definitely postponed.426 

The  friends  of  equal  suffrage  now  began  to  realize 
that  the  attainment  of  their  ideal  of  complete  democracy 
meant  the  expenditure  of  a  large  amount  of  energy, 
money,  and  labor.  When  the  Woman  Suffrage  Associa- 
tion met  for  its  twenty-second  annual  convention  at 
Webster  City  in  November,  1893,  the  officers  reported 
1070  letters  written,  thirty-three  new  political  equality 
clubs  organized,  and  seventy-two  lectures  given.  The 
Dunlap  club  at  this  time  reported  the  largest  member- 
ship —  one  hundred  and  forty-three.  Gratification  was 


202    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

expressed  over  the  planks  in  favor  of  equal  suffrage  in 
the  Populist  and  Prohibition  platforms.427 

When  the  General  Assembly  met  in  1894  an  unusually 
active  campaign  was  begun  and  petitions  poured  into  the 
legislature  —  as  many  as  fifty  being  presented  in  the 
Senate  in  a  single  day.  A  bill  granting  municipal  and 
school  suffrage  to  women  was  introduced  in  the  House, 
and  after  much  debate  was  passed  in  a  greatly  amended 
form  and  was  then  favorably  considered  by  the  Senate. 
As  finally  adopted  this  bill  gave  women  the  privilege  of 
voting  at  municipal  and  school  elections  involving  the 
issuing  of  bonds,  borrowing  money,  or  increasing  the  tax 
levy.  In  such  matters  the  General  Assembly  decreed 
"the  right  of  any  citizen  to  vote  shall  not  be  denied  or 
abridged  on  account  of  sex,  and  women  may  vote  at  such 
elections  the  same  as  men,  under  the  same  restrictions 
and  qualifications. ' '  Two  other  bills  —  one  for  school 
suffrage  and  one  for  municipal  suffrage  —  were  intro- 
duced in  the  Senate,  but  neither  came  to  a  vote.  By  a 
vote  of  twenty  to  twenty-six  a  joint  resolution  to  amend 
the  Constitution  was  defeated.428 

The  petition  sent  to  the  General  Assembly  by  Mrs. 
Eva  S.  Gilchrist  of  Sioux  City  may  be  quoted  as  typical 
of  the  views  of  many  other  women : 

Gentlemen: 

The  undersigned  petitioner,  born  in  the  United  States,  and 
a  citizen  of  Iowa  since  1868,  respectfully  submits  to  your  honor- 
able body  for  consideration  the  following  causes  for  grievance; 
referring  you  first,  as  a  basis  for  these  deductions  to  the  grand 
principles  upon  which  the  foundation  of  our  Republic  and  the 
constitution  of  Iowa  rests,  as  enunciated  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  which  expressly  states  that  "governments  derive 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  203 

their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed;  that  taxa- 
tion without  representation  is  tyranny ;  that  all  men  are  created 
equal;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  in- 
alienable rights;  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness." 

1st.  Your  petitioner  meets  all  the  requirements  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  Iowa,  and  not  belonging  to  the  classes  set  apart  as 
disqualified  voters;  therefore,  being  denied  the  ballot,  is  uncon- 
stitutionally and  unlawfully  disfranchised  —  injuriously  dis- 
criminated against  —  and  is  deprived  of  the  Divine  right  of 
^/-representation,  true  liberty,  happiness,  and  the  prerogatives 
of  a  responsible  citizen,  all  in  direct  opposition  to  the  principles 
upon  which  this  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for 
the  people  is  founded. 

2nd.  Your  petitioner  is  personally  injured  in  feelings,  in- 
fluence, and  power  by  being  politically  classed  with  the  minor, 
insane,  criminal,  Jefferson  Davis,  idiot  and  slave,  and  is,  there- 
fore, compelled  to  stand  before  the  government  of  both  State 
and  Nation,  humiliated  and  reproached  because  created  a  woman. 

3rd.  Believing  class-legislation  unconstitutional,  wrong  in 
principle  and  injurious  in  practice,  your  petitioner  protests 
against  its  further  continuance,  —  as  all  men  having  the  privi- 
lege of  suffrage,  no  matter  how  densely  ignorant,  nor  how  cor- 
rupt in  character,  (only  so  they  are  out  of  prison,)  nor  how 
lately  emigrated  to  my  native  land,  are  my  political  superiors, — 
they  choose  the  rulers,  and  make  laws  to  govern  me  without  my 
consent,  and,  feeling  more  and  more  the  ignominy  of  this  un- 
enviable position  in  our  so-called  Republic. 

I  do,  therefore,  humbly  pray  your  honorable  body  to  redress 
these  grievous  wrongs,  and  so  far  as  you  are  legally  qualified,  to 
confer  the  elective  franchise  upon  me,  that  I  may  represent  my- 
self equally  with  all  those  who  now  enjoy  its  advantages  and 
blessings  and  respectfully  request  that  favorable  action  may  be 
taken  upon  my  petition  at  this  session  of  the  legislature.429 


204    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

In  the  debate  on  the  suffrage  bill  which  finally  became 
a  law  in  an  amended  form,  various  explanations  were 
offered  for  negative  votes,  among  which  the  two  most 
frequently  given  were :  that  the  bill  was  unconstitutional ; 
and  that  the  women  did  not  want  to  vote.  One  Kepre- 
sentative,  however,  was  more  original  and  handed  in  the 
following  reason  for  his  vote: 

I  have  always  been  taught  and  Scripture  says,  God  first  made 
man  and  afterwards  he  took  a  rib  out  of  the  man's  side,  out  of 
which  he  made  a  woman.  Now  it  seems  to  me  a  disgrace  and  an 
injustice  to  let  that  rib  control  or  dictate  to  men  in  any  way, 
shape  or  form  whatsoever  in  regard  to  the  law  making  power  in 
this  State.  Therefore,  I  vote  no. 

P.   STILLMUNKES430 

The  fact  that  the  men  who  dictated  party  policies 
were  unwilling  to  admit  women  to  the  suffrage  did  not, 
however,  prevent  their  asking  for  the  aid  of  women  in 
the  campaign  of  the  autumn  of  1895.  The  Iowa  State 
Register  printed  the  following  appeal  to  the  women  who 
favored  Republican  candidates  in  the  State  election : 

The  Republican  women  of  the  state  should  see  to  it  that  Re- 
publican men  go  to  the  polls  to  vote  on  Tuesday,  November  5, 
even  if  the  women  have  to  run  the  threshing  machines  and  do 
the  husking  for  a  few  hours.  Here  is  an  opportunity  for  the 
women  to  vote.  Every  vote  that  they  cause  to  be  deposited  in 
the  ballot  boxes  on  that  day  will  be  written  to  their  credit.  It 
is  a  lamentable  fact  that  many  men  are  so  indifferent  to  the 
rights  and  duties  of  citizenship  that  they  refuse  to  take  a  few 
minutes  or  a  few  hours  to  vote  ....  We  appeal  to  the 
women  to  see  to  it  that  the  men  exercise  their  right  and  discharge 
their  duty  well  on  the  fifth  of  November.431 

This  appeal  to  the  women,  together  with  some  of  the 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  205 

statements  made  in  connection  therewith,  apparently  pro- 
voked some  comment,  for  some  three  weeks  later  a  de- 
fense of  the  paper's  stand  was  published  in  the  editorial 
columns.  When  compared  with  the  above  statement  as 
to  the  indifference  of  the  men  voters,  the  explanation  is 
rather  interesting.  The  Register,  it  was  asserted,  "has 
frequently  stated  that  it  will  be  in  favor  of  the  extension 
of  full  suffrage  to  the  women  of  the  state  when  the  ma- 
jority of  the  women  want  to  vote  and  will  vote  .... 
The  Register  is  wholly  indifferent  on  the  matter  of  un- 
sexed  suffrage,  except  that  the  majority  of  the  women 
shall  decide  the  matter  and  then,  if  they  declare  in  favor 
of  voting,  vote  as  generally  as  the  men  do."432 

As  the  prohibition  question  had  overshadowed  equal 
suffrage  during  the  years  following  1882,  so  the  excite- 
ment over  the  free  silver  issue  and  the  debate  in  Iowa  on 
the  proposed  changes  in  the  State  government  absorbed 
the  attention  of  Iowa  politicians  and  legislators  in  1896 
-  indeed,  it  seems  that  very  little  was  required  to  divert 
the  attention  of  most  of  them  from  the  suffrage  issue. 
Apparently  no  action  was  taken  in  the  House  during  this 
session;  while  in  the  Senate  a  joint  resolution  in  relation 
to  equal  suffrage  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  twenty-three 
to  twenty-three.433 

While  the  legislators  were  considering  necessary 
changes  in  the  State  laws,  another  assembly  met  in  Des 
Moines.  This  was  the  meeting  of  the  National  Woman 
Suffrage  Association  which  convened  in  January,  1897, 
to  discuss  what  its  members  considered  the  most  neces- 
sary change  in  political  administration.  Among  the 
speakers  was  Miss  Susan  B.  Anthony,  a  woman  of  great 
ability  and  of  better  judgment  than  suffrage  agitators 


206    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

frequently  employed.  The  meeting  brought  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  men  and  women  of  Iowa  the  number  and  the 
class  of  women  interested  in  suffrage  and  the  powerful 
organization  they  had  effected  to  secure  it.  The  Iowa 
State  Register  printed  the  following  comment  on  the 
meeting  : 

The  convention  in  this  city  this  week  will,  no  doubt,  exert  a 
large  influence  on  this  community  and  state.  There  is  something 
infectious  in  a  cause  which  has  so  many  capable  women  pleading 
for  it  constantly.  Other  women  are  influenced  by  it  and  every 
time  we  lose  a  woman  (we  speak  now  from  the  anti-suffrage 
side)  we  are  in  danger  of  losing  from  one  to  half  a  dozen 
men  .... 

But  the  women  who  believe  in  suffrage  are  entitled  to  a  full 
hearing  ....  The  very  chivalry  which  is  the  stronghold, 
or  at  least  the  boast  of  the  anti-suffrage  side,  compels  us  all  to 
yield  them  that.  In  the  meanwhile  we  hope  that  the  good  women 
will  not  all  desert  us  and  go  over  to  the  side  of  "Our  Susan," 
for  we  would  be  lonesome  and  powerless  without  them.  For  the 
success  of  the  anti-suffrage  cause  reliance  must  be  placed  in 
women,  not  in  men.  The  women  are  the  final  arbiters  —  the  men 
are  merely  instruments  in  their  hands.  This  is  the  sad  truth.434 

Miss  Anthony  even  presided  over  a  joint  meeting  of 
the  two  houses  of  the  General  Assembly  in  February, 
1897,  and  a  newspaper  declared  that  she  "did  so  well, 
that  no  man  could  have  done  better. "  Indeed,  it  was 
said  that  "the  session  Friday  presided  over  by  the  inimit- 
able Miss  Susan  B.  Anthony  will  long  be  remembered  by 
those  who  were  present.  And  all  the  remembrances  are 
pleasant  ones.  But,  of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  we 
ought  to  extend  the  suffrage  to  women.  "435 

The  national  suffrage  leaders  urged  a  concerted  effort 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  207 

on  the  part  of  the  Iowa  association  to  elect  a  legislature 
favorable  to  equal  suffrage.  "That  campaign  has  al- 
ready been  begun ",  said  an  Iowa  editor  in  May,  1897, 
"by  the  organization  of  suffrage  societies  and  the  holding 
of  suffrage  conventions  in  a  number  of  the  counties  of 
the  state,  at  which  Miss  Hay  of  New  York,  Eev.  Anna 
Shaw  of  Philadelphia,  our  own  Mrs.  Carrie  Lane-Chap- 
man-Catt  —  the  brightest  woman  enlisted  in  the  woman 
suffrage  cause  —  and  other  speakers  of  National  reputa- 
tion have  been  present  to  instruct  and  inspire  the  sup- 
porters of  unsexed  suffrage.  The  ladies  opposed  to  the 
extension  of  suffrage  to  their  sex  are  not  so  well  organ- 
ized, but  they  are  beginning  to  make  themselves  manifest 
and  will  doubtless  soon  be  as  actively  engaged  in  the  con- 
test as  their  opponents."436 

The  activity  of  the  suffragists  was  chiefly  directed  to- 
wards the  organization  of  local  suffrage  clubs:  more 
than  a  hundred  such  groups  were  reported  during  the 
latter  part  of  1897.  In  1899  there  were  said  to  be  some 
two  thousand  women  enrolled  in  these  clubs.437 

The  work  of  these  local  organizations  may  be  illus- 
trated by  the  program  of  the  Sioux  City  Political  Equal- 
ity Club  which  met  each  month  in  the  city  building.  The 
subjects  for  discussion  were:  Iowa;  parliamentary  drill; 
the  suffrage  movement  in  Iowa;  club  methods  in  Iowa; 
history  of  legislative  work  in  Iowa;  history  of  bond 
suffrage  in  Iowa  and  what  it  has  accomplished;  and 
Iowa  women  office-holders.  There  was  an  open  debate 
upon  woman  suffrage  in  which  the  club  challenged  the 
anti-suffragists.  The  meeting  devoted  to  parliamentary 
drill  took  the  form  of  scenes  from  the  Republican  State 
Convention  with  Mrs.  Julia  C.  Hallam  presiding.438 


208    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Thus  the  women  obtained  training  in  the  practical 
problems  of  administration  and  political  tactics.  In 
these  years  of  struggle  they  gained  much  in  knowledge  of 
affairs  and  in  self-confidence,  although  the  only  conces- 
sion of  political  power  was  the  right  to  vote  on  the  ques- 
tion of  bonds  and  the  right  to  hold  certain  offices. 

The  Code  of  1897  perpetuated  the  provisions  concern- 
ing voting  on  bonds;  but  it  expressly  denied  to  women 
the  right  to  vote  for  school  officers,  thus  deciding  against 
a  claim  made  by  some  persons  that  the  right  to  vote  on 
bonds  included  the  right  to  vote  for  school  officers.  The 
procedure  in  all  elections  at  which  women  were  allowed 
to  vote  was  described  in  these  words  : 

At  all  elections  where  women  may  vote,  no  registration  of 
women  shall  be  required ;  separate  ballots  shall  be  furnished  for 
the  question  on  which  they  are  entitled  to  vote ;  a  separate  ballot 
box  shall  be  provided  in  which  all  ballots  cast  by  them  shall  be 
deposited,  and  a  separate  canvass  thereof  made  by  the  judges  of 
the  election,  and  the  returns  thereof  shall  show  such  vote.439 

An  interesting  incident  was  reported  in  1897  concern- 
ing an  election  at  McGregor  in  Clayton  County  on  the 
question  of  issuing  bonds  for  the  erection  of  a  plant  to 
provide  the  city  with  water.  This  was,  of  course,  one  of 
the  questions  upon  which  women  were  entitled  to  vote; 
but  the  judges  were  not  aware  of  the  provisions  of  the 
law  and  at  first  refused  to  permit  any  woman  to  cast  a 
ballot,  so  that  only  four  women  succeeded  in  voting.  As 
a  result  of  this  irregularity  the  election  was  declared 
illegal.  Again,  in  1916  the  election  on  the  question  of 
establishing  a  municipal  court  at  Des  Moines  was  con- 
tested because  women  were  allowed  to  vote,  but  the  Su- 
preme Court  upheld  the  legality  of  the  vote.440 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  209 

When  the  General  Assembly  met  in  1898  two  joint 
resolutions  for  a  constitutional  amendment  were  intro- 
duced in  the  House  of  Eepresentatives.  One  failed  to 
survive  reference  to  the  committee;  while  the  other  re- 
ceived only  forty-nine  affirmative  votes,  forty-eight  Rep- 
resentatives voting  against  it  and  three  failing  to  vote 
—  thus  giving  less  than  the  constitutional  majority. 
Before  the  vote  was  taken  the  resolution  was  amended  by 
inserting  the  provision  that  "  women  shall  not  be  eligible 
to  perform  jury,  police,  military  or  road  duty."441  A 
Senate  resolution  to  strike  out  the  word  "male"  from 
"section  1,  article  3"  was  evidently  intended  to  apply  to 
Article  II,  but  no  action  was  taken  upon  it. 

While  the  suffrage  resolution  was  under  considera- 
tion, the  House  and  Senate  committees  on  constitutional 
amendments  granted  a  hearing  to  the  equal  suffragists 
and  the  anti-suffragists  on  February  3,  1898,  at  which  a 
number  of  prominent  women  spoke  on  each  side  of  the 
question.  Among  those  in  favor  of  the  resolution  were 
Mrs.  Mary  J.  Coggeshall,  president  of  the  Des  Moines 
Equal  Suffrage  Club,  Mrs.  Evelyn  H.  Belden  of  Sioux 
City,  Mrs.  Nellie  Purcell  of  Des  Moines,  and  Mrs.  D.  S. 
Wright  of  Cedar  Falls.  The  anti-suffrage  side  was  rep- 
resented by  a  number  of  women,  among  whom  were  Miss 
Emilie  Stowe,  Mrs.  Martin  Flynn,  and  Mrs.  H.  A.  Foster 
of  Des  Moines. 

Exact  reports  of  the  speeches  made  before  the  com- 
mittees are  not  available,  but  some  of  the  points  made 
were  preserved  by  the  newspapers.  According  to  the 
report  printed  in  the  Woman's  Standard  Mrs.  Coggeshall 
said: 


14 


210    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Anti-suffragists  tell  us  that  it  is  easy  to  get  by  the  votes  of 
men  every  right  to  which  we  are  entitled ;  but  the  facts  are  that 
every  inch  of  advanced  ground  has  been  contested  .... 
It  is  less  than  sixty-five  years  since  a  change  in  the  laws  favor- 
able to  women  has  taken  place  in  any  part  of  the  United  States, 
and  none  of  these  occurred  until  women  began  to  ask  for  the 
ballot.  The  remnants  of  old-time  restrictions  remain.  Were  it 
not  so,  this  company  would  not  be  here  this  afternoon. 

Prejudices  die  hard.  The  creed  of  all  nations  has  made  the 
subordination  of  women  the  cornerstone  of  her  religious  char- 
acter. The  literature  of  all  our  past  is  saturated  with  this  idea. 
If  we  accept  the  story  of  Genesis  that  a  woman  set  up  the  world 
in  the  clothing  business,  furnishing  the  fig  leaves  for  herself  and 
husband,  it  is  pathetic  that  the  growth  of  6,000  years  does  not 
yet  in  many  states  of  this  union  allow  the  wife  to  own  her  fig 
leaves.  You  probably  read  in  the  daily  papers  a  short  time  ago 
of  the  man  in  Connecticut  who  was  so  tired  of  the  fancy  gowns 
his  wife  persisted  in  wearing  that  he  burned  them.  He  was 
arrested  for  this  destruction  of  property,  but  nothing  could  be 
done  with  him,  because,  as  was  plainly  showed,  a  man  has  a 
right  to  do  what  he  pleases  with  his  own  clothes. 

The  suffrage  women  are  taunted  with  the  assertion  that  they 
are  seeking  to  don  their  husbands'  clothes,  while  the  facts  are 
that  women  have  always  worn  men's  clothes  —  the  suffragists 
are  only  trying  to  get  women  the  right  to  wear  their  own. 

Miss  Emilie  Stowe,  the  first  "  remonstrant ",  is  re- 
ported to  have  begun  by  declaring  that  they  would  all 
rather  be  at  home  with  their  knitting,  but  feared  the 
members  of  the  legislature  might  be  misled,  and  their 
minds  biased  toward  equal  suffrage,  if  they  did  not  ap- 
pear and  protest  against  submitting  the  proposed 
amendment  to  the  voters.  She  declared  that  the  right  to 
vote  had  become  a  "very  shibboleth "  with  the  suffra- 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  211 

gists,  but  asserted  that  "from  our  point  of  view  that 
word  'right'  pales  into  insignificance  —  becomes  nil, 
when  pitted  against  the  word  '  expediency, 9  in  connection 
with  this  question. ' ' 

Mrs.  H.  A.  Foster  declared  that  the  women  had  left 
their  homes  very  reluctantly  to  speak  in  behalf  of  the 
contented  wives  and  mothers  who  felt  that  their  social 
duties  in  connection  with  home  cares,  taxed  to  their  full- 
est capacity  their  mental,  moral,  and  physical  strength. 
She  thought  all  arguments  in  favor  of  female  suffrage 
"illogical  and  sophistical. "  In  reference  to  the  suffrage 
petitions  that  had  gone  to  the  legislature,  Mrs.  Foster 
made  the  following  statement : 

[They]  bear  the  signatures  of  not  only  women  of  mature 
years,  but  of  girls,  of  men,  and  of  the  dead.  I  mention  the  latter 
class  because  these  petitions  have  been  many  years  in  prepara- 
tion, and  a  large  number  of  the  original  signers  have  passed 
away,  leaving  their  signatures  to  be  used  in  a  manner  which 
they,  no  doubt,  by  this  time,  sadly  regret.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
these  petitions  indicate  nothing  but  the  craft  and  indomitable 
energy  of  the  women  engaged  in  securing  them,  and  the  good 
natured  carelessness  of  the  signers. 

Mrs.  Day  began  with  the  sarcastic  reflection  that 
those  "least  qualified  to  speak  on  legislative  matters 
were  the  most  prompt  to  offer  suggestions  to  law  mak- 
ers. "  Instead  of  lessening  the  qualifications  for  the 
suffrage,  she  declared,  such  qualifications  should  be  in- 
creased. 

In  her  concluding  remarks  Mrs.  Belden  discussed  the 
argument  that  voting  would  degrade  women,  saying  : 

I  feel  almost  like  speaking  a  word  or  two  for  man's  suffrage, 
so  much  has  been  said  against  it  this  afternoon.  I  have  never 


212    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

known  that  a  particular  crowd  of  men  was  let  loose  on  election 
day  to  corrupt,  who  are  shut  up  the  rest  of  the  time.  I  have 
never  believed  a  man  was  less  a  gentleman  at  the  polls  than  at 
the  opera  and  circus,  nor  that  there  was  anything  at  the  polls  to 
endanger  women  which  they  do  not  meet  elsewhere  daily.  I 
must  resent  the  imputation  regarding  the  petitions,  for  it  hurt 
me  deeply.  I  hate  to  think  that  I  live  in  a  state  where  the  men 
are  so  careless  about  signing  a  petition  on  a  great  question,  and 
[I]  refuse  to  admit  such  is  the  case.  That  this  movement  is 
backed  by  poor  house-keepers  and  discontented  women,  I  also 
deny.  We  have  in  our  ranks  some  of  the  best  home  makers  and 
housekeepers  in  Iowa.442 

In  1900  a  similar  resolution  providing  for  equality  of 
suffrage  and  office-holding  failed  to  receive  the  necessary 
constitutional  majority  in  the  Senate;  and  in  the  House, 
the  equal  suffrage  amendment  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of 
forty-three  to  fifty-six.443  The  amendment,  indeed,  fared 
a  little  better  in  the  Twenty-ninth  General  Assembly  in 
1902,  for  it  was  then  adopted  in  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of 
twenty-eight  to  sixteen,  although  it  was  indefinitely  post- 
poned by  the  House  of  Representatives.444  Indifference 
was  largely  responsible  for  the  action  of  the  legislators. 
The  interest  in  public  affairs  which  had  been  aroused  by 
the  Civil  War  had  largely  died  down,  while  thousands  of 
women  now  found  an  outlet  for  their  energies  in  home 
work  or  in  the  clubs  which  were  organized  —  at  first,  for 
individual  culture  rather  than  for  the  public  welfare. 

There  is  some  evidence,  however,  that  popular  senti- 
ment was  slowly  becoming  more  favorable  to  universal 
suffrage.  The  extension  of  the  franchise  to  the  women  of 
the  West  was  a  strong  argument  in  favor  of  the  Iowa 
amendment.  The  emphasis  on  social  problems  which  de- 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  213 

veloped  in  the  decade  from  1890  to  1900  inevitably  di- 
rected attention  to  the  non-voting  group  which  included 
approximately  one-half  the  adult  population.  Newspa- 
pers began  to  take  a  more  favorable  attitude  towards 
equality  of  men  and  women  in  political  affairs.  Most  im- 
portant of  all,  women  began  to  exhibit  more  self-confi- 
dence. They  seldom  talked  of  " women's  rights ",  but 
more  often  vindicated  them  in  the  courts.  The  men  of 
the  seventies  sometimes,  no  doubt,  voted  for  equal  suf- 
frage to  please  the  women  —  especially  when  they  did 
not  believe  it  would  be  successful  or  permanent.  Twenty 
years  later,  men  were  just  beginning  to  realize  that  po- 
litical equality  was  inevitable. 

The  General  Assembly,  however,  was  very  conserva- 
tive and  continued  to  vote  down  the  constitutional  amend- 
ment until  1913.  In  1904  the  resolution  was  defeated  in 
the  House,  while  the  Senate  permitted  it  to  be  buried  in 
the  sifting  committee  after  being  unfavorably  reported 
by  the  committee  to  which  it  had  been  referred.  More- 
over, the  following  explanation  of  an  affirmative  vote 
made  by  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives  indi- 
cates that  the  legislators  were  becoming  desirous  of 
shifting  the  rejecting  of  equal  suffrage  to  the  voters  of 
the  State : 

I  have  voted  in  the  affirmative  for  the  reason  that  this  ques- 
tion has  been  presented  to  many  past  sessions  of  the  General 
Assembly;  and,  in  all  probability  will  be  urged  on  every  future 
session  until  finally  submitted  to  the  electors  for  their  deter- 
mination. 

Personally,  I  am  opposed  to  the  proposition,  but  do  not  wish 
to  array  myself  against  the  submission  to  the  people  —  having 
abiding  faith  in  the  defeat  of  the  measure  at  the  polls.445 


214    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

This  prophecy  concerning  the  re-submission  of  the 
amendment  was  at  fault  only  in  inferring  that  the  ques- 
tion would  be  settled  by  a  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the 
voters  of  the  State.  His  advice,  however,  was  not  fol- 
lowed, and  the  General  Assembly  which  met  in  1906  de- 
feated not  only  the  joint  resolution  for  the  constitutional 
amendment,  but  also  a  bill  granting  presidential  suffrage 
to  women.446 

In  1907  Senator  Gale  introduced  a  resolution  for  con- 
stitutional equal  suffrage,  but  his  measure  was  defeated 
in  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  twenty-one  to  twenty-six.  A 
bill  introduced  in  the  House  by  Representative  C.  A. 
Meredith  to  give  women  school  suffrage  was  passed  by  a 
vote  of  seventy-seven  to  nine,  with  twenty-two  not  vot- 
ing; but  the  amendment  resolution  was  not  even  consid- 
ered by  the  Senate.  Another  bill  aiming  at  presidential 
suffrage  was  referred  to  a  committee  where  it  was 
smothered.447 

In  the  Thirty- third  General  Assembly  a  bill  was  intro- 
duced in  the  Senate  providing  "That  the  right  of  any 
citizen  to  vote  at  any  election  upon  any  question,  except 
nomination  and  election  of  officers,  or  amendments  to  the 
constitution,  shall  not  be  denied  or  abridged  on  account 
of  sex,  and  women  may  vote  thereon  the  same  as  men". 
But  this  bill  was  deprived  of  any  meaning  it  might  other- 
wise have  possessed  by  the  striking  out  of  its  enacting 
clause.  A  resolution  for  the  much  discussed  constitu- 
tional amendment  was  indefinitely  postponed ;  and  a  sim- 
ilar resolution  in  the  House  failed  to  survive  reference 
to  the  committee.448 

The  House  of  the  Thirty-fourth  General  Assembly  de- 
feated the  equal  suffrage  amendment  by  a  close  vote  of 


EQUAL  SUFFKAGE  IN  IOWA  215 

forty-eight  to  fifty-three;  while  a  bill  to  permit  women 
to  vote  on  the  question  of  establishing  county  hospitals 
did  not  secure  definite  action.  A  similar  bill  in  the  Sen- 
ate was  lost  in  the  sifting  committee;  and  a  school  suf- 
frage bill  was  introduced  and  indefinitely  postponed.  It 
was  during  this  session  of  the  legislature  that  Miss 
Sylvia  Pankhurst  of  England,  then  visiting  in  Des 
Moines,  was  invited  to  address  a  joint  convention  of  the 
General  Assembly  and  on  February  1st,  after  a  ballot  on 
United  States  Senator,  the  members  listened  to  "Lady 
Pankhurst".449 

It  was  about  this  time  that  a  group  of  men  organized 
a  State  association  for  the  "approval  of  the  movement  of 
women  to  attain  the  full  suffrage  in  this  state  and  coun- 
try ;  and  to  aid  them  in  their  efforts  toward  that  end  by 
public  appearance  in  behalf  of  the  cause,  and  by  circula- 
tion of  literature  and  holding  of  meetings".  This  Men's 
League  for  Woman  Suffrage  held  its  first  meeting  in 
July,  1910,  and  included  in  its  membership  list  at  that 
time  the  names  of  Edwin  A.  Nye,  John  J.  Hamilton,  H.  C. 
Evans,  Henry  Wallace,  Edgar  B.  Harlan,  A.  L.  Urick, 
B.  D.  Emory,  Johnson  Brigham,  Leon  Brown,  E.  T. 
Meredith,  James  Nugent,  Harvey  Ingham,  and  J.  F. 
Biggs.  These  men  were  not  demonstratively  enthusi- 
astic, but  their  organization  showed  that  they  were  really 
in  sympathy  with  the  equal  suffrage  workers.450 

When  the  Thirty-fifth  General  Assembly  met  in  1913 
the  advocates  of  equal  suffrage,  still  hopeful,  again  pre- 
sented their  demands  for  the  removal  of  political  dis- 
crimination against  women.  A  joint  convention  of  the 
two  houses  listened  to  an  argument  by  Mrs.  Trout  of  the 
Illinois  Suffrage  Association.  She  discussed  the  various 


216    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

objections  to  suffrage:  women  do  not  want  to  vote;  a 
woman's  place  is  in  the  home;  women  can  not  fight;  the 
ballot  would  coarsen  women;  bad  women  only  would 
vote ;  wives  would  be  quarrelsome ;  and  other  fears  of  the 
anti-suffragists.  The  speech  is  too  long  to  be  repeated  at 
length,  but  the  following  paragraph  will  illustrate  its 
character : 

Some  people  object  to  equal  suffrage  because  they  fear  that  if 
women  were  allowed  to  handle  that  dangerous  piece  of  paper 
called  a  " ballot,"  they  would  grow  coarse  and  masculine,  be- 
cause they  would  be  associated  in  such  a  horrible  and  degrading 
way  with  men.  Still  women  ride  in  our  cars  and  in  our  autos 
every  day,  side  by  side  with  men,  and  seem  to  enjoy  it.  They 
work  in  our  stores,  teach  in  our  schools,  side  by  side  with  men. 
They  go  to  church,  side  by  side  with  men.  They  even  live  under 
the  same  roof  with  men,  and  yet  this  constant  association  has 
failed  to  make  them  either  coarse  or  masculine.  But,  voting  is, 
of  course,  different.451 

It  is  unlikely  that  this  speech  had  any  large  effect,  but 
the  general  increase  in  opinion  favorable  to  equal  suf- 
frage at  this  time  made  possible  the  adoption  of  a  pro- 
posed constitutional  amendment  that  "  Every  citizen  of 
the  United  States,  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  who 
shall  have  been  a  resident  of  this  state  six  months  next 
preceding  the  election,  and  of  the  county  in  which  he  or 
she  claims  his  or  her  vote,  sixty  days,  shall  be  entitled  to 
vote  at  all  elections  which  are  now  or  hereafter  may  be 
authorized  by  law."  This  amendment  was  to  take  the 
place  of  Section  1,  Article  II,  of  the  Constitution,  which 
had  so  long  disfranchised  the  women  of  the  State :  it  was 
adopted  by  a  vote  of  eighty-one  to  twenty-six  in  the 
House,  and  thirty-one  to  fifteen  in  the  Senate.452 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  217 

The  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  provided 
that  voters  at  school  elections  in  corporations  of  over 
5000  inhabitants  must  register;  but  this  clause  was  not 
to  be  "construed  to  prohibit  women  from  voting  at  all 
elections  at  which  they  are  entitled  to  vote."453 

Two  years  later  it  was  provided  that  in  voting  at 
elections  under  the  drainage  act  "the  owner  of  each  tract 
of  land,  if  he  or  she  is  over  twenty-one  years  of  age,  shall, 
without  regard  to  sex  ....  be  entitled  to  at  least 
one  vote".454 

According  to  the  Constitution  an  amendment  to  the 
fundamental  law  must  pass  two  successive  General  As- 
semblies before  being  submitted  to  the  people,  and  so  the 
equal  suffrage  amendment  passed  in  1913  came  before 
the  Thirty-sixth  General  Assembly.  The  anti-suffragists 
made  a  determined  effort  to  defeat  the  resolution ;  but  in 
this  they  failed.  By  a  vote  of  thirty-eight  to  eleven  in 
the  Senate,  and  eighty-four  to  nineteen  in  the  House,  the 
suffrage  amendment  w^as  approved  by  the  legislature.455 

At  the  committee  hearing  on  the  resolution  in  the 
House,  advocates  and  opponents  of  the  amendment  ap- 
peared, and  two  of  the  speeches,  both  by  anti-suffragists, 
were  printed  in  the  Journal  of  the  House  in  accordance 
with  a  motion  by  Representative  Klinker  who  was  op- 
posed to  equal  suffrage.  These  objectors  to  equal  suf- 
frage urged  that  women  could  best  serve  the  State  by 
staying  at  home;  that  men  and  women  have  different 
functions,  and  therefore  women  should  be  content  to  let 
men  vote  alone ;  that  a  mother 's  influence  is  greater  than 
a  voter 's ;  that  eighty  per  cent  of  the  women  over  twenty- 
four  years  of  age  are  married  and  have  interests  iden- 
tical with  their  husbands;  that  if  a  wife  voted  against 


218    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

her  husband  she  would  nullify  his  vote;  that  the  fran- 
chise is  not  a  right  but  a  privilege  delegated  to  whomso- 
ever the  government  wishes;  that  the  majority  of  the 
women  do  not  want  to.  vote  anyway ;  that  taxation  with- 
out votes  is  not  tyranny,  since  women  are  represented  by 
the  men;  that  women  can  carry  on  philanthropic  work 
better  without  the  aid  of  the  ballot ;  and  that  women  are 
no  better  off  in  suffrage  States  than  they  are  in  non- 
suffrage  States.  "The  suffrage  states'*,  declared  Miss 
Bronson,  "are  for  the  most  part  black. "  Furthermore, 
"Pasadena,  saloonless  throughout  its  history,  voted  in 
the  saloons  at  the  first  election  held  after  women 
voted.  "45G 

Mrs.  Cullums  of  Des  Moines  based  her  objections  to 
suffrage  upon  the  difference  between  the  sexes  and  the 
apparent  intention  of  God  that  women  were  to  dominate 
the  world  as  mothers.  The  suffragists,  she  asserted,  were 
intent  upon  breaking  up  the  home.  Some  of  her  argu- 
ments were  as  follows : 

If  I  were  explaining  a  weed  to  a  class  of  young  girls  and 
married  women,  I  would  say  a  weed  and  a  suffragist  look  alike, 
and  history  has  proven  a  suffragette  is  detrimental  and  injurious 
to  home  and  home  life,  and  that  her  silent  aim  seems  to  be  an 
upheaval  of  the  home  and  places  sprags  in  the  mental  wheels  of 
all  young  girls  and  married  women  by  saying,  any  expectant 
mother  should  have  pay  for  producing  a  child,  and  then  I  would 
dismiss  the  class  and  enter  into  a  silent  prayer,  asking  Lord  God 
Almighty  to  give  me  strength  to  go  on  and  teach  purity  and 
morality  and  motherhood  in  this  sinful,  twisted,  carnal  minded 
old  world  .... 

The  best  rights  that  a  woman  can  own  she  already  has  in  her 
possession.  The  grandeur  and  power  of  her  realm  have  never 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  219 

yet  been  appreciated.  She  sits  today  on  a  throne  so  high  that  all 
the  thrones  of  earth  piled  on  top  of  each  other,  would  not  make 
for  her  a  foot  stool.  Here  is  the  platform  on  which  she  stands. 
Away  down  below  it  are  the  ballot  box  and  the  congressional 
assemblage  and  the  legislative  hall  ....  I  am  positive  the 
minister  who  proclaims  suffrage  from  his  pulpit  is  of  the  world 
worldly.  The  ministers  may  preach  prohibition  and  may  see  the 
saloons  go,  but  more  than  that,  back  of  all,  is  broken  homes  and 
immorality,  which  always  drives  imperfect  humanity  to  drink.457 

Arrangements  were  made  by  the  General  Assembly 
for  the  submission  of  the  amendment  to  the  voters  of 
Iowa  at  the  primary  election  on  June  5, 1916,  by  a  vote  of 
sixty-seven  to  thirty-six  in  the  House,  and  thirty  to  four- 
teen in  the  Senate.  The  resolution  as  passed  by  the  leg- 
islature was  signed  on  April  16, 1915,  by  Governor  George 
W.  Clarke.458 

An  exciting  campaign  followed.  Miss  Flora  Dun- 
lap459  of  Des  Moines,  the  president  of  the  Iowa  Equal 
Suffrage  Association,  was  in  charge  of  the  suffrage 
forces.  She  was  assisted  by  a  large  corps  of  local  speak- 
ers and  by  a  number  from  outside  the  State,  including 
Mrs.  Carrie  Chapman  Catt  and  Mr.  Owen  E.  Lovejoy. 
There  was  less  speaking  and  fewer  organizations  on  the 
anti-suffrage  side.  A  majority  of  the  opposition  speak- 
ers were  from  outside  the  State ;  among  them  were  Miss 
Minnie  Bronson  of  New  York  and  Mr.  John  P.  Irish  of 
California  —  the  same  Mr.  Irish  who  in  1870  had  intro- 
duced into  the  Iowa  legislature  the  first  resolution  for 
the  submission  of  an  equal  suffrage  amendment  to  the 
Constitution. 

Opposition  and  inertia  proved  more  effective  than 
suffrage  propaganda  and  the  measure  was  defeated  at 


220    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  polls  by  a  vote  of  162,849  to  172,990.460  Indifference 
and  suspicion  of  any  unusual  step  in  public  affairs  were 
probably  the  chief  reasons  for  this  unfavorable  vote; 
although  the  predominance  of  negative  majorities  on 
both  this  amendment  and  the  later  prohibitory  amend- 
ment in  counties  with  a  large  foreign  element  seems  to 
afford  some  grounds  for  the  opinion  that  the  influence  of 
the  liquor  interests  and  the  opposition  of  foreign-born 
voters  and  voters  of  foreign  parentage  were  partially 
responsible  for  the  result. 

The  census  report  of  1915  shows  that  Clinton,  Des 
Moines,  Dubuque,  and  Scott  counties  contained  at  that 
time  a  total  of  62,252  male  citizens  over  twenty-one  years 
of  age.  Of  this  number,  22,512  had  been  born  in  the 
United  States  of  native  American  parents:  the  other 
39,740  had  either  been  born  in  foreign  countries  or,  if 
born  in  this  country,  were  of  foreign  parentage.  The 
vote  in  these  four  counties  stood  8061  for  the  suffrage 
amendment,  and  19,031  against  it;  while  the  vote  on  the 
prohibitory  amendment  was  9635  for  the  measure,  and 
27,206  against  it.  Thus,  in  these  counties  the  majority 
against  suffrage  was  10,970,  and  the  majority  against 
prohibition  was  17,571.  At  the  same  time  it  appears  that 
the  total  majority  in  the  State  as  a  whole  was  only 
10,141  against  suffrage,  and  887  against  prohibition.461 

Immediately  following  the  defeat  of  the  suffrage 
amendment  at  the  polls  preparations  were  made  to  urge 
the  General  Assembly  to  provide  for  the  submission  of  a 
new  amendment.  In  spite  of  the  popular  defeat  of  the 
previous  amendment,  the  members  of  the  Thirty-seventh 
General  Assembly  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  decision 
at  the  polls  did  not  close  the  case  for  equal  suffrage,  and 


EQUAL  SUFFRAGE  IN  IOWA  221 

so  they  passed  the  new  resolution  by  a  vote  of  eighty-six 
to  twenty  in  the  House  and  thirty-five  to  thirteen  in  the 
Senate. 

Attempts  were  made  to  include  in  this  resolution  a 
provision  for  submitting  the  question  to  the  women  of 
the  State  at  the  1918  election,  and  also  to  add  a  provision 
that  if  defeated  by  a  popular  vote  the  amendment  should 
not  be  re-submitted  within  ten  years.  The  former  motion 
was  withdrawn,  and  the  second  was  declared  out  of  order 
on  the  ground  that  it  attempted  to  bind  future  legis- 
lation. The  amendment,  however,  was  not  published  as 
provided  by  law  previous  to  the  election  of  1918,  and  was 
thus  rendered  invalid.462 

Thus,  the  year  1918  finds  the  women  of  Iowa  pos- 
sessed of  the  following  political  rights : 

The  right  to  vote  at  municipal  and  school  elections  on 
questions  involving  the  issuing  of  bonds  or  the 
increase  of  the  tax  levy. 

The  right  of  women  owning  property  within  certain 
drainage  districts  to  vote  at  the  elections  concern- 
ing the  administration  of  such  districts. 

In  Iowa  women  citizens  still  lack  these  essential  polit- 
ical rights: 

The  right  to  vote  for  presidential  electors  and  mem- 
bers of  the  United  States  Congress. 

The  right  to  vote  for  the  Governor  of  the  State  and 
all  other  State  officers. 

The  right  to  vote  for  county  and  township  officers. 

The  right  to  vote  for  municipal  officers. 

The  right  to  vote  for  school  officers. 

The  right  to  vote  on  constitutional  amendments. 


XVI 
WOMEN  IN  APPOINTIVE  OFFICES  IN  IOWA 

IN  a  democracy  there  is  a  close  connection  between 
voting  and  office-holding:  indeed,  with  the  exception  of 
an  additional  age  requirement  for  certain  important  of- 
fices, there  has  developed  in  America  a  general  rule  of 
law  that  anyone  who  is  qualified  to  vote  is  qualified  to 
hold  office.  Consequently  women  have  been  interested  in 
office-holding  as  well  as  in  the  franchise.  But  in  the 
early  history  of  Iowa  it  was  scarcely  ever  suggested  that 
women  should  have  the  right  to  hold  office.  Indeed,  it 
was  considered  " unladylike"  for  her  to  want  to  vote  and 
quite  beyond  her  proper  sphere  to  hold  a  public  office. 

As  a  general  rule  American  women,  especially  those 
of  pioneer  localities,  did  not  aspire  to  office-holding  until 
after  the  Civil  War.  At  that  time  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  women  employed  to  take  the  places  of  the  men 
who  entered  the  army  and  the  resulting  confidence  of 
women  in  their  own  abilities  began  to  arouse  an  interest 
in  public  offices  among  the  women  of  Iowa.  Further- 
more, during  the  war  women  began  to  take  a  large  part 
in  the  philanthropic  and  educational  work  of  the  State 
and  to  occupy  some  of  the  clerical  and  administrative 
positions  in  this  field  of  endeavor. 

In  accordance  with  a  generally  understood  principle 
that  elective  offices  can  be  held  only  by  electors,  unless 
otherwise  specifically  stated,463  women  in  Iowa  have  been 
generally  excluded  from  such  positions  —  although  the 

222 


WOMEN  IN  APPOINTIVE  OFFICES  223 

only  offices  specifically  denied  to  women  by  the  Constitu- 
tion are  those  of  State  Senator  and  Eepresentative.  On 
the  other  hand,  no  such  restrictions  have  regulated  ap- 
pointive positions  in  the  government,  since  the  qualifica- 
tions for  such  officers  are  fixed  by  the  law  creating  the 
office  or  are  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  appointing  officer 
or  board. 

It  appears  that  in  the  relief  work  made  necessary  by 
the  Civil  War  so  efficient  did  some  of  the  women  become 
in  organizing  the  work  of  soliciting  and  distributing  sup- 
plies that  when  the  legislature,  in  September,  1862,  made 
provision  for  the  appointment  of  two  or  more  sanitary 
agents  by  the  Governor,  it  was  specifically  directed  that 
one  of  these  should  be  Mrs.  Annie  Wittenmyer.464 

Miss  Linda  M.  Eamsey  of  Tipton,  employed  as  a 
clerk  by  Adjutant  General  Baker  in  1864,  is  said  to  have 
been  the  first  woman  regularly  employed  and  paid  for 
clerical  services  by  the  State  government  of  Iowa.  Miss 
Augusta  Matthews  also  served  as  military  secretary  to 
Governor  Stone  during  the  war.  In  1870  Miss  Mary  E. 
Spencer  of  Clinton  County  was  elected  engrossing  clerk 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,465  and  in  1872  each 
house  appointed  one  woman  among  its  officers.  Succeed- 
ing General  Assemblies  have  increased  the  number  of 
women  employed  in  clerical  work  during  the  session. 
Among  the  positions  frequently  held  by  women  in  the 
legislature  are  those  of  post  mistress  and  her  assistants, 
enrolling  and  engrossing  clerks,  and  stenographers. 

Other  appointments  soon  followed.  Mrs.  Ada  E. 
North  was  employed  as  a  clerk  in  one  of  the  State  offices 
in  1871 ;  and  later  she  was  appointed  State  Librarian  by 
Governor  Carpenter,  serving  from  1871  to  1878.  She  is 


224    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

probably  the  first  woman  to  be  included  among  the  State 
officers,  not  only  in  Iowa  but  in  the  United  States.  She 
was  followed  by  a  number  of  women  in  the  same  office : 
Mrs.  S.  B.  Maxwell,  1878-1888;  Mrs.  Mary  H.  Miller, 
1888-1894;  Mrs.  Laura  C.  Creighton,  1894-1896;  and 
Mrs.  Lena  H.  Cope,  1896-1898.466 

Likewise  women  have  frequently  served  as  notaries 
public,  court  reporters,  and  as  members  of  certain  com- 
mittees appointed  to  visit  penal  or  charitable  institutions 
where  women  or  girls  are  detained.  Many  of  the  early 
appointments  were  for  special  purposes.  Thus,  Gov- 
ernor Carpenter  in  1874  appointed  Mrs.  Deborah  Cattell 
a  commissioner  to  investigate  charges  of  mistreatment  of 
the  inmates  of  the  Reform  School  at  Eldora.467 

It  is  probable  that  the  first  woman  notary  public  was 
Mrs.  Nancy  E.  Allen,  appointed  by  Governor  Kirkwood 
in  1876.  He  also  appointed  Mrs.  Anna  C.  Merrill  as 
librarian  and  teacher  at  the  Anamosa  penitentiary,  and 
Dr.  Jennie  McCowen  and  Dr.  Sara  A.  Pangborn  on  the 
staff  of  physicians  at  the  hospitals  for  the  insane.  In 
1880  Governor  Gear  designated  Dr.  M.  Abbie  Cleaves  as 
delegate  from  Iowa  to  the  National  Conference  of  Char- 
ities and  Correction  and  to  the  National  Association  for 
the  Protection  of  the  Insane.  It  was  in  the  same  year 
that  Mrs.  Jane  C.  McKinney  was.  chosen  by  the  General 
Assembly  as  one  of  the  trustees  of  the  hospital  for  the 
insane  at  Independence.468 

In  the  matter  of  public  service,  women  have  usually 
taken  up  work  similar  to  that  done  by  them  in  commer- 
cial and  professional  circles.  Offices  which  are  political 
stepping  stones  or  rewards  for  political  influence  are  for 
the  most  part  still  filled  by  men.  A  few  women,  however. 


WOMEN  IN  APPOINTIVE  OFFICES  225 

have  been  desirous  of  holding  such  positions.  In  1897 
the  Iowa  State  Register  published  the  statement  that  a 
woman  from  Muscatine  had  offered  to  accept  a  place  as 
United  States  consul.  Another  Iowa  woman  was  said  to 
have  requested  that  President  Grant  appoint  her  as  con- 
sul at  Havre.  Her  request  was  refused  because  the 
President  feared  that  the  precedent  would  be  unsatisfac- 
tory to  the  French  government  —  although,  as  the  editor 
suggested,  a  nation  which  recognized  a  queen  might  rec- 
ognize a  woman  consul.469 

Recognition  of  women  in  legal  and  judicial  circles  has 
also  been  slow,  largely  because  women  themselves  have 
not  been  attracted  to  such  work.  Women  lawyers  have 
not  been  numerous.  In  spite  of  this  fact  it  appears  that 
women  have  occupied  some  positions  of  importance  even 
in  this  field.  In  1900  Mrs.  M.  Lloyd  Kennedy  of  Sioux 
City  was  appointed  by  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  as  one 
of  the  examining  committee  for  the  graduating  law  class 
at  the  State  University  —  the  first  woman  thus  honored 
by  the  State.470  In  1907  seven  of  the  fifty-three  court 
reporters  in  Iowa  were  women.471 

Indeed,  the  laws  of  Iowa  have  sometimes  made  it  a 
specific  requirement  that  a  woman  should  hold  a  certain 
position.  In  1873  the  Code  provided  that  one  of  the  three 
members  of  the  committee  appointed  by  the  Governor  to 
visit  the  hospitals  for  the  insane  must  be  a  woman  —  a 
provision  that  was  repeated  in  later  Codes.  In  1882  the 
General  Assembly  passed  a  law  concerning  the  Board  of 
Educational  Examiners,  providing  that  one  of  the  two 
members  to  be  appointed  must  be  a  woman.472  The  visit- 
ing committee  for  the  hospitals  for  the  iixsane  was  abol- 
ished in  1898,  but  the  Board  of  Control  was  authorized  to 

15 


226    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

appoint  a  woman  residing  within  fifty  miles  of  any  hos- 
pital to  visit  it  and  report  on  conditions  there.  In  1915 
the  salary  of  such  women  visitors  was  fixed  at  four  dol- 
lars a  day  and  expenses.473 

Probation  officers,  according  to  the  law  enacted  in 
1904,  must  be  " persons "  of  good  character;  and  in  1917 
it  was  required  that  in  counties  having  two  deputy  pro- 
bation officers,  one  must  be  a  woman.  The  law  of  1894 
creating  boards  of  library  trustees  specified  that  mem- 
bers must  be  "male  or  female "  bona  fide  citizens  and 
residents  over  twenty-one  years  of  age.  The  law  adopted 
in  1913  providing  for  county  hospitals  permitted  the 
county  supervisors  to  appoint  three  women  on  the  first 
hospital  board,  but  it  was  not  stated  whether  women  were 
eligible  as  members  of  the  succeeding  elective  boards.474 

When  provision  was  made  for  factory  inspectors  in 
1913  the  law  stated  that  one  of  the  three  should  be  a  wom- 
an ;  and  it  was  made  her  duty  to  investigate  the  sanitary 
and  moral  conditions  under  which  women  and  children 
were  working  —  although  neither  the  inspector  nor  the 
Commissioner  of  Labor  have  much  authority  to  remedy 
conditions  which  are  found  to  be  undesirable.  In  ac- 
cordance with  this  act  Mrs.  Ellen  M.  Rourke  of  Des 
Moines  was  appointed  the  woman  factory  inspector. 
She  began  her  work  on  July  4, 1913,  confining  her  investi- 
gations chiefly  to  certain  selected  industries  such  as 
laundries,  telephone  exchanges,  stores,  and  hotels.  As  a 
result  she  has  made  two  reports  —  one  in  1914  and  a  sec- 
ond in  1916.  It  is  probable  that  one  result  of  these  in- 
vestigations will  be  an  effort  to  bring  Iowa  in  line  with 
the  more  progressive  States  in  the  matter  of  industrial 
protection  of  women  and  children.475 


WOMEN  IN  APPOINTIVE  OFFICES  227 

The  increasing  interest  of  women  in  municipal  admin- 
istration was  recognized  in  1915  when  the  General  As- 
sembly enacted  a  law  in  reference  to  city  playgrounds, 
providing  that  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  city  council 
where  such  playground  was  established  to  "appoint  a 
woman,  peculiarly  fitted  for  such  work,  who  shall  be 
known  as  i  Play  ground  Superintendent'  "  and  who  shall 
have  charge  of  the  children  and  playground.  Her  salary 
was  to  be  fixed  by  the  city  council.476  Two  years  later 
the  Assembly  repealed  the  provision  requiring  that  a 
woman  should  be  employed  in  this  work  by  substituting 
the  words  "suitable  person ".477 

The  Thirty-seventh  General  Assembly  also  provided 
that  one  of  the  three  commissioners  to  be  appointed  by 
the  mayor  to  manage  public  comfort  stations  must  be  a 
woman.  Likewise  one  of  the  nine  members  of  the  State 
advisory  committee  to  be  appointed  by  the  State  Board 
of  Vocational  Education  must  be  a  "  woman  experienced 
in  woman 's  work".478 


XVII 
WOMEN  IN  ELECTIVE  OFFICES  IN  IOWA 

IN  the  case  of  appointive  offices,  as  has  been  stated, 
women  were  seldom  legally  ineligible :  public  opinion  and 
lack  of  political  influence  were  the  chief  disqualifying 
factors.  Elective  offices,  on  the  contrary,  have  been  gen- 
erally closed  to  women  by  the  interpretation  of  the  Con- 
stitution if  not  by  a  definite  sex  qualification.  Besides 
providing  that  only  male  citizens  may  vote,  the  Iowa 
Constitution  states  that  only  men  may  be  elected  to  the 
legislature.  By  the  general  rule  that  only  electors  may 
hold  office,  unless  it  is  otherwise  definitely  stated  in  the 
law,  women  have  been  excluded  from  all  elective  offices  in 
Iowa  except  in  the  few  cases  which  will  be  discussed  in 
the  paragraphs  that  follow.479 

The  first  woman  to  serve  in  an  elective  office  in  Iowa 
was  Miss  Julia  C.  Addington  who  was  appointed  county 
superintendent  of  Mitchell  County  in  1869  and  elected  to 
the  same  office  at  the  October  election  of  that  year.  Some 
question  as  to  her  eligibility  seems  to  have  arisen,  which 
elicited  an  opinion  from  Attorney  General  Henry  0  'Con- 
nor. In  this  opinion  the  Attorney  General  declared  that 
women  were  made  ineligible  to  seats  in  the  legislature  by 
the  Constitution  and  that  "time  honored  usage"  had 
interpreted  the  words  " person "  and  "citizen"  used  in 
connection  with  office-holding  to  mean  men  only.  "But", 
he  observed,  "a  recent  decision  in  the  Court  of  Ex- 
chequer, England,  holding  that  the  generic  term  man  in- 

228 


WOMEN  IN  ELECTIVE  OFFICES  229 

eluded  women  also,  indicates  our  progress  from  a  crude 
barbarism  to  a  better  civilization. "  Furthermore,  he 
expressed  the  opinion  that  "Neither  in  that  act  [Laws  of 
Iowa,  1862,  Ch.  172],  nor  in  any  subsequent  legislation  on 
the  subject,  have  I  been  able  to  find  any  express  provision 
making  male  citizenship  a  test  of  eligibility  for  the  place, 
or  excluding  women;  and  when  I  look  over  the  duties  to 
be  performed  by  that  officer  ....  I  deem  it  ex- 
ceedingly fortunate  for  the  cause  of  education  in  Iowa 
that  there  is  no  provision  in  the  law  preventing  women 
from  holding  the  office  of  County  Superintendent  of 
Common  Schools. 

"I  know  that  the  pronoun  lie  is  frequently  used  in 
different  sections  of  the  act,  referring  to  the  officer ;  but, 
as  stated  above,  this  privilege  of  the  citizen  cannot  be 
taken  away  or  denied  by  intendment  or  implication ;  and 
women  are  citizens  as  well  and  as  much  as  men."480 

There  seems  to  have  been  no  desire  to  disqualify  Miss 
Addington,  and  as  a  result  of  this  ruling  by  the  Attorney 
General  she  continued  to  fill  the  position  without  further 
question.  Moreover,  in  1871  two  other  women  were 
elected  to  the  office  of  county  superintendent;  and  by 
1874  five  women  were  acting  in  this  capacity.  Indeed,  if 
the  argument  presented  by  Mr.  O'Connor  had  been  gen- 
erally accepted,  all  offices  in  the  State  except  member- 
ship in  the  General  Assembly  might  have  been  opened  to 
women. 

The  ruling  of  the  Attorney  General,  however,  was  not 
permitted  to  go  unchallenged,  as  is  seen  in  the  contest 
which  developed  after  the  election  in  1875.  Among  the 
ten  women  chosen  as  county  superintendents  at  that  time 
was  Miss  Elizabeth  S.  Cook,  who  secured  a  majority  of 


230    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

the  votes  in  Warren  County.  Her  opponent,  Mr.  Howard 
A.  Huff,  contesting  the  election  on  the  ground  that  a 
woman  was  ineligible,  claimed  the  office  for  himself. 
Judge  John  Mitchell  of  the  Circuit  Court  decided  that 
Miss  Cook  could  not  qualify,  since  "a  woman  was  in- 
eligible to  the  office  of  superintendent ";  but  he  also  de- 
nied Mr.  Huff's  claim  to  the  position  since  he  had  not 
received  the  majority  of  the  votes  which  the  law  required. 

The  case  was  appealed  by  Miss  Cook;  but  before  the 
Supreme  Court  had  passed  upon  it,  the  General  Assem- 
bly, in  March,  1876,  enacted  a  law  containing  the  provi- 
sion that  "no  person  shall  be  deemed  ineligible  by  reason 
of  sex,  to  any  school  office  in  the  state  of  Iowa."  Further- 
more, the  law  was  made  retro-active  and  thus  applied  to 
all  women  county  superintendents  who  had  been  elected 
before  this  time  as  well  as  to  those  chosen  at  future 
elections.481 

Thus,  when  the  case  came  before  the  Supreme  Court 
in  December,  1876,  the  status  of  the  appellant  had  been 
changed  and  the  question  for  decision  was  the  validity  of 
the  law  legalizing  the  election  of  women  as  school  of- 
ficers rather  than  the  eligibility  of  a  woman  to  the  office 
of  county  superintendent.  The  Supreme  Court  did  not 
pass  upon  the  original  question  at  issue,  but  merely 
affirmed  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  admit  women  to 
any  office  from  which  the  Constitution  did  not  specifically 
exclude  them  and  to  legalize  past  elections.482 

A  few  years  later  another  attempt  was  made  to  ex- 
clude women  from  any  elective  office  in  Iowa :  the  conten- 
tion was  based  upon  the  requirement  that  any  person 
filing  notice  of  his  intention  of  contesting  an  election 
must  be  an  "  elector ",  according  to  the  Code  of  1873 


WOMEN  IN  ELECTIVE  OFFICES  231 

which  was  then  in  force.  Since  no  woman  could  be  an 
"  elector ",  it  was  claimed  that  a  woman  could  not  contest 
an  election.483  The  test  case  arose  in  1887  when  Miss 
Ella  S.  Brown  and  Mr.  J.  B.  McCollum  were  the  candi- 
dates for  county  superintendent  in  Wright  County.  The 
board  of  canvassers  having  declared  that  Mr.  McCollum 
was  elected,  Miss  Brown  contested  the  decision  on  the 
ground  that  the  judges  had  thrown  out  a  number  of  bal- 
lots which  should  have  been  counted  for  her.  When  the 
district  court  ruled  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  Mr.  McCol- 
lum appealed  the  case  to  the  Supreme  Court. 

The  appellant  claimed  that  he  was  declared  elected 
by  the  judges  of  the  election  and  that  his  opponent,  being 
a  woman,  could  not  legally  contest  this  decision.  The 
Supreme  Court  affirmed  the  decision  of  the  lower  court 
and  declared  Miss  Brown  elected.  In  making  this  de- 
cision, the  court  held  that  all  names  clearly  indicating 
the  intention  of  the  voter  should  be  counted,  even  though 
the  name  was  incorrectly  written.  The  chief  point  in  the 
ruling,  however,  was  that  the  statute  which  made  women 
eligible  to  school  offices  repealed  by  implication  '  '  so  much 
of  the  statute  before  that  time  in  force  as  required  the 
technical  statement  that  the  contestant  is  an  elector."484 

Thus  there  developed  in  Iowa  the  anomaly  of  a  class 
of  citizens  who  were  permitted  to  hold  offices  of  some 
importance  and  yet  were  denied  the  right  of  voting  for 
candidates  for  the  same  offices.  Since  1869  women  have 
served  as  county  superintendents;  and  since  1876  other 
educational  offices  have  been  open  to  them. 

The  number  of  women  occupying  the  office  of  county 
superintendent  has  increased  rapidly,  as  the  following 
statistics  will  show:485 


232    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

1870—   1  1886  —  10  1902  —  17 

1872—   3  1888—   8  1904  —  18 

1874 --   5  1890  —  14  1907  —  29 

1876  — 10  1892  — 12  1909  —  31 

1878—   7  1894  —  13  1911  —  46 

1880—   5  1896  —  15  1913  —  59 

1882—   9  1898  —  11  1915  —  59 

1884  —  11  1900  —  14  1917  —  54 

Concerning  the  work  of  women  county  superintend- 
ents a  report  made  in  1898  by  State  Superintendent  of 
Public  Instruction  Henry  Sabin  declared  that  "  women 
have  uniformly  filled  this  office  with  a  painstaking  con- 
scientious fidelity  to  duty  which  has  rendered  their  work 
of  great  benefit  to  the  schools  under  their  charge.  "486 
Furthermore,  an  Iowa  editor,  whose  paper  opposed  equal 
suffrage,  commented  upon  the  appearance  of  women  in 
this  field  of  endeavor  by  saying  that  it  ' '  will  give  to  all 
of  us  something  like  a  satisfactory  foretaste  of  the  good 
time  coming  when  the  people  shall  no  longer  hold  that  an 
ignorant  man  will  make  a  better  officer  than  an  intelli- 
gent woman.  "487 

A  comment  by  the  Louisville  Courier- Journal  on  the 
situation  in  Iowa  in  1876  suggests  that  conditions  in 
some  of  the  other  States  were  not  so  favorable  to  women. 
"The  women  are  county  superintendents  of  schools  in 
Iowa",  wrote  the  editor,  "and  no  person  is  deemed  in- 
eligible on  account  of  sex  to  any  school  office  in  the  State. 
Any  woman  there  can  practice  law,  sue  and  be  sued,  and 
do  business  in  her  own  name,  if  she  likes.  The  males  will 
dou'btless  gradually  drift  back  to  agriculture,  wander  off 
to  the  Black  Hills,  or  marry  the  lawyers  and  school 
superintendents. ' >488 


WOMEN  IN  ELECTIVE  OFFICES  233 

It  is  evident  that  the  men  of  Iowa  did  not  share  in  this 
pessimistic  outlook,  for  in  1880  the  General  Assembly 
opened  the  office  of  county  recorder  also  to  women.  The 
number  of  women  who  have  served  in  this  position  has 
been  only  about  one-half  that  of  the  women  who  have 
filled  the  office  of  county  superintendent.  This  is  partly 
due  to  the  fact  that  there  is  no  technical  qualification  re- 
quired in  the  case  of  the  recorder  similar  to  the  certificate 
requirement  for  the  superintendent  and  partly  to  the 
more  general  familiarity  of  men  with  business  and  polit- 
ical affairs.  At  the  same  session  of  the  legislature,  a 
bill  to  permit  women  to  qualify  as  county  auditors  was 
passed  by  the  House  of  Representatives,  but  the  Senate 
refused  to  give  its  approval.489 

Two  women,  Mrs.  C.  I.  Hill  and  Miss  Addie  Hayden, 
were  chosen  as  county  recorders  at  the  election  following 
the  passage  of  the  law  of  1880.  Ten  years  later  six  wom- 
en were  serving  in  this  capacity.  In  1902  there  were  five 
women  county  recorders  in  Iowa;  in  1912  there  were 
seventeen ;  and  in  1917  the  number  was  thirty-two.  Thus,v 
approximately  one-third  of  the  incumbents  of  this  office 
at  the  present  time  are  women.400  It  is  interesting  to 
observe  in  this  connection  that  the  Code  of  1897  contains 
the  provision  that  in  counties  with  a  population  of  ten 
thousand  or  less  "the  same  person  may  hold  the  office  of 
county  recorder  and  treasurer,  and  no  person  shall  be 
disqualified  on  account  of  sex  from  holding  the  office  of 
recorder.  "491  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  woman  could 
be  elected  to  this  combination  of  offices  so  long  as  the  law 
does  not  authorize  their  election  as  county  treasurers. 

Women  have,  moreover,  been  largely  employed  as 
deputies  —  especially  in  county  offices.  Mrs.  J.  H.  Latty 


234    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

is  said  to  have  acted  as  deputy  sheriff  in  Des  Homes 
County  in  1870  and  to  have  surprised  the  officials  at  Fort 
Madison  by  conveying  a  prisoner  to  the  penitentiary.492 
In  the  case  of  offices  to  which  women  are  eligible  the  posi- 
tion as  deputy  has  frequently  led  to  their  subsequent 
election  to  the  office.  Even  when  a  woman  may  not  be 
elected  to  an  office  it  appears  that  she  may  be  appointed 
to  fill  a  vacancy.  Thus  Miss  Mae  Freeman  served  as 
auditor  of  Johnson  County  from  September  19,  1915, 
until  January  1,  1917,  completing  the  term  of  her  brother 
who  died  in  office.493 

It  appears  that  women  became  candidates  for  mem- 
bers of  school  boards  at  the  time  Attorney  General 
0  'Connor  ruled  that  they  could  serve  as  county  superin- 
tendents. In  March,  1871,  Mrs.  Lydia  Van  Hyning  was 
chosen  as  a  member  of  the  board  of  directors  of  Polk 
City.  The  following  year  the  president  of  the  board,  de- 
ciding that  a  woman  could  not  legally  serve,  appointed  a 
man  to  fill  the  vacancy.  Mrs.  Van  Hyning,  however,  se- 
cured a  temporary  injunction  reinstating  her,  and  at  the 
following  term  of  the  district  court  was  declared  com- 
petent to  act.494 

Women  were  definitely  made  eligible  to  positions  on 
school  boards  by  the  law  of  1876,  but  they  have  not  served 
in  this  capacity  in  large  numbers.  In  1877  Mrs.  Mary 
Fisher  was  elected  one  of  the  three  directors  in  Fred- 
erica,  Bremer  County.  One  of  the  men  on  the  board  im- 
mediately resigned,  it  is  reported,  declaring  that  "wom- 
an's place  was  to  hum;  she  was  out  of  her  spear  to  school 
meetings,  holdin'  office,"  and  in  similar  work.  Three 
years  later  Mrs.  Mary  A.  Work  was  chosen  as  sub-direc- 
tor of  one  of  the  districts  of  Delaware  Township  in  Polk 


WOMEN  IN  ELECTIVE  OFFICES  235 

County  and  was  made  president  of  the  board.495  At 
Rockford  in  1894  two  women,  who  had  secured  the  ma- 
jority of  the  votes,  were  refused  their  offices  because  the 
officials  did  not  know  that  the  law  permitted  women  to 
act;  but  the  Attorney  General  decided  in  favor  of  the 
women496  and  the  right  has  not  since  been  questioned. 

The  Code  of  1897  contains  the  provision  that  a 
' '  school  officer  or  member  of  the  board  may  be  of  either 
sex,  and  must,  at  the  time  of  election  or  appointment  be  a 
citizen  and  a  resident  of  the  corporation  or  subdistrict, 
and  over  twenty-one  years  of  age,  and,  if  a  man,  he  must 
be  a  qualified  voter  of  the  corporation  or  subdistrict."407 

It  seems  that  a  woman  is  also  eligible  to  the  position 
of  State  Superintendent  of  Public  Instruction,  but  none 
have  as  yet  been  elected,  although  several  have  been  nom- 
inated—  generally  by  minor  or  third  parties.  In  1881 
the  Greenback  party  supported  its  endorsement  of  equal 
political  rights  by  nominating  Mrs.  A.  M.  Swain  of  Fort 
Dodge  as  the  party  candidate  for  the  office  of  State  Su- 
perintendent of  Public  Instruction.408  The  party  was  un- 
successful and  so  the  nomination  was  not  followed  by 
election.  Two  years  later  the  same  party  nominated 
Miss  Abbie  0.  Canfield  of  Des  Moines  County  for  the 
same  office,  but  was  unable  to  secure  her  election  by  the 
voters  of  the  State.  In  1889  the  Prohibition  party  like- 
wise nominated  a  woman,  Mrs.  C.  A.  Dunham  of  Bur- 
lington, for  the  position  of  Superintendent  of  Public 
Instruction.499 

All  offices,  except  those  of  State  Senator  and  Repre- 
sentative, would  be  automatically  opened  to  women  if 
they  were  enfranchised;  and  even  without  enfranchise- 
ment the  right  to  hold  such  offices  may  be  conferred  upon 


236    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

women  by  statute.  The  section  of  the  Constitution  which 
disqualifies  women  from  membership  in  the  General  As- 
sembly is  section  four  of  article  three  which  specifies 
that  members  of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  must  be 
"male  citizens ".  Another  section  provides  that  Sena- 
tors must  have  similar  qualifications.  In  order  to  re- 
move this  disqualification,  a  constitutional  amendment 
will,  of  course,  be  necessary.  A  number  of  attempts  to 
bring  about  the  change  have  already  been  made  —  espe- 
cially during  the  decade  between  1870  and  1880  when  at 
each  session  of  the  General  Assembly  a  proposed  re- 
vision of  the  section  in  question  was  included  in  the  suf- 
frage resolution.500  The  fate  of  these  proposed  amend- 
ments has  already  been  discussed  in  connection  with 
equal  suffrage. 

Since  1880  it  appears  that  the  question  of  office-hold- 
ing by  women  —  particularly  in  reference  to  eligibility 
to  membership  in  the  General  Assembly  —  has  not  been 
emphasized  in  Iowa.  To  be  sure,  the  suffrage  resolution 
of  1898  in  the  House  included  office-holding;  and  again 
in  1904  and  1906  an  attempt  was  made  to  permit  women 
to  serve  as  legislators,  but  the  measure  failed  along  with 
the  suffrage  resolution.501  Later  amendments  have,  for 
the  most  part,  not  included  an  office-holding  provision. 
Friends  of  equal  suffrage  have  decided  that  it  is  best  to 
concentrate  efforts  on  the  main  issue.  Furthermore,  it 
has  been  observed  that  women  in  equal  suffrage  States 
are  largely  interested  in  school  offices:  comparatively 
few  seek  election  to  the  legislature.  As  a  result,  many 
women  who  strongly  desire  a  voice  in  the  selection  of 
legislators  do  not  feel  that  the  office  is  worth  the  effort 
necessary  to  secure  it  under  present  conditions. 


WOMEN  IN  ELECTIVE  OFFICES  237 

It  is  probable  that  women  are  not  legally  disqualified 
from  serving  as  presidential  electors,  or  as  members  of 
either  house  of  Congress:  sex  is  not  mentioned  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  which  prescribes  the 
qualifications  for  these  offices,  and  the  States  are  not 
given  authority  to  prescribe  other  qualifications.  This 
question,  however,  has  never  been  definitely  settled,  since 
there  has  been  no  case  of  a  woman's  election  to  Congress 
in  a  State  where  women  are  denied  the  franchise. 


XVIII 
RECAPITULATION  OF  POLITICAL  STATUS 

THE  history  of  the  struggle  for  the  political  equality  of 
men  and  women  discloses  three  stages:  ridicule;  argu- 
ment; and  adoption.  When  Iowa  was  admitted  into  the 
Union,  the  demand  for  "women's  rights"  was  just  be- 
coming articulate  and  the  suggestion  that  women  should 
vote  and  hold  office  was  frankly  ridiculed.  It  must  be 
noted,  however,  that  from  the  beginning  the  division  of 
opinion  was  not  between  men  and  women,  but  between 
the  progressives  and  conservatives  of  both  sexes.  There 
were  men  who  admitted  the  justice  of  the  enfranchise- 
ment of  women  before  the  Civil  War :  there  are  still  wom- 
en in  Iowa  who  oppose  it. 

When  the  fifteenth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  was  first  discussed  the  friends  of  wom- 
en suffrage  urged  that  "sex"  should  be  included,  but  the 
claims  of  the  women  were  sacrificed  to  expediency.  The 
adoption  of  that  amendment,  however,  resulted  in  bring- 
ing the  subject  of  women's  political  status  clearly  before 
the  people,  and  attempts  were  soon  made  to  secure  suf- 
frage for  women  by  Commonwealth  action.  Wyoming 
Territory  adopted  equal  suffrage  in  1869,  and  at  about 
the  same  time  the  question  became  prominent  in  Iowa. 
In  Iowa  the  first  suffrage  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
was  proposed  in  the  General  Assembly  in  1870  —  the 
year  that  witnessed  the  beginning  of  the  Iowa  Woman 
Suffrage  Association. 

238 


RECAPITULATION  OF  POLITICAL  STATUS      239 

Since  1870  the  proposal  to  enfranchise  the  women  of 
Iowa  has  been  the  subject  of  much  debate  in  the  legis- 
lature. The  resolution  for  a  suffrage  amendment  has 
been  passed  ten  times  by  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  nine  times  by  the  Senate,  but  only  five  times  by  both 
houses  at  the  same  session.  It  was  not  until  1913-1915 
that  the  resolution  passed  both  houses  at  two  consecutive 
sessions  of  the  General  Assembly.  Even  then  it  was 
voted  down  at  the  polls  in  June,  1916.  There  is  now  the 
possibility  that  the  suffrage  may  be  conferred  upon  the 
women  of  this  State  through  Federal  amendment  before 
the  question  is  again  submitted  to  the  voters. 

In  1894  Iowa  women  were  granted  the  right  to  vote  at 
school  or  municipal  elections  on  the  question  of  issu- 
ing bonds  or  raising  taxes.  Propositions  for  granting 
school  suffrage,  municipal  suffrage,  and  presidential  suf- 
frage have  also  been  made,  but  these  suggestions  have 
found  little  favor  with  either  friends  or  opponents  of 
equal  suffrage  —  partly  because  half-way  measures  are 
unsatisfactory,  and  partly  because  it  is  doubtful  whether 
most  of  the  proposed  changes  would  be  constitutional. 

In  the  matter  of  office-holding  it  appears  that  the 
•General  Assembly  has  the  right  to  admit  women  to  all 
offices  except  membership  in  the  General  Assembly.  In 
1869  for  the  first  time  in  Iowa  a  woman  was  elected 
•county  superintendent.  Under  a  ruling  of  the  Attorney 
General,  a  number  of  women  superintendents  were  elect- 
ed and  qualified  between  1869  and  1876.  In  1876,  when 
this  right  was  threatened  by  judicial  ruling,  the  General 
Assembly  passed  a  law  specifically  opening  educational 
offices  to  women.  In  1880  women  were  also  declared 
eligible  as  to  the  office  of  county  recorder.  Probably 


240    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

women  may  legally  serve  as  presidential  electors,  United 
States  Representatives,  and  United  States  Senators,  but 
there  is  little  likelihood  that  women  will  be  nominated  for 
these  offices  until  the  franchise  is  secured.  Practically 
all  elective  offices  in  Iowa  are  still  closed  to  women,  under 
the  rule  that  unless  it  is  otherwise  specifically  provided 
only  electors  may  fill  public  offices. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 


241 


NOTES  AND  EEFERENCES 

CHAPTER  I 

1  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England    (Chitty's  Edi- 
tion), Book  I,  pp.  345,  348,  349  [436]. 

The  pages  given  in  brackets  are  those  of  the  original  edition  of  Black- 
stone's  Commentaries. 

The  man  was  required  to  be  at  least  fourteen  years  of  age.  A  marriage 
in  which  one  or  both  of  the  parties  was  under  age  was  voidable  by  either  at 
the  time  the  age  prescribed  was  reached;  but  if  not  disaffirmed  at  that  time, 
a  valid  marriage  was  complete  without  further  ceremony. 

2  Blackstone 's  Commentaries   (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  I,  pp.  355,  356 
[441,  442]. 

a  Tyler 's  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Infancy  and  Coverture,  p.  361. 

4 Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  I,  p.  165  [219], 
Book  II,  p.  392  [477]. 

5  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  II,  pp.  100,  101, 
351  [126,  127,  128,  434]. 

«  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  II,  pp.  351,  352, 
353  [434,  435,  436]. 

7  Schouler's  Law  of  the  Domestic  Relations,  pp.  102,  103,  113;  Browne's 
Elements  of  the  Law  of  Domestic  Relations,  pp.  29,  30,  31,  36. 

s  Sehouler  's  A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Husband  and  Wife,  pp.  457,  458 ; 
Browne's  Elements  of  the  Law  of  Domestic  Relations,  pp.  22,  23,  54; 
Tyler's  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Infancy  and  Coverture,  pp.  314,  315, 
317,  318,  319;  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  II,  p. 
416  [498]. 

»  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  II,  pp.  234,  235, 
236,  421  [291,  292,  293,  504]. 

10  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  III,  p.  112  [139]. 
Adultery,  under  early  English  law,  was  punishable  as  a  crime  only  in 
Ecclesiastical  courts. 

"  Schouler  's  Law  of  the  Domestic  Relations,  pp.  95-98. 

*    243 


244    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

12  Tyler's  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Infancy  and  Coverture,  pp.  340, 
341,  347. 

The  obligation  of  the  father  to  support  the  children  was  not  so  clearly 
defined  by  the  Common  Law  as  was  the  duty  of  the  husband  to  maintain 
his  wife  in  a  suitable  manner. 

isSchouler's  Law  of  the  Domestic  Relations,  pp.  92-94. 

i* Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (  Chitty 's  Edition),  Book  IV,  pp.  20,  21, 
53,  54,  156,  157  [28,  29,  75,  77,  203,  204]. 

Chitty  suggests  that  there  was  another  reason  for  this  attitude  to- 
wards women  who  committed  minor  crimes  in  company  with  or  under  the 
direction  of  their  husbands.  A  woman,  he  points  out,  could  not  receive  the 
benefit  of  clergy;  and  consequently  if  the  same  charge  was  made  against  a 
man  and  his  wife,  the  husband  might  escape  with  a  slight  punishment  while 
the  woman  would  be  severely  punished  and  perhaps  put  to  death.  To  avoid 
this  injustice,  officers  emphasized  the  wife's  duty  of  obedience  and  dis- 
regarded her. 

is  Browne 's  Elements  of  the  Law  of  Domestic  Relations,  p.  17. 

Legally  the  wife  could  not  be  punished  for  beating  her  husband  any 
more  than  he  could  for  mistreating  her,  but  this  rule  worked  to  the  wife's 
disadvantage.  At  least  one  decision,  however,  denied  the  husband's  right 
to  chastise  his  wife.—  The  Queen  v.  Jackson  [1891]  Q.  B.  671. 

i«  Browne's  Elements  of  the  Law  of  Domestic  Relations,  p.  18;  Black- 
stone's  Commentaries  (Chitty 's  Edition),  Book  I,  p.  345. 

17  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  ( Chitty 's  Edition),  Book  IV,  pp.  159,  160, 
161,  162,  163  [208,  209,  210,  211,  212]. 

is Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty 's  Edition),  Book  I,  pp.  367-374, 
377-379,  380  [447,  448,  449,  450,  451,  452,  453,  458,  459,  461]. 

Although  the  father  was  responsible  for  the  support  of  his  legitimate 
children,  the  mother  of  an  illegitimate  child  could  be  required  to  provide 
for  it  if  she  was  able  to  do  so;  or,  if  she  made  known  the  name  of  the  fa- 
ther, he  also  could  be  held  under  bonds  for  its  support.  The  child,  however, 
could  inherit  from  neither. 

is  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty 's  Edition),  Book  II,  pp.  102,  103, 
107  [129,  130,  131,  136]. 

Alienation  of  dower  by  the  wife's  joining  in  the  transfer  was  also  pro- 
vided for  by  a  statute  of  Henry  VII. 

The  wife  of  a  traitor  was  usually  debarred  from  dower  in  forfeited 
lands,  and  an  alien  —  except  the  Queen  —  could  not  enjoy  this  right  unless 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  245 

special  permission  from  the  King  had  been  obtained.     Apparently  a  wom- 
an's political  status  did  not  always  follow  the  husband's. 

20  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  I,  pp.  353,  354, 
355  [440,  441,  442],  Book  III,  pp.  71,  72  [94]. 

21  Blackstone 's  Commentaries  (Chitty's  Edition),  Book  I,  p.  366  [444, 
445]. 

CHAPTER  II 

22  Shambaugh  's  Documentary  Material  Eelating  to  the  History  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  I,  p.  20. 

23  Shambaugh 's  Documentary  Material  Relating  to  the  History  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  26,  33,  34,  35. 

24  Shambaugh 's  Documentary  Material  Eelating  to  the  History  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  37,  41,  42. 

25  McClain's  The  Introduction  of  the  Common  Law  into  Iowa  in  the 
Iowa  Historical  Lectures,  1892,  pp.  80,  81;  Ordinance  of  1787,  Art.  2,  in 
Shambaugh 's  Documentary  Material  Relating  to  the  History  of  Iowa,  Vol. 
I,  p.  52. 

2«  McClain  's  The  Introduction  of  the  Common  Law  into  Iowa  in  the 
Iowa  Historical  Lectures,  1892,  pp.  86,  87. 

Mr.  Emlin  MeClain  was  Chancellor  of  the  Law  College  of  the  State  Uni- 
versity of  Iowa  at  the  time  this  article  was  written.  He  was  later  one  of 
the  Justices  of  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court. 

27  Ordinance  of  1787  in  Shambaugh 's  Documentary  Material  Relating  to 
the  History  of  Iowa,  Vol.  I,  pp.  47,  48. 

28  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  1191. 

2»  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  1005,  1006. 

so  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  Vol.  II,  pp.  542,  543,  581,  582, 
€70,  671. 

si  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  Vol.  II,  p.  535. 

32  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  Vol.  II,  p.  17,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  1409. 

33  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  Vol.  II,  p.  534. 

34  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  Vol.  II,  pp.  533,  534. 

35  .Shambaugh 's  Documentary  Material  Relating  to  the  History  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  I,  p.  82;  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Wisconsin,  1836-1838    (reprint), 
pp.  5-12. 


246    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 


of  the  Territory  of  Wisconsin,  1836-1838,  pp.  225,  230,  231. 
See  also  pp.  125,  196. 

37  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Wisconsin,  1836-1838,  p.  179. 

ss  Laws  of  the  Territory  of  Wisconsin,  1836-1838,  pp.   106,  223,  498, 
506-508,  512-515. 

ss  Lows  of  Iowa,  1840   (Extra  Session),  Ch.  29;  O'Ferrall  v.  Simplot, 
4  Iowa  381,  at  402. 

CHAPTER  III 

40  Code  of  1851,  See.  808. 

41  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  2224;  Anderson  v.  Blakesly,  155  Iowa  430. 

«  Washington  County  v.  Polk  County,  137  Iowa  333;   Polk  County  v. 
Clarke  County,  171  Iowa  558. 

43  Galvin  v.  Dailey,  109  Iowa  332. 

44  Laws  of  Iowa,  1904,  Ch.  127;  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913, 
Sec.  4471-b. 

45  A  married  woman's  legal  name  is  her  own  Christian  name  and  her 
husband's  surname. 

46  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  2391,  2392. 

47  The  State  v.  Guyer,  6  Iowa  263. 

**  Revision  of  1860,  Sees.  3983,  3986;   Laws  of  Iowa,   1860    (special), 
Ch.  90. 

49Karney  v.  Paisley,  13  Iowa  89;  Euss  et  ux.  v.  The  Steamboat  War 
Eagle,  14  Iowa  363;  Blake  v.  Graves  et  al,  18  Iowa  312. 
Justice  Dillon  dissented  from  this  opinion. 

so  Code  of  1873,  Sec.  3641;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1874,  Ch.  33. 

51  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  4606;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1898,  Ch.  108;  Supplement  to 
the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  Sec.  4606. 

52  For  some  of  the  court  decisions  involving  this  matter  see  :  The  State  v. 
Bernard,  45  Iowa  234;  Watson  v.  Eiskamire  et  ux.,  45  Iowa  231;  The  State 
v.  Eainsbarger,  71  Iowa  746;  Cedar  Eapids  National  Bank  v.  Lavery,  110 
Iowa  575;  Lucas  v.  McDonald  &  Son,  126  Iowa  678. 

53  The  State  v.  McKay,  122  Iowa  658. 

54  Molyneux  v.  Wilcockson,  Judge,  157  Iowa  39. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  247 

55  Goodwin  et  al.  v.  Thompson,  2  Greene  329,  at  336. 

This  decision  practically  nullified  the  law  of  1840  making  fourteen  years 
the  minimum  marriage  age  of  a  girl,  although  the  penalties  provided  for  any 
one  solemnizing  such  marriages  were  not  remitted. —  Laws  of  Iowa,  1839- 
1840,  Ch.  25. 

se  Smith  v.  Silence,  4  Iowa  321;  McKinney  v.  The  Western  Stage  Com- 
pany, 4  Iowa  420,  at  423. 

57  Revision  of  I860,  Sees.  2775,  2790,  2791,  2792,  4103;  Laws  of  Iowa, 
1870,  Ch.  167,  Sees.  11,  35. 

58  Enders  v.  Beck,  18  Iowa  86 ;  Musselman  v.  Galligher  et  ux.,  32  Iowa 
383;  Paneoast  v.  Burnell,  32  Iowa  394. 

59  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2205,  2211,  2562. 

For  the  wife 's  responsibility  for  criminal  acts  committed  in  the  presence 
of  her  husband  see  the  chapter  on  criminal  laws  concerning  women. 

eoMewhirter  v.  Hatten,  42  Iowa  288;  Tuttle  v.  The  Chicago,  Eock 
Island,  and  Pacific  Bailway  Company,  42  Iowa  518;  Thomas  v.  The  Town 
of  Brooklyn,  58  Iowa  438. 

If  the  husband  authorized  the  wife  to  sue  for  medical  expenses,  how- 
ever, he  could  not  afterwards  put  in  his  own  claim  for  them. —  Neumeister 
v.  The  City  of  Dubuque,  47  Iowa  465. 

ei  Peters  v.  Peters,  42  Iowa  182 ;  Mowry  v.  Chaney,  43  Iowa  609 ;  Stut- 
muller,  Administrator  v.  Cloughly,  58  Iowa  738. 

A  newspaper  in  1892  published  the  statement  that  an  insurance  com- 
pany had  refused  an  accident  insurance  policy  to  a  woman  on  the  ground 
that  they  insured  "females  against  death  only." — The  Woman's  Stand- 
ard, Vol.  VI,  No.  9,  May,  1892. 

ez  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  6,  February,  1894. 

es  Hall  v.  The  Town  of  Manson,  90  Iowa  585,  at  592,  593. 

The  quotations  are  found  in  Van  Doran  v.  Harden,  48  Iowa  186,  at  188 ; 
Tuttle  v.  The  Chicago,  Rock  Island,  and  Pacific  Eailway  Co.,  42  Iowa  518, 
at  521;  Fleming  v.  The  Town  of  Shenandoah,  67  Iowa  505,  at  508. 

e*  Bailey  v.  City  of  Centerville,  108  Iowa  20;  Kellar  v.  Lewis,  116 
Iowa  369. 

See  also  Burke  v.  Mally,  141  Iowa  555. 

**Laws  of  Iowa,  1911,  Ch.  163;  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913, 
Sec.  3477-a. 

ee  Supplemental  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1915,  Sec.  3477-a. 


248    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

In  this  connection  it  is  of  interest  to  note  the  affirmation  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  a  verdict  of  $1210  damages  rendered  by  a  lower  court  for 
the  death  of  a  girl  two  years  of  age  on  the  ground  that  school  teachers  in 
that  vicinity  were  paid  $30  and  $35  per  month. —  Gregory,  Administrator, 
v.  Wabash  Railroad  Company,  126  Iowa  230. 

67  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1696,  1697,  2586;  Eevision  of  1860,  Sees.  2790, 
2791;  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2555,  2556;  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  3470,  3471; 
Olson  v.  Bice,  140  Iowa  630. 

es  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  October  5,  1877;  Geiger  v.  Payne, 
102  Iowa  581. 

Although  Iowa  law,  like  the  Common  Law,  permits  a  suit  against  a  wom- 
an for  breach  of  promise,  no  case  brought  by  a  man  against  a  woman  for 
this  cause  has  thus  far  reached  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court. —  Iowa  Law  Bul- 
letin, Vol.  IV,  p.  166. 

69  For  a  discussion  of  the  Iowa  laws  concerning  women  as  administrators 
and  guardians  see  Ch.  IX. 

TO  Code  of  1873,  Sec.  1557;  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  2418. 

71  Woody  v.  Coenan,  44  Iowa  19;  Welch  v.  Jugenheimer,  56  Iowa  11. 

72  Galloway  v.  Laydon,  47  Iowa  456 ;  Jackson  v.  Noble,  54  Iowa  641 ; 
Huff  v.  Aultman  and  Schuster,  69  Iowa  71 ;  Thill  v.  Pohlman  et  al.,  76  Iowa 
638;  Knott  v.  Peterson,  etc.,  125  Iowa  404. 

73  Woolheather  v.  Eisley,  38  Iowa  486. 

74  Ward  v.  Thompson,  48  Iowa  588. 

75  Woolheather  v.  Bisley,  38  Iowa  486 ;  Kearney  v.  Fitzgerald,  43  Iowa 
580;  Ward  v.  Thompson,  48  Iowa  588. 

76  Price  v.  Price  et  al.,  91  Iowa  693,  at  696. 

CHAPTER  IV 

77  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  pp.  180-183 ;  Winship  and  Wallace 's  The 
Louisiana  Purchase  as  It  Was  and  as  It  Is,  p.  104. 

78  For  examples  of  such  schools  see :  Laws  of  Iowa,  1839-1840,  pp.  21, 
62,  63;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1840-1841,  pp.  14,  15,  16,  17;  Aurner's  History  of 
Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  171,  176. 

7»  Catalogue  of  the  State  University  of  Iowa,  1856-1857,  p.  5 ;  Laws  of 
Iowa,  1846-1847,  pp.  188,  189;  Aurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa, 
Vol.  IV,  pp.  20,  21,  28. 

so  Laws  of  Iowa,  1864,  Ch.  59.     See  also  Laws  of  Iowa,  1870,  Ch.  87. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  249 

si  House  Journal,  1868,  p.  39;  Aurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa, 
Vol.  IV,  p.  218. 

82  Aurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  II,  p.  137;  Abstract  of 
Thirteenth  Census,  with  Supplement  for  Iowa,  p.  248. 

83  Aurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  I,  pp.  76,  290. 

s*  Thirteenth  Census  of  the  United  States,  1910,  Vol.  IV,  p.  122. 

ss  Auraer's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  I,  pp.  27,  28,  103,  306; 
The  Iowa  City  Republican,  August  3,  1864. 

seAurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  I,  p.  305;  House  Jour- 
nal, 1868,  p.  123. 

87Aurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  II,  p.  100;   The  Wom- 
an's Standard,  Vol.  II,  No.  5,  January,  1888. 

ss  Aurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  II,  pp.  100,  234,  397,  398. 
89  The  Annals  of  Iowa  (Howe's),  Vol.  Ill,  p.  103. 

CHAPTER  V 

»o  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1026,  1027,  1028. 

91  Annual  Announcement  of  the  Medical  Department  of  the  Iowa  State 
University,  1870-1871,  p.  14. 

92  Catalogue  of  the   Iowa   State    University,   1870-1871,   p.    11;    Fair- 
child's  Medicine  in  Iowa,  p.  57;  Annual  Announcement  of  the  Medical  De- 
partment of  the  Iowa  State  University,  1872-1873,  p.  4. 

93  Fairchild  's  Medicine  in  Iowa,  p.  80. 

»4  Medical  and  Surgical  Directory  of  Iowa,  1878-1879,  pp.  80,  84,  87,  91, 
92,  98,  100,  102,  105,  112,  114,  116,  121. 

95  Laws  of  Iowa,  1886,  Ch.  104;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1880,  Ch.  75. 

96  Ninth  Census  of  the  United  States,  1870,  Vol.  I,  p.  733 ;  Tenth  Census 
of  the  United  States,  1880,  Vol.  I,  p.  822;   Compendium  of  the  Eleventh 
Census  of  the  United  States,  1890,  Part  III,  p.  408 ;  Twelfth  Census  of  the 
United  States,  1900,  Vol.  II,  p.  520 ;  Thirteenth  Census  of  the  United  States, 
1910,  Vol.  IV,  p.  461. 

97  Laws  of  Iowa,  1907,  Ch.  139 ;  Twelfth  Census  of  the  United  States, 
1900,  Vol.  II,  p.  520;  Thirteenth  Census  of  the  United  States,  1910,  Vol. 
IV,  p.  461. 


250    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

»8  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage  'a  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill, 
pp.  401,  402,  631. 

99  Laws  of  Iowa,  1917,  Ch.  309. 

100  Code  of  1851,  See.  1610. 

101  Laws  of  Iowa,  1870,  Ch.  21;  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage's  History 
of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  626;  Iowa  Historical  Record,  Vol.  VII, 
p.  63. 

Arabella  Mansfield  was  said  to  be  the  first  woman  lawyer  in  the  United 
States.  One  writer  states  that  she  was  admitted  to  the  bar  in  1864. — 
Hecker's  A  Short  History  of  Women's  Eights,  p.  171. 

Mrs.  Emma  H.  Haddock  was  the  first  woman  admitted  to  practice  in 
the  Federal  courts  of  Iowa. —  Iowa  Historical  Eecord,  Vol.  X,  p.  96. 

102  Jowa  State  University  Alumni  Register,  1847-1911,  pp.  99-164. 
Women  were  first  allowed  to  plead  in  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 

in  1879.  In  1917  Judge  H.  K.  Evans  and  his  wife  of  Corydon,  Iowa,  were 
admitted  to  practice  before  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  —  the  first 
time  that  a  husband  and  wife  have  been  granted  that  privilege.  Mrs.  Evans 
is  a  law  partner  of  her  husband. —  The  Burlington  Hawk-Eye,  copied  in  the 
Chicago  Herald,  January  15,  1918;  Hecker's  A  Short  History  of  Women's 
Eights,  p.  171. 

103  Ninth  Census  of  the  United  States,  1870,  Vol.  I,  p.  733 ;  Tenth  Census 
of  the  United  States,  1880,  Vol.  I,  p.  822 ;  Compendium  of  the  Eleventh  Cen- 
sus of  the  United  States,  1890,  Part  III,  p.  408;   Twelfth  Census  of  the 
United  States,  1900,  Vol.  II,  p.  520 ;  Thirteenth  Census  of  the  United  States, 
Vol.  IV,  p.  122. 

104  Ninth  Census  of  the  United  States,  1870,  Vol.  I,  p.  733;  Tenth  Census 
of  the  United  States,  1880,  Vol.  I,  p.  822 ;  Compendium  of  the  Eleventh  Cen- 
sus of  the  United  States,  1890,  Part  III,  pp.  408-412;  Twelfth  Census  of 
the  United  States,  1900,  Vol.  II,  p.  520;  Thirteenth  Census  of  the  United 
States,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  120,  122,  460,  461. 

CHAPTEB  VI 

105  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  p.  146. 

This  law  applied  only  to  men  over  fourteen  years  of  age. 

ice  Laws  of  Iowa,  1886,  Ch.  114;  1896,  Ch.  70;  House  Journal,  1915,  see 
index;  House  Bills,  1915,  No.  483. 

107  Laws  of  Iowa,  1894,  Ch.  100. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  251 

108  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  2582,  2583,  2584,  2585,  2710,  2713. 
The  Revision  of  1860  practically  repeated  these  provisions. 

In  1882,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  decided  that  in  case  of  rape  accom- 
plished by  the  use  of  stupefying  drugs,  it  was  immaterial  whether  or  not 
the  woman  knew  of  the  defendant  'a  bad  reputation. —  The  State  v.  Porter, 
57  Iowa  691. 

109  Laws  of  Iowa,  1884,  Ch.  142. 
no  Code  of  1851,  Sec.  2586. 

in  The  State  v.  Tarr,  28  Iowa  397. 

112  The  State  v.  Shean,  32  Iowa  88 ;  The  State  v.  Eeilly,  104  Iowa  13. 
Seduction  could  also  be  made  the  basis  of  a  civil  action  for  damages. 

us  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  4764;  Morris  v.  Stout,  110  Iowa  659. 

114  Laws  of  Iowa,  1907,  Ch.  170. 

For  further  mention  of  this  law  concerning  desertion  see  Chapter  IX. 

us  Code  of  1851,  Sec.  2605;  Revision  of  1860,  See.  4229;  Code  of  1897, 
Sec.  4783;  The  State  v.  Kelly,  74  Iowa  589;  The  State  v.  Fertig,  98  Iowa 
139;  The  State  v.  Gill,  150  Iowa  210. 

The  rule  which  held  the  wife  equally  responsible  for  such  crimes  as  the 
keeping  of  a  disorderly  house  is  an  old  principle  of  law.  In  such  cases  the 
presumption  of  the  husband's  influence  does  not  hold  since  a  woman  might 
reasonably  commit  such  a  crime  without  coercion. 

lie  Briggs  's  Social  Legislation  in  Iowa,  p.  30. 

117  Laws  of  Iowa,  1894,  Ch.  15;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1898,  Ch.  18. 

us  House  Journal,  1882,  pp.  610,  611.  For  examples  of  petitions  in  1872 
see  Senate  Journal,  1872,  pp.  140,  155,  180,  209,  241,  288. 

119  For  examples  of  such  petitions  see  Senate  Journal,  1884,  pp.  81,  128, 
136,  178,  202,  272,  299,  319,  322;  Senate  Journal,  1907,  pp.  102,  385,  386, 
387,  388,  407,  501,  646. 

120  Laws  of  Iowa,  1890,  Ch.  69;  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  5674;  Laws  of  Iowa, 
1900,  Ch.  102;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1907,  Ch.  193;  Supplement  to  the  Code  of 
Iowa,  1907,  Sec.  2713-e,  2713-f ;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1904,  Ch.  80. 

For  later  provisions  concerning  female  inebriates  see  Supplement  to  the 
Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  Sees.  2310-al9a,  2310-a22. 

121  Laws  of  Iowa,  1913,  Ch.  17;  Supplemental  Supplement  to  the  Code  of 
Iowa,  1915,  Sees.  2713-nl  to  2713-nl9. 


252    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 


122  Lows  of  Iowa,  1917,  Ch.  427;   Senate  Journal,  1917,  pp.  684,  732, 
808,  834,  908,  942,  1054,  1106,  1542. 

123  Laws  of  Iowa,  1868,  Ch.  59  ;  Report  of  the  Iowa  Reform  School,  pp. 
4,  21,  in  the  Iowa  Legislative  Documents,  1872,  Vol.  II. 

124  Laws  of  Iowa  (General),  1872,  Ch.  77;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1876,  Ch.  38; 
Laws  of  Iowa,  1880,  Ch.  171;  Aurner's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol. 
V,  Part  IV. 

125  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  2702-2713;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1900,  Chs.  100,  101; 
Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  Sees.  2701-a-2713-4a. 

126  The  State  v.  Eayburn,  170  Iowa  514. 

This  was  an  interpretation  of  Sec.  4943  of  the  Code  of  1897. 

127  Laws  of  Iowa,  1890,  Ch.  43. 

CHAPTER  VII 

128  See  Chapter  I. 

129  Laws  of  Iowa,  1839-1840,  Ch.  25. 

130  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1464,  1466,  1487. 

wi  Revision  of  1860,  Sees.  2516,  2539;  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2186,  2191, 
2237;  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  3140,  3141,  3188. 

132  For  a  complete  discussion  of  the  causes  for  divorce  in  Iowa,  see 
Patton's  History  of  Divorce  Legislation  in  Iowa  (a  manuscript  thesis  in 
the  possession  of  the  library  of  the  State  University  of  Iowa). 

iss/owo  Capitol  Reporter  (Iowa  City),  September  9,  1843. 

134  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1482,  1483;   Laws  of  Iowa,  1854-1855,  Ch.  76; 
Laws  of  Iowa,  1858,  Ch.  64;  Revision  of  1860,  Sees.  2534,  2535;  Code  of 
1873,  Sees.  2223,  2224;  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  3174,  3175. 

135  Code  of  1873,  Sec.  2224. 

136  Knight  v.  Knight,  31  Iowa  451,  at  456. 

137  Doolittle  v.  Doolittle,  78  Iowa  691. 

iss  Turner  v.  Turner,  122  Iowa  113;  Pfannebecker  v.  Pfannebecker,  133 
Iowa  425;  May  v.  May,  108  Iowa  1. 

139  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  p.  179. 

140  Laws  of  Iowa,  1839-1840,  Ch.  81. 
1*1  Code  of  1851,  Sec.  1485. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  253 

142  Jolly  v.  Jolly,  1  Iowa  9,  at  13. 

Another  case  which  showed  an  advance  over  the  Common  Law  was  de- 
cided in  1859,  when  the  judges  ruled  that  a  man  who  brought  an  immoral 
woman  into  his  home  might  be  compelled  to  pay  for  his  wife's  support  else- 
where, even  though  she  was  insane  part  of  the  time  and  unconscious  of  the 
insult. —  Deseelles  v.  Kadmus,  8  Iowa  51. 

i43Fiveeoat  v.  Fivecoat,  32  Iowa  198,  at  199. 

144  Code  of  1873,  See.  2226. 

145  Barnes  v.  Barnes,  59  Iowa  456. 

146  Klaes  v.  Klaes,  103  Iowa  689. 

147  Dayton  v.  Prake,  64  Iowa  714;  Picket  v.  Garrison,  76  Iowa  347. 

148  Aitchison  v.  Aitchison,  99  Iowa  93 ;  Vey  v.  Vey,  150  Iowa  166. 

149  Bouse  v.  Bouse,  47  Iowa  422 ;  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  40  Iowa  230. 

150  Preston  v.  Johnson,  65  Iowa  285 ;  Doolittle  v.  Doolittle,  78  Iowa  691 ; 
Sherwin  &  Schermerhorn  v.  Maben,  78  Iowa  467;  Stockman  &  Hamilton  et 
al.  v.  Whitmore,  140  Iowa  378;  Gordon  and  Belsheim  v.  Brackey,  143  Iowa 
102 ;  Eead  &  Bead  v.  Dickinson,  151  Iowa  369 ;  Wick  v.  Beck,  171  Iowa  115. 

These  decisions  are  not  uniform.  It  appears  that  the  courts  have  at- 
tempted to  enable  the  wife  to  bring  a  suit  for  divorce  when  there  is  justifi- 
cation for  so  doing  even  though  the  husband  controls  the  financial  resources 
of  the  family.  At  the  same  time  the  husband  is  protected  against  charges 
for  suits  which  are  either  not  supported  by  reasonable  evidence  or  are  not 
carried  through. 

isi  Graves  v.  Graves,  36  Iowa  310;  Finn  v.  Finn,  62  Iowa  482. 

152  Laws  of  Iowa,  1840  (Extra  Session),  Ch.  14;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1841- 
1842,  Chs.  2,  13,  18,  37,  40,  41,  77,  85;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1842-1843    (Local 
Laws),  Ch.  77;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1845-1846,  Ch.  86. 

153  United  States  Census  Eeport,  Marriage  and  Divorce,  1867-1906,  Part 
II,  p.  623. 

For  further  discussion  of  the  mother's  claim  to  the  custody  of  her  chil- 
dren in  case  of  divorce  see  Chapter  VIII.  See  also  Patton's  History  of 
Divorce  Legislation  in  Iowa. 

154  United  States  Census  Eeport,  Marriage  and  Divorce,  1867-1906,  Part 
I,  pp.  437,  485. 

155  Lows  of  Iowa,  1842-1843  (Local  Laws),  Ch.  77. 


254    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

isewillcox's  The  Divorce  Problem,  p.  35,  in  the  Columbia  University 
Studies  in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law,  Vol.  I. 

isrpatton's  History  of  Divorce  Legislation  in  Iowa,  p.  32. 
IBS  United  States  Census  Eeport,  Marriage  and  Divorce,  1867-1906,  Part 
II,  pp.  576,  577.    See  also  Part  I,  pp.  62-65. 

159  United  States  Census  Eeport,  Marriage  and  Divorce,  1867-1906,  Part 
I,  pp.  92,  93,  94,  95. 

Four  States  —  Virginia,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  North  Carolina  — 
showed  a  larger  per  cent  of  divorces  granted  to  the  husband  than  to  the 
wife  in  1887-1906,  while  seven  showed  a  preponderance  in  favor  of  the 
husbands  during  the  period  between  1867  and  1887.  South  Carolina  has 
had  no  divorces  since  1878.  The  State  with  the  highest  per  cent  of  divorces 
granted  to  women  from  1887  to  1906,  was  not  a  western  Commonwealth,  as 
might  be  expected,  but  Ehode  Island,  where  women  were  granted  78.2  per 
cent  of  the  divorces.  Iowa  ranked  third  in  this  respect,  with  75.7  per  cent 
of  the  divorces  granted  to  wives.  Utah  was  second  with  77.5  per  cent. 

160  United  States  Census  Eeport,  Marriage  and  Divorce,  1867-1906,  Part 
I,  pp.  86,  87,  88,  89,  94,  95. 

In  this  table  only  the  statistics  concerning  the  four  most  important 
causes  of  divorce  are  given. 

lei  United  States  Census  Eeport,  Marriage  and  Divorce,  1867-1906,  Part 
I,  pp.  92,  93. 

During  the  period  between  1867  and  1886  neglect  to  provide  was  the 
cause  specified  in  one-tenth  of  one  per  cent  of  the  divorces  granted  to  wives. 
This  was  not  legal  grounds  for  a  divorce  to  a  husband. 

CHAPTER  VIII 

162  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  pp.  47,  347. 

163  Code  of  1851,  Ch.  88. 

164  Hunt  v.  Hunt,  4  Greene  216,  at  222,  223. 

165  Cain  v.  Devitt,  8  Iowa  116;  Eevision  of  1860,  Sec.  2543. 

The  father  was  not  liable,  however,  for  necessities  furnished  an  adult, 
unmarried  daughter  who  lived  at  his  home  although  he  made  no  objection. 
—  Blachley  v.  Laba,  63  Iowa  22. 

166  Cole  v.  Cole,  23  Iowa  433;   Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2241,  2242,  2243; 
Code  of  1897,  Sees.  3192,  3193,  3194. 

For  decisions  concerning,  this  equal  guardianship,  see  The  State  v.  Kirk- 
patrick,  54  Iowa  373.  See  also  Laws  of  Iowa,  1882,  Ch.  40. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  255 

167  Ostheimer  v.  Ostheimer,   125   Iowa   523;    Caldwell   v.   Caldwell,   141 
Iowa  192;  The  State  v.  Dewey,  155  Iowa  469. 

les  Laws  of  Iowa,  1913,  Ch.  31. 

169  Laws  of  Iowa,  1839-1840,  Ch.  24;   Code  of  1851,  Sees.  855,  1415- 
1418 ;  Eevision  of  1860,  Ch.  58 ;  Black  Hawk  County  v.  Cotter,  32  Iowa  125. 

CHAPTER  IX 

170  House  Journal,  1843-1844,  February  1,  1844,  p.  170. 

Among  the  eleven  who  were  opposed  to  the  motion  which  killed  this  bill 
was  James  W.  Grimes,  afterwards  Governor  of  Iowa. 

171  Laws  of  Iowa,  1845-1846,  Ch.  5. 

The  date  of  this  act  was  January  2,  1846. 

172  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1192,  1207,  1304,  1447-1450,  1453. 

173  McCrory  v.  Poster,  1  Iowa  271. 

174  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  458,  1192. 

175  Suiter  v.  Turner  et  al,  10  Iowa  517,  at  521;  Peck  v.  Hendershott,  14 
Iowa  40. 

176  Eevision  of  1860,  Sees.  2499-2504. 

177  Ticonic  Bank  v.  Harvey  et  al.,  16  Iowa  141 ;  Laing  v.  Cunningham 
et  al.,  17  Iowa  510.    See  also  Duncan  v.  Roselle  et  ux.,  15  Iowa  501. 

178  Sunderland  et  al.  v.  Sunderland  et  al.,  19  Iowa  325. 

179  Jones  v.  Jones,  19  Iowa  236.    Logan  v.  Hall,  Administrator,  19  Iowa 
491. 

iso  Goodrich  v.  Hunger  et  al.,  30  Iowa  343,  at  349. 

isi  Miller  v.  Wetherby,  12  Iowa  415. 

182  Woolheather  v.  Eisley,  38  Iowa  486. 

iss  Daily  Evening  Press  (Iowa  City),  May  17,  1871. 

184  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2202,  2204,  2206,  2211. 

iss  Lower  v.  Lower,  46  Iowa  525. 

iso  Stamy  v.  Laning  et  al,  58  Iowa  662 ;  Jones  v.  Brandt,  59  Iowa  332. 

187  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  I,  No.  3,  November,  1886;  Vol.  I,  No. 
10,  June,  1887. 


256    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

iss  Gilbert,  Hedge  &  Co.  v.  Glenny  et  al.,  75  Iowa  513;   Code  of  1873, 
Sec.  2211.    See  also  Mewhirter  v.  Hatten,  42  Iowa  288. 

189  Hoag  &  Steere  v.  Martin  et  al,  80  Iowa  714. 

i»o  Jones  v.  Storms  et  al.,  90  Iowa  369 ;  Garr,  Scott  &  Co.  v.  Klein  et  ux., 
93  Iowa  313. 

i»i  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  3153,  3162. 

i»2  Clark  Bros.  v.  Ford,  126  Iowa  460. 

193  in  re  Estate  of  Kennedy,  154  Iowa  460. 

i»4  Miller,  Watt  &  Co.  v.  Mercer,  170  Iowa  166. 

195  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  p.  485,  Sec.  44. 

196  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  pp.  473,  484-486. 

Illegitimate  children  inherited  from  the  mother,  but  not  from  the  father 
unless  definitely  recognized  by  him. 

i9T  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1390,  1394,  1421;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1852-1853,  Ch. 
61,  Sec.  1. 

198  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1407,  1410,  1411,  1412,  1413. 

199  Ealston  et  al.  v.  Ealston,  3  Greene  535. 

200  Eaiston  v.  Ealston  et  al,  3  Greene  533. 

201  Eowland  v.  Eowland  et  al,  4  Greene  183. 

202  Laws  of  Iowa,  1854-1855,  Chs.  12,  13. 

203  Claussen,  Guardian,  v.  La  Franz,  1  Iowa  226. 

204  Laws  of  Iowa,  1858,  Ch.  63. 

205  Revision  of  1860,  Sees.  2361,  2422,  2477,  2490 ;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1862, 
Ch.  151. 

206  McMenomy  v.  McMenomy,  22  Iowa  148. 

207  Laws  of  Iowa,  1862,  Ch.  22. 

208  Meyer  v.  Meyer  et  al,  23  Iowa  359 ;  Dodds  et  al  v.  Dodds,  26  Iowa 
311;  Sully  V.  Neberball  et  al,  26  Iowa  338;  Cain  v.  Cain  et  al,  23  Iowa  31. 

209  Laws  of  Iowa,  1868,  Ch.  50 ;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1872,  Ch.  51. 

210  in  re  Estate  of  Jacob  Davis,  36  Iowa  24. 

211  Mock  v.  Watson  et  al,  41  Iowa  241;  Felch  v.  Finch,  52  Iowa  563; 
In  re  Estate  of  Dennis,  67  Iowa  110;  Thomas  v.  Hanson  et  al,  44  Iowa  651. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  257 

In  1914  the  exempt  personal  property  of  the  decedent,  the  Supreme 
Court  ruled,  should  be  held  exempt  in  the  hands  of  the  widow  and  the  ex- 
penses of  the  last  sickness,  etc.,  together  with  the  allowance  for  the  widow's 
maintenance  during  the  year,  should  be  paid  out  of  the  remaining  personal 
property.  —  In  re  Estate  of  Smith,  165  Iowa  614. 

212  Laws  of  Iowa,  1870,  Ch.  7. 

213  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2436,  2440,  2441,  2442. 

214  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2451,  2452  ;  Revision  of  1860,  See.  2435. 

215  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2455,  2456,  2457,  2458. 

216  McGuire  v.  Brown  et  al.,  41  Iowa  650  ;  Jones  v.  Jones  et  al.,  47  Iowa 
337. 

217  Buzick  v.  Buzick  et  al.,  44  Iowa  259. 

218  Senate  Journal,  1880,  p.  126. 

219  Ward  v.  Wolf  et  al.,  56  Iowa  465  ;  Samson,  Administrator,  v.  Samson 
et  al.,  67  Iowa  253;  Senate  Journal,  1886,  pp.  80,  405,  729;  House  Journal, 
1886,  p.  717. 

22oRittgers  v.  Bittgers  et  al.,  56  Iowa  218;  Bentley  v.  Bentley,  112  Iowa 
625. 

See  also  Howard  et  al.  v.  Smith  et  al.,  78  Iowa  73. 

221  Phillips  v.  Carpenter,  79  Iowa  600  ;  In  re  Estate  of  Cook,  126  Iowa 
158;  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  3313. 

222  Baldwin  et  al.  v.  Hill  et  al.,  97  Iowa  586. 

In  case  the  widow  was  the  administratrix  such  consent  was  taken  for 
granted  if  she  acquiesced  in  the  sales  made  in  accordance  with  the  will.  — 
Goldizen  v.  Goldizen  et  al.,  107  Iowa  280. 


of  Iowa,  1896,  Ch.  84;  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  2906;  Nicholson  v. 
Aney,  127  Iowa  278;  Dowling  &  Allgood  v.  Wood,  125  Iowa  244;  Laws  of 
Iowa,  1906,  Ch.  148. 

224  Laws  of  Iowa,  1913,  Ch.  280. 

225  Meyer,  Executor,  v.  Weiler,  121  Iowa  51;  Wright  v.  Breckenridge, 
125  Iowa  197. 

226  Conn  v.  Conn  et  al.,  58  Iowa  747  ;  Schlarb  et  al.  v.  Holderbaum  et  al., 
80  Iowa  394. 

227  Laws  of  Iowa,  1839-1840,  Ch.  28,  Sees.  20-28. 

17 


258    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

228  Davis  v.  O'Ferrall,  4  Greene  168. 

229  Goddard,  as  trustee,  etc.  v.  Beebe,  4  Greene  126. 

230  Butler  and  Robinson  v.  Rickets,  11  Iowa  107 ;  Westf  all  et  ux.  v.  Lee 
et  al,  7  Iowa  12. 

231  Laws  of  Iowa,  1858,  Ch.  33. 

232McHenry  v.  Day  et  ux.,  13  Iowa  445;  Simms  v.  Hervey  et  ux.,  19 
Iowa  273. 

233  Robertson  v.  Robertson,  25  Iowa  350. 

234  Stoddard  v.  Cutcompt  et  al.,  41  Iowa  329. 

235  Code  of  1873,  Sec.  2203. 

236  Linton  v.  Crosby  et  al.,  54  Iowa  478. 

237  Shane  v.  McNeill  et  al,  76  Iowa  459. 

238  Newberry  v.  Newberry,  114  Iowa  704. 

In  1892,  a  contract  between  husband  and  wife  providing  for  the  division 
of  property  in  case  of  a  divorce  was  held  valid. —  Nieukirk  v.  Nieukirk,  84 
Iowa  367. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  why  a  contract  looking  toward  divorce  should  be 
valid  while  one  concerned  with  a  simple  division  of  the  property  before 
death  is  not. 

239  Baker  v.  Syf  ritt,  147  Iowa  49. 

240  Martin  v.  Martin,  65  Iowa  255;  Blake  v.  Blake,  7  Iowa  46. 

241  Cruize,  Guardian,  v.  Billmire,  69  Iowa  397. 

242Swartz  v.  Andrews,  137  Iowa  261;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1902,  Ch.  237; 
Sawyer  v.  Biggart,  114  Iowa  489. 

The  act  of  1902  was  held  to  refer  only  to  joint  acts. 

2*3  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  Sec.  2942-f .  See  also  Laws 
of  Iowa,  1904,  Ch.  118;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1902,  Ch.  237. 

244Baird  v.  Connell,  121  Iowa  278. 

245  Pitkin  v.  Peet,  Executor,  et  al.,  87  Iowa  268 ;  Fisher  v.  Koontz,  Ad- 
ministrator, et  al.,  110  Iowa  498. 

246  Nesmith  v.  Platt  et  al,  137  Iowa  292. 

247  Weis  v.  Bach,  146  Iowa  320;  In  re  Estate  of  Johnson,  154  Iowa  118. 

248  Toliver  et  al  v.  Morgan  et  al,  75  Iowa  619. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  259 

249  Levins  v.  Sleator,  2  Greene  604. 

The  court  ruled  that  a  divorce  granted  by  the  legislature  in  1843  was 
valid  and  dower  right  was  cancelled. 

250  Laws  of  Iowa,  1911,  Ch.  159;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1913,  Ch.  281. 

251  Stidger  v.  Evans,  64  Iowa  91;  Troutman  v.  Gowing,  16  Iowa  415. 

252  Braun  v.  Mathieson,  139  Iowa  409. 

253  Byington  v.  Carlin  et  al.,  146  Iowa  301. 

254  Stewart  &  Company  v.  Whicher  et  al.,  168  Iowa  269. 

255  Kuhn  v.  Kuhn,  125  Iowa  449. 

This  is  in  accord  with  the  decision  formerly  cited  that  a  wife  does  not 
inherit  from  her  husband. 

256  Hamilton  et  al.  v.  Smith  et  al.,  57  Iowa  15 ;  Wallace  v.  Wallace,  137 
Iowa  169 ;  Collins  v.  Smith  et  al.,  144  Iowa  200. 

257  Beck  v.  Beck  et  al.,  64  Iowa  155. 

258  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  p.  41. 

259  Painter  v.  Weatherford,  1  Greene  97. 

260  Greenough  v.  Wiggington  and  Wife,  2  Greene  435 ;   Laws  of  Iowa, 
1845-1846,  Ch.  5. 

261  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1207,  1454,  1456,  1459. 

262  Blake  v.  Blake,  7  Iowa  46  at  53,  54,  55. 

The  wife  had  agreed  to  give  up  her  dower  in  a  large  amount  of  property 
for  less  than  two  dollars  a  week. 

263  McMullen  v.  McMullen,  10  Iowa  412. 

This  was  an  appeal  from  the  Linn  County  District  Court. 

It  appears  from  these  two  decisions  that  the  wife's  contract  was  to  be 
enforced  when  it  was  to  her  disadvantage  while  it  was  not  enforced  when 
it  was  in  her  favor. 

26*  Whitecarver  et  ux.  v.  Bonney,  9  Iowa  480;  Kramer  v.  Conger,  16 
Iowa  434. 

265  Jones  v.  Crosthwaite  et  ux.,  17  Iowa  393 ;  Laing  v.  Cunningham  et  al., 
17  Iowa  510. 

In  this  connection  the  following  modest  announcement  found  in  an  early 
paper  may  be  of  interest: 

"MILLENEBY" 

"Miss  H.  J.  Eiccord,  respectfully  informs  the  public  that  she  has  com- 


260    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

menced  the  above  business  in  its  various  branches,  and  will  attend  promptly 
to  all  business  in  her  line. 

Eesidence  at  her  father's,  north  of  the  National  Hotel." — The  Iowa 
City  Standard,  September  17,  1842. 

zee  Laws  of  Iowa,  1858,  Ch.  34. 

267  Revision  of  I860,  See.  2771,  footnote  pp.  489,  490. 

268  Revision  of  I860,  Sees.  2772-2774,  2933. 

269  Wolff  v.  Van  Metre  et  al.,  19  Iowa  134 ;  Eeed  v.  King  and  King,  23 
Iowa  500;  Simms  v.  Hervey  et  ux.,  19  Iowa  273. 

270  Laws  of  Iowa,  1870,  Ch.  126. 

The  appearance  of  women  in  the  business  world,  however,  was  still  in- 
frequent enough  to  attract  attention  as  is  evidenced  by  the  following  com- 
ment in  a  newspaper  in  1871:  "Pella  has  a  lady  who  buys  and  sells  produce 
and  makes  money." — Daily  Evening  Press  (Iowa  City),  May  2,  1871. 

271  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2211,  2213;  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  3164.    Spafford  v. 
Warren  et  al,  47  Iowa  47,  at  51. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  since  the  adoption  of  the  Code  of 
1873,  married  women  have  not  been  allowed  to  make  contracts  with  their 
husbands  concerning  the  distributive  share  of  either. —  Code  of  1873,  See. 
2203. 

272  Van  Metre  v.  Wolf,  27  Iowa  341;  Guthrie  v.  Howard  et  ux.,  32  Iowa 
54.    See  also  Mitchell  v.  Smith  et  ux.,  32  Iowa  484. 

273  McLaren  v.  Hall  et  al,  26  Iowa  297. 

274  Chamberlain  v.  Eobertson,  31  Iowa  408. 

275  Nicholas  &  Shepard  v.  Higby  et  al,  35  Iowa  401 ;  In  re  Alexander, 
37  Iowa  454. 

276  Sweazy  v.  Kammer,  51  Iowa  642,  at  645. 

277  Hatcher  et  al  v.  Day  et  al,  53  Iowa  671. 

278  Senate  Journal,  1892,  pp.  133,  358,  454. 

279Sprague,  Warner  &  Company  v.  Benson  et  al,  101  Iowa  78;  Garner 
et  al  v.  Fry  et  al,  104  Iowa  515. 

280  Woods  v.  Allen,  109  Iowa  484. 

281  Cox  v.  Collis,  109  Iowa  270. 

282Heacock  v.  Heacoek,  108  Iowa  540;  Hoaglin  v.  Henderson  &  Com- 
pany, 119  Iowa  720;  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2204,  2211,  2213. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  261 

283  in  re  Estate  of  Deaner,  126  Iowa  701 ;  McElhaney  v.  McElhaney,  125 
Iowa  279. 

284  Hostetler  v.  Eddy,  128  Iowa  401. 

285Codte  of  1851,  Sees.  1245,  1246;  Revision  of  I860,  Sees.  2277,  2278; 
Code  of  1873,  Sees.  1988,  1989;  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  2972,  2973. 

WCode  of  1851,  Sees.  1247,  1248,  1263,  1264;  Revision  of  1860,  Sees. 
2295,  2296;  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2007,  2008;  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  2973,  2985; 
Arnold  v.  Waltz,  53  Iowa  706. 

287  Williams  v.  Swetland,  10  Iowa  51. 

This  provision  was  entirely  distinct  from  the  dower  right  of  the  wife. 

288  Morris  v.  Sargent  et  al,  18  Iowa  90. 

The  laws  concerning  the  procedure  to  certify  a  wife's  signature,  it  will 
be  remembered,  were  not  very  strict  at  this  time. 

289  Wilson  v.  Christopherson  et  ux.,  53  Iowa  481. 
2»o  Stewart  v.  Brand,  23  Iowa  477. 

291  Whitehead  v.  Conklin  et  al.,  48  Iowa  478 ;  Wold  &  Olson  v.  Berkholtz, 
105  Iowa  370;  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2007,  2008;  Peebles  and  White  v.  Bunt- 
ing, 103  Iowa  489. 

The  wife  might  occupy  the  homestead  even  after  remarriage,  in  spite  of 
the  claims  of  the  heirs. —  Nicholas  v.  Purczell,  21  Iowa  265. 

292  Burns  et  al  v.  Keas  et  al,  21  Iowa  257. 

293  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  pp.  480,  487. 

294  Laws  of  Iowa,  1841-1842,  Ch.  20,  p.  17.     See  also  Laws  of  Iowa, 
1843-1844,  p.  69. 

2»5  Code  of  1851,  Sec.  1304;  Code  of  1897,  See.  3288. 

296  in  re  Estate  of  O  'Brien,  63  Iowa  622. 

297  Code  of  1851,  Sec.  1207;  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  3270. 

298  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  p.  456 ;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1841-1842,  Ch.  98. 

299  The  Iowa  Standard  (Bloomington),  April  29,  1841. 

300  The  Iowa  Standard  (Iowa  City),  May  23,  1844. 

Similar  announcements  are  to  be  found  in  newspapers  down  to  the  pres- 
ent, although  more  seldom  in  late  years. 

*°iCode  of  1873,  Sees.  2207,  2208;  Eawson  and  Eice  v.  Spangler,  62 
Iowa  59. 


262    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

ao2  Vanduzer  v.  Vanduzer,  70  Iowa  614 ;  Lawrence  v.  Brown,  91  Iowa 
342. 

SOB  Senate  Journal,  1894,  p.  249. 

so4  House  Journal,  1902,  pp.  121,  440,  441;  House  Journal,  1904,  pp. 
143,  233. 

BOS  House  Journal,  1906,  pp.  34,  97,  203,  204,  287 ;  Senate  Journal,  1907, 
p.  20;  House  Journal,  1907,  pp.  632,  633,  1009;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1907,  Ch. 
170. 

ace  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1907,  Sees.  4775-a,  4775-b. 
so?  Baker  v.  Oughton,  130  Iowa  35. 
808  The  State  v.  Stout,  139  Iowa  557. 

309  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  1447-1462. 

For  a  case  decided  in  accordance  with  section  1455,  see  Eodemeyer  v. 
Eodman,  5  Iowa  426.  See  also  Revision  of  1860,  Sec.  2507;  Code  of  1873, 
Sec.  2214;  Code  of  1897,  See.  3165;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1913,  Ch.  271. 

sio  Smedley  v.  Felt,  41  Iowa  588 ;  McCormick  v.  Muth  et  ux.,  49  Iowa 
536;  Martin  Bros.  v.  Vertres,  130  Iowa  175. 

*ii  Courtright  v.  Courtright,  53  Iowa  57.  See  also  Hayward  v.  Jackman, 
96  Iowa  77;  Sherman  v.  King  et  ux.,  51  Iowa  182. 

312  Fitzgerald  v.  McCarty  et  al,  55  Iowa  702 ;  Davis  v.  Ritchey,  55  Iowa 
719. 

sis  Haggard  v.  Holmes  et  al.,  90  Iowa  308. 

suNeasham  v.  McNair,  103  Iowa  695;  Black  Hawk  County  v.  Scott,  111 
Iowa  190;  Vose  v.  Myott,  141  Iowa  506. 

In  a  decision  handed  down  in  1875,  however,  a  contract  between  the 
guardian  of  an  insane  husband  and  the  wife  that  she  should  receive  pay  for 
caring  for  the  husband  was  void  because  she  owed  the  service  without  pay. — 
Grant  v.  Green,  41  Iowa  88. 

sis  Boss,  Administrator,  v.  Jordan,  118  Iowa  204;  The  Aultman  Engine 
and  Thresher  Co.  v.  Greenlee,  134  Iowa  368. 

sie  O 'Neil  v.  Cardina,  159  Iowa  78. 

si?  Wihelm  et  al.  v.  Hertz  et  al.,  4  Greene  54. 

sis  Eeunecker  v.  Scott,  4  Greene  185. 

3i»  Cheuvete  et  al.  v.  Mason,  4  Greene  231. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  263 

320  Revision  of  I860,  Sees.  2499-2514;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1845-1846,  Ch.  5. 

321  Duncan  v.  Eoselle  et  ux.,  15  Iowa  501. 

322  Laws  of  Iowa,  1866,  Ch.  24. 

323  Mitchell  &  Sons  v.  Sawyer  and  Wife,  21  Iowa  582. 

324  Laws  of  Iowa,  1870,  Ch.  126. 

325  Patterson  v.  Spearman,  Clark,  and  Seeley,  37  Iowa  36. 

326  Ottumwa  Daily  Democrat,  November  2,  1886. 

327  Code  of  1873,  Sees.  2203,  2212. 

Three  cases  involving  this  question  of  the  notice  of  ownership  are  to  be 
found  in  the  court  reports. —  Myers  v.  McDonald,  Sheriff,  27  Iowa  391; 
Stewart  v.  Bishop  et  al.,  33  Iowa  584;  Schmidt  v.  Holtz,  44  Iowa  446. 

328  Miller  v.  Hollingsworth,  36  Iowa  163. 

329  Hamilton  v.  Lightner  et  al.,  53  Iowa  470. 

sso  Hoag  &  Steere  v.  Martin  et  al,  80  Iowa  714. 

331  Laws  of  Iowa,  1894,  Ch.  95;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1896,  Ch.  84. 

332  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  3155,  3156. 

333  The  County  of  Delaware  v.  McDonald,  46  Iowa  170 ;  Wapello  County 
v.  Eikelberg,  140  Iowa  736. 

334  Tibbetts  v.  Wadden,  94  Iowa  173  at  174. 

335  Skillman  v.  Wilson,  146  Iowa  601. 

CHAPTER  X 

336  Trained  nursing  was  classed  as  personal  or  domestic  service  in  1900 
and  as  a  profession  in   1910.     At  the   former  date  there  were  only   160 
women  in  Iowa  in  this  profession  who  were  classed  as  trained  nurses:  ten 
years  later  the  number  is  given  as  1,710. —  Twelfth  Census  of  the  United 
States,  1900,  Vol.  II,  p.  522;  Thirteenth  Census  of  the  United  States,  1910, 
Vol.  IV,  p.  122. 

337  Ninth  Census  of  the  United  States,  1870,  Vol.  I,  pp.  686-690 ;  Tenth 
Census  of  the   United  States,  1880,  Vol.   I,  pp.   712,  713,   792-794;    Com- 
pendium of  the  Eleventh  Census,  1890,  Part  III,  pp.  408-410 ;  Twelfth  Cen- 
sus of  the  United  States,  1900,  Vol.  II,  pp.  520-524;  Thirteenth  Census  of 
the  United  States,  1910,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  110-123;  Census  of  Iowa,  1915,  pp. 
552,  553. 


264    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

338  The  American  Labor  Legislation  Eeview,  Vol.  VI,  p.  359. 

339  Laws  of  Iowa,  1874,  Ch.  31,  Sec.  5;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1892,  Ch.  47; 
Code  of  1897,  Sec.  4999;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1902,  Ch.  97. 

340  Code  of  1897,  See.  2448;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1906,  Ch.  103. 

The  provision  as  to  dangerous  employments  applies  also  to  boys  under 
sixteen. 

341  Laws  of  Iowa,  1902,  Ch.  149. 

342  The  American  Labor  Legislation  Beview,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  359,  372-381. 
The  other  States  are  Alabama,  Florida,  Nevada,  New  Mexico,  and  West 

Virginia. 

343  Senate  Bills,  1917,  Nos.  164,  376;  House  Bills,  1917,  No.  257;  Index 
and  History  of  Senate  and  House  Bills,  1917,  pp.  90,  142,  296. 

See  also  House  Journal,  1915,  pp.  191,  192,  999,  1000. 

344  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  See.  2477. 

345  Biennial  Eeport  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1914,  pp.  112- 
185;  1916,  pp.  180-303. 

CHAPTER  XII 

346  Channing  's  A  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  I,  pp.  370-377. 

347  Maryland  Historical  Magazine,  Vol.  II,  pp.  221,  224,  379. 

348 Warner's  Library  of  the  World's  Best  Literature,  Vol.  I,  p.  87; 
McLaughlin  and  Hart's  Cyclopedia  of  American  Government,  Vol.  Ill,  p. 
694;  Writings  of  Thomas  Paine,  Vol.  I,  p.  330;  Wollstonecraf t 's  A  Vindica- 
tion of  the  Eights  of  Woman  (Camelot  Series),  p.  xiv. 

349  Greene's  Results  of  the  Woman-Suffrage  Movement  in  The  Forum, 
Vol.  XVII,  pp.  413,  414. 

sso  Martineau  's  Society  in  America,  Vol.  II,  p.  259. 

351  Hart's  Slavery  and  Abolition,  p.  210;  Garrison's  William  Lloyd  Gar- 
rison, Vol.  II,  pp.  353,  368-373;   Jacobi's  "Common  Sense"  Applied  to 
Woman  Suffrage,  p.  5. 

352  Thorpe 's  The  Political  Value  of  State  Constitutional  History,  in  The 
Iowa  Journal  of  History  and  Politics,  Vol.  I,  p.  30. 

SOB  McLaughlin  and  Hart 's  Cyclopedia  of  American  Government,  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  695;  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  V,  No.  9,  May,  1891. 

354  The  Atlantic  Monthly,  Vol.  XI,  p.  479. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  265 

355  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage 's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  VoL  IV, 
pp.  994-1000. 

356  McLaughlin  and  Hart 's  Cyclopedia  of  American  Government,  Vol. 
Ill,  pp.  694,  695;   The  American  Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  XII,  pp. 
102-105;  Information,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  325;  Catt's  Woman  Suffrage  ly  Federal 
Constitutional  Amendment,  pp.  93,  94;  Woman  Suffrage  Amendment  Pro- 
ceedings  in   the    United   States   Senate,   July   31,    1913;    Ogg's   National 
Progress,  1907-1917,  pp.  152,  153;  The  Survey,  Vol.  XXXIX,  p.  144;  The 
American  Tear  Book,  1917,  pp.  180-182;  The  Literary  Digest,  Vol.  LVII, 
No.  6,  p.  14;  The  Des  Moines  Eegister,  November  23,  30,  1918. 

The  Territory  of  Washington  enfranchised  its  women  citizens  in  1883, 
but  the  act  was  declared  unconstitutional  by  the  Territorial  Supreme  Court. 
The  amendment  was  later  rejected  by  a  State  vote. —  The  Outlook,  Vol. 
LXV,  p.  430;  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage, 
Vol.  IV,  pp.  967-969. 

Vermont,  in  1917,  permitted  women  tax-payers  to  vote  for  certain  town 
officers  and  on  appropriations. 

357  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage 's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  648-689. 

sss  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage 's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  333,  363;  The  Congressional  Globe,  1st  Session,  41st  Congress,  p.  72. 

It  is  said  that  Senator  Harlan  of  Iowa  was  in  favor  of  this  amendment, 
but  he  did  not  publicly  advocate  its  passage. 

359  House  Reports,  1st  Session,  48th  Congress,  Vol.  V,  No.  1330,  pp.  4-7 ; 
Horack's  Equal  Suffrage  in  Iowa,  pp.  23,  24;  Catt's  Woman  Suffrage  by 
Federal  Constitutional  Amendment,  Introduction;  Hearing  Before  the  Com- 
mittee on  Eules  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  2nd  Session,  63rd  Con- 
gress, 1913,  p.  11. 

seo  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage 's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  IV, 
pp.  110,  111;  Catt's  Woman  Suffrage  by  Federal  Constitutional  Amend- 
ment, Introduction. 

Among  the  yeas  was  Senator  Wilson  of  Iowa.  Senator  William  B. 
Allison  was  among  those  absent. 

sei  Congressional  Record,  3rd  Session,  63rd  Congress,  pp.  1483,  1484. 

362  Information,  Vol.  II,  p.  492. 

363  The  Review  of  Reviews,  Vol.  LVII,  p.  137;  Congressional  Record,  2nd 
Session,  65th  Congress,  pp.  836,  11914,  11984.     For  an  account  of  the  vote 
see  The  Searchlight  on  Congress,  Vol.  II,  Nos.  11—12,  p.  9. 


266    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

Among  the  negative  votes  was  that  of  one  Iowa  Kepresentative,  Harry 
E.  Hull. 

364  Catt  's  Woman  Suffrage  by  Federal  Constitutional  Amendment,  pp. 
93-95;  Information,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  424;  American  Year  Book,  1917,  pp.  87, 
91;  Bay's  Woman  Suffrage  in  Foreign  Countries  in  The  American  Political 
Science  Eeview,  Vol.  XII,  pp.  469-474. 

CHAPTER  XIII 

366  Laws  of  Iowa,  1838-1839,  p.  33. 
see  House  Journal,  1843-1844,  p.  23. 

367  Booth 's  Eeminiscences  of  Twenty-seven  Tears  Ago  in  The  Annals  of 
Iowa  (First  Series),  Vol.  IX,  pp.  564,  565. 

s«*The  Iowa  Standard  (Iowa  City),  October  24,  1844.  See  also  the 
Journal  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  1857,  pp.  241,  242. 

869  Constitution  of  Iowa,  1844,  Art.  II,  Sec.  1,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  1 ;  Consti- 
tution of  Iowa,  1857,  Art.  II,  Sec.  1. 

370  Code  of  1851,  Sees.  258,  259,  2631. 

371  House  Journal,  1852-1853,  pp.  82,  83. 

372  Aurner  's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  II,  p.  197. 

373  Journal  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  1857,  pp.  240-243. 

Mr.  Arthur  Springer  is  authority  for  the  statement  that  his  father,  Mr. 
Francis  Springer,  was  one  of  those  in  favor  of  woman  suffrage  in  this  con- 
vention in  1857. 

374^6  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  11,  July,  1894;  Bloomer's 
Life  and  Writings  of  Amelia  Bloomer,  pp.  211,  212. 

Mrs.  D.  C.  Bloomer,  one  of  the  pioneers  in  the  woman  suffrage  move- 
ment, was  born  in  New  York  in  1818  and  came  to  Iowa  with  her  husband  in 
1855.  She  became  an  enthusiastic  advocate  of  the  emancipation  of  women 
and,  in  order  to  accomplish  this  purpose,  she  joined  the  ranks  of  the  dress 
reformers  and  adopted  a  combination  dress  of  trousers  and  skirt  which 
made  her  an  object  of  curiosity  and  obscured  to  some  extent  her  real  con- 
tributions to  the  reforms  of  temperance  and  woman  suffrage.  She  died  in 
1894. —  Bloomer's  Life  and  Writings  of  Amelia  Bloomer,  pp.  9,  67,  332. 

CHAPTEE  XIV 

375  The  State  Press  (Iowa  City),  January  18,  February  1,  1865;  Fairall's 
Manual  of  Iowa  Politics,  1881,  p.  78. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  267 

376  House  Journal,  1866,  pp.  188,  442. 

For  a  summary  of  the  proposed  equal  suffrage  amendments  see  Van  der 
Zee's  Proposed  Constitutional  Amendments  in  Iowa  1857-1909  in  The  Iowa 
Journal  of  History  and  Politics,  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  192-196. 

377  Shambaugh  's  The  Constitution  of  the  State  of  Iowa   (Pocket  Edi- 
tion, 1914),  p.  105;  House  Journal,  1868,  pp.  530,  605;  Fairall's  Manual  of 
Iowa  Politics,  1881,  p.  80. 

378  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  11,  July,  1894. 

379  House  Journal,  1870,  pp.  95,  417,  469,  470 ;  Senate  Journal,  1870,  pp. 
113,  388,  389,  394,  395;  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  12,  August, 
1894. 

This  resolution  included  office-holding  as  well  as  voting. 

sso  House  Journal,  1872,  pp.  191,  211,  248,  249,  377;  Senate  Journal, 
1872,  p.  421. 

381  House  Journal,  1872,  pp.  381,  479,  573. 

382  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines),  March  15,  1871.    ' 

sss  It  was  about  this  time  that  one  of  the  most  faithful  and  prominent 
suffrage  workers  of  this  period  came  to  Iowa.  This  was  Mrs.  Margaret  W. 
Campbell,  who  served  as  lecturer  and  organizer  for  the  cause  of  political 
equality  for  many  years.  In  1875  Mrs.  Campbell  and  her  husband  made  a 
series  of  speeches  on  political  reform  throughout  northern  Iowa. —  The 
Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  11,  July,  1894. 

384  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines),  August  16,  1871. 

385  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines) ,  September  1,  1871. 
sse  Iowa  State  Press  (Iowa  City),  May  31,  1871. 

387  Iowa  State  Press  (Iowa  City),  February  22,  1871. 

sss  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines),  October  25,  1871. 

sso  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines),  June  21,  1871. 

wo  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines),  August  16,  1871. 
For  the  election  of  the  first  woman  county  superintendent  in  Iowa,  see 
Chapter  XVI. 

391  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines) ,  October  25,  1872 ;  Iowa 
State  Press  (Iowa  City),  October  16,  1872. 

392  Gue's  History  of  Iowa,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  252,  253;  The  Woman's  Stand- 
ard, Vol.  XI,  No.  4,  June,  1898;  Stanton,  Anthony,  and  Gage's  History  of 
Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  614-617. 


268    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

The  name  of  this  association  is  given  in  various  ways  —  the  two  most 
frequent  terms  being  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association  and  the  Iowa 
Woman's  Suffrage  Association.  The  Constitution  not  being  available,  the 
writer  has  adopted  the  former  name  since  it  corresponds  with  the  national 
organizations.  One  of  these,  the  National  Woman  Suffrage  Association, 
was  founded  in  1869  under  the  leadership  of  Miss  Susan  B.  Anthony  and 
Mrs.  Elizabeth  Cady  Stanton;  another  association  organized  at  the  same 
time  under  the  leadership  of  Mrs.  Lucy  Stone  was  called  the  American 
Woman  Suffrage  Association.  In  1890,  these  two  organizations  combined 
under  the  name  National  American  Woman  Suffrage  Association. —  Anthony 
and  Harper's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  14,  164. 

393/owa  State  Weekly  Register  (Des  Moines),  October  5,  1871,  March  7, 
1873. 

394  The  Woman 's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  11,  July,  1894. 

395  Iowa  State  Weekly  Eegister    (Des  Moines) ,   July   3,   1874 ;    House 
Journal,  1874,  pp.  102,  251,  324,  364,  365,  462,  491;  Senate  Journal,  1874, 
pp.   280,  321;    Fairall's  Manual  of  Iowa  Politics,   1881,   p.   96;    Stanton, 
Anthony,  and  Gage's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  621. 

396  From  a  report  of  speech  by  Samuel  J.  Kirkwood  in  the  Iowa  State 
Weekly  Eegister  (Des  Moines),  August  27,  1875. 

MT  Iowa  State  Weekly  Register  (Des  Moines),  April  21,  1876;  Stanton, 
Anthony,  and  Gage's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  621. 

398  Laws  of  Iowa,  1874  (Private),  Joint  Resolution  No.  18,  p.  85;  Sham- 
baugh's  Messages  and  Proclamations  of  the  Governors  of  Iowa,  Vol.  IV, 
p.  168;  Senate  Journal,  1876,  pp.  351,  352,  386,  387;  House  Journal,  1876, 
pp.  296,  297,  298,  396. 

399  House  Journal,  1878,  pp.  381,  382,  493;  House  Journal,  1880,  pp.  124, 
126,  637;   Senate  Journal,  1878,  pp.  188,  253,  417;  Senate  Journal,  1880, 
pp.  385,  386,  387,  412. 

400  House  Journal,  1880,  pp.  39,  112,  118,  119;   Senate  Journal,  1880, 
pp.  59,  90,  112,  132,  171,  200,  224,  230,  256. 

^oiHaynes's  Third  Party  Movements  Since  the  Civil  War,  p.  181;  Fair- 
all's  Manual  of  Iowa  Politics,  1881,  pp.  107,  116,  124;  1883,  p.  49. 

The  National  Union  Greenback  Labor  Convention  had  put  an  equal 
suffrage  plank  in  their  platform  in  1880,  and  women  from  the  National 
Woman  Suffrage  Association  were  given  seats  on  the  platform  at  one  of 
the  meetings.  The  Union  Labor  Party  also  favored  equal  suffrage  in  1888. 
—  Haynes's  Third  Party  Movements,  pp.  134,  135,  136,  208. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  269 

402  Shambaugh  'a  Messages  and  Proclamations  of  the  Governors  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  V,  p.  256;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1882,  Joint  Resolution  No.  11,  p.  180;  House 
Journal,  1882,  pp.  310,  311;  House  Journal,  1882,  p.  524;  Senate  Journal, 
1884,  pp.  335,  336;    The  Weekly  Hawk-Eye    (Burlington),   September  27, 
1883. 

403  Senate  Journal,  1884,  pp.  279,  280. 

The  first  protest  against  woman  suffrage  presented  in  the  Iowa  legisla- 
ture is  said  to  have  been  presented  in  1884,  signed  "Many  ladies".  It  was 
referred  to  the  library  committee,  although  the  Senate  objected  to  receiving 
a  petition  without  signatures.  It  does  not  appear  that  any  official  record 
of  this  incident  was  made. —  The  Annals  of  Iowa  (Howe's),  Vol.  Ill,  p.  112. 

404  The  Annals  of  Iowa  (Howe's),  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  Ill,  112. 

405  For  the  work  of  these  women  see  The  Woman 's  Standard  and  the 
Eecords  of  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association. 

Among  the  speakers  from  without  the  State  were  Susan  B.  Anthony, 
Mrs.  Lucy  Stone,  and  her  husband  Henry  B.  Blaekwell.  Their  daughter, 
Alice  Stone  Blaekwell,  was  secretary  of  the  National  American  Woman 
Suffrage  Association  in  1890. —  Eecords  of  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Asso- 
ciation, Sixteenth  to  Thirty-sixth  Meetings,  p.  43  et  passim. 

Lieutenant  Governor  B.  F.  Gue  was  also  in  favor  of  equal  suffrage.  At 
his  death  in  1904  the  Des  Moines  Political  Equality  Club  adopted  resolu- 
tions containing  these  words:  "Thirty  years  ago  when  this  cause  had  but 
few  friends  he  did  not  shrink  from  being  publicly  identified  with  an  un- 
popular measure." — The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  XVII,  No.  5,  July, 
1904.  Mrs.  Gue  had  died  in  1888. 

406Tfte  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  7,  March,  1889. 

The  first  biennial  convention  of  the  Iowa  Federation  of  Women's  Clubs 
was  held  in  Cedar  Rapids  in  May,  1895. —  The  Iowa  State  Eegister  (Des 
Moines),  May  10,  1895,  p.  5. 

407  The  Woman 's  Standard,  Vol.  IV,  No.  4,  December,  1889 ;  Eecords  of 
the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association,  Sixteenth  to  Thirty-sixth  Meetings, 
pp.  34,  46. 

40827*6  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  V,  No.  5,  January,  1891,  No.  8,  April, 
1891,  No.  9,  May,  1891;  Vol.  VIII,  No.  5,  January,  1894,  No.  6,  February, 
1894. 

409  Eecords  of  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association,  Sixteenth  to  Thir- 
ty-sixth Meetings,  p.  19.  This  was  a  letter  to  Mrs.  Margaret  Campbell. 


270    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

410  The    Woman 's   Standard,    Vol.    IV,    No.    8,    April,    1890 ;    Stanton, 
Anthony,  and  Gage's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  625. 

411  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VII,  No.  4,  December,  1891;    'Records 
of  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association,  Sixteenth  to  Thirty-sixth  Meet- 
ings, p.  126. 

412  Shambaugh  's  Messages  and  Proclamations  of  the  Governors  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  VI,  p.  23. 

The  property  rights  of  women  in  Iowa  have  been  discussed  in  another 
chapter. 

413  Senate  Journal,  1886,  pp.  94,  108,  130,  423,  555,  556,  777;   House 
Journal,  1886,  pp.  108,  109,  163,  375,  563,  573. 

414  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  October,  1886,  Vol.  I,  No.  3, 
November,  1886. 

415  From  the  Cedar  Eapids  EepuUican,  copied  in  The  Woman 's  Standard, 
Vol.  I,  No.  3,  November,  1886,  No.  7,  March,  1887. 

4ie  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  I,  No.  11,  July,  1887. 

417  Shambaugh 's  Messages  and  Proclamations  of  the  Governors  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  VI,  pp.  67,  68;  Iowa  State  Press  (Iowa  City),  October  27,  1886;  The 
Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  I,  No.  4,  December,  1886. 

418  From  The  Iowa  City  Eepublican  and  The  Cedar  Eapids  Eepublican, 
copied  in  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  II,  No.  6,  February,  1888. 

419  From  the  Maquolceta  Eecord,  copied  in  The  Woman 's  Standard,  Vol. 
II,  No.  7,  March,  1888. 

For  a  brief  account  of  early  suffrage  States,  see  Chapter  XI. 

420  House  Journal,  1888,  pp.  511,  512,  513,  633,  915;   Senate  Journal, 
1888,  pp.  81,  642;  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  II,  No.  7,  March,  1888. 

421  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  II,  No.  8,  April,  1888,  No.  12,  August, 
1888. 

422  Shambaugh 's  Messages  and  Proclamations  of  the  Governors  of  Iowa, 
Vol.  VI,  p.  182. 

Wyoming  was  admitted  as  a  State  in  1890  with  equal  suffrage  in  its 
Constitution,  having  granted  suffrage  to  women  in  1869. 

423  Senate  Journal,  1890,  pp.  91,  103,  200,  215,  751,  755;  House  Journal, 
1890,  pp.  218,  265. 

*24  Eecords  of  the  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Association,  Sixteenth  to  Thir- 
ty-sixth Meetings,  pp.  46,  47. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  271 

CHAPTER  XV 

425  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  IV,  No.  11,  July,  1890,  No.  12,  August, 
1890. 

«6  Senate  Journal,  1892,  pp.  95,  210,  243;  House  Journal,  1892,  pp.  97, 
186,  240,  291,  330,  415,  474,  475,  476. 

427  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  4,  December,  1893. 

428  Senate  Journal,  1894,  pp.  44,  61,  117,  158,  160,  206,  306-309,  320, 
428,  794,  800;  House  Journal,  1894,  pp.  58,  244,  269,  526,  627,  757,  891, 
1007,  1010;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1894,  Ch.  39. 

429  The  Woman 's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  9,  May,  1894. 

430  House  Journal,  1894,  p.  758. 

431  The  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  October  25,  1895. 

432  The  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  November  15,  1895. 

433  Senate  Journal,  1896,  pp.  93,  209,  753. 

434  The  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines) ,  January  29,  1897. 

435  The  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  February  5,  1897. 

436  The  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  May  28,  1897. 

437  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  IX,  No.  12,  February,  1897;  Vol.  X, 
No.  3,  May,  1897,  No.  4,  June,  1897,  No.  5,  July,  1897,  No.  6,  August,  1897; 
Vol.  XII,  No.  9,  November,  1899,  No.  10,  December,  1899. 

438  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  XIV,  No.  8,  October,  1901. 

439  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  1131,  2747. 

440  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  X,  No.  1,  March,  1897;  Information, 
Vol.  II,  p.  154.     The  decision  was  rendered  on  January  22,  1916. 

441  House  Journal,  1898,  pp.  185,  216,  378,  379,  435;   Senate  Journal. 
1898,  p.  240. 

442  The  Woman 's  Standard,  Vol.  XI,  No.  1,  March,  1898.    See  also  The 
Iowa  State  Register   (Des  Moines),   February   11,   1898;    House  Journal, 
1898,  pp.  435,  436. 

443  Senate  Journal,  1900,  pp.  996,  997;  House  Journal,  1900,  pp.  652, 
•653. 

444  Senate  Journal,  1902,  pp.  134,  269,  403,  404,  610. 


272    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

445  House  Journal,  1904,  pp.  961,  1049,  1099,  1100,  1117,  1118;  Senate 
Journal,  1904,  pp.  208,  877,  967. 

440  House  Journal,  1906,  pp.  282,  380,  381,  601,  602,  866,  1163,  1164; 
Senate  Journal,  1906,  pp.  108,  764,  787. 

Both  Senate  bills  were  introduced  by  Senator  A.  H.  Gale  of  Mason  City. 

447  Senate  Journal,  1907,  pp.  895,  896,  1343,  1348;  House  Journal,  1907, 
pp.  1150,  1414,  1415. 

4*8  Senate  Bills,  1909,  No.  242;  Senate  Journal,  1909,  pp.  730,  731,  732; 
House  Journal,  1909,  p.  651. 

449  House  Journal,  1911,  pp.  661,  662,  663,  1193,  1229 ;  House  Bills,  1911, 
No.  544;  Senate  Journal,  1911,  pp.  286,  301,  933,  1169,  1272;  Senate  Bills, 
1911,  Nos.  430,  432. 

450  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  XXIII,  Nos.  6-7,  August-September, 
1910. 

«i  Senate  Journal,  1913,  pp.  226-229. 

452  Laws  of  Iowa,  1913,  p.  426;  Senate  Journal,  1913,  pp.  512,  709,  710, 
889;  House  Journal,  1913,  pp.  191,  366,  432,  635-637. 

This  did  not  affect  section  four  of  article  three  of  the  Constitution 
which  disqualifies  women  from  holding  seats  in  the  General  Assembly. 

453  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  Sec.  2755. 

454  Supplemental  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1915,  See.  1989-a73. 
The  number  of  votes  depended  upon  the  amount  of  benefit  to  be  derived 

from  the  improvement. 

455  Senate  Journal,  1915,  p.  339 ;  House  Journal,  1915,  pp.  586-588. 

456  House  Journal,  1915,  pp.  546-565. 

457  House  Journal,  1915,  pp.  547,  549,  551. 

458  House  Journal,  1915,  pp.  1191,  1192,  2134;   Senate  Journal,   1915, 
pp.  1657,  1658. 

459  Miss  Dunlap  was  chosen  president  of  the  Association  in  1913.     Her 
party  succeeded  in  having  the  society  reineorporated  under  the  name  of  the 
Iowa  Equal  Suffrage  Association.     The  women  who  opposed  the  change 
were  led  by  Mrs.  Bowena  Stevens,  who  declared  that  the  new  body  could 
not  have  the  money  belonging  to  the  former  organization.     Miss  Dunlap, 
however,    secured   the    funds. —  The   Eegister   and   Leader    (Des    Moines), 
October  11,  1913. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  273 

4f.o  Iowa  Official  Register,  1917-1918,  p.  481. 

461  These  statistics  were  obtained  from  the  following  sources:  Census  of 
Iowa,  1915,  pp.  418-433;   Iowa  Official  Register,  1917-19.1 8,  pp.  462-481; 
and  The  Des  Moines  Register,  October  18,  1917. 

462  House  Journal,  1917,  p.  1387;  Senate  Journal,  1917,  pp.  1085-1087; 
Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  State,  December  12,  1918. 

CHAPTER  XVI 

463  The  State  ex  rel.  v.  Van  Beek,  87  Iowa  569,  at  577 ;  McClain  's  Con- 
stitutional Law  in  the  United  States,  p.  287. 

464 Laws  of  Iowa  (Extra  Session),  1862,  Ch.  36. 

465  Gue  's  History  of  Iowa,  Vol.   Ill,   p.   255 ;    Stanton,   Anthony,   and 
Gage's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  626;  House  Journal,  1870, 
p.  8. 

466  Gue's  History  of  Iowa,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  255;  Iowa  Official  Register,  1917- 
1918,  p.  103. 

467  Gue 's  History  of  Iowa,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  255,  256;  The  Woman's  Stand- 
ard, Vol.  IV,  No.  10,  June,  1890,  No.  11,  July,  1890 ;  House  Journal,  1904, 
p.  311;  House  Journal,  1909,  p.  199;   Senate  Journal,  1906,  pp.  53,  102. 
Women  frequently  serve  as  chaplains  in  the  legislature. 

468  Gue 's  History  of  Iowa,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  256 ;   Biennial  Report  of  the 
Warden    of    the    Additional    Penitentiary,    1879;    Stanton,    Anthony,    and 
Gage's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  626,  627. 

469  The  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  March  26,  1897. 

470  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  XIII,  No.  5,  July,  1900. 

471  The  Register  and  Leader  (Des  Moines),  December  28,  1907. 

472  Code  of  1873,  Sec.  1435;  Code  of  1897,  Sees.  2299,  2628;  Laws  of 
Iowa,  1882,  Ch.  167. 

473  Laws  of  Iowa,  1898,  Ch.  118,  Sees.  9,  11;  Supplement  to  the  Code  of 
Iowa,  1913,  Sec.  2727-all;  Supplemental  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa, 
1915,  See.  2727-all;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1915,  Ch.  114. 

474  Laws  of  Iowa,  1894,  Ch.  41;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1904,  Ch.  11;  Laws  of 
Iowa,  1917,  Ch.   405;   Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1907,  Sec.   728; 
Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  Sec.  409-c. 

475  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913,  Sec.  2477;  Biennial  Report  of 
the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1914,  pp.  112-185;  1916,  pp.  180-303. 

18 


274    LEGAL  AND  POLITICAL  STATUS  OF  WOMEN 

476  Supplemental  Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1915,  Sec.  879v. 

477  Laws  of  Iowa,  1917,  Ch.  181. 

478  Laws  of  Iowa,  1917,  Chs.  232,  290. 

CHAPTER  XVII 

479  Constitution  of  Iowa,  1857,  Art.  II,  Sec.  1,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4 ;  Huff  v. 
Cook,  44  Iowa  639. 

480  Gue  's  History  of  Iowa,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  256 ;  Iowa  State  Weekly  Register 
(Des  Moines),  December  15,  1869;   Laws  of  Iowa,  1862,  Ch.  172.     Miss 
Addington  is  said  to  have  been  the  first  woman  in  the  United  States  to  hold 
this  office. 

481  Laws  of  Iowa,  1876,  Ch.  136 ;  Huff  v.  Cook,  44  Iowa  639 ;  Iowa  State 
Weekly  Register   (Des  Moines),  March  24,  1876;   The  History  of  Warren 
County,  Iowa  (Union  Historical  Co.),  pp.  368-372. 

The  case  was  commenced  in  November,  1875,  and  the  judgment  of  the 
Circuit  Court  was  rendered  on  the  sixteenth  of  March,  1876.  The  act  of  the 
General  Assembly  was  approved  on  March  17,  1876. 

482  Huff  v.  Cook,  44  Iowa  639. 

483  Code  of  1873,  Sec.  697. 

484  Brown  v.  McCollum,  76  Iowa  479. 

485  Aurner  's  History  of  Education  in  Iowa,  Vol.  II,  p.  89 ;  Report  of  the 
Superintendent  of  Public  Instruction,  p.  112,  in  the  Iowa  Legislative  Docu- 
ments, 1898,  Vol.  II;  Iowa  Official  Register,  passim. 

486  Report  of  the  Superintendent  of  Public  Instruction,  p.   112,  in  the 
Iowa  Legislative  Documents,  1898,  Vol.  II. 

487  Iowa  State  Weekly  Register  (Des  Moines),  August  30,  1871. 

488  Quoted  from  the  Louisville  Courier- Journal  in  the  Iowa  State  Weekly 
Register  (Des  Moines),  April  7,  1876. 

489  Laws  of  Iowa,  1880,  Ch.  40;  House  Journal,  1880,  p.  404;   Senate 
Journal,  1880,  p.  462. 

4»o  I0ica  Official  Register,  1881-1918,  passim. 

491  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  493. 

492  state  Democratic  Press  (Iowa  City),  June  8,  1870. 

493  Information  obtained  from  Miss  Freeman. 


NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  275 

494  The  Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  July  19,  August  2,  November 
1,  1872. 

495  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  12,  August,  1894;  Stanton, 
Anthony,  and  Gage's  History  of  Woman  Suffrage,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  629. 

496  The  Woman 's  Standard,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  10,  June,  1894.    The  women 
were  Mrs.  Walter  and  Mrs.  Billings. 

497  Code  of  1897,  Sec.  2748. 

498Haynes's  Third  Party  Movements,  p.  504;  FairalFs  Manual  of  Iowa 
Politics,  1881,  p.  124. 

4w  The  Woman's  Standard,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  11,  July,  1889;  Fairall's 
Manual  of  Iowa  Politics,  1883,  p.  50. 

BOO  Senate  Journal,  1870,  pp.  113,  388,  389,  394,  395;  1872,  p.  421;  1876, 
pp.  351,  352,  386,  387;  1878,  pp.  188,  253,  417;  1880,  p.  385;  House  Journal, 
1870,  pp.  95,  469;  1872,  pp.  191,  248,  249,  377;  1876,  pp.  296,  297,  298,  308, 
396,  397;  1878,  pp.  381,  382,  493;  1880,  pp.  124,  126;  Laws  of  Iowa,  1874, 
Joint  Resolution  No.  18,  p.  85. 

MI  House  Journal,  1898,  pp.  185,  378,  435;  1904,  pp.  961,  1049,  1099, 
1100,  1117;  1906,  pp.  282,  380,  381,  601,  602. 


INDEX 


277 


INDEX 


Abbott,  Abbie  S.,  position  held  by,  44 

Abduction,  punishment  for,   11 

Abolition,  relation  of  women's  rights 
movement  to,  162 

Adams,  Abigail,  request  of,  for  equal 
rights,  160 

Adams,    Austin,    50,    51 

Addington,  Julia  C.,  election  of,  as  coun- 
ty superintendent,  228,  229,  274 

Administration  of  estates,  right  of  women 
in,  127,  128 

Administrator,  right  of  women  to  act  as,  7 

Administratrix,  special  act  concerning, 
128 

Adultery,  divorce  for,  12,  18,  66,  68,  153  ; 
number  of  divorces  granted  for,  74,  79, 
80 ;  punishment  for,  243 

Age,  minimum  required,  for  marriage,  64, 
65 

Age  of  consent,    11,   19,   55 

Agent,  power  of,  122 

Agriculture,  number  of  women  employed 
in,  146 

Alabama,  divorces  in,  254;  labor  laws  in, 
264 

Alaska,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  164 

Alberta,  equal  suffrage  granted  by,   171 

Algona,  suffrage  society  organized  at,  186 

Alienation  of  affections,  right  of  wife  to 
sue  for,  38 

Alienation  of  dower,  105-114  (see  also 
Dower) 

Aliens,  movement  to  enfranchise,  177 

Alimony,  provision  for,  to  wife,  19;  who 
entitled  to,  68-73 ;  definition  of,  68, 
70,  71;  obligation  to  pay,  71;  right  of 
husband  and  wife  to  contract  concern- 
ing, 109,  110 

Allen,  Mrs.  Nancy  R.,  appointment  of,  as 
notary  public,  224 

Allison,  William  B.,   265 

Amendment,  Susan  B.  Anthony,  history 
of,  167-170 


American  men,  attitude  of,  toward  wom- 
en, 187 

American  Woman  Suffrage  Association, 
connection  between  equal  suffrage  and 
free  love  denied  by,  182,  183;  affilia- 
tion of  Iowa  Association  with,  193; 
organization  of,  268 

Anamosa,  building  for  women  convicts  at, 
60;  woman  employed  in  penitentiary 
at,  224 

Antenuptial   contracts,   validity  of,    111 
Anthony,    Susan   B.,    attempt   of,    to   vote, 

167;  history  of  amendment  named  for, 

167-170;   lecture  of,    at   Cedar  Rapids! 

183;  suffrage  work  of,  205,   206,  268; 

General    Assembly    presided    over    by', 

206;  speech  by,  269 
Anti-suffragists,    speeches    by,    209,    210, 

211,   217;  protest  of,   269 
Appointive    offices,    women    in,    222-227; 

women  eligible  to,  228 
Arizona,  school  suffrage  adopted  by,  164; 

equal  suffrage  adopted  by,   164 
Arkansas,    primary   suffrage    adopted   bv 

165 

Arson,    punishment    of    married    woman 

for,  58 
Assault  and  battery,  recovery  for  injuries 

in  case  of,  33 

Assignment,  alienation  of  dower  by,  112 
Atlas,  responsibility  of  wife  for  price  of, 

134 
Attorney  General  of  Iowa,  decision  of,  on 

municipal  suffrage,   195;   ruling  of,  on 

office-holding,    228,    239 
Attorney's  fees,   wife  not  responsible  for, 

134 

Augusta,  seminary  at,  22 
Australia,   enfranchisement  of  women  of, 

171 
Aylesworth,  Barton  O.,  address  by,  192 


279 


280 


INDEX 


Baker,  Nathaniel  B.,  woman  clerk  em- 
ployed by,  223 

Ballard,  J.  E.,  notice  concerning,   140 

Ballard,  Mary  E.,  notice  by,   140 

Baltimore,  Lord,  woman  representative 
of,  159 

Bank  stock,  right  of  wife  to,  88;  notice 
of  ownership  of,  not  required,  137 

Bar,  admission  of  women  to,  50,  51,  250 

Beer,  wife  not  liable  for  price  of,  135, 
136 

Belden,  Mrs.  Evelyn  H.,  speech  by,  209, 
211,  212 

Belmont,  22 

Bemis,  Mrs.  Narcissa  T.,  suffrage  work 
of,  186;  choice  of,  as  delegate,  193 

Bigamy,   divorce  granted  for,   66 

Black  Hills,  232 

Blackstone,  William,  comment  of,  on  stat- 
us of  women,  13 

Blackwell,  Alice  Stone,  position  of,  269 

Blackwell,  Henry  B.,  protest  of,  against 
exclusion  of  women,  161;  speech  by, 
269 

Bloomer,  Mrs.  Amelia,  work  of,  for  equal 
suffrage,  175 ;  assistance  given  to,  by 
husband,  181;  offices  of,  in  suffrage 
association,  185,  193;  sketch  of  life 
of,  266 

Bloomer,  D.  C.,   181,   266 

Boies,  Horace,  attitude  of,  toward  equal 
suffrage,  200 

Bond  suffrage,  history  of,   207 

Bonds,  women  to  vote  on,  202,  221; 
women  refused  right  to  vote  on,  208 

Borrowing  money,  women  to  vote  on,  202 

Breach  of  promise,  right  of  man  to  sue 
for,  248 

Bremer  County,  woman  on  school  board 
in,  234 

Brent,   Giles,   159 

Brent,  Margaret,  position  of,  159 

Brigham,  Johnson,  equal  suffrage  sup- 
ported by,  215 

Brinkerhoff,  Mrs.  Martha  H.,  lectures  by, 
179 

British  Columbia,  equal  suffrage  adopted 
by,  171 

British  Parliament,  statutes  of,  15;  wom- 
en enfranchised  by,  171 


Bronson,  Minnie,  argument  of,  against 
equal  suffrage,  218;  equal  suffrage  op- 
posed by,  219 

Brown,  Ella  S.,  election  contest  of,  231 

Brown,  Leon,  equal  suffrage  supported 
by,  215 

Browne,  T.  M.,  minority  report  on  equal 
suffrage  signed  by,  168 

Burial,  responsibility  of  husband  for  ex- 
penses of  wife's,  143 

Burlington,  21;  suffrage  society  formed 
at,  186 

Business,  women  engaged  in,   145,  260 

California,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  164 

Callanan,  James,  choice  of,  as  delegate, 
193 

Callanan,  Mrs.  Martha  C.,  suffrage  activ- 
ities of,  191;  choice  of,  as  delegate, 
193 

Calvert,   Leonard,   death  of,   159 

Campbell,  Mrs.  Margaret  W.,  assistance 
given  to,  by  husband,  181;  suffrage 
activities  of,  191 ;  choice  of,  as  dele- 
gate, 193;  sketch  of  life  of,  267 

Canada,  women  enfranchised  by,  during 
war,  171 

Canfield,   Abbie  O.,  nomination  of,   235 

Canning  factories,  hours  of  work  of  wom- 
en in,  149 

Carpenter,  Cyrus  C.,  equal  suffrage  fa- 
vored by,  186,  187;  woman  appointed 
.  State  librarian  by,  223,  224;  woman 
commissioner  appointed  by,  224 

Cassville,   seminary  at,   22 

Catt,  Mrs.  Carrie  Lane  Chapman,  work 
of,  as  suffrage  organizer,  192,  207; 
choice  of,  as  delegate,  193 ;  speeches 
made  by,  219 

Cattell,  Mrs.  Deborah,  appointment  of,  as 
commissioner,  224 

Cedar  Falls,  superintendent  of  schools  at, 
43 

Cedar  Rapids,  44;  lecture  of  Susan  B. 
Anthony  at,  183;  convention  at,  269 

Cedar  Rapids  Republican,  woman  suf- 
frage department  in,  195 ;  equal  suf- 
frage supported  by,  197 

Centennial  celebration,  effect  of,  on  suf- 
frage sentiment,  187 


INDEX 


281 


Certificates,  granting  of,  to  women,  41 
Chaplains,  service  of  women  as,  273 
Chapman,    Mrs.    Carrie    Lane    (see    Catt, 

Mrs.   Carrie  Lane  Chapman) 
Charitable  institutions,  women  on  visiting 

committees  of,   224 

Charities    and    Correction,    National    Con- 
ference of,  woman  delegate  to,   224 
Chattel     mortgage,     proposal     to     require 
wife's    signature    to,    102;    validity    of, 
between  husband  and  wife,  124 
Child  labor  laws,   149 
Children,   right  of  mother  to   custody  of, 
11,    12,    253;    obligation    of    father    to 
support,    19 ;   provision  for,    in   case  of 
divorce,  19,  73,  74;  legal  settlement  of, 
25;  damages  for  loss  of  society  of,  37; 
number    of,    affected   by    divorces,    74; 
relation    of,    to    divorce    rate,    80,    81; 
guardianship  of,    82-85,    153 ;   right  of, 
to  support,  99,  244;  education  of,  133; 
exclusion  of,   from  mines,   148;  protec- 
tion of,   in  industry,   226 
Chiropractors,    number    of    women    listed 

as,  49 

Chitty,  Joseph,   comment  by,   244 
Choses    in    action,    right    of    husband    to 
wife's,  under  Common  Law,  6,  7;  right 
of  wife  to,  88 

Citizen,  definition  of,  228,  229 
Citizenship,    law    concerning,    26;    giving 

of,   to  negroes,    166 

Civil  contract,  marriage  considered  as,  64 
Civil  injuries,   husband  not  liable  for,   if 

committed  by  wife,   142 
Civil    Law,     existence    of,     in    Louisiana 
Purchase,  14 ;  relative  position  of  wom- 
en under,   16-18 
Civil  rights  of  women,  1-151 
Civil    War,    increase    of    women    teachers 
during,  42 ;  effect  of,  on  women's  prop- 
erty rights,  90 ;  equal  suffrage  previous 
to,  159-162;  effect  of,  on  suffrage,  162, 
163,  166,  167,  176;  part  of  women  in, 
223 

Clarinda,   women  registered  at,   180,   181 
Clarke,  George  W.,  equal  suffrage  amend- 
ment signed  by,  219 
Clarkson,    J.    S.,    equal   suffrage   opposed 

by,   198 
Cleaves,    M.    Abbie,    appointment    of,    as 


physician,  48;   appointment  of,  as  dele- 
gate,   224 

Clergy,  benefit  of,   244 
Clergymen,  number  of  women  serving  as, 

52 
Clerical  work,  number  of  women  engaged 

in,    146,   223 

Clerk,  first  woman  employed  as,  223 
Clinton  County,   petition  from  women  of, 
177;  vote  in,  on  suffrage  and  prohibi- 
tion, 220 

Clothing,  right  of  women  to  own,  210 
Clubs,  organization  of,  192,  201,  212 
Coats,  Henry,  property  rights  of  widow 

of,  97 

Code    of   1851,   provision    of,    concerning 
testimony,    27,    28;    provision    of,    con- 
cerning recovery  for   injuries   to  wom- 
en, 30;  provision  of,  concerning  seduc- 
tion, 34 ;  provision  of,  concerning  med- 
ical college,   47;  provision  of,   concern- 
ing admission  to  the  bar,   50 ;   penalty 
for    enticing    a    virtuous    woman    to    a 
house  of  ill-fame  provided  by,  56;  pro- 
vision   of,    concerning    arson,    58 ;    pro- 
vision   of,     concerning    marriage,     65 ; 
provision  of,  for  financial  settlement  in 
case  of  divorce,   69;  provision  of,   con- 
cerning  guardianship    of  children,    83 ; 
provision    of,    concerning    wife's    prop- 
erty,   87,    88,    133,    138;    provision   of, 
concerning  dower  and  curtesy,  95,  107; 
provision    of,    concerning    contracts    by 
married   women,    116,    118;    homestead 
exempted   from   judicial   sale   by,    125; 
provision  of,   concerning  women  as  ad- 
ministrators,    128;    provision    of,    con- 
cerning  disposal   of   property   by   mar- 
ried   woman,    129;    provision    of,    con- 
cerning liability  for  debts,   136;  provi- 
sion of,  concerning  elections,  174 
Code    of    1873,    provision    of,    concerning 
testimony,  28 ;  provision  of,  concerning 
responsibility    for    torts,    31;    provision 
of,  concerning  loss  of  support,  36;  pro- 
vision of,   concerning  divorce,   66;  pro- 
vision    of,     concerning     alimony,     71 ; 
provision       of,       concerning      property 
rights  of  married  women,  91;  provision 
of,    concerning  distributive  share,    100, 
101;    alienation   of   dower  by  postnup- 


282 


INDEX 


tial  agreement  prohibited  by,  108,  109 ; 
provision  of,  concerning  judicial  sale, 
112;  provision  of,  concerning  contracts 
by  married  women,  120,  121,  260;  pro- 
vision of,  concerning  dower,  127;  pro- 
vision of,  concerning  desertion  of  fam- 
ily, 130;  provision  of,  concerning  debts, 
141 ;  section  of,  concerning  exemption 
of  property,  142;  provision  of,  con- 
cerning election  contests,  230,  231 
Code  of  1897,  provision  of,  concerning 
settlement  of  married  women,  25 ;  pro- 
vision of,  concerning  testimony,  28; 
penalty  for  desertion  provided  by,  57; 
provision  of,  for  prison  matron,  60 ; 
per  capita  allowance  fixed  by,  62;  pro- 
vision of,  concerning  legal  heirs,  103 ; 
provision  of,  concerning  property 
rights,  104;  provision  of,  concerning 
postnuptial  contracts,  110;  provision 
of,  concerning  inheritance  by  murder- 
er, 113 ;  provision  of,  concerning  con- 
tracts between  husband  and  wife,  124, 
125;  provision  of,  concerning  home- 
stead, 126;  provision  of,  concerning 
wife's  liability  for  family  expenses,  135, 
142 ;  employment  of  women  in  mulct 
saloon  prohibited  by,  148 ;  provision 
of,  concerning  women  voters,  208;  pro- 
vision of,  concerning  county  recorders, 
233 ;  provision  of,  concerning  school 
officers,  235 

Co-education,   provisions   for,   22 ;    accept- 
ance of  principle  of,  in  Iowa,  39-41 
Coggeshall,  Mrs.  Mary  J.,  speech  by,  209, 

210 

College  of  Physicians   and   Surgeons,   en- 
trance requirements  of,   47 
Colorado,  school  suffrage  adopted  by,  164 ; 

equal  suffrage  adopted  by,    164 
Commissioner   of   Labor,    duty   of,   to   en- 
force   law    requiring    seats    for    female 
employees    in    stores,    148 ;    inspectors 
appointed  by,   226 

Committees,  service  of  women  on,  224 
Common  Law,  distinctions  of,  between 
married  and  single  women,  3,  4;  pro- 
visions of,  concerning  women,  3-13 ; 
provisions  of,  concerning  marriages,  4, 
18;  provisions  of,  concerning  married 
women's  property  rights,  4-8,  152;  in- 


troduction of,  in  America,  13;  exten- 
sion of,  over  Missouri  Territory,  15, 
16;  extension  of,  to  Iowa,  16;  relative 
position  of  women  under,  16-18;  civil 
rights  of  women  under,  23,  24;  protec- 
tion under,  53 ;  attitude  of,  towards 
women  offenders,  58;  right  of  dower 
and  curtesy  under,  94,  95;  alienation 
of  dower  under,  105 ;  right  of  contract 
denied  to  married  women  by,  114; 
right  of  wife  to  support  under,  129, 
130;  liability  of  husband  for  debts  of 
wife  under,  136,  142;  property  rights 
of  married  women  under,  138;  wife 
not  liable  for  husband's  debts  under, 
140 ;  provisions  of,  concerning  punish- 
ment of  married  women,  154 
Common  schools,  status  of  girls  in,  39,  40 
Competition,  harm  of,  to  inexperienced 

workers,   147 

Congress,      history      of      equal      suffrage 
amendment  in,  167-170;  women  denied 
vote  for  members  of,   221;   women  eli- 
gible to  seats  in,   237,   240 
Connecticut,    school   suffrage   adopted   by, 

164;  wife's  property  rights  in,  210 
Consent,  age  of,   11,   19,  55 
Conservatives,  238 

Constitution  (Iowa),  report  to  framers 
of,  on  negro  suffrage,  173,  174;  suf- 
frage questions  concerning,  175; 
amendment  to,  requested,  177;  equal 
suffrage  amendment  to,  179,  180,  186, 
187,  188,  189,  190,  193,  194,  197, 
199,  201,  205,  209,  212,  213,  214, 
215,  216,  217,  219,  220,  221;  popular 
vote  on  amendment  to,  219,  220;  pro- 
visions of,  concerning  office-holding, 
228;  attempts  to  amend,  236 
Constitution  (United  States),  proposed 
amendment  to,  167-170;  no  sex  quali- 
fication in,  237 

Constitutional    amendments,     women     de- 
nied right  to  vote  on,  221 
Consul,   desire  of  woman  to  become,   225 
Contracts,  right  of  women  to  make,   114- 
125,    152,   259;   restrictions  on  making 
of,    between    husband    and    wife,    141, 
258,   260 

Contributory   negligence,    damages  barred 
by,  32 


INDEX 


283 


Control,    Board   of,    women's   reformatory 

under,  60 ;  woman  to  be  appointed  by, 

226 

Convicts,   treatment  of,   59-63 
Cook,    Elizabeth    S.,    election    contest    of, 

229,   230 
Cook,    Harriette    J.,    appointment    of,    as 

college  professor,  44 
Cope,  Mrs.  Lena  H.,  service  of,  as  State 

librarian,   224 

Cornell  College,  woman  professor  at,  44 
Council  Bluffs,   32 
County    auditor,    proposal    to    open    office 

of,   to  women,   233 
County  hospitals,  bill  to  permit  women  to 

vote    on,    215;    women    on    boards    of, 

226 
County    officers,    women    denied   right    to 

vote  for,  221 
County  recorder,  women  made  eligible  to 

office  of,  233,   239 
.County  superintendent,  women  elected  to 

office    of,     228-232,     239;     number    of 

women  acting  as,  232 
County  treasurer,  office  of,  combined  with 

that  of  county  recorder,  233 
Court  reporters,  service  of  women  as,  224, 

225 

Coverture,  meaning  of,  4 
Cowgill,   Mrs.  Margaret  S.,   office  of,   193 
Creditors,    right   of   husband's,    to    wife's 

property,   88 
Creighton,   Mrs.  Laura  C.,   service  of,   as 

State  librarian,  224 
Crimes,    immunity   of   wife   in   respect   to 

punishment    for,     10 ;     punishment    of 

women  for,   58-63,   154 
Criminal  affairs,  status  of  women  in,  154 
Criminal  law,  status  of  women  under,  53- 

63 
Criminals,  women  as,  53-58;  disfranchise- 

ment  of,   203 

Cruelty,   divorces  granted  for,    18;   defin- 
ition   of,    67,    68,    80;    number    of    di- 
vorces granted  for,   74,   79,   80 
Cullums,     Mrs.     Earl     S.,     argument    of, 

against  equal  suffrage,   218,   219 
Cummins,  Albert  B.,  recommendations  of, 

for  punishment  of  desertion,    131,   132 
Cummins,   Mrs.   Albert  B.,   207 


Curtesy,  right  of  husband  to,   6,    19,   20, 

94-105;   abolition  of  right  of,  96,   101; 

limitation    on    right    of,    136    (see    also 

Distributive   share) 
Curtis,   George  William,   defense  of  equal 

suffrage  by,    161 
Custom,  divorce  rate  affected  by,   75 

Damages,  right  of  husband  to  sue  for, 
8,  9;  right  to  recover  for,  under  Com- 
mon Law,  29 ;  right  of  wife  to,  for  il- 
legal sale  of  liquor  to  husband,  36-38; 
amount  of,  for  girl's  death,  248 

Dangerous  employment,  girls  under  six- 
teen excluded  from,  148 ;  prohibition 
of,  for  boys,  264 

Davenport,   visit  of  Horace  Mann  to,    39 

Davenport  Manual  Labor  College,  pur- 
pose of,  22 

Davis,  Jefferson,  disfranchisement  of,  203 

Day,   Mrs.,   speech  by,   211 

Debts,  responsibility  of  husband  for 
wife's,  9 ;  widow's  dower  free  from, 
100;  liability  of  husband  and  wife  for, 
133-143;  liability  of  wife's  property 
for,  141 

Declaration  of  Independence,  160;  prin- 
ciples of,  161;  anniversary  of,  187; 
rights  stated  by,  202,  203 

Deed,  alienation  of  dower  by  joining  in, 
106,  107;  validity  of,  if  signed  by  mar- 
ried woman,  123;  signing  of  wife's 
name  to,  by  husband,  126 

Defective  street,  damages  for  accident 
due  to,  32 

Delaware,  school  suffrage  adopted  by,  164 

Delaware  township  (Polk  County),  wom- 
an elected  sub-director  in,  234,  235 

Delinquent  girls,   provision  for,   60-63 

Democrats,  attitude  of,  toward  equal  suf- 
frage, 170;  enfranchisement  of  for- 
eigners proposed  by,  177 

Denmark   (Iowa),  college  at,  22 

Denmark,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  171 

Dental  hygienists,   qualifications  of,   50 

Dentistry,  status  of  women  in,  49;  num- 
ber of  women  in  profession  of,  52 

Depere,   seminary  at,   22 

Deputies,  employment  of  women  as,  233, 
234 


284 


INDEX 


Desertion,  divorce  granted  for,  18,  66, 
153;  penalty  for,  57,  131,  132,  153; 
number  of  divorces  granted  for,  74,  79, 
80 

Des  Moines,  Republican  State  convention 
at,  179;  Republican  rally  at,  184;  sec- 
ond suffrage  convention  held  at,  185 ; 
meeting  of  national  suffrage  association 
at,  205;  municipal  court  at,  208 

Des  Moines,  West,  superintendent  of 
schools  at,  43 

Des  Moines  County,  seminary  in,  22; 
vote  in,  on  suffrage  and  prohibition, 
220;  woman  deputy  sheriff  in,  233, 
234 

Des  Moines  Equal  Suffrage  Club,  presi- 
dent of,  209 

Des  Moines  Political  Equality  Club,  reso- 
lution of,  269 

Dickinson,   Anna,    183 

Dilley,  Alice,  position  held  by,  44 

Dipsomaniacs,   treatment  of,    60 

Directors,   women  on  board  of,   234,   235 

Disorderly  house,  punishment  of  married 
woman  for  keeping,  58,  251 

Distributive  share,  assignment  of,  101- 
105;  equality  of,  152  (see  also  Dower 
and  Curtesy) 

Divorce,  8;  kinds  of,  under  Common 
Law,  12  ;  causes  for,  18,  65-68,  153,  154, 
254;  granting  of,  by  legislature,  21; 
desertion  a  cause  for,  57,  133;  status 
of  women  in  case  of,  65-81;  statistics 
concerning,  74,  77,  78,  79,  80;  factors 
determining  rate  of,  75;  distributive 
share  alienated  by,  105 ;  dower  right 
extinguished  by,  112;  effect  of,  on  hus- 
band's control  over  wife's  property, 
136;  disposition  of  children  in  case  of, 
153 ;  judicial  rulings  concerning,  253 ; 
validity  of  contracts  in  case  of,  258 ; 
legality  of  legislative,  259 

Divorces,  number  of,  in  Iowa,  74,  75- 
81;  proportion  of,  to  husbands  and 
wives,  76-78,  154,  254 

Domestic  difficulties,  non-interference 
with,  54 

Domestic  relations,  laws  concerning,  16 

Domestic  service,  number  of  women  em- 
ployed in,  146;  hours  of  work  in,  149 

Dower,  right  of  wife  to,   under  Common 


Law,  12 ;  provision  of  Ordinance  of 
1787  for,  18;  wife's  right  to,  under 
laws  of  Michigan  Territory,  20;  provi- 
sions concerning,  94-114;  right  of  hus- 
band to,  99-105;  abolition  of  right  of, 
101;  alienation  of,  105-114,  244,  259; 
homestead  to  be  included  in,  126,  127 
(see  also  Distributive  share) 

Drainage  districts,  women  permitted  to 
vote  in,  217,  221 

Drake  University,   president   of,    192 

Dress  reform,   demand  for,    172 

Drugs,  excessive  use  of,  60 

Drunkenness,  divorce  granted  for,  66, 
153 ;  number  of  divorces  granted  for, 
74,  79,  80 

Dubuque,  equal  suffrage  organization 
formed  at,  184 

Dubuque  County,  vote  in,  on  suffrage  and 
prohibition,  220 

Dubuque   Seminary,   co-education   in,    22 

Dugdale,  Joseph,  election  of,  as  vice  pres- 
ident of  suffrage  association,  185 

Dunham,  Mrs.  C.  A.,  nomination  of,  235 

Dunlap,  Flora,  campaign  managed  by, 
219;  equal  suffrage  work  of,  272 

Dunlap,  suffrage  club  at,  201 

Earnings,  right  of  married  women  to,  138 

East,    conservatism  of,    164 

Economic  conditions,  divorce  rate  affect- 
ed by,  75 

Economic  responsibility,  share  of  women 
in,  144 

Education,  equality  of  women  in,  22 ; 
status  of  women  in,  39-44;  relation  of, 
to  work  done  by  women,  150,  151 

Educational  Examiners,  Board  of,  one 
member  of,  to  be  a  woman,  225 

Educational  offices,  eligibility  of  women 
to,  230,  231,  234,  235,  239 

Eighteenth  General  Assembly,  attitude  of, 
toward  equal  suffrage,  188 ;  office-hold- 
ing and  school  suffrage  for  women  re- 
jected by,  188 

Eldora,  reform  school  located  at,  62 ;  in- 
vestigation of  reform  school  at,  224 

Election  contest,  right  of  woman  to  file 
notice  of,  230,  231 

Elective  franchise,  presentation  of  peti- 
tion for,  202,  203 


INDEX 


285 


Elective    offices,    qualifications    for,    222 ; 

status  of  women  in,  228-237,   240 
Electors,    requirement    that    office-holders 

be,   222,   228 

Eleventh    General   Assembly,    petition   for 
amendment  presented  to,    177;    resolu- 
tion introduced  in,   178 
Emory,    R.   D.,    equal  suffrage   supported 

by,  215 

Enfranchisement,  forms  of,  163 
England,  provisions  of  Common  Law  of, 
concerning  women,  3-13,  15,  16;  ex- 
tension of  full  suffrage  to  women  of, 
171;  decision  of  Court  of  Exchequer 
in,  228,  229 

Engle,   Perry,  bill  introduced  by,    201 
Engrossing  clerks,  women  as,  223 
Enrolling  clerks,  women  as,   223 
Equal  rights,  beginning  of  movement  for, 

159 

Equal  suffrage,  status  of,  in  United 
States,  before  the  Civil  War,  159-162; 
history  of,  in  United  States,  159-170; 
growth  of,  in  United  States,  after  the 
Civil  War,  162-170;  forms  of,  163; 
political  influence  of,  166;  struggle  for 
federal  amendment  granting,  166-170; 
status  of,  in  foreign  countries,  171; 
first  discussion  of,  in  Iowa  legislature, 
172,  173;  history  of  struggle  for,  in 
Iowa,  172-221;  evil  effects  of,  predict- 
ed, 181,  182;  attitude  of  S.  J.  Kirk- 
wood  toward,  186;  attitude  of  C.  0. 
Carpenter  toward,  186,  187;  endorse- 
ment of,  190;  support  of,  by  fusion 
candidates,  196 ;  activities  on  behalf  of, 
207;  committee  hearing  on,  209;  ob- 
jections to,  216;  relations  of  office- 
holding  to,  236;  attitude  of  political 
parties  to,  268;  protest  against,  pre- 
sented to  legislature,  269 
Equal  suffrage  amendment  (Iowa),  his- 
tory of,  179,  180,  186,  187,  188,  189, 
190,  193,  194,  197,  199,  201,  205, 
209,  212,  213,  214,  215,  216,  217, 
219,  220,  221;  popular  vote  on,  219, 
220;  summary  of,  239,  267 
Equal  suffrage  amendment  (United 

States),    167-170 

Equal  suffragists,   speeches  by,   209,   210, 
211,   212 


Estate,  increase  in  amount  of,  assigned 
to  surviving  spouse,  104 

Estates,    administration  of,    127,    128 

Evans,  H.  C.,  equal  suffrage  supported 
by,  215 

Evans,  H.  K.,  admission  of,  to  practice 
in  United  States  Supreme  Court,  250 

Evans,  Mrs.  H.  K.,  admission  of,  to  prac- 
tice in  United  States  Supreme  Court, 
250 

Everall,  Hannah,  property  of,  freed  from 
husband's  control,  97 

Exchequer,  Court  of,  decision  of,  228, 
229 

Executor,  limitation  on  woman's  right  to 
act  as,  20 

Exemplary  damages,  right  of  wife  to,  36- 
38 

Exempt  property,  wife's  signature  re- 
quired on  mortgage  of,  104;  lien  on, 
142;  widow's  right  to,  257 

Factories,  number  of  women  employed  in, 
154 

Factory  Act  of  1902,  provisions  of,  con- 
cerning employment  of  girls,  148 

Factory  inspector,  woman  employed  as, 
150,  226  (see  also  Woman  factory  in- 
spector) 

Factory  operatives,  women  employed  as, 
145 

Family  expenses,  definition  of,  133,  134, 
135,  136;  liability  for,  138,  141,  153 

Farmington,  seminary  at,  22 

Farms,  hours  of  work  of  women  on,   149 

Father,  right  of,  to  custody  of  children, 
11,  12,  82,  83,  84;  consent  of,  re- 
quired, 18,  64;  right  of,  to  recover 
damages  for  marriage  of  minor  daugh- 
ter, 29,  30;  right  of,  to  damages  for 
seduction  of  minor  daughter,  30;  obli- 
gation of,  to  support  children,  244,  254 

Federal  amendment,  agitation  for,  166- 
170;  possibility  of,  239 

Federal  courts,  woman  admitted  to  prac- 
tice in,  250 

Feeble-minded  girl,  penalty  for  seduction 
of,  57 

Felony,  divorce  granted  for  conviction  of, 
after  marriage,  66,  153,  154 

Feme  Covert,  4  (see  also  Married  women) 


286 


INDEX 


Fifteenth  Amendment,  effect  of,  166,  167; 
extension  of  electorate  by,  176;  inter- 
est in,  200;  attempt  to  include  "sex" 
in,  238 

Fifteenth    General    Assembly,    equal    suf- 
frage amendment  adopted  by,   186 
Finland,    equal  suffrage   adopted  by,    171 
Fisher,  Mrs.  Mary,  election  of,  on  school 

board,    234 
Flagg,    Mrs.,    nomination    of,    for    county 

superintendent,    184 

Fleming,  Mrs.  Eva,  position  held  by,  44 
Fletcher,   Matilda,  speeches  of,   on  behalf 

of  U.  S.  Grant,  184 
Florida,  labor  laws  in,  264 
Flynn,  Mrs.  Martin,  speech  by,  209 
Foreign  born  voters,  attitude  of,  on  equal 

suffrage,  220 

Foreign  countries,  equal  suffrage  in,   171 
Fort  Madison,  seminary  at,  22 ;  reference 

to,  234 

Foster,  Mrs.  H.  A.,  speech  by,  209,  211 
Foster,   Mrs.   Judith  Ellen,   admission  of, 

to  bar,  50 

Fourteenth  Amendment,  effect  of,  166, 
167;  woman  suffrage  claimed  under, 
185 ;  abandonment  of  claim  based  on, 
192;  interest  in,  200 

Fourteenth  General   Assembly,   equal  suf- 
frage amendment  rejected  by,   180 
France,  divorce  rate  in,   75 
Franchise,  qualifications  for,   15,  21 
Fraud,  agreement  for  the  purpose  of,  141, 

142 
Frederica,   woman   on  board  of  directors 

at,   234 

"Free  love",   confusion  of  political  equal- 
ity of  women  with,   181;  connection  of 
equal  suffrage  with,   denied,   182,   185 
Free  silver,   agitation  for,   205 
Freeman,  Mae,  service  of,  as  county  audi- 
tor, 234 

Gage,  Frances  Dana,  lectures  by,   175 

Gale,  A.  H.,  resolution  introduced  by, 
214;  bills  introduced  by,  272 

Garrison,  William  Lloyd,  protest  of, 
against  exclusion  of  women  from  Lon- 
don conference,  161 

Gates,  George  W.,  equal  suffrage  advo- 
cated by,  193 


Gear,  John  H.,  woman  delegate  appoint- 
ed by,  224 

General  Assembly,  action  of,  on  equal 
suffrage,  179,  180,  186,  187,  188,  189, 
190,  193,  194,  197,  199,  201,  205, 
209,  212,  213,  214,  215,  216,  217, 
221,  239;  policy  of,  on  suffrage  amend- 
ment, 186;  amendment  admitting  wom- 
en to,  proposed,  188 ;  Miss  Anthony 
presiding  officer  of  session  of,  206;  ad- 
dress to,  215;  women  employees  of, 
223;  women  ineligible  to,  228,  229, 
236,  239;  school  offices  opened  to  wom- 
en by,  230 ;  office  of  county  recorder 
opened  to  women  by,  233;  right  of,  to 
admit  women  to  offices,  239 
German  language  newspaper,  equal  suf- 
frage opposed  by,  195 
Gilchrist,  Mrs.  Eva  S.,  petition  of,  202, 

203 

Girls,  penalty  for  enticing  away  of,  for 
immoral  purposes,  56;  treatment  of 
wayward,  61-63;  minimum  age  of,  for 
marriage,  64,  65 ;  employment  of,  re- 
stricted, 148 

Gougar,    Mrs.    Helen    M.,    committee    ad- 
dressed by,   197 
Governor,  women  denied  right  to  vote  for. 

221 

Granger,  Lottie  E.,  election  of,  44 
Grant,  Ulysses  S.,  225 
Great  Britain,  statutes  of,  22 
Greenback  party,  equal  political  rights  ad- 
vocated by,   188,   189;  women  nominat- 
ed by,  235 

Grimes,  James  W.,  vote  of,  255 
Grinnell  College,  president  of,   193 
Guardian,    right    of,    to   sue   for    injuries, 
35,    36;    appointment   of,    82,    83,    84; 
right  of  mother  to  act  as,   153 
Guardianship  of  children,   right  of  moth- 
er to,    73,    153,   254;   laws   concerning, 
82-85 
Gue,  B.  F.,  support  of  equal  suffrage  by, 

269 

Gue,  Mrs.  B.  P.,  suffrage  activities  of, 
191;  death  of,  269 

Haddock,    Mrs.   Emma   H.,    admission   of, 

to  bar,   50,  250 
Hallam,  Mrs.  Julia  C.,  207 


INDEX 


287 


Hamilton,  John  J.,  equal  suffrage  sup- 
ported by,  215 

Harlan,  Edgar  R.,  equal  suffrage  sup- 
ported by,  215 

Harlan,  James,  vote  of,  on  equal  suf- 
frage, 265 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  support  of  women 
asked  for,  198 

Hart,  Gratia,  130 

Hart,    Henry,    130 

Havre,  desire  of  woman  to  be  consul  at, 
225 

Hay,  Mary  G.,  work  of,  207 

Hayden,  Addie,  election  of,  as  county  re- 
corder, 233 

Hayes,  E.  A.,  equal  suffrage  supported 
by,  170 

Head  of  a  family,  definition  of,  125,  126; 
exemption  of  property  of,  142 

Heir,  definition  of,  103 ;  widow  not  con- 
sidered as,  113 

Heirs,  provisions  concerning,  20,   21 

Hickey,  Mary  B.,  law  degree  received  by, 
51 

High  schools,  status  of  girls  in,  40 

Hill,  Mrs.  C.  I.,  election  of,  as  county 
recorder,  233 

Hobbs,  Lucy  B.,  practice  of  dentistry  by, 
49 

Home  rule  charter  cities,  municipal  suf- 
frage granted  by,  165 

Homestead,  right  of  widow  to  choose, 
104;  right  of  wife  to,  124-127,  261; 
platting  of,  126;  relinquishment  of 
right  of,  126 

Hospitals  for  insane,  women  physicians 
in,  224;  woman  on  committee  to  visit, 
225,  226 

Hotels,  women  employees  in,  145 ;  hours 
of  work  in,  150;  condition  of  women 
employees  in,  150,  151;  inspection  of, 
226 

Hours  of  work,  attempts  to  limit,  for 
women,  149,  150;  number  of,  for  wom- 
en employees,  150 

House  of  Representatives  (Iowa),  report 
to.  on  women's  reformatory,  59,  60; 
first  woman  to  speak  in  hall  of,  197; 
woman  clerk  of,  223;  women  not  eli 
gible  to,  223,  235,  236  (see  also  Gen- 


eral Assembly  and  the  various  General 


House  of  Representatives  (United  States), 
attitude  of,  toward  equal  suffrage,  167- 
170;  vote  in,  on  equal  suffrage,  169, 
170;  adoption  of  federal  equal  suffrage 
amendment  by,  170 ;  women  eligible  to 
seats  in,  240 

Household  goods,  bill  to  require  consent 
of  husband  and  wife  to  sale  of,  102 

Housewife,  recovery  for  injuries  to,  33, 
34 

Huff,  Howard  A.,  election  contest  of, 
229,  230 

Hughes,  Charles  E.,  federal  action  on 
suffrage  favored  by,  170 

Hull,  Harry  E.,  vote  of,  on  equal  suf- 
frage, 266 

Hunt,  Harriet  R.,  protest  issued  by,   177 

Husband,  invalidity  of  contracts  between 
wife  and,  4 ;  right  of,  to  damages  for 
injuries  to  wife,  8,  9,  29-34;  responsi- 
bility of,  for  wife's  acts,  9,  10;  right 
of,  to  control  wife,  10,  11,  244;  right 
of,  to  control  wife's  property,  18,  19, 
20,  68,  69,  70,  71,  72,  86-94,  114, 
115,  136;  right  of,  to  testify,  27-29, 
58 ;  right  of,  to  wife's  services,  29, 
30,  32,  33 ;  criminal  cases  involving, 
53 ;  murder  of,  54 ;  punishment  of,  for 
desertion,  57;  responsibility  of,  for 
wife's  support,  66,  129-133,  143,,  153, 
244 ;  right  of,  to  alimony,  68-73 ;  right 
of,  to  curtesy,  94-105;  alienation  of 
distributive  share  of,  112 ;  control  of 
family  property  by,  114,  143,  153;  po- 
sition of,  as  head  of  the  family,  125, 
126,  127;  responsibility  of,  for  family 
expenses,  133,  134,  135;  wife  not  li- 
able for  care  of,  135;  liability  of,  for 
wife's  debts,  136,  137,  139,  140; 
wife's  earnings  not  the  property  of, 
138;  wife's  property  liable  for  debts 
of,  138,  139;  right  of,  to  sue  wife, 
142 ;  responsibility  of,  for  care  of  in- 
sane wife,  143 ;  liability  of,  to  provide 
for  burial  of  wife,  143 ;  right  of,  to 
sue  for  medical  expenses,  247 
Husbands,  divorces  to,  21;  number  of  di- 
vorces granted  to,  74.  78,  79,  80,  254 


288 


INDEX 


Hutchinson,  Mrs.  Anne,  demand  of,  for 
equal  rights,  159 

Iceland,  equal  suffrage  granted  to  women 
of,  171 

Idaho,  per  cent  of  illiteracy  among  wom- 
en in,  42;  equal  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164 

Idiots,   disfranchisement  of,  203 

Illegitimate  children,  obligation  of  father 
to  support,  19 ;  guardianship  of,  85 ; 
inheritance  laws  concerning,  85,  256; 
obligation  of  mother  to  support,  244 

Ill-fame,  punishment  for  enticing  a  vir- 
tuous woman  to  a  house  of,  56 

Illinois,  school  suffrage  adopted  by,  164; 
presidential  and  local  suffrage  adopted 
by,  164,  165 

Illinois  Suffrage  Association,  president 
of,  215 

Illiteracy,  per  cent  of,  in  Iowa,  41 

Impotency,  divorce  granted  for,   18,   66 

Incompatibility,  divorce  granted  for,  66 

Independence,  wife  not  responsible  for 
care  of  husband  in  hospital  at,  135; 
suffrage  society  formed  at,  186;  wom- 
an trustee  for  hospital  at,  224 

Indiana,  jurisdiction  of  officers  of,  over 
District  of  Louisiana,  14;  presidential 
suffrage  in,  165 

Indirect  injuries,  right  of  women  to  dam- 
ages for,  35-38 

Industrial  school,  girls  to  be  sent  to,  61; 
provision  for,  62,  63 

Industrial  School  for  Girls,  organization 
of,  62,  63 

Industry,  part  of  women  in,  144-151; 
number  of  women  wage  earners  in, 
145-147;  protection  of  women  in,  147- 
151;  status  of  women  in,  154 

Inebriates,  treatment  of,  60 

Tngham,  Harvey,  equal  suffrage  support- 
ed by,  215 

Inheritance,  distributive  share  distin- 
guished from,  103 

Inhuman  treatment,  divorce  granted  for, 
66,  153;  definition  of,  67,  68 

Innocence,  presumption  of,  in  case  of 
married  woman,  58 

Insane,  disfranchisement  of,  203 ;  women 
physicians  in  hospitals  for,  224;  wom- 


an on  committee  to  visit  hospitals  for, 
225,  226 

Insane,  National  Association  for  the  Pro- 
tection of  the,  woman  delegate  to,  224 

Institutions,   girls  sent  to,   63 

Insurance,   247 

Insurance  policy,  decision  concerning, 
103 

Iowa,  status  of  women  in,  before  organ- 
ization of  Territory  of,  14-22 ;  lack  of 
government  for,  16;  effect  of  Michigan 
and  Wisconsin  laws  on,  22;  per  cent 
of  illiteracy  in,  41;  number  of  women 
physicians  in,  48,  49 ;  number  of  wom- 
en dentists  in,  49 ;  women  lawyers  in, 
50,  51;  divorce  rate  in,  75-81;  num- 
ber of  women  employed  in  industry  in, 
146,  147;  protection  of  women  in,  147- 
151;  tax  suffrage  adopted  by,  164; 
history  of  struggle  for  equal  suffrage 
in,  172-221;  vote  in,  on  suffrage  and 
prohibition,  220;  first  equal  suffrage 
amendment  in,  238;  proportion  of  di- 
vorces granted  to  wives  in,  254 

Iowa  City,  wages  of  teachers  at,  42 

Iowa  Equal  Suffrage  Association,  name 
changed  to,  193  ;  incorporation  of,  272 
(see  also  Iowa  Woman  Suffrage  Asso- 
ciation) 

Iowa  Federation  of  Women's  Clubs,  con- 
vention of,  269 

Iowa  Industrial  Reformatory  for  Females, 
establishment  of,  60;  change  of  name 
of,  61  (see  also  Women's  Reformatory) 

Iowa  press  convention,  women  permitted 
to  vote  at,  183 

Iowa  Reform  School,  provision  for  girls 
at,  61,  62 

Iowa  State  College  of  Agriculture  and 
Mechanic  Arts,  status  of  women  in,  41 

Iowa  State  motto,  variation  of,   190 

Iowa  State  Register  (Des  Moines),  atti- 
tude of,  toward  equal  suffrage,  198, 
205 ;  aid  for  Republican  candidates  re- 
quested by,  204,  205;  comment  by,  on 
suffrage  meeting,  206;  statement  in, 
225 

Iowa  State  Weekly  Register  (Des 
Moines),  letter  published  in,  181 

Towa  Woman  Suffrage  Association,  origin 
of,  184;  history  of,  184,  185,  190,  191, 


INDEX 


289 


192,  193,  199,  201,  202,  219;  meet- 
ings of,  184,  185,  190,  191,  193,  199, 
201,  202;  leaders  in,  191;  plan  of  or- 
ganization of,  191;  local  clubs  organ- 
ized by,  192 ;  affiliation  of,  with  Amer- 
ican Woman  Suffrage  Association,  193 ; 
incorporation  of,  193;  support  of  The 
Woman's  Standard  by,  194;  activities 
of,  201;  organization  of,  238;  name  of, 
268  (see  also  Iowa  Equal  Suffrage 
Association) 

Iowa  Woman's  Suffrage  Association, 
name  of,  268  (see  also  Iowa  Woman 
Suffrage  Association) 

Irish,  John  P.,  first  constitutional  amend- 
ment granting  equal  suffrage  intro- 
duced by,  179;  bill  introduced  by,  to 
give  women  presidential  suffrage,  180 ; 
election  of,  as  vice  president  of  suffrage 
association,  185 ;  bill  introduced  by, 
201;  equal  suffrage  amendment  opposed 
by,  219 

Jails,  men  and  women  not  to  be  confined 
in  same  apartments  in,  59 

James  I,   15 

Japan,   divorce  rate  in,   75 

Johnson  County,  woman  county  auditor 
of,  234 

Jones,  Abraham,  divorce  from,  21 

Jones,  Lucinda,  divorce  granted  to,  21 

Judicial  sale,  alienation  of  dower  by,  112 

Judiciary  committee,  equal  suffrage  re- 
ferred to,  167 

Julian,  George  W.,  amendment  introduced 
in  Congress  by,  167 

Jury  duty,  proposal  to  exclude  women 
from,  209 

Kansas,  school  suffrage  adopted  by,  163, 
164;  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  164; 
success  of  school  suffrage  in,  198 

Karney  v.  Paisley,  decision  concerning 
wife's  testimony  in,  27 

Keating,  Edward,  equal  suffrage  support- 
ed by,  170 

Kennedy,  Mrs.  M.  Lloyd,  appointment  of, 
on  committee,  225 

Keokuk,  medical  college  at,  47 

KeokuJe  Constitution,  equal  suffrage  fa- 
vored by,  195 


King,  property  rights  of  wife  of,  5;  pen- 
alty for  murder  of,  10 

Kirkwood,  Samuel  J.,  attitude  of,  toward 
equal  suffrage,  186 ;  women  appointed 
by,  224 

Klinker,  Peter  J.,  equal  suffrage  opposed 
by,  217 

Knights  of  Labor,  admission  of  women 
to,  200 

Kossuth,  Louis,   185 

Labor,  Commissioner  of,  laws  to  be  en- 
forced by,  148;  inspectors  appointed 
by,  226 

Labor  legislation,  small  amount  of,  in 
Iowa,  149 

Larrabee,  William,  limited  suffrage  advo- 
cated by,  193,  194,  198,  199;  equal 
suffrage  supported  by,  196 

Latham,  Mrs.  L.  M.,  woman  suffrage  de- 
partment conducted  by,  195 

Latty,  Mrs.  J.  H.,  service  of,  as  deputy 
sheriff,  233,  234 

Laundries,  women  employees  in,  145;  re- 
port concerning  condition  of  women 
employed  in,  150,  151;  inspection  of, 
226 

Law,  45 ;  status  of  women  in  profession 
of,  50,  51;  lack  of  interest  in,  by  wom- 
en, 225 

Laws  of  Iowa,  1862,  provision  of,  229 

Lawyer,  first  woman,  250 

Lawyers,  number  of  women  serving  as, 
52,  145,  225 

Lee  County,  reform  school  in,  62 

Legal  status  of  women,  recapitulation  of, 
152-155 

Legalizing  acts,  passage  of,  concerning 
property  transfers,  112 

Legislation,  attempt  of  women  to  influ- 
ence, 174 

Legislative  Assembly,  divorces  granted  by, 
76 

Legislative  divorces,   76 

Legitimate  children,  guardianship  of,  82- 
85 

Lewdness,   63 

Libel,  right  of  wife  to  sue  for,  31 

Librarians,   women  as,    145 

Library  trustees,  women  eligible  as,  226 

Lien,  wife's  property  subject  to,  141 


19 


290 


INDEX 


Liquor,  recovery  for  injuries  due  to  sale 

of,  36-38 
London,    trade    carried    on    by    married 

women    of,    5;    anti-slavery    conference 

at,   161 
Loss   of  time,   recovery  of   damages   for, 

31;    right   of   husband   to   recover   for, 

32,   33,   34 
Louisiana,     jurisdictions    over,     14;     tax 

suffrage  adopted  by,  164 
Louisiana,  District  of,  organization  of,  14 
Louisiana,    Territory  of,    organization   of, 

15 

Louisiana  Purchase,  Iowa  included  in,  14 
Louisville    Courier-Journal,    comment    by, 

232 

Lovejoy,    Owen    R.,    equal    suffrage    sup- 
ported by,  219 

McClain,  Emlin,  comment  of,  on  Civil  and 
Common  Law,  16-18;  facts  concerning, 
245 
McClintock,  Mary  Ann,  convention  called 

by,  162 
McCoid,  M.  A.,  minority  report  on  equal 

suffrage  signed  by,  168 
McCollum,  J.  R.,  election  contest  of,  231 
McCowen,  Jennie,  service  of,  on  hospital 

staff,  224 
McGregor,    women   refused   franchise    at, 

208 
Machinery,    regulation   of   employment   of 

girls  around,  148 
McKinney,   Mrs.   Jane   C.,    service   of,    as 

trustee,   224 

Madden,  Martin  B.,  equal  suffrage  sup- 
ported by,  170 

Maintenance,  contract  of  wife  for  sep- 
arate, 107 

Majority,  age  of,  65 

"Male",  amendment  to  strike,  from  the 
constitution,  179,  180,  186,  187,  188, 
189,  190,  193,  194,  197,  199,  201, 
205,  209,  212,  213,  214,  215,  216, 
217,  219,  220,  221 

"Male  citizens",  members  of  General  As- 
sembly must  be,  236 
Mai-treatment,  damages  for,  32 
Manitoba,  equal  suffrage  granted  by,   171 
Mann,  Horace,  co-education  recommended 
by,  39,  40 


Mansfield,  Mrs.  Arabella,  admission  of,  to 
bar,  50 ;  election  of,  as  secretary  of 
suffrage  association,  185 ;  facts  con- 
cerning, 250 

Manslaughter,  married  women  punished 
for,  10 ;  exemption  of  woman  from 
penalty  for,  58 

Manual  labor,  women  engaged  in,  145 
Manufactures,     number     of     women     em- 
ployed in,    146 

Marion  County  Political  Equality  Associ- 
ation, address  before,  192 
Marriage,  contract  of,  4 ;  effect  of,  on 
rights  of  women,  17;  restrictions  on, 
18,  64,  65,  243,  247;  coercing  a  wom- 
an into,  56 ;  prosecution  for  seduction 
barred  by,  56;  status  of  women  in,  64, 
65 ;  demand  for  abolition  of  institution 
of,  172,  181 

Married  women,  status  of,  under  Com- 
mon Law,  3-13 ;  property  rights  of, 
under  Common  Law,  4-8 ;  relative  po- 
sition of,  under  Civil  and  Common 
Law,  16-18;  control  of  husband  over 
property  of,  19,  20;  legal  settlement 
of,  25;  legal  name  of,  26,  246;  right 
of,  to  testify,  27-29;  right  of,  to  re- 
cover for  personal  injuries,  29-35; 
right  of,  to  damages  for  indirect  in- 
juries, 35-38 ;  protection  of,  from  hus- 
bands' mistreatment,  54;  ownership  of 
property  by,  86-94,  152,  153;  right  of, 
to  property,  91;  dower  rights  of,  94- 
105 ;  alienation  of  dower  right  of,  105- 
114;  right  of,  to  make  contracts,  114- 
125,  260;  conveyances  by,  120;  re- 
sponsibility for  contracts  disliked  by, 
121;  contracts  with,  enforceable,  122; 
homestead  rights  of,  125-127;  adminis- 
tration of  estates  by,  127;  right  of,  to 
convey  property,  129;  exemption  of 
property  of,  from  husbands'  debts,  138 
Marshalltown,  Iowa  press  convention  at, 

183 ;   Greenback  convention  at,  188 
Martineau,   Harriet,   opinion   of,   concern- 
ing position  of  American  women,  161 
Maryland,  position  of  woman  in,  159 
Massachusetts,  appearance  of  equal  rights 
movement     in,     159;     school     suffrage 
adopted  by,    164 
Matron,   appointment  of,  at  Anamosa,   60 


INDEX 


291 


Matthews,  Augusta,  position  of,  as  secre- 
tary, 223 

Maxwell,  Mrs.  S.  B.,  service  of,  as  State 
librarian,  224 

Mechanical  work,  number  of  women  em- 
ployed in,  146 

Mechanic's  lien,  widow's  share  exempt 
from,  113 

Medical  attendance,  responsibility  of  hus- 
band for,  31,  131 

Medical  expenses,  liability  of  married 
woman  for,  33 ;  right  of  wife  to  sue 
for,  247 

Medicine,  45 ;  status  of  women  in,  46- 
49;  number  of  women  in,  52 

Men,  number  of,  in  teaching  profession, 
42 

Men's  League  for  Woman  Suffrage,  or- 
ganization of,  215 

Meredith,  C.  A.,  bill  granting  school  suf- 
frage introduced  by,  214 

Meredith,  E,  T.,  equal  suffrage  supported 
by,  215 

Merrill,  Mrs.  Anna  C.,  appointment  of,  as 
teacher,  224 

Michigan,  repeal  of  laws  of,  22;  school 
suffrage  adopted  by,  164;  presidential 
suffrage  adopted  by,  165;  equal  suf- 
frage adopted  by,  166 

Michigan,  Territory  of,  Iowa  included  in, 
16;  laws  of,  concerning  women,  18-21; 
law  of,  concerning  dower  and  curtesy, 
94 

Military  duty,  proposal  to  exempt  women 
from,  209 

Military  secretary,  woman  as,  223 

Militia,  provisions  for,   14 

Miller,  Mrs.  Mary  H.,  service  of,  as  State 
librarian,  224 

Millinery,  notice  concerning,  259,  260 

Mineral  Point  (Wisconsin),  seminary  at, 
22 

Mines,  women  excluded  from,  148 

Minimum  wage  law,  absence  of,  in  Iowa, 
150 

Ministry,  45 

Minneapolis   Tribune,    statement   of,    con- 
cerning school  suffrage,   187 
Minnesota,    school    suffrage    adopted    by, 
164;  success  of  school  suffrage  in,  187 
Minors,  enfranchisement  of,  203 


Mississippi,  divorces  in,  254 

Mississippi  River,  first  suffrage  State  east 
of,  164 

Missouri,  admission  of,  16 

Missouri,  Territory  of,  organization  of, 
15 ;  the  Common  Law  extended  over, 
15,  16 

Mitchell,  John,  decision  of,  230 

Mitchell  County,  election  of  woman  as 
county  superintendent  of,  228,  229 

Mitchellville,  girls  to  be  transferred  from, 
60;  establishment  of  Industrial  School 
for  Girls  at,  62 

Mondell,  Frank  W.,  equal  suffrage  sup- 
ported by,  170 

Mondell  Resolution,  vote  on,  169,  170 

Montana,  school  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164 ;  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  164 

Montgomery  County,  women  in  Repub- 
lican convention  of,  184 

Moore,  Esther,  exclusion  of,  from  London 
conference,  161 

Mortgage,  wife's  signature  required  on, 
104;  responsibility  of  wife  for  signa- 
ture to,  108;  right  of  wife  to  recover 
by,  111;  execution  of,  by  married  wom- 
an, 120 

Morton,  Levi  P.,  support  of  women  asked 
for,  198 

Mother,  right  of,  to  custody  of  children, 
11,  12,  73,  74;  punishment  of,  for 
causing  death  of  illegitimate  child,  19; 
penalty  for  desertion  of  children  by, 
57;  right  of,  to  guardianship  of  chil- 
dren, 82-85,  153;  appointment  of,  as 
administrator,  128;  care  of,  147;  right 
of,  to  custody  of  children,  253 

Mothers'  pensions,  provision  for,  153 

Mott,  James,  meeting  presided  over  by, 
162 

Mott,  Lucretia,  exclusion  of,  from  Lon- 
don conference,  161;  convention  called 
by,  162 

Mount  Pleasant,  seminary  at,  22 ;  men- 
tion of,  48 ;  girls  in  reform  school 
moved  to,  62;  first  suffrage  convention 
at,  184,  185 

Municipal      administration,      interest     of 

women  in,  227 

Municipal  court,  right  of  women  to  vote 
on  establishment  of,  208 


292 


INDEX 


Municipal  elections,  right  of  women  to 
vote  at,  202,  239 

Municipal  officers,  women  denied  right  to 
vote  for,  221 

Municipal  suffrage,  163 ;  adoption  of, 
165;  suggestion  of,  as  experiment,  194, 
196 ;  possibility  of,  195 ;  defeat  of,  197, 
199;  attempt  to  secure,  198;  bill  con- 
ferring, 201,  202;  objections  to,  239 

Murder,  punishment  of  married  women 
for,  10 

Murderer,  property  not  to  be  inherited 
by,  113 

Muscatine,  225 

Muscatine  County,  minimum  wage  for 
teachers  fixed  by,  43 

Name,  provisions  concerning,  26,  246 

Names,  counting  of,  231 

National-American  Woman  Suffrage  Asso- 
ciation, 268;  secretary  of,  269 

National  Union  Greenback  Labor  party, 
equal  suffrage  favored  by,  268 

National  Woman  Suffrage  Association, 
meeting  of,  205,  206,  207;  organiza- 
tion of,  268 

National  Woman's  Rights  Convention, 
holding  of,  162 

Nebraska,  school  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164;  presidential  and  municipal  suf- 
frage adopted  by,  165 

Necessities,  right  of  wife  to  contract  for, 
115,  129;  liability  of  husband  for,  142 

Neglect  to  provide,  254 

Negro  suffrage,  effect  of  struggle  over, 
161;  relation  of,  to  woman  suffrage, 
173,  174;  early  failure  of,  200 

Negroes,  exclusion  of,  from  practice  of 
law,  50;  property  rights  granted  to, 
90;  enfranchisement  of,  162,  166,  167, 
179 

Nevada,  divorce  rate  in,  75;  equal  suf- 
frage adopted  by,  164;  labor  laws  in, 
264 

New  Hampshire,  school  suffrage  adopted 
by,  164 

New  Jersey,  women  entitled  to  vote  in, 
160,  161;  school  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164 

New  Mexico,  school  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164;  labor  laws  in,  264 


New  York,  equal  suffrage  discussed  in 
constitutional  convention  of,  161; 
school  suffrage  adopted  by,  164 ;  equal 
suffrage  adopted  by,  165,  166;  attempt 
of  women  to  vote  in,  167 

New  Zealand,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by, 
171 

Newspaper  work,  45 

Newspapers,  attitude  of,  toward  equal 
suffrage,  189,  191,  194,  195,  199,  219 

Newton,  John  C.,   divorce  from,   21 

Newton,  Martha,   divorce  granted  to,  21 

Newton,  51 

Night  work,  attempt  to  prohibit,  for  wom- 
en, 149 

Nineteenth  General  Assembly,  equal  suf- 
frage amendment  adopted  by,  189 

North,  Mrs.  Ada  E.,  appointment  of,  as 
State  librarian,  223,  224 

North  Carolina,   divorces   in,   254 

North  Dakota,  school  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164;  presidential  and  municipal  suf- 
frage adopted  by,  165 

Northern  Woman  Suffrage  Association, 
organization  of,  184 

Northwest  Territory,  rights  of  inhabitants 
of,  16 

Norway,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,   171 

Notaries  public,  women  as,  224 

Notes,  right  of  wife  to,   88 

Nugent,  James,  equal  suffrage  supported 
by,  215 

Nurses,  hours  of  work  of,   149 

Nursing,  45;  status  of  women  in  profes- 
sion of,  49,  263;  number  of  women  in, 
52 

Nye,  Edwin  A.,  eqiial  suffrage  supported 
by,  215 

O'Connor,  Henry,  election  of,  as  president 
of  suffrage  association,  185 ;  decision 
of,  228,  229,  234,  239 

Offenders,  treatment  of,   58 

Office,  sex  qualification  for,  228 

Office-holders,  women  as,   207 

Office-holding,  status  of  women  in,  222- 
237;  lack  of  emphasis  on,  236;  reso- 
lution concerning,  267 

Officials,  number  of  women  employed  as, 
52 

Ohio,    school    suffrage    adopted   by,    164; 


INDEX 


293 


presidential  and  municipal  suffrage  in, 

165 
Oklahoma,    school    suffrage    adopted    by, 

164;   equal  suffrage  in,   166 
Old  Blue  Book,  provision  of,   concerning 

imprisonment,   59 
O'Meara,   Thomas  J.,   attitude  of,   toward 

equal  suffrage,  196 

Ontario,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,   171 
Ordinance  of  1787,  extension  of,  to  Iowa, 

16;   provisions  of,   concerning  widow's 

share  in  property  of  husband,  18 
Oregon,     per    cent    of     illiteracy     among 

women  in,  42;  school  suffrage  adopted 

by,    164;    equal    suffrage    adopted   by, 

164 

Orleans,  Territory  of,  organization  of,  14 
Osceola,  44 
Osteopaths,   number  of  women  listed  as, 

49 

Ottumwa,  44 
Ownership,  notice  of,  required,   137,  263 

Pain  and  suffering,  recovery  of  damages 

for,  33,  34 
Paine,  Thomas,   equal  suffrage  advocated 

by,  160 
Palmer,   Mrs.  F.  W.,   election  of,   as  vice 

president  of  suffrage  association,  185 
Pangborn,  Sara  A.,  service  of,  on  hospital 

staff,  224 

Pankhurst,   Sylvia,  address  by,  215 
Paraphernalia,   husband's  authority  over, 

6 

Parents,    consent    of,    required    for    mar- 
riage    of    minor     children,     65 ;     joint 

guardianship  of,   84 
Parliamentary  law,   drill  in,   207 
Pasadena   (California),  effect  of  women's 

votes  in,  218 

Pay,  demand  for  equal,  201 
Pella,  business  woman  of,  260 
Penal  institutions,   women  on  committees 

to  visit,  224 
Penitentiary,    provision    of,    for    women, 

60 ;  woman  employed  as  teacher  in,  224 
"Person",  definition  of,  15,  63,  228 
Personal    injuries,    recovery    of    damages 

for,   29-35 
Personal   property,    right   of   husband    to 

wife's,  under  Common  Law,  6 ;  right  of 


wife  to  share  in,  x02 ;  wife's  lack  of 
control  over,  114,  153 ;  signature  of 
husband  and  wife  necessary  for  lien  on 
exempt,  142;  right  of  widow  to  share 
in,  257 

Personal  rights  of  women,  23-38 

Personal  service,  number  of  women  em- 
ployed in,  146 

Petit  treason,  act  of,   10 

Petitions,  presentation  of,  202,  203; 
charges  against,  211;  defense  of,  212 

Pharmacy,  45 ;   women  in  practice  of,  52 

Philandrian  College,  co-education  in,  22 

Phillips,  "Wendell,  protest  of,  against  ex- 
clusion of  women,  161 

Physicians,  number  of  women  serving  as, 
48,  49,  52,  145 

Piano,  responsibility  of  wife  for  price  of, 
134 

Pioneer  life,  equality  of  men  and  women 
fostered  by,  155 

Piqua    (Ohio),   138 

Playground  superintendent,  woman  may 
act  as,  227 

Police  duty,  proposal  to  exclude  women 
from,  209 

Police  matron,  appointment  of,  59 

Police  power,  exercise  of,  53 

Police  stations,  apartments  for  women  at, 
59 

Political  rights  of  women,  history  of,  159- 
240;  summary  of,  221 

Political  status,  recapitulation  of,  238-240 

Polk  City,   234 

Polk  County,  woman  elected  sub-director 
in,  234,  235 

Polk  County  Suffrage  Society,  organiza- 
tion of,  185,  186;  address  before,  192 

Poor  relief,  married  women  not  liable  for, 
21,  22;  settlement  requirement  for,  24, 
25 

Popular  vote,  attempt  to  restrict,  221 

Populist  party,  equal  suffrage  plank  in, 
202 

Post  mistress,  women  employed  as,   223 

Postnuptial  contract,  validity  of,  107; 
alienation  of  dower  by,  prohibited,  108, 
109,  110 

Poultry,   exemption  of,   142 

Powderly,  Terence  V.,  attitude  of,  toward 
equal  suffrage,  200,  201 


294 


INDEX 


Power     of     attorney,     dower    not    relin- 
quished under,   110 
Presidential   campaign   of   1872,   part  of 

women  in,   184 

Presidential  electors,  women  entitled  to 
vote  for,  166;  women  denied  vote  for, 
221;  women  qualified  to  serve  as,  237, 
240 

Presidential   suffrage,    163;    adoption   of, 
165;   proposal  of,  for  Iowa,   180;   bill 
granting,  201;   defeat  of  bill  granting, 
214;  objections  to,  239 
Preston,  J.  H.,  ruling  of,  103 
Primary   election,    equal   suffrage   amend- 
ment submitted  at,  219 
Primary  suffrage,   adoption  of,   165 
Prisoners,   treatment  of,   58-63 
Probation  officers,   service  of  women   as, 

226 

Professions,   status  of  women   in,   45-52; 
number    of   women    in,    146;    right    of 
women  to  enter,    152;   trained  nursing 
classed  among,   263 
Progressives,    238 

Prohibition,    petition    for,    174;    struggle 
over,   189;   emphasis  on,   205;   relation 
of  vote  on,  to  vote  on  suffrage,  220 
Prohibition   party,    equal   suffrage   plank 

in,  202;  woman  nominated  by,  235 
Prohibition-Republican-Knights  of  Labor 
party,  equal  suffrage  endorsed  by,  196 
Property,  classes  of,  5;  laws  concerning 
rights  of,  16;  right  of  husband  to 
wife's,  19,  20;  right  to  sue  for  dam- 
ages to,  35;  right  of  women  to  own, 
86-94,  152,  153 ;  amount  of,  owned  by 
women,  90,  91,  92;  right  of  wife  to 
dispose  of,  129 ;  exemption  of  wife's, 
from  husband's  debts,  138;  notice  of 
ownership  of,  required,  141 ;  contracts 
concerning  distributive  share  in,  for- 
bidden, 141;  importance  of  rights  con- 
cerning, 194 

Property  rights  of  women,  86-143 
Prostitution,  attitude  of  Common  Law  to- 
ward,  54 ;  enticing  virtuous  women  to 
a  house  of,  56 

Protection,  right  of  women  to,  53-58 
Protective   legislation,    lack    of,    in    Iowa, 
147,  149,  154 


Public  comfort  stations,  woman  commis- 
sioner for,  227 

Public  Instruction,  State  Superintendent 
of,  nomination  of  woman  for,  189; 
women  eligible  to  office  of,  235 

Public  schools,  share  of  women  in,  39-44 

Punitive  damages,    34 

Purcell,  Mrs.  Nellie,  speech  by,  209 

Quakers,  equality  of  men  and  women  fa- 
vored by,  160,  161 

Queen,  independence  of,  5 ;  recognition 
of,  225;  dower  right  of,  244,  245 

"R.  W.  T.",  letter  signed  by,  181,  182 
Ramsey,    Linda    M.,    appointment   of,    as 

clerk,   223 

Rape,  punishment  of,  11,  19,  54,  55; 
attitude  of  Common  Law  towards,  54 ; 
use  of  drugs  for  immoral  purposes  con- 
sidered as,  56,  251 

Real  estate,  right  of  husband  to  wife's, 
under  Common  Law,  5,  6 ;  transfer 
of,  116,  117,  153;  conveyance  of,  by 
married  women,  129 

Recapitulation  of  political  status,  238-240 
Recorder,     county,    office    of,     opened    to 

women,   233,   239 
Reed,     Thomas    B.,    minority    report    on 

equal  suffrage  written  by,  168,  169 
Reform  school,  investigation  of,  224 
Register  and  Leader,  The  (Des  Moines), 

support  of  equal  suffrage  by,   219 
Registration,    women    exempt    from,    208, 

217 

Relative,  decision  that  husband  is,  143 
Relief  work,  experience  of  women  in,  223 
Religion,   divorce  rate  affected  by,   75 
Representation,    relation    of    taxation    to, 

187 

Representatives    (United  States),  number 
of,    from    equal    suffrage    States,    166 ; 
attempt  of  women  to  vote  for,   167 
Republican     party,     attitude     of,     toward 
equal    suffrage,    170,    198;    submission 
of  amendment  approved  by,  179;  pref- 
erence   of    woman    nominee    for,    189; 
prohibition   supported  by,    198;    aid  of 
women  asked  by,  204 
Republican    State   convention,    submission 


INDSX 


295 


of  suffrage  amendment  favored  by, 
186;  imitation  of,  207 

Residence,  right  of  women  to  acquire,  24, 
25,  26 

Restaurants,  women  employees  in,  145, 
150,  151 

Revision  of  1860,  provision  of,  concern- 
ing testimony,  27;  provision  of,  con- 
cerning recovery  for  injuries  to  wom- 
en, 30;  provision  of,  concerning  wife's 
property,  88,  137,  138;  provision  of, 
concerning  dower,  99,  100;  provision 
of,  concerning  redemption  of  property 
from  tax  sale,  113;  provision  of,  con- 
cerning contracts  by  married  women, 
118,  119,  120,  123;  modification  of 
provision  of,  concerning  liability  for 
debts,  139 

Revolutionary  War,  demands  for  equal 
rights  during,  159,  160 

Rhode  Island,  presidential  suffrage  adopt- 
ed by,  165 ;  divorces  in,  254 

Riccord,  Miss  H.  J.,  advertisement  by, 
259,  260 

Riggs,  J.  F.,  equal  suffrage  supported  by, 
215 

Rights  of  Man,  160 

Road  duty,  proposal  to  exclude  women 
from,  209 

Roads,  proposal  to  require  women  to 
work  on,  180 

Rockford,  election  of  women  at,  235 

Rockwell  City,  selection  of,  as  site  of 
women's  reformatory,  61 

Roselle,   Lucinda,   case  of,   138 

Roselle,  W.  M.,  case  of,  138 

Rourke,  Mrs.  Ellen  M.,  appointment  of, 
as  factory  inspector,  150,  226 

Russia,  equal  suffrage  tried  in,  171 

Ruttkay,  Mr.,  speech  by,  185 

Sabin,  Henry,  statement  by,  232 
Saloons,    women  not   to   be   employed   in, 

148;  mention  of,  218 
Sanford,  Nettie,  election  of,  as  vice  presi- 
dent of  suffrage  association,   185 
Sanitary  agents,  law  providing  for,  223 
Saskatchewan,  equal  suffrage  granted  by, 

171 

Savery,  Mrs.  Annie  C.,  admission  of,  to 
bar,  50;  lectures  by,  179:  election  of, 


as   corresponding  secretary  of  suffrage 
association,   185;   speech  by,   185 
School,  right  of  women  to  attend,   39-42, 

152 

School  boards,  women  on,  234,  235 
School  elections,   right  of  women  to  vote 
at,   202,   239;  registration  for,   217 

School  officers,  women  denied  right  to 
vote  for,  221;  women  made  eligible  as, 
230,  234,  235;  interest  of  women  in, 
236 

School  suffrage,  adoption  of,  163,  164; 
success  of,  in  Minnesota,  187;  bill  to 
confer,  188,  199,  201,  202,  214,  215; 
suggestion  of  trial  of,  194;  attempt  to 
secure,  198;  denial  of,  208;  objections 
to,  239 

Scott  County,  vote  in,  on  suffrage  and 
prohibition,  220 

Secondary  schools,  share  of  girls  in,  39, 
40 

Seduction,  right  to  damages  for,  30,  34, 
35 ;  attitude  of  Common  Law  toward, 
54;  punishment  for,  56;  elements  in, 
57 

Seminaries,  establishment  of,  for  girls,  40 

Senate  (Iowa),  equal  suffrage  endorsed 
by  committee  of,  190;  women  not  eli- 
gible to,  223,  235,  236  (see  also  Gen- 
eral Assembly  and  various  General  As- 
semblies ) 

Senate  (United  States),  attitude  of,  to- 
ward equal  suffrage,  167-170;  vote  in, 
on  equal  suffrage,  169,  170;  rejection 
of  equal  suffrage  amendment  by,  170; 
women  eligible  to  seats  in,  240 

Senators,  number  of,  from  equal  suffrage 
States,  166 

Seneca  Falls  (New  York),  convention  at, 
161,  162 

Settlement,  right  of  women  to  acquire,  24, 
25,  26 

Seventeenth  General  Assembly,  equal  suf- 
frage amendment  rejected  by,  188 

Sewing,  right  of  wife  earning  money  by, 
to  sue  for  injuries,  33 

Sex,  crimes  involving  differences  in,  53 ; 
attempt  to  include,  in  fifteenth  amend- 
ment, 166 

Sex  crimes,  punishment  for,  54,  55 

Shaw,  Anna  Howard,  work  of,  207 


296 


INDEX 


Shepard,  Anna  A.,  degree  granted  to,  48 

Sherman,  Buren  R.,  refusal  of,  to  sup- 
port equal  suffrage,  189 

Shiras,   Oliver  P.,   decision  by,  32 

Shirt  stud,  responsibility  of  wife  for  price 
of,  135 

Single  women,  status  of,  under  Common 
Law,  3,  4;  status  of,  under  laws  of 
Michigan  Territory,  19 

Sinnott,  Nicholas  J.f  equal  suffrage  sup- 
ported by,  170 

Sioux  City  Political  Equality  Club,  organ- 
ization of,  192;  program  of,  207 

Sixteenth  General  Assembly,  action  of,  on 
equal  suffrage  amendment,  187,  188 

Sixteenth  amendment,  introduction  of,  167 

Slander,  right  of  wife  to  sue  for,  30,  31 

Slavery,  interest  of  women  in  abolition  of, 
161 

Slaves,   disfranchisement  of,   203 

Social  conditions,  divorce  rate  affected  by, 
75 

Social  problems,  interest  in,  212,  213 

South  Carolina,   divorce  rate  in,   75,   254 

South  Dakota,  school  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164;  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  166 

Spencer,  Mary  E.,  election  of,  as  clerk, 
223 

Springer,  Arthur,   statement  by,   266 

Springer,  Francis,  equal  suffrage  sup- 
ported by,  266 

Standing,  girls  under  sixteen  not  to  be 
employed  in  occupation  requiring,  148 

Stanton,  Mrs.  Elizabeth  Cady,  exclusion 
of,  from  London  conference,  161;  con- 
vention called  by,  162 ;  suffrage  work 
of,  268 

State  government,  proposed  change  in, 
205 

State  librarian,  women  appointed  to  of- 
fice of,  223,  224 

State  officers,  women  denied  right  to  vote 
for,  221;  first  woman  among,  224 

State  Teachers'  Association,  women  presi- 
dents of,  43,  44;  resolution  that  wom- 
en be  given  school  suffrage  tabled  by, 
175 

State  University  of  Iowa,  status  of  wom- 
en in,  40,  41;  medical  department  of, 
47:  women  in  law  school  of,  51;  wom- 
an on  committee  to  examine  law  class 


of,  225;  chancellor  of  law  college  of, 
245 

States,  growth  of  equal  suffrage  in,  162- 
166 

Stenographers,  149 ;  women  employed  as, 
223 

Stevens,  Mrs.  Rowena,  272 

Stillmunkes,  P.,  explanation  of  vote  by, 
204 

Stone,  Mrs.  Lucy,  call  for  convention 
signed  by,  162;  work  of,  268;  speech 
by,  269 

Stone,  William  M.,  woman  secretary  em- 
ployed by,  223 

Stores,  women  employees  in,  145;  seats 
required  for  female  employees  in,  148; 
condition  of  women  employees  in,  150, 
151 ;  inspection  of,  226 

Stowe,  Emilie,   speech  by,   209,   210 

Strawberry  Point,  address  at,   196 

Stupefying  drugs,  penalty  for  immoral 
use  of,  56 

Sudlow,  Phoebe  W.,  election  of,  as  presi- 
dent of  Teachers'  Association,  43 

Suffrage,  extension  of,  to  negroes,  162, 
163 ;  growth  of,  after  Civil  War,  162- 
170;  forms  of,  163;  discussion  of,  207 
(see  also  Equal  suffrage) 

Suffrage   clubs,    organization   of,    192 

Suffrage  societies,  organization  of,  207 

Suits,  right  of  women  to  prosecute  and 
defend,  152 

Superintendent,  provision  for,  at  women's 
reformatory.  61;  girls  cared  for  by,  62 

Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1907, 
provision  of,  concerning  women's  prop- 
erty rights,  142,  143 

Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa,  1913, 
provision  of,  concerning  registration, 
217 

Support,  responsibility  of  husband  for 
wife's,  9,  31,  66,  153;  right  of  wife  to 
sue  for  loss  of,  36-38;  right  of  wife  to, 
129-133 

Supreme  Court  of  Iowa,  admission  of 
women  to  practice  in,  50,  51;  right  of 
women  to  vote  on  municipal  court  up- 
held bv,  208 

Swain,  Mrs.  A.  M.,  nomination  of,  235 

Swisshelm,  Mrs.  J.  G.,  lecture  on  suffrage 
bv,  180 


INDEX 


297 


Tax  levy,  right  of  women  to  vote  on  in- 
crease of,  202,  221 

Tax  suffrage,   163 

Taxation,  91,  177;  association  of,  with 
representation,  187;  proposal  to  exempt 
women  from,  188 

Taxes,  dower  alienated  by  sale  of  land 
for,  113;  women  to  vote  on  increase 
of,  202 

Taylor,  E.  B.,  minority  report  on  equal 
suffrage  signed  by,  168 

Taylor,  Mrs.  Lucy  B.,  49 

Teachers,  women  employed  as,  42-44,  52, 
145,  146,  152;  wages  of,  42,  43,  248 

Teaching,  status  of  women  in,  42-44 

Telegraph  operators,  hours  of  work  of, 
149 

Telephone  exchanges,  employment  of  wom- 
en in,  145;  inspection  of,  226 

Telephone  operators,  hours  of  work  of, 
149;  report  concerning  condition  of 
women  employed  as,  150,  151 

Temperance  convention,  State,  equal  suf- 
frage favored  by,  188 

Testimony,  limitations  on,  11;  right  of 
women  to  give,  26-29,  154 

Texas,  primary  suffrage  adopted  by,   165 

Thirteenth  Amendment,   interest  in,   200 

Thirteenth  General  Assembly,  equal  suf- 
frage amendment  adopted  by,  179 

Thirtieth  General  Assembly,  action  of,  on 
equal  suffrage,  213 

Thirty-first  General  Assembly,  action  of, 
on  equal  suffrage,  214 

Thirty-second  General  Assembly,  action 
of,  on  equal  suffrage,  214 

Thirty-third  General  Assembly,  action  of, 
on  equal  suffrage,  214 

Thirty-fourth  General  Assembly,  action 
of,  on  equal  suffrage,  214,  215 

Thirty-fifth  General  Assembly,  action  of, 
on  equal  suffrage,  215,  216 

Thirty-sixth  General  Assembly,  action  of, 
on  equal  suffrage,  217 

Thirty-seventh  General  Assembly,  action 
of,  on  equal  suffrage,  220,  221 

Tilton,   Theodore,   183 

Timber  culture,  right  of  entryman  under, 
113 

Todd,  Miss  E.  M.,  service  of,  as  superin- 
tendent of  schools,  43 


Torts,   responsibility  for   those   committed 

by  women,   9,    10,   31,   32,   58;   actions 

for  damages  for,    31,   32 
Township  officers,  women  denied  right  to 

vote  for,  221 
Trade,    number    of    women    employed    in, 

146 
Trained    nurses,     number    of,    49,     263 ; 

women  as,   145 ;  hours  of  work  of,  149 
Traitor,    forfeiture   of   dower   of   wife   of, 

244,   245 

Tramp,   definition  of,   63 
Tramps,  lack  of  women,   196 
Transportation,    number    of    women    em- 
ployed in,   146 
Treason,    punishment    of    married    women 

for,  10;  murder  of  husband  considered 

as,   54 
Trout,    Mrs,    Grace    Wilbur,    address    by, 

215,  216 
Trustee,    contract   of   wife   through,    107, 

116,    117 
Truth,     Sojourner,     opinion    of    women's 

rights  expressed  by,   162 
Twelfth     General     Assembly,      resolution 

looking    toward    equal    suffrage    intro- 
duced  in,    178 

Twentieth    General    Assembly,    equal    suf- 
frage amendment  defeated  by,  189,  190 
Twenty-first  General  Assembly,   action  of, 

on  equal  suffrage  amendment,   194 
Twenty-second    General    Assembly,    action 

of,  on  equal  suffrage,   197 
Twenty-third  General  Assembly,  action  of, 

on  equal  suffrage,   199 
Twenty-fourth    General    Assembly,    action 

of,   on  equal  suffrage,   201 
Twenty-fifth  General  Assembly,  action  of, 

on    equal    suffrage,    202,    204;    petition 

to,   202,   203,   204 
Twenty-sixth  General  Assembly,  action  of, 

on  equal  suffrage,   205 
Twenty-seventh   General  Assembly,   action 

of,    on   equal   suffrage,    209,   210,    211, 

212 
Twenty-eighth    General    Assembly,    action 

of,  on  equal  suffrage,  212 
Twenty-ninth    General    Assembly,     action 

of,  on  equal  suffrage,  212 

Unchastity,  false  assertion  of,  a  cause  for 
divorce,   67,   68 


298 


INDEX 


United  States,  illiteracy  in,  42;  review  of 
equal  suffrage  in,  159-170 

United  States  Constitution,  sex  not  men- 
tioned in,  237 

United  States  Supreme  Court,  women  ad- 
mitted to  practice  in,  250 

Universal  suffrage,  proposed  restrictions 
on,  177 

Urick,  A.  L.,  equal  suffrage  supported  by, 
215 

Utah,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  164; 
divorces  in,  254 

Vagrants,  bonds  to  be  required  of,   129 

Van  Hyning,  Mrs.  Lydia,  election  of,  on 
school  board,  234 

Vermont,  school  suffrage  adopted  by, 
164;  women  tax  payers  to  vote  in,  265 

Vice  President,  number  of  women  en- 
titled to  vote  for,  166 

Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Woman,  A, 
160 

Virginia,  divorces  in,  254 

Vocational  Education,  State  Board  of, 
woman  to  serve  on,  227 

Vote,  demand  for,  162;  right  of  women 
to,  221 

Voting,  residence  requirement  for,  25,  26 

Wage  earners,  number  of  women,  145- 
147 

Wages,  relative  status  of  women  in  re- 
spect to,  42,  43 ;  right  of  married  wom- 
en to,  91,  154;  amount  of,  150 

Wallace,  Henry,  equal  suffrage  supported 
by,  215 

Warren,  Mercy  Otis,  rights  of  women 
urged  by,  160 

Warren  County,  election  contest  in,  229, 
230 

Washington  (D.  0.),  suffrage  meeting  at, 
193 

Washington,  equal  suffrage  in,  164,  265 

Weaver,  James  B.,  address  by,  192 

Webster  City,  suffrage  convention  at,  201, 
202 

Welch,  Mrs.  Mary  B.,  suffrage  activities 
of,  191 

West,  equal  suffrage  in,   164,  212,  213 

West  Point,   seminary  at,   22 

West  Virginia,  labor  laws  in,  264 


"White",  striking  of,  from  constitution, 
179 

Whitfield,  Isabel  G.,  degree  granted  to,  48 

Widow,  right  of,  to  support,  99,  103 ; 
exclusion  of,  from  heirs,  103 ;  position 
of,  as  head  of  the  family,  125,  126; 
right  of,  to  homestead,  125-127;  right 
of,  to  act  as  husband's  administrator, 
127,  128;  right  of,  to  exempt  personal 
property,  257 

Widower,  position  of,  as  head  of  the  fam- 
ily, 125,  126 

Wife,  prohibition  of  contracts  by,  4 ;  right 
of  husband  to  services  of,  8 ;  right  of 
husband  to  collect  for  injuries  to,  8,  9 ; 
right  of,  to  support,  9,  31,  66,  129- 
133,  143,  153,  253;  husband's  author- 
ity over  person  of,  10,  11;  immunity 
of,  for  certain  crimes,  10,  58,  154; 
status  of,  in  divorce,  21,  65,  67,  73, 
74,  78,  79,  80,  154,  254;  testimony  of, 
27-29,  58;  right  of,  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  personal  injuries,  29-34;  right 
of,  to  damages  for  indirect  injuries, 
35-38;  criminal  cases  involving,  53; 
murder  of,  54;  duty  of,  to  obey,  58, 
66;  right  of,  to  alimony,  68-73;  right 
of,  to  property,  68,  69,  70,  71,  72,  87, 
91,  138;  right  of,  to  children,  in  case 
of  divorce,  73,  74;  dower  right  of,  94- 
105;  right  of,  as  heir,  104,  259;  alien- 
ation of  dower  right  of,  105-114;  right 
of,  to  share  in  property  of  husband  she 
had  murdered,  113;  personal  property 
not  under  control  of,  114;  right  of,  to 
make  contracts,  114-125,  258,  260; 
contract  of,  with  husband,  122,  123 ; 
right  of,  to  sue  husband,  123,  142; 
homestead  rights  of,  125-127,  261; 
lack  of  responsibility  of,  for  care  of 
insane  husband,  135,  262;  responsi- 
bility of,  for  family  expenses,  133,  134, 
135,  136 ;  liability  of  husband  for  debts 
of,  136,  137;  responsibility  of,  for 
husband's  debts,  139,  140;  notice  of 
ownership  to  be  filed  by,  141;  right  of, 
to  payment  for  care  of  husband's 
mother,  142;  obligation  of,  to  live 
Mrhere  husband  chooses,  143 ;  share  of, 
in  family  property,  144;  personal 
property  of  family  not  controlled  by, 


INDEX 


299 


153 ;  right  of,  to  chastise  husband,  244 
(see  also  Married  women) 

Will,  effect  of,  on  dower,  95,  99,  100, 
101,  102,  103,  104,  105 

Wilson,  Mrs.  D.  S.,  election  of,  as  presi- 
dent of  suffrage  association,  184 

Wilson,  James  F.,  vote  of,  on  equal  suf- 
frage, 265 

Wilson,  Mrs.  Lou  M.,  service  of,  as  su- 
perintendent of  schools,  43 

Wilson,  William  G.,  resolution  introduced 
by,  178 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  equal  suffrage  favored 
by,  170 

Wisconsin,  repeal  of  laws  of,  22;  school 
suffrage  adopted  by,  164 

Wisconsin,  Territory  of,  inclusion  of  Iowa 
in,  21;  law  of,  concerning  dower  and 
curtesy,  94 

Wisconsin  University,  purpose  of,   22 

Witness,  need  of,  in  addition  to  com- 
plainant, 55,  56 

Wittenmyer,  Mrs.  Annie,  appointment  of, 
223 

Wollstonecraft,  Mary,  book  by,   160 

Woman,  enticing  of,  to  a  house  of  ill- 
fame,  56 

Woman  attendant,  requirement  of,  61 

Woman  factory  inspector,  provision  for, 
150;  report  of,  150,  151 

Woman  suffrage,  committees  on,  167  (see 
also  Equal  suffrage) 

Woman  Suffrage,  Men's  League  for,  or- 
ganization of,  215 

Woman's  Christian  Temperance  Union, 
petition  of,  59 

Woman's  Standard,  The,  establishment  of, 
194;  attitude  of  newspapers  toward, 
194,  195;  speeches  reported  in,  209, 
210,  211,  212 

Women,  civil  rights  of,  in  Iowa,  1-151; 
disregard  of,  in  early  laws,  14,  15 ; 
status  of,  in  Iowa  country  before  1836, 
14-22;  effect  of  Common  Law  on  stat- 
us of,  16,  17,  18;  legislation  concern- 
ing, 21;  personal  rights  of,  23-38; 
legal  name  of,  26;  status  of,  as  citi- 
zens, 26;  right  of,  to  testify,  26-29; 
right  of,  to  recover  for  personal  inju- 
ries, 29-35 ;  right  of,  to  damages  for 
indirect  injuries,  35-38;  status  of,  in 


education,  39-44;  pay  of,  as  teachers, 
42,  43 ;  status  of,  in  the  professions, 
45-52 ;  opposition  to  practice  of  medi- 
cine by,  46,  47;  admission  of,  to  med- 
ical college,  47;  number  of,  serving  as 
physicians,  48,  49;  status  of,  in  law, 
50,  51;  number  of,  in  various  occupa- 
tions, 52;  status  of,  under  criminal 
law,  53-63,  154;  treatment  of,  when 
accused  of  crimes,  58-63;  treatment  of, 
after  conviction,  59-63 ;  building  for, 
at  Anamosa,  60 ;  rules  concerning  mar- 
riage of,  64,  65 ;  status  of,  in  divorce, 
65-81;  right  of,  to  guardianship  of 
children,  82-85;  status  of,  as  to  prop- 
erty, 86-143,  152,  153 ;  right  of,  to 
make  contracts,  114-125 ;  administra- 
tion of  estates  by,  127,  128;  status  of, 
in  industry,  144-151;  protection  of,  in 
industry,  147-151;  increase  of,  in  in- 
dustry, 148;  exclusion  of,  from  mines, 
148 ;  seats  required  for,  in  stores,  148 ; 
employment  of,  in  mulct  saloons  pro- 
hibited, 148;  hours  of  work  of,  149, 
150;  recapitulation  of  legal  status  of, 
152-155;  number  of,  in  gainful  occu- 
pations, 154;  political  rights  of,  159- 
240,  245 ;  influence  of,  in  political  af- 
fairs, 166;  share  of,  in  World  War, 
170;  admission  of,  to  floor  of  Iowa 
House  of  Representatives,  172,  173 ; 
exclusion  of,  from  franchise,  173,  174, 
175;  resolution  to  enfranchise,  178; 
proposal  to  exempt  from  taxation,  188; 
right  of,  to  franchise,  190;  educa- 
tion of,  in  public  affairs,  192 ;  aid  of, 
asked  by  Republicans,  204 ;  study  clubs 
organized  by,  212;  independence  of, 
213;  participation  of,  in  drainage 
elections,  217;  attempt  to  submit 
amendment  to,  221;  protection  of,  in 
industry,  226 ;  school  offices  opened  to, 
230;  reason  for  attitude  of  Common 
Law  toward  punishment  of,  244;  re- 
fusal to  insure,  against  accidents,  247 ; 
responsibility  of,  for  keeping  disorderly 
houses,  251 

Women  county  recorders,  number  of,  233 
Women    county    superintendents,    number 

of,   232 
Women  offenders,   treatment  of,   53-63 


300 


INDEX 


Women  wage  earners,  number  of,  145- 
147 

Women's  Reformatory,  The,  61  (see  also 
Iowa  Industrial  Reformatory  for  Fe- 
males) 

"Women's  rights",  demand  for,   172,  238 

"Women's  rights  and  children's  follies", 
prohibition  petition  referred  to  com- 
mittee on,  174 

Woodhull,  Mrs.  Victoria  0.,  repudiation 
of  doctrines  of,  183 

Woods,  Roma,  suffrage  activities  of,   191 


Worcester      (Massachusetts),      convention 

held  at,   162 

Work,  Mrs.  Mary  A.,  election  of,  as  sub- 
director,  234,  235 
World  War,   effect  of,   on   equal  suffrage, 

170 

Wright,  Mrs.  D.  S.,  speech  by,  209 
Wright,  Martha,  convention  called  by,  162 
Wyoming,  equal  suffrage  adopted  by,  163, 
164,    238,    270;    success   of   equal   suf- 
frage in,   198,   199 


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